Scores
Note . Means are based on the participants who had data at all time periods ( n s = .31 for questionnaires and n s = 28 for the prosocial moral interview). No T9 questionnaire scores were used because either the score was missing or rated on a scale that differed from other assessments.
Self-reported helping was assessed five times (from T7 to T12, omitting T9). In the repeated measures 2 (sex) ×5 (assessment) MANOVA, the cubic trend was significant, F ’s(1, 29) = 6.70, p <.02. Self-reported helping increased with age from T7 to T8, and then dropped somewhat and stabilized at T10 and T11, and increased somewhat again at T12, albeit not to the T8 level ( M s = 3.10, 3.23, 3.02, 3.01, and 3.17). The main effect of sex was not significant. 2
Because the same measures of sympathy, perspective taking, and personal distress were available at T7–T12, we examined the changes in these variables from age 15–16 to age 25–26. The IRI scales for these two variables were rated on 5-point scales at all times except T9 (when a 7-point scale was used). The findings were similar when adjusted T9 measures were used in the analyses or not; thus, analyses without T9 data are reported (and the polynomial for the trend analysis reflected the 4-year gap between T8 and T10).
For the five assessments of sympathy from T7 to T12 (omitting T9), only the main effect of sex was significant, F (1, 28) = 23.24, p <.01 ( M s for women and men were 4.37 and 3.62, respectively). The lack of a linear or quadratic trend for sympathy was because of multiple changes in the level of sympathy over time ( M s = 3.94, 3.98, 3.87, 4.06, and 3.99).
In a similar repeated measures MANOVA for the five assessments of perspective taking between T7 and T12, the linear trend for time was significant, F (1, 28) = 14.18, p <.01. Perspective taking generally increased with age from late adolescence into early adulthood ( M s at T7, T8, T10, T11, and T12 = 3.39, 3.33, 3.62, 3.69, and 3.74). In addition, women ( M = 3.77) scored marginally higher than men ( M = 3.37) on PT, F (1, 28) = 3.95, p <.06. In contrast, a negative linear trend was found for personal distress when assessed at T7, T8, T10, T11, and T12 ( M s = 2.57, 2.35, 2.28, 2.25, and 2.15), F (1, 19) = 6.22, p <.019.
To examine age changes in moral reasoning as assessed in interviews from adolescence into adulthood, similar repeated measures Time × Sex multivariate and univariate trend analyses were computed. If the moral judgment interview data from T9 had been used, only 24 individuals could have been included in the analyses because four different people were not interviewed at T9 and at T10 (for a total of eight missing subjects). However, 28 people could be included in analyses if data from only T7 (age 15–16), T8 (age 17–18), T10 (age 21–22), and T12 (age 25–26) were used in the analyses (recall that there was no interview at T11). Analyses of the changes in reasoning across childhood (up until T8) can be found in Eisenberg et al. (1991 , 1995 ).
Repeated measures MANOVAs were computed for two types of data: (a) the five levels of moral reasoning and (b) the composites scores. Composite scores and those for levels 1 and 5 were skewed and were transformed for analyses. Because transforming these data had no effect on the pattern of results, data from the MANOVA using the untransformed data are reported for ease of interpretation.
In the analysis of the T7, T8, T10, and T12 levels of moral reasoning (in which the spacing of years was taken into consideration in the polynomial specification), the multivariate F ’s were significant or marginally significant for the linear and cubic effects of time and for sex and the Sex × Linear interaction, F (5, 22) = 12.58, 3.70, 5.11, and 2.56, p s<.01, 02, .01, and .06. Hedonistic reasoning (Level 1) did not change with age (although there were slight ups and downs in mean levels over time; see Table 1 ), nor did Level 5 reasoning. 3 In contrast, both the linear and cubic trends were significant for Levels 2 and 4. Level 2 (rudimentary needs-oriented) reasoning was level from 15–16 to 17–18 years, decreased sharply with age from age 17–18 to 21–22 years, and then leveled off (proportions of Level 2 reasoning at T7, T8, T10, and T12 = .43, .43, .24, and .23), whereas Level 4 (self-reflective, empathic orientation) reasoning increased with age from T7 to T10—with a sharp rise at age 17–18 to 21–22 years—and then dropped by a modest amount at T12 ( M s = .19, .15, .31, and .27, respectively); F s(1, 26) for the linear trends at Levels 2 and 4 = 43.29 and 18.64, p s<.01, and F s(1, 26) for the cubic trends 7.98 and 19.05, p s<.01, respectively. However, the strength of the linear trend for Level 4 varied with sex, F (1, 26) = 7.38, p <.02, and the linear trend was significant only for females ( M s = .20, .15, .40, and .35) and not males ( M s = .19, .15, .23, and .21), F s(1, 26) = 23.09 and 1.38, p s<.01 and NS . In addition, Level 3 reasoning increased linearly with age, F (1, 26) = 5.42, p <.03 ( M s = .15, 17, 21, 23).
With regard to sex differences, across the four assessments, females, compared with males, scored lower on proportion of Level 1 (self-focused orientation) reasoning ( M s for males and females were .08 and .21, respectively) and marginally higher on Level 4 (self-reflective, empathic orientation) reasoning ( M s = .26 and .19), F s(1, 26) = 16.64 and 3.32, p s<.01 and .08.
In an additional analysis, we covaried scores on perspective taking when looking at the age trends in prosocial moral reasoning. Only the linear age trend for stereotypic reasoning was reduced to non-significance.
In the repeated measures 2 (sex) × 4 (time) MANOVA for composite proportion scores, there were significant effects for sex and the linear and cubic trends, F s(1, 26) = 8.19, 19.73, and 11.73, p ’s<.01. Females ( M = 2.86) scored higher than males ( M = 2.57). The linear increase in overall prosocial moral reasoning was strong; the somewhat weaker (but substantial) cubic trend indicated that prosocial moral reasoning scores were fairly stable in mid-adolescence, increased from T8 (age 17–18 years) to T10 (age 21–22 years), and then stabilized (and declined very slightly) at T12 (age 25–26 years) ( M s = 2.54, 2.49, 2.92, 2.87).
In the present study, we examined age-related changes in prosocial functioning from mid-adolescence (age 15–16) to early adulthood (age 25–26). We found an interesting pattern: some aspects of prosocial functioning increased in maturity from adolescence into adulthood, whereas others did not. Sympathy did not show a specific pattern of change with age, whereas personal distress decreased with age. Thus, the tendency to experience sympathy may not increase in a systematic manner after mid-adolescence (and the pattern of change in adolescence is not highly consistent; Davis & Franzoi, 1991 ; Karniol, et al., 1998 ; Olweus & Endresen, 1998 ). In addition, although self-reported helping increased from early adolescence into adulthood (see Footnote 2), it had a cubic trend from age 15–16 years into the 20s. Helping increased from age 15–16 to age 17–18 years, dropped off in the early 20s, and increased again at age 25–26 years. These findings are consistent with the lack of a consistent increase in instrumental helping from childhood to adolescence ( Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998 ); indeed, there was a decline in helping in late adolescence into the early 20s (followed by an increase in adulthood). Thus, although individual differences in both helping and sympathy were quite consistent over time ( Eisenberg et al., 2002 ), neither increased systematically with age from mid-adolescence to adulthood.
Why did helping and sympathy not increase with age? The types of helping behavior assessed in this study (or in most studies) generally did not require sophisticated perspective taking; similarly, the measure of sympathy probably assessed the tendency to experience sympathy rather than the ability to sympathize in developmentally sophisticated ways (i.e., in ways that require high-level perspective taking). Thus, age-related changes in perspective taking may have been relatively unlikely to influence either participants’ helping or sympathy. It is also possible that the sociocognitive skills underlying sympathy are fairly developed by mid-adolescence: Hoffman’s (2000) highest level of empathy is achieved by late childhood or early adolescence. After that age, individual difference in sympathy may have more to do with emotional characteristics such as the susceptibility to feel others’ emotions (i.e., empathize) and experiencing concern for another than with an understanding of others’ emotions or state. Thus, in adolescence, dispositional differences in characteristics such as emotionality and the ability to modulate empathic emotion so that it does overwhelm the individual (and turn into personal distress; Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, Karbon, Maszk, Smith, O’Boyle, & Suh, 1994 ) may be more predictive of sympathy than age. Moreover, the contributions of factors such as parental socialization to prosocial behavior and sympathy ( Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998 ) may be evident primarily at younger ages or may be constant over time, such that they contribute to individual differences in adolescents’ and adults’ prosocial tendencies, but not to systematic age-related change in these capacities.
The aspects of functioning that most obviously involved social cognition (perspective taking and moral reasoning) increased with age. Specifically, perspective taking increased from adolescence into the 20s. Moreover, we found a linear increase in overall (composite) prosocial moral reasoning and Level 4 (self-reflective, empathic) reasoning, as well as a decline in rudimentary needs-oriented moral reasoning from adolescence into early adulthood. The pattern of results for prosocial moral reasoning is somewhat consistent with that for perspective taking, which is believed to foster higher level moral reasoning ( Colby & Kohlberg, 1987 ; Eisenberg, 1986 ). Indeed, it is possible that changes in perspective-taking abilities contribute to changes in prosocial moral reasoning; higher level moral reasoning is viewed as based on social perspective-taking skills ( Colby et al., 1983 ). Moreover, Eisenberg et al. (2001) found that the measure of perspective taking used in this study was linked to moral reasoning and helping (the latter through sympathy) in early adolescence. However, our analyses demonstrated that the index of perspective taking in this study did not account to a substantial degree for the changes in overall prosocial moral reasoning or in Level 2 (needs-oriented) or 4 (self-reflective, empathic) reasoning. Unfortunately, we did not have a measure of perspective taking that tapped sophisticated sociocognitive skills (rather than the propensity to take another’s perspective), so we could not determine whether change in the ability (rather than tendency) to perspective taking could account for the age-related changes in prosocial moral reasoning that were found.
In addition to linear trends, there were cubic trends for the composite moral reasoning score and for Level 2 (needs-oriented) and 4 (self-reflective, empathic) prosocial moral reasoning. In general, these types of reasoning changed relatively little from age 15–16 to 17–18 years, exhibited more dramatic change from17–18 to 21–22 years, and leveled off from age 21–22 to age 25–26 years. For example, the overall interview prosocial moral judgment was fairly stable in mid-adolescence, increased from age 17–18 to age 21–22 years, and was fairly stable from age 21–22 to 25–25 years. Further, Level 3 reasoning (related to stereotypic and approval-oriented concerns) increased with age, although at a relatively slow pace.
Thus, it appeared that there was considerable change in some aspects of prosocial moral reasoning from late adolescence into the early 20s, with little change from the early 20s to the mid-20s. Indeed, in auxiliary analyses of age trends in moral reasoning from T10 (age 21–22 years) to T12 (age 25–26 years), there were no significant age trends, nor was there an increase in perspective taking from T10 to T12 (although the quadratic tend was marginally significant, p <.055). As adults move out of higher education into family and work roles, their level of perspective taking, as well as their prosocial moral judgment, may no longer develop at the same rate, if at all. In addition, it is likely that changes in the structure of young adults’ lives and roles have an influence on the types of prosocial moral reasoning used by adults, even if they are capable of verbalizing higher level moral judgment. Rest (1979) and Eisenberg (1986) have argued that people often use levels of moral reasoning lower than are characteristic of their moral competence; Eisenberg (1986) further suggested that goals, needs, and values at a given moment affect an individual’s level of moral judgment. Moreover, the range of a person’s moral reasoning is more likely to be evident if it is coded with a system (such as in this study) that does not minimize the content of reasoning or focus primarily on the highest level of reasoning expressed with any frequency (e.g., through various coding rules used by Kohlberg; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987 ; see Eisenberg, 1986 ). Perhaps, the roles that young adults encounter in the mid-20s do not “pull” for the higher level reasoning of which they are capable. It will be important to chart further changes in prosocial moral reasoning as individuals move further from college and establish themselves to a greater degree in their families and work environments, and to link these with changes in adults’ everyday concerns.
In contrast to sympathy, personal distress decreased with age from adolescence into adulthood. Feelings of personal distress likely occur when an individual is empathically overaroused and cannot modulate his or her empathic affect ( Eisenberg et al., 1994 ; Eisenberg,Wentzel, &Harris, 1998 ; Hoffman, 1982 ). Because regulation seems to continue to develop in adolescence and adulthood ( Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999 ), people may become less vulnerable with personal distress as they move through adolescence into adulthood. Because personal distress is aversive, it is likely that the measure of this construct tapped the ability to regulate empathic overarousal rather than the mere tendency to experience it. Thus, perhaps even more than sympathy, personal distress is dependent on age-related changes in regulatory skills. Consistent with this view, the relations of regulation to personal distress are somewhat more consistent than analogous relations with sympathy ( Eisenberg et al., 1998 ).
As already noted, stereotypic/approval-oriented reasoning increased with age. In prior analyses of the frequency (rather than proportion) of reasoning, stereotypic reasoning increased from childhood until age 15–16 years and then declined somewhat by age 19–20 years; approval reasoning increased with age from childhood to mid-adolescence ( Eisenberg et al., 1995 ). Such reasoning was expected to stabilize or decline from adolescence into adulthood; however, given that prosocial behavior is viewed as a marker of adulthood ( Arnett, 2003 ), some people may increasingly be oriented to acting in prosocial ways because it is viewed by society (and valued others) as mature and desirable. Indeed, the types of reasoning in our Level 3 are very common in adults’ justice-oriented moral reasoning ( Colby et al., 1983 ).
It was surprising that Level 5, strongly internalized reasoning, did not increase with age. Such reasoning did increase from early adolescence into adolescence and adulthood (see Footnote 3), but it was still verbalized infrequently (about 10–12% of the time) in early adulthood. Level 5 types of reasoning generally involved relatively abstract notions (e.g., generalized reciprocity) and reference to living up to one’s own values or self-image. It is quite possible that such prosocial reasoning never becomes very frequent, so age trends are difficult to detect.
Women, in comparison with men, scored higher in prosocial moral judgment (and were especially low in hedonistic reasoning), were higher in sympathy, and were marginally higher in perspective taking. Women and men did not differ in the measure of self-reported helping, which included numerous items of instrumental helping (giving directions to a stranger, carrying a stranger’s belongings, offering a seat to a stranger on a bus), as well as sharing or giving to charity. Thus, the moral reasoning data provide some support for the notion that women attend more to others’ needs and less to their own wants than do men ( Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988 ). This finding is consistent with a growing body of work in which females score higher on care-related moral reasoning (see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000 ) and with the sex difference favoring females in prosocial behavior and in some measures of empathy/sympathy in childhood and adolescence ( Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998 ), if not for instrumental behaviors in adulthood ( Eagly & Crowley, 1986 ). Because of sex differences in socialization and social roles, it is likely that females learn to focus more than males on others’ internal states and needs in their thinking about moral issues. For example, parents discuss some emotions more with girls than boys ( Dunn, Bretherton,&Munn, 1987 ; Kuebli, Butler,&Fivush, 1995 ) and may encourage girls more than boys to be prosocial ( Power & Parke, 1986 ; Power & Shanks, 1989 ). Few sex differences in moral reasoning were found until early adolescence in this sample, and Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) found that the gender difference in empathy/sympathy increased across childhood to adolescence. Thus, the pattern of findings suggests that gender differences in prosocial tendencies may increase in adolescence, perhaps because of an increased emphasis on gender-related norms and expectations as many youth begin intimate relationships and start to adopt or internalize stereotypic gender-related adult roles.
The linear trend reflecting an increase in other-oriented, self-reflective (Level 4) reasoning in early adulthood was significant for women but not for men. Adult roles and relationships may stimulate other-oriented modes of reasoning such as role-taking, sympathetic, and positive affect/consequences reasoning, and the impact of these relational experiences may be greater for women than men. Involvement in mature intimate relationships in late adolescence and early adulthood may promote the development or use of self-reflective, other-oriented reasoning more for women, more because of the role of prosocial responding in the expressive, feminine role (e.g., Spence & Helmreich, 1978 ).Whatever the reason, our findings suggest that women in their teens and early 20s are more caring than men, although they may not always help more when instrumental skills or contact with strangers are required to assist ( Eagly & Crowley, 1986 ). It is likely that young women behave in more prosocial ways, especially when dealing with people whom they know and can sympathize with or when helping in nonthreatening contexts.
In summary, the findings in this study are consistent with the view that there are advances in a variety of aspects of prosocial functioning from adolescence into early adulthood, but that there is relatively little further development in the early to mid-20s. Further research is needed to assess the nature of further developmental change of prosocial functioning in early adulthood, and why it seems to stabilize in the 20s. In addition, we currently have little information on factors that contribute to the developmental changes in prosocial functioning that were noted in adolescence into early adulthood. Whereas increases in perspective-taking ability (or tendencies) during these years likely are an important factor, there are probably other cognitive and social factors that contribute to the age-related changes found in this sample.
A limitation of the current study is the use of self-report measures of prosocial tendencies. Although we had nonself-report indexes, none was used from adolescence into adulthood. However, many of the self-report measures that were used, individually or in composites, have been linked to actual prosocial behavior (as far back as preschool), as well as to mothers’ or friends’ reports of prosocial tendencies ( Eisenberg et al., 1991 , 1995 , 2002 ). Moreover, the measures of self-reported helping, sympathy, perspective taking, and personal distress were consistent across individuals over a decade or more, and the measure of moral reasoning was correlated across several years. Thus, our self-report measures appeared to have some validity. Another limitation in the study is that the sample was rather homogenous. Consequently, the results may not generalize to different socioeconomic or racial/ethnic groups. Finally, given the small sample size and the number of analyses, it is possible that some of the findings were because of chance. Thus, it will be important to replicate the findings, especially those that were not consistent with prior research or theory.
Patterns of Age-Related Change in the Major Prosocial responding Measures
Questionnaires | |
Helping | Cubic |
Sympathy | None |
Perspective taking | Linear I |
Personal distress | Lin D |
Moral judgment | |
Level 1 | None |
Level 2 | Linear D , cubic |
Level 3 | Linear I |
Level 4 | Linear I ; cubic , Sex × Linear |
Level 5 | None |
Composite score | Linear I , cubic |
Note . I = linear increase with age; d = linear decrease with age; cubic = cubic trend; none = no significant age trend. See Table 1 and/or text for means to interpret trends.
This research was supported by grants from the National Institutes of Mental Health and Research Scientist Development and Research Scientist Awards from the National Institute of Mental Health to Nancy Eisenberg. Ivanna Guthrie is now in the Department of Psychology at Loma Linda University; Bridget C. Murphy is now in the Department of Psychology at The University of Oklahoma; and Stephanie A. Shepard is at E. P. Bradley Hospital, Brown University School of Medicine. The authors thank the participants in the longitudinal samples who provided the data. Gratitude is also due to the Tempe schools for their earlier participation in this research and to individuals who helped with the early data collections (e.g., Gustavo Carlo, Paul Miller).
1 The primary coder for the moral reasoning protocols was the same person who had scored the data at all previous follow-ups; this procedure was used to prevent differences across different coders at different times being interpreted as age-related changes in reasoning. To determine whether there was any change in the primary coder’s scoring over the years (and to prevent the primary coder from knowing the age of the participants being coded), two protocols from each of the T4 to T9 follow-ups were mixed together with the various protocols from T10 or T12 and were re-scored by the primary coder to determine whether there was a change in her scoring over the years. Scores for data from earlier sessions at both T10 and T12 were highly similar to the original scores for the same data (agreement on codes within one point was 84% or higher on all categories; correlations were .80 and higher).
2 There was a strong linear trend when T6 (age 13–4) was included in the analysis. Helping ( M = 2.63 at T6) rose considerably from T6 to T8.
3 Level 5moral reasoning did increase in a linear manner with age when T6 was included in the analyses, F (1, 26) = 5.83, p <.03. Thus, there is evidence that this type of reasoning increases with age from early adolescence to early adulthood.
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Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."
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Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a theory that focuses on how children develop morality and moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory suggests that moral development occurs in a series of six stages and that moral logic is primarily focused on seeking and maintaining justice.
Here we discuss how Kohlberg developed his theory of moral development and the six stages he identified as part of this process. We also share some critiques of Kohlberg's theory, many of which suggest that it may be biased based on the limited demographics of the subjects studied.
At the end of this article, take a fast and free pop quiz to see how much you've learned about Kohlberg's theory.
Moral development is the process by which people develop the distinction between right and wrong (morality) and engage in reasoning between the two (moral reasoning).
How do people develop morality? This question has fascinated parents, religious leaders, and philosophers for ages, but moral development has also become a hot-button issue in psychology and education. Do parental or societal influences play a greater role in moral development? Do all kids develop morality in similar ways?
American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg developed one of the best-known theories exploring some of these basic questions. His work modified and expanded upon Jean Piaget's previous work but was more centered on explaining how children develop moral reasoning.
Kohlberg extended Piaget's theory, proposing that moral development is a continual process that occurs throughout the lifespan. Kohlberg's theory outlines six stages of moral development within three different levels.
In recent years, Kohlberg's theory has been criticized as being Western-centric with a bias toward men (he primarily used male research subjects) and for having a narrow worldview based on upper-middle-class value systems and perspectives.
Kohlberg based his theory on a series of moral dilemmas presented to his study subjects. Participants were also interviewed to determine the reasoning behind their judgments in each scenario.
One example was "Heinz Steals the Drug." In this scenario, a woman has cancer and her doctors believe only one drug might save her. This drug had been discovered by a local pharmacist and he was able to make it for $200 per dose and sell it for $2,000 per dose. The woman's husband, Heinz, could only raise $1,000 to buy the drug.
He tried to negotiate with the pharmacist for a lower price or to be extended credit to pay for it over time. But the pharmacist refused to sell it for any less or to accept partial payments. Rebuffed, Heinz instead broke into the pharmacy and stole the drug to save his wife. Kohlberg asked, "Should the husband have done that?"
Kohlberg was not interested so much in the answer to whether Heinz was wrong or right but in the reasoning for each participant's decision. He then classified their reasoning into the stages of his theory of moral development.
Kohlberg's theory is broken down into three primary levels. At each level of moral development, there are two stages. Similar to how Piaget believed that not all people reach the highest levels of cognitive development, Kohlberg believed not everyone progresses to the highest stages of moral development.
Preconventional Morality | 0 to 9 | Stage 1: Obedience and punishment Stage 2: Individualism and exchange |
Conventional Morality | Early adolescence to adulthood | Stage 3: Developing good interpersonal relationships Stage 4: Maintaining social order |
Postconventional Morality | Some adults; rare | Stage 5: Social contract and individual rights stage 6: Universal principles |
Preconventional morality is the earliest period of moral development. It lasts until around the age of 9. At this age, children's decisions are primarily shaped by the expectations of adults and the consequences of breaking the rules. There are two stages within this level:
The next period of moral development is marked by the acceptance of social rules regarding what is good and moral. During this time, adolescents and adults internalize the moral standards they have learned from their role models and from society.
This period also focuses on the acceptance of authority and conforming to the norms of the group. There are two stages at this level of morality:
At this level of moral development, people develop an understanding of abstract principles of morality. The two stages at this level are:
Kohlberg believed that only a relatively small percentage of people ever reach the post-conventional stages (around 10 to 15%). One analysis found that while stages one to four could be seen as universal in populations throughout the world, the fifth and sixth stages were extremely rare in all populations.
Understanding Kohlberg's theory of moral development is important in that it can help parents guide their children as they develop their moral character. Parents with younger children might work on rule obeyance, for instance, whereas they might teach older children about social expectations.
Teachers and other educators can also apply Kohlberg's theory in the classroom, providing additional moral guidance. A kindergarten teacher could help enhance moral development by setting clear rules for the classroom, and the consequences for violating them. This helps kids at stage one of moral development.
A teacher in high school might focus more on the development that occurs in stage three (developing good interpersonal relationships) and stage four (maintaining social order). This could be accomplished by having the students take part in setting the rules to be followed in the classroom, giving them a better idea of the reasoning behind these rules.
Kohlberg's theory played an important role in the development of moral psychology. While the theory has been highly influential, aspects of the theory have been critiqued for a number of reasons:
Gilligan instead suggested that Kohlberg's theory overemphasizes concepts such as justice and does not adequately address moral reasoning founded on the principles and ethics of caring and concern for others.
Kohlberg isn't the only psychologist to theorize how we develop morally. There are several other theories of moral development.
Kohlberg's theory is an expansion of Piaget's theory of moral development. Piaget described a three-stage process of moral development:
Kohlberg expanded on this theory to include more stages in the process. Additionally, Kohlberg believed that the final stage is rarely achieved by individuals whereas Piaget's stages of moral development are common to all.
Proposed by Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and Jesse Graham, the moral foundations theory is based on three morality principles:
While Kohlberg's theory is primarily focused on help vs. harm, moral foundations theory encompasses several more dimensions of morality. However, this theory also fails to explain the "rules" people use when determining what is best for society.
Several other theories exist that attempt to explain the development of morality , specifically in relation to social justice. Some fall into the category of transcendental institutionalist, which involves trying to create "perfect justice." Others are realization-focused, concentrating more on removing injustices.
One theory falling into the second category is social choice theory. Social choice theory is a collection of models that seek to explain how individuals can use their input (their preferences) to impact society as a whole. An example of this is voting, which allows the majority to decide what is "right" and "wrong."
See how much you've learned (or maybe already knew!) about Kohlberg's theory of moral development with this quick, free pop quiz.
While Kohlberg's theory of moral development has been criticized, the theory played an important role in the emergence of the field of moral psychology. Researchers continue to explore how moral reasoning develops and changes through life as well as the universality of these stages. Understanding these stages offers helpful insights into the ways that both children and adults make moral choices and how moral thinking may influence decisions and behaviors.
Lapsley D. Moral agency, identity and narrative in moral development . Hum Dev . 2010;53(2):87-97. doi:10.1159/000288210
Elorrieta-Grimalt M. A critical analysis of moral education according to Lawrence Kohlberg . Educación y Educadores . 2012;15(3):497-512. doi:10.5294/edu.2012.15.3.9
Govrin A. From ethics of care to psychology of care: Reconnecting ethics of care to contemporary moral psychology . Front Psychol . 2014;5:1135. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01135
American Psychological Association. Heinz dilemma .
American Psychological Association. Kohlberg's theory of moral development .
Kohlberg L, Essays On Moral Development . Harper & Row; 1985.
Ma HK. The moral development of the child: An integrated model . Front Public Health . 2013;1:57. doi:10.3389/fpubh.2013.00057
Gibbs J. Moral Development And Reality . 4th ed. Oxford University Press; 2019.
Gilligan C. In A Different Voice . Harvard University Press; 2016.
Patanella D. Piaget's theory of moral development . Encyclopedia of Child Behavior and Development . 2011. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-79061-9_2167
Dubas KM, Dubas SM, Mehta R. Theories of justice and moral behavior . J Legal Ethical Regulatory Issues . 2014;17(2):17-35.
By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."
IMAGES
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In general, this systematic review summarises the findings from various research studies and articles and provides a definite conclusion. First, moral sense is innate. Second, moral development is considerably strengthened through social interactions and exposure to constructive and interactive environmental factors.
Research on moral development in adulthood has shown that postconventional thinking emerges only during adulthood. The fact that a fearful child may become more anxious than a fearless child when disciplined best demonstrates how moral development can be impacted by
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The area of moral cognition has long been dominated by research on moral reasoning, or how one thinks about moral situations and dilemmas. This research emphasis began with seminal work on moral reasoning by Piaget and Kohlberg ( Kohlberg, 1984 ; Piaget, 1965 ), which dominated the field for a number of decades, with much of the research being ...
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In recent years there has been an upsurge in research and publication in the psychology of religion, including work with implications for adult development. This article reviews the relevant literature, considering themes such as religion and spirituality and well-being in the adult years; religion, prosocial, and antisocial behavior; and models of religious and spiritual development ...
This makes adult development an inherently moral project, and it makes the third decade of life a period of profound moral development. ... (as self-concept) implicates a moral point of view. Moreover, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to selfhood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more so ...
The role of age and education in adult moral reasoning was examined utilizing Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral development and the most recent Standard Scoring System for assessing moral judgments. Individual interviews utilizing standard Kohlberg moral dilemmas were conducted with 195 adults ranging in age from nineteen ...
Because the development of moral reasoning tapping justice-related issues continues in adulthood (Colby et al., 1983) and advances in logical and sociocognitive capabilities occur during late adolescence and early adulthood (Kuhn et al., 1988; Selman, 1980), there is reason to expect further normative developmental change in prosocial moral ...
Moral development has its roots early in life. ... Research has shown that morality emerges during the early ages of life and continues to expand and . ... 2.3 Moral Development during Adulthood .
Morality is an extremely broad and yet nuanced topic and field of development, with a multitude of factors that are thought to contribute to moral behavior. Although an exhaustive review is outside the scope of this chapter, the author examines the broad areas of moral cognition, moral emotion, moral identity, and prosocial behavior with a particular emphasis on how these aspects of morality ...
Moral development during emerging adulthood is a topic of recent but growing interest. Several different theories within the study of human development appear to converge on this point of inquiry ...
Research on Kohlberg's stages of moral development has shown that _____ _. China Emerging adults who live in __________ would emphasize becoming capable of supporting parents financially as among the most important criteria for becoming an adult.
From the age of responsibility to adult maturity, important changes are proposed in how the moral identity goal is represented and how it motivates moral action. By outlining these changes, the ...
Probabilistic conjoint measurement (Rasch analysis) was used to model the results. The detailed analysis of these pooled data confirms results reported in previous research about the ordered acquisition of moral stages and the relationship between moral stages and age, education, and sex. New findings include: (1) empirical evidence that ...
With development, however, children, adolescents, and adults from different cultures become diverse in their moral reasoning. The chapter ends with a discussion of three promising future research directions pertaining to coverage of the full life span, conceptualizing moral reasoning not only as intrapersonal but also interpersonal, and ...
MORAL IDENTITY IN ADULTHOOD . ii Abstract Past research on moral identity development mostly focused on adolescence and early adulthood. As a consequence, little is known about developmental changes in moral identity in the adult years. The purpose of the present study was to broaden the research done on moral identity by investigating the
Results have shown that: 1. moral judgment and behaviour are at least partially affected by the. type of situations and by interpersonal variables such as gender and. age; 2. moral reasoning ...
Stage 1 (Obedience and Punishment): The earliest stages of moral development, obedience and punishment are especially common in young children, but adults are also capable of expressing this type of reasoning.According to Kohlberg, people at this stage see rules as fixed and absolute. Obeying the rules is important because it is a way to avoid punishment.
Research on moral development in adulthood has shown that: 1) Postconventional thinking does not only emerge during adulthood. Postconventional thinking, which involves moral reasoning based on universal ethical principles, can develop at any point in life, not just during adulthood.