oxford students thesis

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• Graduate school
• Information for postgraduate research students
• Submitting your thesis

This section contains essential information and guidance for the preparation and submission of your thesis.

Preparation and Submission of your Thesis

IMPORTANT - When preparing your thesis please ensure that you have taken into account any copyright or sensitive content issues, and dealt with them appropriately. 

COVID-19  Additional academic support – Supporting Students to Submission

Additional academic support is available for postgraduate research students impacted by the pandemic. If your research has been disrupted by COVID-19, it will now be possible to have this taken into account in viva examinations.

Tips on planning your thesis

At an early stage you should:

• Prepare a detailed work plan for your research in consultation with your supervisor.
• Build some flexibility into your plan. It is difficult to give general advice about the allocation of time on theory‑oriented projects, because the nature of these is so variable. In the case of experiment‑based research projects, you should normally allow up to six months to write a DPhil thesis, or three to four months for a corresponding MSc by Research thesis.
• Consider attending available skills training courses, for example  Thesis and Report Writing .

It is not advisable to leave all the writing to the end, for several reasons:

• You will need practice at writing over a period of time in order to develop a good style.
• There will inevitably be hold‑ups in experimental work and it is better to use that time to work on part of your thesis, rather than to waste it. If you do some writing earlier the final completion of your thesis will not seem such a daunting task.
• Approaching your submission date will become more stressful than necessary.

About your thesis

The best way to find out what is required for a successful thesis in your subject area is to look at some written in recent years. You should obviously look particularly closely at theses written by previous members of your own research group, which are available in the University library.

The formal requirements for obtaining your degree are set out in detail in the ‘ Examination Regulations ’. The standard required for success in the DPhil examination is defined as follows: that the student present a significant and substantial piece of research, of a kind which might reasonably be expected of a capable and diligent student after three or at most four years of full‑time study in the case of a full-time student, or eight years in the case of a part-time student. For the MSc by Research the standard required is that the candidate should have made a worthwhile contribution to knowledge or understanding of the relevant field of learning after a minimum of one year or two years of full-time study.

Thesis structure - Integrated Thesis

Subject to approval, students registered on research programmes (DPhil, MSc (Res) and CDTs) in the following departments may submit an integrated thesis rather than a conventional thesis: Biology, Chemistry, Earth Sciences, Engineering Science and Statistics. Where a student is admitted to an interdisciplinary doctoral training programme (CDT/DTP), the regulations for the department that the student is hosted in will therefore determine whether an integrated thesis may be applied for.

An integrated thesis may either be a hybrid of conventional chapters and high-quality scientific papers, or be fully paper-based. Regardless of the format, the content of the thesis should reflect the amount, originality and level of work expected for a conventional thesis. It should not be assumed that the act of publication (in whatever form) means the work is of suitable academic quality and content for inclusion in a thesis, and students should discuss all papers in detail with their supervisor before including. It would be anticipated that the candidate would be a lead contributor, rather than a minor author, on at least some of the papers in order to consider this format. There is no minimum, or maximum, number of papers a candidate is expected/allowed to include as part of such a thesis and it will remain a matter for the examiners to conclude whether the contributions are equivalent to that which would be expected of a standard DPhil.

Any papers utilised must concern a common subject, constitute a continuous theme and conform to the following guidelines:

 (i) If a candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy wishes to be examined through an integrated thesis (in the departments listed above), they should apply for permission to be examined in this way when they apply for confirmation of status, as detailed in the relevant departmental handbook. A candidate for the Degree of Master of Science by Research should normally apply to the DGS for permission to be examined in this way six months before submitting their papers for examination. To revert to being examined by a conventional thesis rather than an integrated thesis, the candidate must inform their department of the change as detailed in the relevant departmental handbook.

(ii) Work can be included regardless of its acceptance status for publication but candidates may be questioned on the publication status of their work by the examiners.

(iii) Any submitted/published papers should relate directly to the candidate’s approved field of study, and should have been written whilst holding the status of PRS or a student for the MSc (by Research), or DPhil.

(iv) The collection of papers must include a separate introduction, a full literature review, discussion and a conclusion, so that the integrated thesis can be read as a single, coherent document.

(v) The candidate must ensure all matters of copyright are addressed before a paper’s inclusion. A pre-print version of any published papers should be included as standard.

(vi) Joint/multi-authored papers are common in science based subjects and thus acceptable if the candidate can both defend the paper in full and provide a written statement of authorship, agreed by all authors, that certifies the extent of the candidate’s own contribution. A standard template is available for this purpose.

• Download the Statement of Authorship template as a Word document
• View the Statement of Authorship template as a webpage  

The length and scope of theses, including word limits for each subject area in the Division are set out in Departmental guidelines.

In all departments, if some part of the thesis is not solely your work or has been carried out in collaboration with one or more persons, you should also submit a clear statement of the extent of your contribution.

• Download the guidance for submitting an Integrated Thesis as a Word document
• View the guidance for submitting an Integrated Thesis as a webpage

Thesis page and word limits

Several departments place a word limit or page limit on theses. Details can be found in the  Examination Regulations  or  GSO.20a Notes of Guidance for Research Examinations .

Permission to exceed the page and word limits

Should you need to exceed your word/page limit you must seek approval from the Director of Graduate Studies in your department. You and your supervisor must submit a letter/email requesting approval, giving reasons why it is necessary to exceed the limit. This must be sent to the MPLS Graduate Office ( [email protected] ).

Proof-reading

It is your responsibility to ensure your thesis has been adequately proof-read before it is submitted.  Your supervisor may alert you if they feel further proof-reading is needed, but it is not their job to do the proof-reading for you.  You should proof-read your own work, as this is an essential skill in the academic writing process. However, for longer pieces of work it is considered acceptable for students to seek the help of a third party for proof-reading. Such third parties can be professional proof-readers, fellow students, friends or family members (students should bear in mind the terms of any agreements with an outside body or sponsor governing supply of confidential material or the disclosure of research results described in the thesis).   Proof-reading assistance may also be provided as a reasonable adjustment for disability.    Your thesis may be rejected by the examiners if it has not been adequately proof-read.  

See the University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Proof-readers . The MPLS Division offers training in proof-reading as part of its Scientific Writing training programmes.

Examiners and Submission Dates

You are strongly advised to apply for the appointment of examiners at least four to six weeks before you submit your thesis.

Appointing examiners for your thesis

Approval of the proposed names of examiners rests with the Director of Graduate Studies. Two examiners are normally appointed. It is usual for one of the examiners to be a senior member of Oxford University (the ‘internal examiner’) and the other to be from another research organisation (the ‘external examiner’). The divisional board will not normally appoint as examiners individuals previously closely associated with the candidate or their work, representatives of any organisation sponsoring the candidate’s research, or former colleagues of a candidate. Your supervisor will make suggestions regarding the names of possible examiners. Before doing so, your supervisor must consult with you, in order to find out if you have any special views on the appointment of particular examiners. Your supervisor is also allowed to consult informally with the potential examiners before making formal suggestions. Such informal consultation is usually desirable, and is intended to determine whether the people concerned are willing in principle to act, and if so, whether they could carry out the examination within a reasonable period of time. (For example, there may be constraints if you have to return to your home country, or take up employment on a specific date).

See information on examiner conflicts of interest , under section 7.3.3 Examiners.

What forms do I need to complete?

You will need to complete the online  GSO.3 form. Supervisors complete the section indicating names of the proposed examiners, and they should provide alternatives in case the preferred examiners decline to act.

Timing for appointment of examiners

You are advised to submit your appointment of examiners form in advance of submitting your thesis to avoid delays with your examination process. Ideally you should apply for the appointment of examiners at least 4-6 weeks before you expect to submit your thesis for examination.

There are currently no University regulations requiring examination to take place within a certain time limit after thesis submission. However, your examiners would normally be expected to hold your viva within 3 months. If you need to have your examination sooner than this, you may apply for an early viva , by completing the 'Application for a time specific examination' section on the appointment of examiners form, this section must be endorsed by your supervisor and DGS in addition to their approval in the main body of the form. The request must be made at the time of completing and submitting the appointment of examiners form, it cannot be done after this.

Please bear in mind that the examination date requested must not be earlier than one calendar month after the date on which the thesis has been received by the Research Degrees Team or after the date on which the examiners have formally agreed to act, whichever is the latest. The actual date of the examination will depend primarily on the availability of both examiners. In the Long Vacation, a longer time is normally required. It is therefore essential that you leave sufficient time for your forms to be formally approved, and for your examiners to be formally invited.  If sufficient time has not be given this could impact on your early examination request .

If, for any reason, examiners wish to hold a viva within four weeks of receiving their copy of the thesis, permission must be sought from the Director of Graduate Studies. The internal examiner will need to give details of the proposed arrangement and the reasons for the request. Under no circumstances will a viva be permitted to take place within 14 days of receipt of the thesis by the examiners.

Special considerations

Your supervisor is permitted to indicate to the Director of Graduate Studies if there are any special factors which should be taken into account in the conduct of your examination. For example, a scientific paper may have been produced by another researcher which affects the content of your thesis, but which was published too late for you to take into account. The Director of Graduate Studies will also need to be told of any special circumstances you may require or need to inform your examiners of which may affect your performance in an oral examination, or if any part of your work must be regarded as confidential. The Director of Graduate Studies will then forward (via the Graduate Office), any appropriate information that they think should be provided to the examiners. The Graduate Office will also seek approval from the Proctors Office if required.

Change of thesis title

If during your studies you want to change the title or subject of your thesis, you must obtain the approval of the Director of Graduate Studies using the online form GSO.6 . If you are requesting the change at the time of submitting your thesis, you may do this on the application for appointment of examiners form. A change of title is quite straightforward; it is common for students to begin with a very general title, and then to replace it with a more specific one shortly before submitting their thesis. Providing your supervisor certifies that the new title lies within the original topic, approval will be automatic. A change of the subject of your research requires more detailed consideration, because there may be doubt as to whether you can complete the new project within the original time‑scale.

If following your examination your examiners recommend that your thesis title be changed, you will need to complete a change of thesis title form to ensure that your record is updated accordingly.

From MT19 y ou must submit your digital examiners’ copy of your thesis online, via the Research Thesis Digital Submission (RTDS) portal, no later than the last day of the vacation immediately following the term in which your application for the appointment of examiners was made.   If you fail to submit by this date your application will be cancelled and you will have to reapply for appointment of examiners when you are ready to submit. Y our thesis should not be submitted until your application for confirmation of status has been approved (this applies to DPhil students only) . For MSc by Research students you should ensure that your transfer of status has been completed .

If you are funded on a research council studentship, you will have a recommended end-date before which your thesis must be submitted. If you do not know this date, please consult your supervisor.

Please note that you must not submit copies of your thesis directly to your examiners as this could result in your examinations being declared void and you could be referred to the University Proctors.

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Writing a Thesis or Dissertation

A course for students who are either writing, or preparing to write, a dissertation or thesis for their degree course at oxford, intensive course timetable: trinity term 2024.

Enrolment will close at 12 noon on Thursday of Week 8 of term (13 June 2024).

To ensure that we have time to set you up with access to our Virtual Learning Environment (Canvas), please make sure you have enrolled and paid no later than five working days before your course starts. 

MT = Michaelmas Term (October - December); HT = Hilary Term (January - March); TT = Trinity Term (April-June)

Course Timetable: Trinity Term 2024

Enrolment will close at 12 noon on Wednesday of Week 1 of term (24 January 2024).

Course overview

This course is designed for students who are either writing, or preparing to write, a dissertation or thesis for their degree course at Oxford. Each lesson focuses on a different part of the thesis/dissertation/articles (Introductions, Literature Reviews, Discussions etc.), as well as the expected structure and linguistic conventions. Building upon the foundational understanding provided by our other Academic English courses (particularly Introduction to Academic Writing and Grammar, and Key Issues), this course prepares students for the challenges of organising, writing and revising a thesis or dissertation.

Learning outcomes

• Gain an understanding of the different organisational structures used within Humanities, Social Sciences and Natural Sciences dissertations and theses
• Consider works of previous Oxford students in order to understand the common structural, linguistic and stylistic issues that arise when drafting a research project
• Increase competence in incorporating citations into texts, including choosing appropriate tenses and reporting verbs   
• Learn how to structure the various parts of a dissertation or thesis (Introduction, Literature Review, Discussion, Conclusion and Abstract)

Enrolment information

For Learners with an Oxford University SSO (Single Sign-On) simply click on the enrol button next to the class that you wish to join. 

For Learners without an Oxford University SSO, or who are not members of the University, once enrolment opens , please email  [email protected]  with the following details:

• Email address and phone number
• The name of the course you wish to study
• The start date and time of the course
• Your connection to Oxford University, if any (to determine course fee)

We will then provisionally enrol you onto the course and send you a link to the Oxford University Online Store for payment. Once payment is received we will confirm your place on the course. Please note that we will be unable to assist you until enrolment has opened, so please do not send us your enrolment details in advance.

Course structure

• Taught in Weeks 2-8 of term
• Seminars per week: 1
• Length of seminar: 2 hours
• Academic English tutor will provide all materials

Intensive course structure

• One week intensive course
• Taught in week 9 of term (Monday - Friday)
• Number of classes throughout the week: 5
• Length of class: 2-3 hours
• Total hours of tuition over the week: 14

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Submission of Your Thesis

The thesis must state the number of words to the nearest hundred, and the number so stated must be within the prescribed word limit. There must be an abstract of the thesis, of about 300 words. At the end of the process, successful DPhil theses must be submitted to the Bodleian Library and a digital copy should be deposited in the Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) . Students for the MPhil are not required to submit copies to the Bodleian, but if they wish to do so they should contact the Research Degree Office for further information about how to proceed.

There is a summary of key regulations applicable to all examinations.

Details of the Faculty’s Format for Theses can be found on p42 of the  Graduate Research Students Handbook .  Please note that some requirements related to the formatting, such as referencing style and attachments that are developed for students in legal studies are not mandatory for CSLS students. You can choose to comply with the Social Science style and presentation requirements.    

Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) and Digital Publication of Theses

The University of Oxford is committed to the widest dissemination of research theses produced by its graduate students. The Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) is an online archive of research output including theses created in fulfilment of Oxford awards, produced by graduate students at the University of Oxford.

DPhil, MLitt and MPhil by Research

All students following the DPhil, MLitt or MPhil by Research who registered from 1 October 2007 onwards are required to deposit a hardbound and a digital copy of their thesis with the Bodleian Libraries. Please be aware that this is a condition for award of the degree and it is enforced.  The digital copy should be deposited into ORA after Leave to Supplicate (LTS) has been granted. Students who commenced these degrees before October 2007 must deposit a hardbound copy but may also optionally submit a digital copy.

ORA provides maximum visibility and digital preservation for Oxford digital theses. Students should read the important information about the deposit of, and access to, digital theses , which includes:

Legal requirements (including funder mandates) and author responsibilities

When to deposit the digital copy of your thesis

How to deposit the digital copy of your thesis.

Options for open and embargoed access.Theses, or parts of theses, can be embargoed for reasons such as sensitive content, material that would affect commercial interests, pre-publication or legal reasons

Information about file formats, fonts and file sizes

Copyright of the thesis usually rests with the author: this does not change when depositing your thesis in ORA. The author does not give away any rights to the Oxford University Research Archive or to the Bodleian Libraries. However, students should read the information on third party copyright .

Students are strongly encouraged to ascertain and arrange permissions for inclusion and distribution of material via the Internet where copyright is held by a third party at the point that the items are gathered. This is similar to the process used when writing a journal article or monograph. A ‘Record of Permissions’ template has been created to assist with this process.

Further information or queries about depositing digital theses should be addressed to [email protected] .

MPhil in Socio-Legal Research

Students following the MPhil in Law or in Socio-Legal Research are invited to deposit a digital copy of their thesis voluntarily, in addition to the deposit of a hardbound copy. The digital copy should be deposited in the Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) .

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Article contents

The common core thesis in the study of mysticism.

• Ralph W. Hood Jr. Ralph W. Hood Jr. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.241
• Published online: 07 July 2016

The common core thesis contends that mystical experience is an ultimate non-sensuous experience of unity of all things. It can be identified within major faith traditions, whether explicitly religious or not. Its roots are in the work of William James who explored mystical experience outside the limits imposed by what he perceived as only a provisional natural science assumption of the newly emerging discipline of empirical psychology. Following the explicit phenomenological work of Walter Stace, the phenomenology of a universal core to mystical experience has been operationalized and an explicit psychometric measure developed to allow empirical assessment of the claim to a common core to mysticism. It is the linkage of psychometric approaches to the work of James and Stace that is now known explicitly as the common core thesis. The common core thesis needs to be delineated from the perennialist thesis popularized by Aldous Huxley in which there is postulated not only a common core experience, but also values and practices claimed to be associated with this experience if not directly derived from it. Psychometric and empirical evidence for the common core thesis is substantial and continues to accumulate. The common core thesis is restricted to mystical experience and assumes that this experience seeks to express itself in various faith traditions, whether religious or not, but is not restricted to or defined adequately by the culture or language with which this experience is interpreted. Unlike the perennialist thesis, the common core thesis does not assume that any common theology, philosophy, or practice necessarily follows from mystical experience.

• Aldous Huxley
• common core
• interpretation
• mystical experience
• perennialist
• Walter Stace
• William James

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date: 26 June 2024

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Thesis recognition for Dr Andrew Mummery

Dr Andrew Mummery from Oxford’s Department of Physics has been recognised by the International Astronomical Union and the Royal Astronomical Society for his thesis. He has been awarded the IAU’s Division D High Energy Phenomena and Fundamental Physics PhD Prize and is runner-up of the Royal Astronomical Society’s Michael Penston Thesis Prize.

In his thesis entitled 'Illuminating tidal disruption events with a time-dependent theory of relativistic accretion discs', he studies one the most extreme astrophysical events in our universe: tidal disruption events. These occur in the centre of galaxies, where supermassive black holes (black holes with masses of more than a million times that of our sun) are situated and stellar densities are high. If an unfortunate star ventures too close to this black hole, it can be tidally destroyed, in its entirety, by the black hole’s gravitational forces. The debris from this event then rains back towards the black hole, causing bright flares from otherwise quiescent galactic centres. To probe the properties of the black holes in the centre of tidal disruption events, one must understand in detail the physics of the discs of stellar debris which form in their aftermath. In his thesis, Dr Mummery developed a new time-dependent and relativistic theory of accretion discs, which he then utilised to analyse the observed luminosity of tidal disruption events. This model takes as input data taken simultaneously across a wide range of observing frequencies (from infra-red all the way up to X-ray), and returns the properties (the mass and rate of rotation) of the black holes at the centre of these events.

‘I thoroughly enjoyed my 4 years in the astrophysics sub-department and I am delighted to have my work recognised by these two institutions,’ comments Dr Mummery. ‘As a Leverhulme-Peierls Fellow at Oxford’s Department of Physics, I am extending the ideas developed in my thesis, in anticipation for forthcoming large data sets of these objects discovered by the new observational survey LSST.'

Dr Mummery studied for his DPhil under the supervision of Professor Steven Balbus : 'Andy took some ideas and results which were barely passed their teething stage, and turned them into a full-fledged cottage industry. In his hands, tidal disruption events have gone from astrophysical curiosities to diagnostic tools of remarkable power for studying black hole populations. His thesis blends fundamental relativistic fluid theory with detailed observations in a very beautiful way.'  

Read more on the RAS website: https://ras.ac.uk/news-and-press/news/2022-thesis-prize-winners-announced

Read more on the IAU website: https://www.iau.org/news/announcements/detail/ann23019/  

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Computer Science: Theses and dissertations

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• ORA: Oxford University Research Archive by Jason Partridge Last Updated Apr 10, 2024 2498 views this year

Tips for Finding Theses at Oxford

SOLO now allows you to search for theses in the Oxford collections very easily.

1. Navigate to the SOLO homepage.

2. Type details of the Thesis you would like to search for into the main search box.

3. Under the search box is a series of drop-down menus marked 'Refine your search'. In the first box select the the ' Theses ' option.

4. Now press the ' Search ' button to run your search.

Oxford Theses

• SOLO Search for print and electronic Oxford DPhil theses in the library catalogue. Electronic versions will link directly to the record in ORA. Limit your search to "Theses".
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• NDLTD Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations. Search and access e-theses and dissertations from around the world.

The  Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)  contains research publications and other research output produced by members of the University of Oxford. Content includes copies of journal articles, conference papers and theses.

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Deconstructing Dworkin's 'One-Right-Answer' Thesis

Kian Jepson

Time to read

Dworkin argues that all hard questions of law admit of one correct answer. This is a necessary supposition for the theory of law as integrity, and one which he aims to prove in A Matter of Principle . [1] Dworkin advances a logical argument that bivalent propositions of law have, necessarily, one right answer. This logical argument is not the whole of the one-right-answer thesis, but it is an important preliminary step. Dworkin attempts to bind positivism by limiting the definition of when a proposition of law is negated. Elaboration on this logical proof is key to the understanding of both the right-answer-thesis, and its critique. This article only aims to critique Dworkin’s proof against positivism. Dworkin does, in fact, anticipate the critique here laid out, but he does not appreciate that it does not have the effect on positivism he argued it does. He fails in showing that there is a necessarily right answer to every difficult legal question, but simply that the penumbra of law is further back than Hart anticipated. Further, a very brief sketch of a defence of the no-right-answer thesis using Finnis’ distinction between intra-systemic obligation and legal-moral obligation is provided. It is argued that a judge’s role in reaching an answer is not only to consider law in the instant case, but also the general principles of law in the broad sense, and considerations of morality as to when a law should apply.

The No-Right-Answer Thesis

Hart argues that law has an open texture. [2] This means that at the penumbra of the law, where it is unclear whether or not a validly passed law will apply, the judge has ‘discretion’ as to the outcome of the case.

In these cases it is clear that the rule-making authority must exercise a discretion and there is no possibility of treating the question raised by the various cases as if there were one uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct from an answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests. [3]

Dworkin argues that ‘discretion’ here means strong discretion, where the decision-maker is unbound by standards within the authority being discussed. [4] Dworkin argues that this strong discretion is mistaken, that in almost every case there is a right-answer which expresses to the rights and duties of the parties, contrary to the concept that there is an area of legal indeterminacy in which there is no truly ‘right’ answer for the judge. [5]

Dworkin’s Logical Thesis

Certain concepts are bivalent. If they apply the judge decides the case one way; if they do not apply the judge will decide the case the other way. For example, conduct C constitutes crime X, or, conduct C does not constitute crime X. The proposition that C constitutes X is (p), and the negation of that proposition (C does not constitute X) is ( ~ p). [6]

Let ( ~ p ) be defined as the logical negation of (p), so that if (p) is false ( ~ p ) is true, and if ( ~ p ) is false (p) is true. [7]

This is a description of legal duties, legal duties being the outcomes of cases. Dworkin argues that concepts describe the occasions of duties, but the concepts do not need to have the same structure as duties. [8] For example, a contract can conceptually be valid, void, or inchoate, but the duty is bivalent – either to fulfil the contract or not. Of course, the remedy to fulfil that duty can be different, but the duty itself remains the same.

What is the negation of a proposition of law (p)? Simply taken, Dworkin says that (non-p), or, where the proposition of law (p) is not the case, is equivalent to (~p). This, to be clear, is true. However, Dworkin is mistaken in arguing that the positivist position is thus:

The second version, on the other hand, does not deny that (non-p) is identical to ( ~ p ); instead it holds that in some cases neither (p) nor ( ~ p ) is true, that is, that in some cases bivalence does not hold. [9]

There is only one way that a bivalent concept can be negated, however, there are two reasons that proposition of law can be negated. First, the law can specifically say that (p) is not true. In Dworkin’s logical framework, L is the set of social facts (forming the rule of recognition) that a rule must have to be a valid law. A valid proposition (p) is valid because it has passed L, or L(p).

We may therefore state the structure of positivism, as a type of legal theory, this way. If ‘p’ represents a proposition of law, and ‘L(p)’ expresses the fact that someone or some group has acted in a way that makes (p) true, then positivism holds that (p) cannot be true unless L(p) is true. [10]

So, the first reason for the negation of (p) to be valid is that ( ~ p) fulfils the social facts L. Or L( ~ p) is true, therefore ( ~ p) is valid. However, there is a second reason by which the negation of the proposition can be true, that nothing has passed through the relevant social facts at all. Or ~ L(p) is true, therefore ( ~ p) is valid. In plain language, the law can say that C does not constitute X, L( ~ p), or the law can say nothing about C constituting X, ~ L(p). Both can lead to the validity of the negated statement ( ~ p). The key here is (non-p), which is not defined by virtue of the validity of the statement through social facts, but instead is the mere nullity of the legal proposition (p), this is where Dworkin obfuscates the no-right-answer position.

Dworkin argues that the positivist standpoint says that ( ~ p) cannot be true, in the sense of legally valid, unless L( ~ p) is true. [11] Or, for the statement ‘C does not constitute X’ to be a valid legal proposition, the relevant social facts forming the rule of recognition must be attached to the statement ‘C does not constitute X’. However, this is not so. The statement of ( ~ p) can also be true if the law has never been passed, ~ L(p), both forms are equally negatory of L(p). However, ~ L(p) is crucially different. Dworkin follows from the flawed premise that the positivist standpoint says ( ~ p) cannot be valid unless L( ~ p) is true - L(p) must be true or false. The social facts of a rule either are or are not present. When L(p) is false, the social facts are not present, so ( ~ p) is true. So, if L(p) is false, then its negation ~ L(p) is true. Because L(p) is not true, ( ~ p) is true. [12] But if ( ~ p) cannot be true unless L( ~ p) is also true, it leads to the statement that ~ L(p) is the same as L( ~ p). [13] Or, the statement that ‘the law says that C does not constitute X’ and ‘the laws say nothing about C constituting X’ are equivalent. [14] Plainly they are not, the law saying nothing about C constituting X is a negative statement, the law saying that C does not constitute X is a positive statement. In an endnote Dworkin argues that positivism, in this form, supposes that whatever is not prohibited is permitted. [15] This is clearly a reductionist view of Hart’s positivist standpoint.

However, when it is realised that it is not necessarily true that (~p) is true only when L( ~ p) is true, the problem falls away – as Dworkin notes. Both ( ~ p) and (p) can be true when ~ L(p) is true. L( ~ p) is not necessarily true when ( ~ p) is true, similarly ( ~ p) is not necessarily true when ~ L(p) is true. Zhao advances a stronger argument. The argument interprets Dworkin’s meaning as saying that where ~ L(p) = L( ~ p) then ( ~ p) or (p) is not true, so there remains only one answer. [16] The issue herein lies in the first statement that ~ L(p) = L( ~ p), it plainly does not, both can lead to the same result, but they do not conceptually mean the same thing, nor do they have to lead to the same result.

Have we confused concepts and duties? Is the idea that (~p) can mean either L( ~ p) or ~ L(p) simply saying that a duty must be identical to the concept, which Dworkin has disavowed? It is argued that this is not equivalent. A conceptual tripartite split (as in our contract example) is distinct from this example; an inchoate contract, for example, is not the same as saying that the law has not commented on the situation. Instead, an inchoate contract leads to a definitive duty one way or the other, as Dworkin himself correctly argues. However, ~ L(p) does not necessarily lead one way or the other. To determine the borderline of the validity of (p) and the validity of ( ~ p) we must return to Hart’s concept of the open texture.

The Open Texture at the Penumbra

Each law has a central case. [17] As you move away from this central case, the focal conception of the law in question no longer directly comments on it. Let us flesh out our example of C constituting X. The law says that parking a vehicle on the pavement (C) constitutes the crime of aberrant parking (X). The central case of this law is a car, for example, being parked across the pavement. This ‘focal’ conception is moved away from when we consider cases where the terminology of the law is unclear, and the central case does not comment on it. Take a tricycle parked on the pavement. Does that constitute aberrant parking? Plainly the deviance of this case is in the definition of ‘vehicle’, a tricycle is not a central case of a vehicle. The central case does not directly comment on the tricycle case. A key caveat to this concept is that the law itself could conceivably cover that case, but the case is not the central example of such a law, and the central example of the law does not explicitly comment on that case.

By using the idea of ‘focal’ conceptions, and ‘deviant’ examples we import a large corpus of work. Finnis discusses the concept of deviant legal systems, and laws, and whether they are truly ‘law’. First, we must interrogate whether this analogy is valid. For one, Finnis is discussing the legal and moral obligation of a deviant law, we are discussing whether deviant examples of laws have a necessarily ‘right’ answer through interpretation of the principle of the focal conception. However, there is a strong link between the concept of political obligation and legal right answers, to explicate this link we must delve into the analogy. To avoid confusion the analogies will first be drawn, and then separate terminology used for our analogous types of obligation. There are three types of obligation in Finnis’ concept: (1) intra-systemic obligation, which we will re-term ‘interpretive- gesetz obligation’; (2) legal-moral obligation, which we will re-term ‘interpretive- recht obligation’; (3) moral obligation, which we will re-term ‘discretionary-moral obligation’. This section will first explain Finnis’ conception of obligation, and second analogise it with our reformed terminology.

(1) Interpretive- Gesetz Obligation:  Finnis describes the first two types of obligation as legal. For Finnis, intra-systemic obligation is the obligation to perform conduct required by law. [18] What does this mean for a legal-right answer in the sense Dworkin means? Our analogous term is the ‘interpretive- gesetz obligation’, we have already established that the fact pattern of the central case does not comment on the deviant cases in question. Hence the interpretive- gesetz obligation is those legal principles which underlie and justify that central case, and their analogy with the deviant case. The term gesetz means law in the small sense of a statute or rule. So, for our example this obligation derives from the closeness of the analogy with the central case. This, plainly, is a key element to Dworkin’s interpretive process. To use the literary analogy, it is the themes which underlie the sections prior to the new chapter-writers section.

(2) Interpretive- Recht Obligation: The second type of legal obligation Finnis discusses is the legal-moral obligation. This is the obligation which derives from the moral duty not to bring a system which gives rise to the common good, into disrepute. For the right answer to a deviant case, our analogy is the applications of the general principles of the entire legal system. The term recht means law in the broad sense, not coincidentally the word also means ‘right’ and ‘justice’. Hence the interpretive- recht obligation is that obligation which derives from the underlying principle of the legal system, and the balance that the legal system as a whole strikes between different values. Its application can also be described as the need to avoid bringing the central principles of the legal system into disrepute by extending laws to deviant cases which are contrary to those principles. Dworkin, too, considers this element.

(3) Discretionary-Moral Obligation: The third type of obligation Finnis describes is not legal, but purely moral. Thomas Aquinas describes that the intra-systemic and legal-moral obligation can cease to apply when a law is deviant, or unjust enough, in the court of conscience. [19] The discretionary-moral obligation is the sum of moral considerations which favour, or oppose, application of the central case of law to the deviant case. This is a discretionary practice, the balance of moral considerations involved in this stage, and the borderline of when discretionary-moral obligation outweighs both interpretive stages, is fundamentally discretionary.

A Judge’s Court of Conscience

How do these obligations for considerations and reasoning apply in a deviant case? For a deviant case, there will be countervailing moral principles to the application of the central case of the law to that situation. Take the tricycle example, the interpretive- gesetz obligation may well be that the law values safe parking, and respect for rights of way. The interpretive- recht obligation may well consider the proportionality of the response, and the underlying justice of the situation. The discretionary-moral obligation involves the moral principles which oppose application to the central case. A tricycle may well be driven by a child and moral principles may say that activity, freedom and friendship are morally important values which are unduly interfered with by application of the law to this case.

The interpretive- gesetz , and interpretive- recht obligations are likely, naturally, to pull strongly in the direction of one answer. But this does not mean it is a ‘right’ answer per se, since the balance between these obligations, and their balance with countervailing discretionary-moral obligations.

This is not necessarily inconsistent with Hart’s concept, or positivism more generally. Judges’ reasoning, according to Raz, ought to have a large element of moral reasoning. [20] Even more bravely, he claims that legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning. Raz himself reasons that such application of moral reasoning is a ‘change’ in the law. However, this would only be true if the law had commented on the situation, L(p) or L(~p), but this is not the case. The application of moral reasoning is important when the law, in its central case, does not comment on deviant (~L(p), or ~L(~p)) cases. It is not a change in the law, but merely application of the three obligations involved in legal reasoning on a situation which the law does not comment on. This area of cases is Hart’s penumbra, and this is where the law shows its open texture. [21]

Next, we must discuss how the obligations apply. We have discussed that judges are, inevitably, more predisposed to following the interpretive obligations, but this does not preclude explanation of the weight of the obligations. The interpretive- gesetz obligation is invariable in weight, theoretically it admits of one correct answer following Dworkin’s interpretive process. The interpretive- recht obligation is variable, and it depends on the balance of the law and the legal system principles; this also varies with the importance, and how ‘in vogue’ the central principle is. Discretionary-moral obligation is similarly variable, and whilst less explicitly legal still ought to form an important part of reasoning according to law.

Legal reasoning is an instance of moral reasoning. Legal doctrines are justified only if they are morally justified, and they should be followed only if it is morally right to follow them. [22]

Further, such moral reasoning remains a key element of legal reasoning, or as Raz terms it, reasoning according to law (though he is not discussing this specific question, it too is analogous). [23] Hence questions of law are subject to much more discretion that Dworkin makes out. The penumbra of a difficult case lies where the considerations of the interpretive- recht obligation, and discretionary-moral obligations, are sufficiently weighty that the invariable weight of the interpretive- gesetz answer does not apply. Hence, the penumbra Hart describes lies here. Whilst the discretion is not the ‘strong’ discretion that Dworkin lays out, there remains a factor of the principle inherent in the authority, it is nevertheless discretionary. It lies somewhere in between the weak sense of merely making a decision, [24] and the strong sense of being unbound by authority.

Confusing Obligation and Correctness?

The central objection is that Finnis’ conception is not truly analogous. What Finnis is considering is the obligation to follow law, and the obligation to follow unjust law for a citizen. A further objection is that the judge as an official ought only to consider the interpretive- gesetz validity, for which there is always a correct answer.

In response to the first, working from a presumption that it is the role of a judge to apply the correct law as much as possible this objection begins to fade. The obligation on the judge is to apply the law. Where there is a gap in the law – namely, where the central case does not cover a deviant case – the role of the judge is to follow the obligations on either side to apply or not apply the particular law. Plainly, there is analogy between following the law, which Finnis’ is considering, and applying the law – which we are. However, drawing this analogy leads us to the second objection.

Is it not in the nature of a judge to have concern only for intra-systemic legal correctness, for which there is one correct answer? The response to this objection lies in the notion of central and deviant cases. An intra-systemic obligation derives from the existence of the law, but we have shifted Finnis’ original obligation’s meaning slightly. Instead, the interpretive- gesetz obligation, since the deviant case is not actually covered by the law, is the application of the underlying principle in Dworkin’s sense. It is not truly intra-systemic in terms of positive law of the central case, but legal principle. However, legal-moral principle is also, in our analogy, shifted in meaning from strictly the obligation to follow the law as law so as not to undermine the legal system, to meaning the obligation to follow the underlying principles of the legal system. Such principles can be perfectly contradictory of the principles underlying the law in question. The interpretive- gesetz obligation also contains consideration of those principles, but it only contains it as it regards that specific law, not law in general. The moral consideration is the obligation of the judge in reasoning with moral principles, as Raz argues. [25] Hence, we might say that the role of the judge is not only to consider the law in this instance, but the law generally, and morality generally in order to draw the borderline of when a law should and should not apply. Yet such balancing of considerations is, fundamentally, a discretionary task without a truly, legally, ‘right’ answer.

The logical proof Dworkin advances does not defeat positivism for the reason that he believes it does. There is no necessity for ~ L(p) to always equate with ( ~ p), and L( ~ p) is not the only reason that ( ~ p) can be true. Dworkin appreciates most of this critique within A Matter of Principle  but does not appreciate the significance of the idea of ‘central cases’ and penumbral cases, and the duties, obligations, and principles that determine the outcome of the cases. This essay has attempted to elucidate the logic that Dworkin uses, and to propose an alternative discussion on the reasoning that leads to there being no truly ‘right’ answer in a hard case.

[1] Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (HUP 1985).

[2] HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 128.

[3] ibid 132.

[4] Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013) 50.

[5] ibid 54.

[6] Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 1) 122.

[7] ibid 121.

[8] ibid 124.

[9] ibid 122.

[10] ibid 131.

[12] ibid 121.

[13] ibid 133.

[14] ibid 121.

[15] ibid 405–406, note 4.

[16] Zhao Yingnan, ‘Do We Really Know Dworkin’s “One-Right-Answer” Thesis?’ (2018) 20 < https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144793 > .

[17] HLA Hart, ‘Discretion’ (2013) 127(2) Harvard Law Review 652, 653.

[18] John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s “Ideal Dimension”’ (2014) 59 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 85.

[19] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (1911), Question 96.

[20] Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford 1995) 333.

[21] Hart (n 17) 129.

[22] Raz (n 20).

[24] Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 4) 48–52.

[25] Raz (n 20).

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'Oxford is unpleasant for Israelis and Jews, and there’s nothing we can do to help you'

Israeli students at both oxford and cambridge have described repeated incidents in which their safety concerns, amid constant pro-palestinian demonstrations on campus, have been marginalized and belittled; 'swastikas and chants calling to gas the jews are heard here'.

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Cholesterol-lowering drug slows progression of eye disease in people with diabetes

The LENS trial has demonstrated that fenofibrate, a drug usually used to lower cholesterol, reduces the risk of progression of diabetic retinopathy by 27%. The results were announced today at the American Diabetes Association Scientific Sessions and published in NEJM Evidence .

Diabetes can cause damage to the small blood vessels at the back of the eye, a condition called diabetic retinopathy. Diabetic retinopathy is among the top five causes of visual loss worldwide and the only major cause to increase in recent decades.

Fenofibrate is a tablet that has been used to lower cholesterol for more than 30 years. Previous results from sub-studies of trials looking into treatments for heart disease had suggested that fenofibrate might be able to slow the progression of diabetic retinopathy but more conclusive results were needed.

Coordinated by Oxford Population Health, the LENS (Lowering Events in Non-proliferative retinopathy in Scotland) trial compared the effects of fenofibrate with a placebo (dummy tablet) on the progression of retinopathy in 1,151 adults with type 1 or type 2 diabetes in Scotland as part of the national routine diabetic eye screening programme. All of the participants had early to moderate diabetic retinopathy when they joined the trial.

Key findings:

• People who received fenofibrate had a 27% lower risk of needing to be referred for specialist care or treatment for diabetic retinopathy or maculopathy (a progressive eye disease that can lead to vision loss) over four years compared with people who were assigned to receive a placebo; • Treatment with fenofibrate was also associated with a lower risk of developing macular oedema (swelling at the back of the eye) and a lower risk of requiring treatment for retinopathy compared to placebo; • The benefits of fenofibrate were similar in people with both type 1 and type 2 diabetes, and in people with both normal and impaired kidney function.

Dr David Preiss , Associate Professor at Oxford Population Health and lead author of the study, said ‘Diabetic retinopathy remains a leading cause of visual loss. Good control of blood glucose is important but this is very difficult to achieve for many people, and there are few other treatments available. We need simple strategies that can be widely used to reduce the progression of diabetic eye disease. Fenofibrate may therefore provide a valuable addition to treat people with early to moderate diabetic retinopathy.’

Melville Henry, a LENS trial participant from Leven, said ‘Taking part in the trial was very easy; there was nothing to it really. I just had to follow the instructions and take the study tablets. I attended my local research clinic appointments at first and then I had regular telephone calls to ask about my progress.’

Linda Gillespie, a LENS trial participant from Kirkcaldy, said ‘I attended the clinic for diabetic eye screening anyway so taking part in the trial was extremely easy, I never had to think about it. If I had any questions, someone was always at the end of the phone. It was really important to me to take part in research because without trials like LENS we can’t move forward. The results of the trial might not help me but it might help someone else in the future.’

Dr Lucy Chambers, Head of Research Communications at Diabetes UK, said ‘Eye problems are a frightening and too frequent complication of diabetes. But acting early can stop the first signs of damage progressing into devastating sight loss. We’re excited by the positive results from this major trial of a new treatment to slow progression of eye damage, which has the potential to benefit many people with diabetes in the UK.’

LENS is being coordinated by Oxford Population Health, and was run in close partnership with the Universities of Glasgow, Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh, and with NHS Scotland’s Diabetic Eye Screening Service. It was funded primarily by the National Institute for Health and Care Research’s Health Technology Assessment Programme.

The paper ' Effect of Fenofibrate on Progression of Diabetic Retinopathy ' is published in  NEJM Evidence .

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