war in yemen essay

Back to Map

War in Yemen

Center for Preventive Action

Fighting between Houthi rebels and the Saudi coalition that backs Yemen’s internationally recognized government has largely subsided , but Houthis have repeatedly attacked ships transiting the Red Sea in response to Israel's war on Hamas. Dialogue between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, along with Iranian-Saudi normalization , has provided hope for a negotiated solution. However, talks have yielded little progress and have been punctuated by violence . The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has also renewed calls for an independent southern Yemeni state, complicating peace prospects, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks have surged . Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis has not improved; 21.6 million people need aid, including 11 million children, and more than 4.5 million are displaced.

Yemen’s civil war began in 2014 when Houthi insurgents—Shiite rebels with links to Iran and a history of rising up against the Sunni government— took control  of Yemen’s capital and largest city, Sanaa,  demanding  lower fuel prices and a new government. Following failed negotiations, the rebels  seized  the presidential palace in January 2015, leading President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government to  resign . Beginning in March 2015, a coalition of Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia  launched  a campaign of economic isolation and air strikes against the Houthi insurgents, with U.S. logistical and intelligence support.

In February 2015, after escaping from Sanaa, Hadi  rescinded  his resignation, complicating the UN-supported transitional council formed to govern from the southern port city of Aden. However, a Houthi advance forced Hadi to  flee  Aden for exile in Saudi Arabia. While he attempted to return to Aden later that year, he ultimately ruled as president in  exile .  

The intervention of regional powers in Yemen’s conflict, including Iran and Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia, also drew the country into a regional proxy struggle along the  broader Sunni-Shia divide . In June 2015, Saudi Arabia implemented a  naval blockade  to prevent Iran from supplying the Houthis. In response, Iran dispatched a  naval convoy , raising the risk of military escalation between the two countries. The militarization of Yemen’s waters also drew the attention of the U.S. Navy, which has continued to  seize  Yemen-bound Iranian weapons. The blockade has been at the center of the humanitarian crisis throughout the conflict. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also led an unrelenting air campaign, with their coalition carrying out over twenty-five thousand  air strikes . These strikes have caused over nineteen thousand  civilian casualties , and from 2021 to 2022 the Houthis responded with a spate of  drone attacks  on  Saudi Arabia  and the UAE.

On the battleground, the Houthis made fast  progress  at the start of the war, moving  eastward  to Marib and pushing south to Aden in early 2015. However, a Saudi intervention pushed the Houthis back north and west until the frontlines  stabilized . A UN effort to broker peace talks between allied Houthi rebels and the internationally recognized Yemeni government  stalled  in the summer of 2016. In the south and east of the country, a growing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  threatened  the government’s control, though its influence has since  waned .

In July 2016, the Houthis and the government of former President Saleh, ousted in 2011 after nearly thirty years in power, announced the formation of a  political council  to govern Sana’a and much of northern Yemen. However, in December 2017, Saleh  broke  with the Houthis and called for his followers to take up arms against them. Saleh was killed and his forces were  defeated within two days . Meanwhile, Hadi and the internationally recognized governments faced their own challenge: the  Southern Transitional Council (STC) . Established in 2017, the STC grew out of the southern  separatist movement  that predates the civil war and controls areas in the southwest around and including Aden. A 2019  Saudi-brokered deal  incorporated the STC into the internationally-recognized governments, but the faction could still present  challenges .

In 2018, coalition forces made an  offensive push  on the coast northward to the strategic city of Hodeidah, the main seaport for northern Yemen. The fighting ended in a  ceasefire  and commitments to withdraw troops from the city; the ceasefire largely  held , but fighting continued elsewhere. Taiz, Yemen’s third largest city, also remained a key point of contention, having been  blockaded  by the Houthis since 2015. In 2020, the UAE officially  withdrew  from Yemen, but it maintains extensive influence in the country.

In February 2021, Houthi rebels  launched  an offensive to seize Marib, the last stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, and in early March, Houthi rebels conducted  missile air strikes  in Saudi Arabia, including targeting oil tankers and facilities and international airports. The Saudi-led coalition  responded  to the increase in attacks with air strikes targeting Sanaa. The offensive was the deadliest clash since 2018,  killing hundreds  of fighters and  complicating  peace processes.

Meanwhile, the conflict has taken a heavy toll on Yemeni civilians, making Yemen the  world’s worst humanitarian crisis . The UN  estimates  that 60 percent of the estimated 377,000 deaths in Yemen between 2015 and the beginning of 2022 were the result of indirect causes like food insecurity and lack of accessible health services. Two-thirds of the population, or 21.6 million Yemenis, remain in dire need of assistance . Five million are at risk of famine, and a  cholera outbreak  has affected over one million people. All sides of the conflict are  reported to have violated  human rights and international humanitarian law.

An economic crisis continues to  compound  the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In late 2019, the conflict led to the splintering of the economy into two broad  economic zones  under territories controlled by the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government. In the fall of 2021, the sharp depreciation of Yemen’s currency, particularly in government-controlled areas, significantly  reduced  people’s purchasing power and pushed many basic necessities even further out of reach, leading to widespread  protests  across cities in southern Yemen. Security forces forcefully  responded  to the protests.

Separate from the ongoing civil war, the United States is  suspected  of conducting counterterrorism operations in Yemen, relying mainly on air strikes to target  al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  and militants associated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The United States is deeply invested in combating terrorism and violent extremism in Yemen, having collaborated with the Yemeni government on counterterrorism since the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. Since 2002, the United States has carried out  nearly four hundred strikes  in Yemen. In April 2016, the United States deployed a small team of forces to advise and assist Saudi-led troops to retake territory from AQAP. In January 2017, a  U.S. Special Operations Forces raid  in central Yemen killed one U.S. service member, several suspected AQAP-affiliated fighters, and an unknown number of Yemeni civilians. Breaking from previous U.S. policy, President Joe Biden announced an  end to U.S. support  for Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen in February 2021 and revoked its  designation  of the Houthis as a terrorist organization. In January 2024, the Houthis were  redesignated  as a terrorist organization due to their recent attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

In April 2022, Yemen’s internationally recognized but unpopular president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi,  resigned  after ten years in power to make way for a new seven-member presidential council more representative of Yemen’s political factions. Rashad al-Alimi, a Hadi advisor with  close ties  to Saudi Arabia and powerful Yemeni politicians, chairs the new council.

Though a six-month  UN-brokered  cease-fire officially lapsed in October 2022, both sides have since refrained from major escalatory actions and hostility levels remain low. Peace talks between Saudi and Houthi officials, mediated by Oman,  resumed  in April 2023, accompanying ongoing UN mediation efforts. However, concrete progress remains elusive , and the first official Houthi visit to the Saudi capital since the war began, on September 14, yielded nothing beyond optimistic statements. The discussions were reportedly centered around a complete reopening of Houthi-controlled ports and Sanaa airport, reconstruction efforts, and a timeline for foreign forces to withdraw from Yemen. Negotiations have also been overshadowed by the suspension of the only commercial air route out of Sanaa and a late September Houthi drone strike that killed four Bahraini members of the Saudi-led coalition.

Talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia in April 2023, mediated by China, have raised hopes of a  political settlement  to end the conflict in Yemen. The talks led to a breakthrough agreement to  re-establish  diplomatic relations and re-open both sides' embassies after years of tension and hostility. Iran’s UN mission said that the agreement could  accelerate efforts  to renew the lapsed cease-fire.

While hostility between the two warring sides remains low, AQAP’s political violence surged in May and June, reaching the highest monthly level since November 2022. Most of the violence has been centered around Yemen’s Abyan and Shawba governates, where AQAP has used drones and IEDs to target forces affiliated with the STC. In August 2023, AQAP launched an explosion that killed a military commander and three soldiers from the Security Belt Forces, an armed group loyal to the STC. Earlier that month, AQAP fighters killed five troops from another force affiliated with the separatist council. The recent use of drones by AQAP in Yemen’s south is likely an attempt to reassert its influence in the area despite its waning influence, and some speculate that this sudden and sustained use of drones signals external support. Additionally, AQAP has continued its anti-separatist efforts, with another attack in early October targeting and wounding five STC-backed fighters.

Three days following the October 7 attack on Israel, Yemen’s Houthi leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi warned that if the United States intervenes in the Hamas-Israel War directly, the group will respond by taking military action. In mid-October, U.S. officials announced that the USS Carney downed several Houthi cruise missiles and drones fired toward Israel. The Houthis continued to launch several rounds of missiles and drones until it officially announced entry into the war to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on October 31. Houthi attacks of the same nature continued into November. On November 19, the Houthis hijacked a commercial ship in the Red Sea and have since attacked at least thirty-three others with drones, missiles, and speed boats as of late January 2024. As a result, major shipping companies have stopped using the Red Sea—through which almost 15 percent of global seaborne trade passes—and have rerouted to take longer and costlier journeys around Southern Africa instead. The situation has resulted in heightened shipping and insurance costs, stoking fears of a renewed cost-of-living crisis. In response to the consistent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the United States and United Kingdom carried out coordinated air strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen on January 11 and January 22. It is unclear whether the attacks will cease in the near future, with the Houthis vowing to persist in their military operations until a ceasefire is agreed to in the Gaza Strip and aid is allowed into the enclave.

Latest News

Sign up for our newsletter, receive the center for preventive action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict..

On The Site

Photo by yeowatzup on Wikimedia Commons

How U.S. Policy in Yemen Went Tragically Wrong

May 13, 2024 | M'Baye, Fatou | Current Affairs , Middle East Studies , Politics

Alexandra Stark—

On October 8, 2016, an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition struck a crowded funeral hall in Sanaa, Yemen, killing at least 140 people and wounding an additional 600, including children. The strike was shocking to many Americans, not only because of the tragic death toll, but because of how it happened: according to Human Rights Watch , remnants of a U.S.-manufactured bomb were identified at the site.

This was eight years after President Obama was elected with the promise that he would end the United States’ “ dumb wars ” in the Middle East. So how, and why, was a U.S.-made weapon contributing to the deaths of children in Yemen?

The answer is important—and not just to humanitarians who are concerned about preventing harm to Yemeni civilians. It’s important because it can help us to understand why even well-intentioned U.S. policy in the Middle East often goes so tragically wrong.

For decades, U.S. policy in Yemen has been shaped by narrowly defined U.S. security interests, from countering the Soviet Union’s influence in the region during the Cold War to combating terrorist organizations after 9/11. It was not about what could contribute to the well-being of Yemenis.

Before Houthi insurgents rose up and captured the capital in 2014, setting off the civil war, U.S. policy in Yemen was framed by its own counterterrorism interests. The United States faced the dilemma of how to fight Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—a terrorist organization linked to an attempted bombing on a U.S.-bound airliner in 2009 among other threats—without risking another quagmire in the Middle East. To effectively prevent terrorism without a larger U.S. investment, the U.S. partnered with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government and launched the occasional drone or missile strike. At first, American officials thought this approach was so successful that they dubbed it “ the Yemen model ” and advertised its success through early 2015, when the country was overrun by civil war.

The Yemen model has not worked because this framework is too narrow. It meant that Obama administration officials were unable to see that their corrupt government partner had started to wobble, even before the Arab Spring protests washed over the country in 2011. And it meant that in March 2015, when Saudi Arabia asked for support in their military intervention against the Houthis, U.S. officials felt they had to go along. They wanted to maintain the United States’ important security relationship with Gulf partners, even though one official said that the decision felt like “getting into a car with a drunk driver.”

Later on, some U.S. officials would acknowledge that “we were wrong to think that cautious and at times conditional support for the war in Yemen would influence Saudi and Emirati policy.” Still, under the Trump administration, the U.S. doubled down on its support for the coalition until the October 2018 assassination of Saudi regime critic Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents.

In February 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would be “stepping up our diplomacy to end the war in Yemen,” and in April 2022, the UN managed to negotiate a truce . The truce has, more or less, held up even though the Houthis continue to attack commercial vessels in the Red Sea and U.S. still launches strikes on Houthi targets.

In the meantime, though, U.S. support had contributed to a war that caused “one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises,” according to Oxfam , causing over 12,000 civilian deaths and forcing almost 4 million people to flee the fighting. Eighty percent of Yemen’s population, or 24 million people, now relies on emergency aid. Aid groups have warned that the turmoil in the Red Sea could contribute to the ongoing humanitarian crisis and create additional barriers for the humanitarian organizations delivering lifesaving support in Yemen.

The lessons of the Yemen model therefore remain potent a decade on, as another devastating conflict rages in Gaza. A narrow focus on maintaining U.S. security partnerships, counter-terrorism operations, and countering Iranian influence did not achieve U.S. security goals in Yemen. What might a new approach look like? It could focus on the well-being of people in Yemen and across the region, instead of on only narrowly defined U.S. security interests.

Alexandra Stark  is an associate policy researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartian research institution, and a fellow at New America’s International Security Program. Her award-winning work has been published in academic and public outlets.

Recent Posts

• Ep. 137 – Interacting with Color
• Our Palestine Question: A Conversation with Geoffrey Levin
• What the Founders Didn’t Know—But Their Children Did—About the Constitution
• Loneliness and Screens: Causes and Consequences
• Why Does Paris Look the Way it Does?
• Writing a Life

Sign up for updates on new releases and special offers

Newsletter signup, shipping location.

Our website offers shipping to the United States and Canada only. For customers in other countries:

Mexico and South America: Contact TriLiteral to place your order. All Others: Visit our Yale University Press London website to place your order.

Shipping Updated

Learn more about Schreiben lernen, 2nd Edition, available now. 

• Search UNH.edu
• Search Inquiry Journal

Commonly Searched Items:

• Academic Calendar
• Feature Article
• Research Articles
• Commentaries
• Mentor Highlights
• Editorial Staff

Yemen and the Dynamics of Foreign Intervention in Failed States

Yemen, a small nation at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula, has been mired in political strife and unrest since its government was overthrown in 2014 by the Houthis, a minority Shiite tribal group. Soon after, foreign intervention began, with Saudi Arabia joining the fight alongside the remains of the Yemen government authorities against the Houthis. In 2015, Iran began supporting their ally the Houthis with economic aid and materials, but not with direct military involvement. What ensued has been labeled one of the worst modern-day humanitarian crises, and it rages on to this day.

The author, Bryn Lauer

With no end to the conflict in sight, Yemen now has the status of a failed state, one with no governmental authority or rule of law. This humanitarian tragedy raises many unanswered questions about the effects of foreign intervention on failed states: Why has Yemen’s civil war continued? Why is Saudi Arabia siding with a country lacking a working government? What does Iran have to gain by allying with the Houthis, and why hasn’t it intervened directly? Has Yemen as a failed state exacerbated the conflict? What is at stake for each actor? 

The use of the term  failed state  is debated by political science researchers. Definitions of the term range from complete anarchy to a functioning government with weak institutions. In this article I use the term  failed state  for two reasons: (1) it places greater emphasis on the system of governance as a path to civil war than on extremism and terrorism (Cordesman and Molot, 2019), and (2) it has been used explicitly as justification for intervention by Saudi Arabia. I use political scientist Robert Rotberg’s commonly accepted definition of a failed state: a state which is unable to provide political goods to its inhabitants and experiences high levels of internal violence (Rotberg, 2003). My project aims to shed light on the dynamic between failed states and foreign intervention, with Yemen as a case study. I became interested in this subject because of an international politics course I took at SUNY Binghamton and have followed Yemen closely since then. After transferring to the University of New Hampshire (UNH) and completing an internship at the Department of State in the Office of Investment Affairs, I received an Undergraduate Research Award, with Dr. Elizabeth Carter as my faculty mentor, and turned my interest into a concrete research project.

Summarizing Yemen’s history over the past several decades remains a challenge, which is why I focus on the key events in this background section. Yemen’s conflict is multifaceted, with regional and domestic actors at play, a history of governmental instability, economic constraints, political fallout, and strained alliances.

The Houthis make up 5 to 10 percent of the population in Yemen. Although a revolutionary Shiite Muslim group, the Houthis’ plight began as a political one during the rule of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh from 1978 to 2011 (Haykel, 2021). For years, authoritarian President Saleh used corruption and oppression to unify the government and to repress dissent. The Houthis’ goal was to assert themselves as a dominant political group to bring an end to political marginalization and discrimination. These sentiments then cultivated six wars between the Houthis and the central government from 2004 to 2010. In 2011, President Saleh resigned because of mounting tension among supporters and was replaced by Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, but Hadi’s leadership lasted only three years and included unsuccessful attempts at reform before the Houthis seized Sana’a, the highly populated capital of Yemen, thereby waging war once again on the government of Yemen. With no true foundation in place, Yemen’s government fell swiftly by January 2015, when President Hadi and other politicians were forced to resign. President Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s sovereignty became porous, the remaining domestic institutions ceased to operate, and foreign actors have had free rein to exert their influence over the region since 2015.

On March 26, 2015, shortly after the Houthis overthrew Hadi’s government, Saudi Arabia launched its first military involvement in Yemen with Operation Decisive Storm, and air strikes, ground troops, and economic sanctions were deployed almost immediately (Nußberger, 2017; Gunaratne, 2018). The launch of Operation Decisive Storm in 2015 was Saudi Arabia’s first deviation from its norm of unassertive foreign policy toward Yemen (Stenslie, 2013). Saudi Arabia justified its active, open military engagement with Yemen by claiming it was countering Iranian influence while defending itself against fallout from a failed state.

Airstrike by Saudi Arabia in Sana’a, Yemen, 2015.  Source:   Wikimedia Commons

Throughout the fighting, Saudi Arabia and many prominent Western scholars have accused Iran of supporting the Houthis. Iran has historically kept a limited role in Yemeni affairs and did not become an active ally of the Houthis until Saudi Arabia’s direct involvement in 2015. However, during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, which were a series of anti-government protests that ricocheted throughout the Middle East, Iran had provided limited aid to the Houthis. The Houthis are not dependent on Iran and are not under their direct control (Vatanka, 2015; Milani, 2015). Nonetheless, Iran has increasingly provided more arms to the Houthis as a direct response to escalation in fighting from Saudi coalition forces (Nichols and Landay, 2021). 

As of spring 2022, the conflict is continuing to escalate, United Nations mediation attempts have repeatedly failed, and there remains no internationally recognized government in place (Aljazeera, 2022; Reuters, 2022). As of 2022, 24 million Yemenis need assistance, 100,000 Yemenis have been killed since the start of the conflict in 2015, and 4 million remain displaced (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022).  

Martin Griffiths, a UN Special Envoy to Yemen who has attempted diplomacy between the Yemeni and Houthi factions, noted that the crisis in Yemen is man-made, and that ending the war is a choice. Yet Mr. Griffiths, and others in the international community who support this premise, fail to specify exactly what allowed Yemen’s crisis to become man-made in the first place. I was interested in researching the reasons behind foreign interference in a failed state because, intuitively, intervention should be a means to end a conflict. In Yemen, the conflict has only been exacerbated, and I wanted to know what went wrong and why.

This map shows Yemen in relation to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other regional countries.  Source:  Wikimedia Commons

To uncover why regional foreign actors interfere in failed states—specifically, Yemen—I planned several phases of research, each of which would take several weeks. First, I planned to look at when and how Yemen became a failed state, including its weaknesses, when and why each foreign and domestic actor intervened, and the overall geopolitical and societal trends of each actor. Next, I planned to examine empirical evidence from the start of the conflict in 2014 to the present, including military data, domestic and economic data, and peace data. For the final weeks of my research time, I planned to compile theories about the motives of Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and Iran. This was done via literature review, whereby I examined the rhetoric of each actor toward Yemen and looked at the contemporary policies and overall belief system of each actor. I planned to conclude my research time by drawing conclusions and drafting an argument that would address my research goal. All research was conducted remotely using sources accessible online.

I used a variety of sources over the course of my research, including both political science and history journal articles. For empirical evidence, I relied upon data collected from the World Bank, the Yemen Data Project and Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, as well as online articles from  MediaWire, Reuters,  and  Al Jazeera.  Specifically, I collected data on the change in Saudi military expenditures, civilian casualties, coalition air raids, political violence, unemployment, government institutions, rule of law, markets, poverty, GDP, supply chains, migration flows, and peace attempts before and during the war. This data was critical, as it allowed me to quantify the potential impact of interference on factors relating to violence, political stability, and economics in a failed state—specifically, Yemen.

I adapted my research plan on numerous occasions. Most of my research was composed of searching the history of Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis on EBSCOHost. From there, I selected data on the conflict and pieced together an argument. When I needed to fill in gaps, I searched news articles. My research was nonlinear, because the ideas grew as I went along, thereby causing me to deviate from my original plan as needed.

Results: Three Opportunities

My research suggests that foreign actors may perceive the cost of intervening in a failed state—a space devoid of authority—as low and therefore simply too good an opportunity to pass up to influence regional power. In pursuing opportunities to intervene in a failed state, foreign actors may exacerbate the conflict and plunge the state into chronic instability. After concluding my research, including my review of the articles and databases mentioned in my methods section, I argue that failed states create three opportunities for actors who intervene.

The first is the Opportunity for Security, in which foreign actors may perceive failed states to be security threats to their own inhabitants and to neighboring countries. Therefore, actors looking to gain favor domestically and regionally may claim to intervene to defend the inhabitants of the failed state while protecting themselves from regional spillover.

The second is the Opportunity for Influence. Because failed states are unable to defend themselves militarily and are unable to pursue diplomatic measures, foreign actors perceive intervention as low risk, and victorious foreign actors gain the opportunity of influencing the restructuring of the government of the failed state in their favor.

The third is the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, in which actors who intervene can amplify their regional power by securing a swift victory at a low cost.

Saudi Arabia: Opportunity for Amplifying Power

With its intervention in the conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia claims to pursue the Opportunity for Security, but the reality shows that it pursues the Opportunity for Amplifying Power. Despite claiming to defend the Yemeni people and restore the Hadi government, the extent and intensity of Saudi Arabia’s military efforts, their unwillingness to cooperate in peace talks with the Houthis and other actors or abide by ceasefires, their blocking of food and medicinal imports, and deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure such as hospitals indicate they are uninterested in the well-being of Yemen’s inhabitants and its stability. Actors insecure in regional power likely pursue more aggressive intervention as a desperate attempt to amplify their regional status. Saudi Arabia’s regional power status has been waning since 2014, driven largely by their dwindling oil reserves and unsuccessful interventions in Iraq after 2003 and Lebanon in 2008 (Council, 2011), which evidences their motivation behind intervention.

As mentioned previously, Saudi Arabia has not acted in a way that suggests it is concerned with a strong Yemeni state, and especially not one as an ally. Driving Yemen into further instability has created a breeding ground for terrorism, illegal immigration, and regional spillover. Under the guise that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Security, Saudi Arabia has been able to justify its intervention as countering Iranian influence while defending itself against fallout from a failed state. In reality, Saudi Arabia’s intentions extend further than self-defense. By pursuing the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, Saudi Arabia has supported an illegitimate government, destroyed critical infrastructure, killed innocent civilians, refused to accept anything other than complete victory over the Houthis, and blocked imports, thereby guaranteeing Yemen’s instability for years to come. 

Iran: Opportunity for Influence

Iran’s intervention in Yemen suggests that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Influence. In contrast with Saudi Arabia, Iran is more stable in regional power. This is evidenced by Iran’s national sovereignty and fierce independence, and that it aligns itself with “Neither East nor West” (Maloney, 2017). Stable actors do not seek to use failed states to boost their status and can instead pursue opportunities related to “soft power”—building support domestically and regionally through positive attraction and persuasion (Nye, 1990). Iran seeks to align itself with marginalized groups—in the case of Yemen, the Houthis—to gain in soft power by being viewed as a “champion of the oppressed and marginalized” (Juneau, 2016). This is the same strategy Iran applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it exerted soft power through reconstruction aid, infrastructure development, media, and financial investments (Wehrey et al., 2009).

Rather than engage militarily in Yemen, Iran has supported the Houthis from a safe distance. During the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Iran provided limited aid to the group. By the time the Yemeni government was overthrown in 2014, Iran supplied some arms and economic support to the Houthis, and as of 2022 it continues to keep its distance (IISS, 2019). Iran’s goal is to establish ties to the Houthis should they secure victory and restructure the government. Although Iran does not directly seek to state-build in Yemen, the opportunity to maintain a steady presence with the Houthis has been low-cost and low-risk.

Map of the Yemeni civil war and Saudi Arabian intervention as of 2021. Red is controlled by the Hadi-led government; green is Houthi controlled; and yellow is controlled by the Southern Transitional Council, a secessionist organization in southern Yemen.  Source:  Wikimedia Commons

Current Situation

As of January 2022, the war continues to drag on, despite Saudi Arabia’s expectation of a quick and decisive victory. Both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are intensifying their efforts, and Iran continues to steadily support the Houthis with arms. To complicate the situation even further, the United Arab Emirates, which has been part of Saudi Arabia’s coalition since 2015, has shown signs of increasing its role in the conflict for its own ends. All this means that peace is still far out of reach. For years, Saudi officials promised that progress was being made in their fight. Instead, Saudi Arabia finds itself struggling to exit Yemen, which has further exemplified its deteriorating regional power. It is likely that Saudi Arabia overestimated its military prowess and strategy. By using a “blank check” strategy for fighting the Houthis, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its lack of understanding of the conflict (Horton, 2020). When compared with the fractured and weakly governed Yemeni army supported by Saudi Arabia, the Houthis have repeatedly been successful against coalition forces by striking fast and staying mobile, and, according to some Western experts, are poised to defeat the coalition forces despite the odds (Horton, 2020). 

If a peace settlement is reached through Saudi Arabia and Iran brokering a peace agreement between the Houthi and Hadi regimes, the question remains: What is to prevent intervention from occurring every time an internal conflict arises? If Yemen and other failed states experience conflicts via revolution or civil war, what can prevent external actors from intervening? As this research has demonstrated, the incentive to intervene in failed states is a powerful one. Reworking a state’s entire structure of government is complex, and there is no one-size-fits-all.

Given that Saudi Arabia sought to amplify its power, its inability to conquer an easy target will be a major blow to its regional power status. If Iran is to cease support, it is likely that the Houthis would be capable of surviving on their own. Having sought gains in soft power, Iran will not lose out as extensively. Regardless, the real loser at the end of the conflict will be Yemen. The real calamity is that unchecked intervention has degraded the state and created further conflict. Under the guise of championing the oppressed, Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and Iran have all made for a grave future for Yemen. I hope that readers will see through the layers of complexity of the Yemen conflict and better understand why foreign intervention can be dangerous and costly.

By studying the conflict in Yemen so deeply, I have garnered a greater appreciation for research in international politics. I underestimated how in-depth and complex the research process is. Most importantly, I have learned that research is not rigid; it morphs and grows with each new discovery, and often more questions arise than answers. Because of this research, I now think about the world in terms of opportunities and incentives, on the global and personal level. My next goal is to apply the ideas that I theorized in this project to an exploration of international politics from a financial incentive perspective. This perspective is important to include in the research of world affairs, because, more often than not, money is at the heart of conflicts. After graduation, I hope to follow my passion for researching international conflict and to publish more of my writing on the subject.

Thank you to Mr. Dana Hamel, who made this research possible through a generous endowment, as well as the Hamel Center for Undergraduate Research staff. Dr. Elizabeth Carter, thank you for inspiring me to pursue international politics research in your United States in World Affairs class. I am incredibly grateful for the opportunity to complete this project and for those who helped me along this journey.

Allinson, Tom. (2019). Yemen’s Houthi rebels: Who are they and what do they want? DW: 01.10.2019.  www.dw.com/en/yemens-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-and-what-do-they-want/a-50667558 .

Al Jazeera. (2022). How the Yemen conflict flare-up affects its humanitarian crisis.   https:/www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/18/yemens-humanitarian-crisis-at-a-glance .

Council on Foreign Relations Press. (2011). Saudi Arabia in the new Middle East.  https://www.cfr.org/report/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east .

Cordesman, A., and Molot, M. (2019). Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: The long-term civil challenges and host country threats from “failed state” wars. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-iraq-syria-libya-and-yemen .

Global Conflict Tracker. (2022, March 11). War in Yemen.  https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen .

Gunaratne, R., and Johnsen, G. (2018). When did the war in Yemen begin?  https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-did-war-yemen-begin .

Haykel, B. (2021). The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen.  https://www.hoover.org/research/houthis-saudi-arabia-and-war-yemen .

Hodali, D. (2021). “Saudi Arabia has lost the war in Yemen.”  https://www.dw.com/en/saudi- arabia-has-lost-the-war-in-yemen/a-57007568 .

Horton, M. (2020). Hot issue—the Houthi art of war: Why they keep winning in Yemen.  https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/ .

IISS (2019). Chapter five: Yemen. Iran’s networks of influence in the Middle East. Routledge.  https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier .

Juneau, T. (2016). Iran’s policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment.  International Affairs, 92 (3), 648.

Maloney, S. (2017). The roots and evolution of Iran’s regional strategy.  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-roots-drivers-and-evolution-of-iran-s-regional-strategy/ .

Milani, M. (2015, April 19). Iran’s game in Yemen: Why Tehran isn’t to blame for the civil war.  Foreign Affairs .  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-04-19/irans-game-yemen .

Nichols, M., and Landay, J. (2021). Iran provides Yemen’s Houthis “lethal” support, U.S. official says.  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-idUSKBN2C82H1 .

Nußberger, B. (2017). Military strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by invitation and self-defence in the course of Yemen’s “model transitional process.”  Journal on the Use      of Force and International Law, 4 (1), 110–160.

Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power.  Foreign Policy, 80 , 153–171.  https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580 .

Reuters. (2022, January 21). U.N. chief condemns deadly Saudi-led coalition strike in Yemen.   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/several-killed-air-strike-detention-centre-yemens-saada-reuters-witness-2022-01-21/.

Rotberg, R. (2016). Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror_chapter.pdf .

Stenslie, S. (2013). Not too strong, not too weak: Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Yemen. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.  https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162439/87736bc4da8b0e482f9492e6e8baacaf.pdf .

Wehrey, F., et al. (2009). Assertiveness and caution in Iranian strategic culture. In  Dangerous  but not omnipotent: Exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian power in the  Middle East  (pp. 7–38). Rand Corporation.

Vatanka, A. (2014). Iran, Saudi Arabia find common ground in Yemen.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia-houthi-islah.html .

Author and Mentor Bios

Bryn Lauer  will graduate from the University of New Hampshire in spring 2022 with a bachelor of science degree in business administration: finance. She hopes to pursue work as a financial economist with a concentration in international affairs. Originally from Durham, New Hampshire, Bryn became interested in international conflict after taking some international politics classes and participating in an internship at the U.S. Department of State. Because of Yemen’s unique position as a failed state, Bryn wanted to understand the motivations of outside actors intervening and how their actions impacted the conflict there. To pursue her research interests, Bryn received an Undergraduate Research Award through the Hamel Center for Undergraduate Research. From the project Bryn gained a deep understanding of the history of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Houthis, as well as learned a lot about the research process itself. Given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, Bryn unfortunately was unable to conduct field research abroad, so she had to rely only on information that was published in databases. This presented a challenge for Bryn, because she had to be able to work through contradicting data to find information that focused specifically on the effects of external intervention of foreign states. Despite the challenges, Bryn was able to piece together the data, history, and geopolitics to develop her own theories, making the research her own.

Elizabeth Carter  has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire since 2015. She specializes in comparative politics, political economy, and Western European politics. Dr. Carter met Bryn in her U.S. and World Affairs course and was delighted to serve as her research mentor after being impressed with an essay on Yemen that Bryn had written for the class. Though she has mentored several undergraduate students for both undergraduate honors theses and as part of Hamel Center Undergraduate Research Awards, this was Dr. Carter’s first time mentoring a student who submitted an article to  Inquiry . Dr. Carter is proud of the great work that Bryn conducted. In addition, Dr. Carter says that it was wonderful to have the experience of enhancing her understanding of a region, like Yemen, that she had not researched much herself, especially with the rigorous research and applications of political science theories and framework that Bryn incorporated into her work. Dr. Carter believes that it’s important for researchers to make research more accessible to broader audiences across multiple disciplines, not just to those engaged in that particular field.

Contact the author 

Copyright 2022, Bryn Lauer

• Research Article

Inquiry Journal

Spring 2022 issue.

• Sustainability
• Embrace New Hampshire
• University News
• The Future of UNH
• Campus Locations
• Calendars & Events
• Directories
• Facts & Figures
• Academic Advising
• Colleges & Schools
• Degrees & Programs
• Undeclared Students
• Course Search
• Study Abroad
• Career Services
• How to Apply
• Visit Campus
• Undergraduate Admissions
• Costs & Financial Aid
• Net Price Calculator
• Graduate Admissions
• UNH Franklin Pierce School of Law
• Housing & Residential Life
• Clubs & Organizations
• New Student Programs
• Student Support
• Fitness & Recreation
• Student Union
• Health & Wellness
• Student Life Leadership
• Sport Clubs
• UNH Wildcats
• Intramural Sports
• Campus Recreation
• Centers & Institutes
• Undergraduate Research
• Research Office
• Graduate Research
• FindScholars@UNH
• Business Partnerships with UNH
• Professional Development & Continuing Education
• Research and Technology at UNH
• Request Information
• Current Students
• Faculty & Staff
• Alumni & Friends

• The war in Yemen, as seen by ordinary Yemenis

Bushra al-Maqtari has collected their testimonies in “What Have You Left Behind?”

What Have You Left Behind? By Bushra al-Maqtari. Translated by Sawad Hussain. Fitzcarraldo Editions; 256 pages; £12.99

F OR a conflict that has caused arguably the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the war in Yemen is often described in the most inhuman ways. It is another front in the long struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or one of those bewildering civil wars that defies comprehension. It is a morality play for Americans frustrated with their country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. It is a full-employment programme for foreign diplomats fond of banal statements about peace talks.

Your browser does not support the <audio> element.

In “What Have You Left Behind?” Bushra al-Maqtari, a journalist, adds a human element to the conflict. This is not the sort of book you take to the beach or skim before bed. Ms Maqtari started touring her country in 2015 to collect testimonies from ordinary Yemenis. What emerged is simply a string of those testimonies, each one more horrific than the last.

Here is Adel Rassam, recounting his family’s flight from the port city of Aden as militias approached: “Panic filled the air like a restless spirit in the wind.” There is Hafsa Munawis, whose sister was killed when their workplace, a potato-chip factory in Sana’a, was hit by an airstrike. “The missile had landed in the fryer with all that boiling hot oil.” Tahani al-Qudsi’s daughters and niece were killed by militia shelling in Taiz. “Pain is engraved on our faces,” she says. “Just write what you see.”

Each chapter ends with a list of the names and ages of those killed in the events just recounted. The names are too many, the ages often far too young. Some were killed by the Houthis , a Shia militant group that seized the capital in 2014 and still controls much of the country. Others were killed by a coalition of Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia , that invaded the following year to dislodge the Houthis.

The identities of their killers do not much matter: this is not a war story, as war stories are often told. There are no heroes. The antagonists are never glimpsed. No one delivers stirring paeans to freedom or the glorious nation. There is only death, suffering and fear. “Only victims are real in this war, victims crushed by violence,” Ms Maqtari writes in her introduction.

But even trying to humanise the war underscores its inhumanity. Some of Ms Maqtari’s subjects reminisce about the past. Rarely do they imagine the future. Neither the Houthis nor the coalition have grand plans for rebuilding a shattered country. The goal is simply to wield power. “What are they fighting over? What is worth all this death?” asks one interviewee, Munira al-Hamidi. She answers her own question: “Neither of them have a reason.”

These words ring true elsewhere in the region as well. In Libya and Syria killing became a goal in and of itself. In places like Iraq and Iran, state violence plays a similar role, albeit on a lesser scale: it is a way for corrupt, useless factions to stay in office. Too much of the Middle East is a zero-sum competition for power.

The war in Yemen is now in its eighth year. That it has dragged on so long is partly thanks to the input of external actors. No one in Ms Maqtari’s book mentions America or Iran directly. Even Saudi Arabia appears infrequently, and often as a footnote. Yet they loom large in every anecdote. The bombs dropped by coalition aeroplanes were probably made in America; the guns used by militiamen may have been supplied by Iran.

No one mentions the UN either. Since April, when it first brokered a two-month ceasefire, violence in Yemen has been ebbing. The truce was prolonged twice. Diplomats were optimistic that this might herald a lasting peace. Yemenis were not.

Sure enough, earlier this month, the truce lapsed: the Houthis would not agree to another extension. Many Yemenis worry that the lull will soon end. The UN has raised less than half the money it needs for humanitarian aid; a new eight-man presidential council meant to broker an end to the conflict is busy arguing among itself. The combatants may no longer know why they are at war. But for the victims, the fighting is all too real. ■

This article appeared in the Culture section of the print edition under the headline “No heroes, only victims”

Culture October 29th 2022

• Binyamin Netanyahu’s memoir is a fascinating study of power
• The joys of pan de muerto, a sweet tribute to departed loved ones
• Siddhartha Mukherjee’s new book is a tour d’horizon of cell theory
• Pinocchio is the hero of our time
• “Papyrus” is a lively history of books in the ancient world

From the October 29th 2022 edition

Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contents

More from Culture

Cautious optimism reigns at Art Basel this year

The continued downturn many feared seems not to have materialised

Exit Kohli? T20 cricket is about to change

The shortest form of the game is becoming even more fiery

What a row over sponsorship reveals about art and Mammon

It betrays childish misconceptions about money, morality and power

How Les Bleus went from zeroes to heroes

“Va-Va-Voom” chronicles the turnaround of the French men’s national team

Famous Birthdays wants to be the Wikipedia for Gen Z

From mega to micro stars, this is a validation that cannot be paid for

Is now the right time to publish a novel by Louis-Ferdinand Céline?

A newly translated book by an antisemitic French novelist is sure to spark debate

• Get involved

• Assessing the impact of war in Yemen - English pdf (8.8 MB)
• تحميل التقرير باللغة العربية pdf (8.8 MB)
• Assessing the impact of war in Yemen - German pdf (13.9 MB)
• Assessing the impact of war in Yemen - Japanese pdf (26.4 MB)

Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery

November 23, 2021.

We are pleased to present the third and final report of the Impact of War trilogy series. UNDP Yemen has once again partnered with the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures. The report,  Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery , continues to apply integrated modeling techniques to better understand the dynamics of the conflict and its impact on development in Yemen.

Released in November 2021, this report explores post-conflict recovery and finds that war has continued to devastate the country; the conflict’s death toll has already grown 60 per cent since 2019. However, if a sustainable and implementable peace deal can be reached, there is still hope for a brighter future in Yemen.

Seven different recovery scenarios were modeled to better understand prospects and priorities for recovery and reconstruction in Yemen. The analysis identified key leverage points and recommendations for a successful recovery – including empowering women, making investments in agriculture, and leveraging the private sector. Moreover, by combining these, it is possible to save hundreds of thousands of additional lives and put Yemen on a path not only to catch up with – but to surpass – its pre-war SDG trajectory by 2050.

Through achieving a peace deal, pursuing an integrated recovery strategy, and leveraging key transformative opportunities, it is indeed possible for Yemen to make up for lost time and offer better opportunities to the next generation.

PREVIOUS REPORTS

In April 2019, the first of three reports,   Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen , commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Yemen, revealed that the war had already set back development by more than two decades and caused more deaths from indirect causes such as hunger and disease than deaths from conflict-related violence.

The second report,  Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) , released in September 2019, predicted that if conflict persists past 2019, Yemen will have the greatest depth of poverty, second poorest imbalance in gender development, lowest caloric intake per capita, second greatest reduction in economic activity relative to 2014, and second greatest income inequality of any country in the world.

Document Type

Regions and countries, sustainable development goals, related publications, publications, promoting an open and inclusive public sphere.

This set of three documents outline how UNDP leverages its unique comparative advantage to advance the principles of openness and inclusion within governance sy...

Putting a Stop to Gender Violence through Community Actio...

This brief shares the successes and lessons learned of the methodology used to inform and encourage the creation of women leaders networks in other contexts and...

The politics of inequality: Why are governance systems no...

Starting from a theoretical framework that conceptualizes policy outcomes as the result of complex interactions between actors, institutions and discourses, thi...

Guidance Note on Supporting Community-Based Reintegration...

Communities are increasingly recognized as playing a fundamental role in addressing the challenges and opportunities involved in the reintegration of individual...

Pathways to Achieving the Global 10-10-10 HIV Targets

This review focuses on initiatives led by key populations and people living with HIV documented in peer reviewed and grey literature published between January 2...

Navigating Towards a Nature-Positive Future: Strategic Up...

This report outlines the progress of the knowledge uptake efforts in eight countries: Cameroon, Colombia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tob...

Programs submenu

Regions submenu, topics submenu, unpacking the european parliament election results, u.s.-india clean energy partnership for 450 gw, nuclear weapons and foreign policy: a conversation with hpsci chairman mike turner, biotech innovation and bayh-dole: a fireside chat with gillian m. fenton.

• Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy
• Aerospace Security Project
• Africa Program
• Americas Program
• Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
• Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
• Asia Program
• Australia Chair
• Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy
• Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy
• Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
• China Power Project
• Chinese Business and Economics
• Defending Democratic Institutions
• Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
• Defense 360
• Defense Budget Analysis
• Diversity and Leadership in International Affairs Project
• Economics Program
• Emeritus Chair in Strategy
• Energy Security and Climate Change Program
• Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
• Freeman Chair in China Studies
• Futures Lab
• Geoeconomic Council of Advisers
• Global Food and Water Security Program
• Global Health Policy Center
• Hess Center for New Frontiers
• Human Rights Initiative
• Humanitarian Agenda
• Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program
• International Security Program
• Japan Chair
• Kissinger Chair
• Korea Chair
• Langone Chair in American Leadership
• Middle East Program
• Missile Defense Project
• Project on Critical Minerals Security
• Project on Fragility and Mobility
• Project on Nuclear Issues
• Project on Prosperity and Development
• Project on Trade and Technology
• Renewing American Innovation Project
• Scholl Chair in International Business
• Smart Women, Smart Power
• Southeast Asia Program
• Stephenson Ocean Security Project
• Strategic Technologies Program
• Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies
• Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program
• All Regions
• Australia, New Zealand & Pacific
• Middle East
• Russia and Eurasia
• American Innovation
• Civic Education
• Climate Change
• Cybersecurity
• Defense Budget and Acquisition
• Defense and Security
• Energy and Sustainability
• Food Security
• Gender and International Security
• Geopolitics
• Global Health
• Human Rights
• Humanitarian Assistance
• Intelligence
• International Development
• Maritime Issues and Oceans
• Missile Defense
• Nuclear Issues
• Transnational Threats
• Water Security

The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War

Photo: Saleh Al-Obeidi/AFP/Getty Images

Table of Contents

Report by Anthony H. Cordesman

Published May 9, 2017

Available Downloads

• Download PDF file of "The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War" 1468kb

By Anthony H. Cordesman

The Middle East is filled with grim wars in failed states—Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—none of which have good options for a lasting peace. The situation in Yemen, however, has moved beyond crisis, to the point of humanitarian nightmare. It has become a stalemate where the casualties from actual combat are limited, but where the fighting has produced a stalemate that has left the entire country without meaningful governance and security, and has crippled an already desperately poor economy.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has released a new report on the war in Yemen, entitled “The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War.” The report is available on the CSIS web site at: csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170509_Yemen_Hard_Choices_Hard_War.pdf?Hv3JAIjcvSh5eBGPB44sP4r4lCn1kJyG

At present, Yemen remains divided between two major factions: a mix of Houthi Shi’ite rebels and military supporters of its former president Ali Abdullah Saleh , and the Saudi and UAE-backed faction that supports a government led by his replacement in a one candidate election: Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

Some two years of fighting have reached a near stalemate in which the Houthi-Saleh faction controls the capital and much of the populated northwest, and the Saudi-UAE-Hadi faction have taken Aden and other cities, and has a decisive edge in air power, but lack the ground forces to drive the Houthi-Saleh faction out of the areas it now controls. At the same time, other warring factions like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various tribal groups add to the fighting and instability in much of the rest of the country.

The result has become a massive humanitarian crisis that will continue to grow until the fighting ends. It has already inflicted a level of economic damage so serious that Yemen may take a take a decade or more to fully recover—even if the fighting does not resume and some form of effective national unity and governance is established.

Like Syria and Somalia, Yemen is a nation that lacks the resources to quickly recover. Worse, it has become a nation that will then find it difficult to move towards some form of sustained post-war development. No one can help Yemen unless it can acquire a level of unity and quality of governance that will allow it to help itself, but even then, it will have no clear prospect of growth and stability without massive outside aid.

This presents major problems in terms of conflict termination, and in finding some kind of U.S. policy option that can help give Yemen a meaningful future. Putting an end to the conflict can only be a first step in easing Yemen’s growing agony. No ceasefire or settlement that leaves a weak, ineffective, and divided government in power can end Yemen’s humanitarian crisis or allow it to move forward.

Real peace and stability can only come if Yemen can reach a level of unity it has lacked in the past, create a modern enough central government to actually focus on recovery and development, and attract major levels of outside aid. Simply ending the fighting may reduce its level of suffering in the short term, but will inevitably prolong it and may well be a prelude to new levels of conflict.

This presents the problem that the United States must seek some solution that will either fully defeat the Houthi and Saleh faction, or find some kind of compromise that will lead the Houthi-Saleh faction to accept an effective central government. At the same time, even the most decisive military victory by the Saudi and UAE-backed government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi offers little hope of effective leadership. The Hadi government may be more secular and free of Iranian influence, but it is far from clear it can lead or govern effectively.

Like America’s role in its other “failed state wars,” winning a war will only be meaningful if it is the prelude to winning a peace. Like it or not, this means giving nation building the same priority as winning some form of military victory. If anything, this may well be the greater challenge.

Read the entire report at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170509_Yemen_Hard_Choices_Hard_War.pdf?Hv3JAIjcvSh5eBGPB44sP4r4lCn1kJyG

Anthony H. Cordesman

Programs & projects.

• Terrorism and Counterinsurgency
• Patterns in Global Terrorism
• U.S. Strategic and Defense Efforts
• MENA Stability Reports and Studies
• Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and the Gulf

• Doctoral Students
• Counter/Argument: A Middle East Podcast
• By Discipline
• Middle East Briefs
• Crown Conversations
• On Hamas and Israel
• Upcoming Events
• Past Events and Recordings
• Open Positions
• Research and Study Grants
• Scholarships, Fellowships and Internships
• Degree Programs
• Graduate Programs
• Brandeis Online
• Summer Programs
• Undergraduate Admissions
• Graduate Admissions
• Financial Aid
• Summer School
• Centers and Institutes
• Funding Resources
• Housing/Community Living
• Clubs and Organizations
• Community Service
• Brandeis Arts Engagement
• Rose Art Museum
• Our Jewish Roots
• Mission and Diversity Statements
• Administration
• Faculty & Staff
• Alumni & Friends
• Parents & Families
• 75th Anniversary
• Campus Calendar
• Directories
• New Students
• Shuttle Schedules
• Support at Brandeis

Crown Center for Middle East Studies

Understanding yemen: before, during, and after conflict.

A Conversation with Yasmeen al-Eryani and Stacey Philbrick Yadav

Organized and edited by David Siddhartha Patel October 3, 2022 In April, the two main warring parties in Yemen—the Houthi movement and the Government of Yemen—agreed to a two-month truce brokered by the United Nations that has since been extended twice. After the initial truce, Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi handed power to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, a development that many Yemenis and observers hope will lead to an end of almost eight years of war in the country. In this Crown Conversation , we spoke with Yasmeen al-Eryani and Stacey Philbrick Yadav about efforts to end the war, the importance of inclusion in peacebuilding, and the myriad ways in which conflict and international humanitarian efforts have changed the nature of research in Yemen. Al-Eryani is the director of research at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, and Philbrick Yadav is an associate professor of international relations at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and a non-resident fellow at the Crown Center. President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in several ways, represented a Yemen that no longer exists, and the eight members of the new Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) each has some amount of influence on the ground in Yemen. Does this place them in a better position to negotiate with the Houthis during the truce? What challenges does the PLC face? Yasmeen al-Eryani: Ten years under President Hadi was catastrophic for Yemen. He actively blocked any openings for reviving peace processes. For Yemenis, he was an absent leader: He was reclusive and seldom addressed the nation, even in the most critical moments. As president, Hadi remained fixated solely on self-preservation and amassing wealth for himself and his sons. Thus, in contrast—and setting aside the questionable formulation on which the PLC was announced and the nature of its composition (mostly military men with clashing political agendas)—I can at least say that the PLC potentially provides us with an opportunity that was not possible under Hadi’s presidency. That being said, even though Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, in his first address as chairperson of the council, stated that “this is a council of peace and not war,” most of its members head an armed faction or have a military background. We have yet to see if the PLC will set Yemen on a path toward peace or one toward further war. When it comes to the prospects for the PLC to help end the conflict in Yemen, the internal and external challenges that it faces are enormous. However, it has one very important advantage: a degree of regional backing that coincides with the intention of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to move on from the Yemen war. If the PLC does not capitalize on this, we risk a situation in which Saudi and the UAE—after figuring out arrangements to secure their borders—orchestrate a rushed exit, absolving themselves from the responsibility for reconstruction and leaving Yemen in a state of a continuous civil war. There is also recent momentum with the UN-led peace process, which culminated in a truce that both preceded the establishment of the PLC by a few days and was extended for the second time in August for an additional two months. Under the truce, the parties agreed to halt all military offensives inside Yemen and across borders; reopen Sanaa International Airport to commercial flights (to and from Amman and Cairo) after six years of closure; allow fuel shipments to enter Hodeidah, the vital port on the Red Sea; and reach an agreement on opening roads to the battleground city of Taiz, which has been under a brutal seven year-long siege by the Houthis. The first three items in the agreement are holding while negotiations on access to Taiz are faltering. Meanwhile, there are reports of large-scale military mobilization by the Houthis around Taiz and Marib, and the Houthis held several military parades during the months of truce. The window to expand the truce into a national ceasefire seems to be closing rapidly with no clear plan for what would happen past October if the truce is not renewed. Similarly, the window of opportunity for the PLC to gain legitimacy by taking practical measures to improve living conditions and service delivery for people in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, and unify anti-Houthi military groups under its banner, is also rapidly closing. The PLC faces several challenges. The first is establishing a healthy equilibrium between its members, knowing that some of them have political projects that deeply contradict the mandate of the PLC. Next, the PLC must figure out a security arrangement that would allow it to operate from inside Yemen. Currently, the PLC chairperson and cabinet members who operate in Aden depend on the security protection of the Southern Transitional Council, a South Yemen secessionist movement whose president is the deputy chairperson of the PLC. Another challenge that the PLC must deal with is a potential resurgence in the South of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) . AQAP controlled much of the governates of Abyan and Shabwah from 2012 to 2014 and carried out numerous assassinations. It took control of Mukalla in 2015-2016. The PLC also must wisely manage and respond to angry mass protests in Aden that are a result of deteriorating economic conditions, rising fuel prices, and a lack of improvement in public service delivery. Compounding these challenges, the supporting bodies that are meant to provide the infrastructure for the PLC—such as the legal team set to draft the PLC’s regulations and decision-making mechanism, the economic team, and the reconciliation commission—are stumbling, with several members stepping down. Additionally, the US$3 billion economic package that Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged in Riyadh upon the establishment of the PLC has not been disbursed yet. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are engaged in discrete negotiations in Muscat without the PLC. This could be seen as sidelining Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi and his council and signaling that the PLC may not be in a better negotiating position with the Houthis than Hadi was. Meanwhile, the Houthis, who have been steadfast in building their own governance and military structures and keeping the population in their areas heavily taxed and heavily policed , have shown no interest in power-sharing. Stacey Philbrick Yadav: For several years already, Yemenis have been quite clear that President Hadi had limited representational authority and could not be expected to effectively negotiate a sustainable outcome. So, from that perspective, the shift to a presidential council is a late-arriving recognition of that reality. But the current diplomatic framing is still one that emphasizes a fundamentally binary conflict between some kind of “Government of Yemen” and the Houthi insurgents. I am concerned that this is an unrealistic approach for two reasons. The first is that it underestimates the extent of fragmentation and conflict within the “government” camp, and the second is that it underestimates the extent to which governance has been institutionalized by the Houthis. The fact that the Presidential Council hasn’t met in weeks speaks to this point, as does the fact that the primary violations of the truce have thus far fallen outside of the framework established by the truce and unfolded largely among different Yemeni factions. While the truce has contributed to a significant reduction in cross-border conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, it has not addressed Houthi violence against domestic adversaries, which is still substantial, or conflict among the weakly-integrated members of the PLC. The Houthis have controlled at least some of the Yemeni bureaucracy for seven years, and their de facto authority has also enabled the implementation of new institutions and practices in areas under their control. It is not enough to consider the Houthis as a threat to the state—they are, though they are not alone in this—but they have also effectively assumed the role of the state in some parts of the country. That is a different kind of peacebuilding challenge than, say, defeating an armed insurgency: It means really reckoning with the prospect of some kind of postwar power-sharing. The longer the war goes on, of course, this prospect becomes more unpalatable to many Yemenis, and understandably so. Looking at other analogous conflicts of internationalized civil war, however, underscores why some kind of planning for post-conflict justice is so important. In contexts where there has been little or no accountability for wartime injustices—like Lebanon, for example—the postwar political integration of former antagonists continues to be a driver of instability. The UN and many aid organizations often emphasize the importance of inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states. What does the Yemeni experience tell us about what “inclusion” does and does not mean? Yasmeen al-Eryani: I think the word “inclusion” in the context of peacebuilding always calls for more scrutiny: inclusion of whom, when, and how? Is the inclusion embedded in structures that empower those who are meant to be included: Do they feel empowered to affect change? How do we define the categories of those who should be included, and who is left out from these definitions? I think that once you get into answering these questions in the context of peacebuilding in Yemen, the limitations and shortcomings become evident. The war in Yemen was preceded by an attempt at a national dialogue (the National Dialogue Conference, or NDC, of 2013–2014) that—even if not adequately inclusive—was expansive and witnessed a dynamic civil engagement. Some may be critical of the process that was followed, but few would deny that the conversation then was broader than it is now. The stark contrast between the period before the war and the period following the outbreak of war is quite telling of how war, literally overnight, can redefine who gets included and who is excluded from peacebuilding. From that point on, the peace process focused solely on “bringing to the table” the conflict parties: Those with the guns got to dictate the parameters for peace. Sidelining civil society that was activated prior to and around the NDC as soon as armed conflict started was a miscalculation. It created a rupture within Yemeni civil society. Shortly after, many civil society actors became internally displaced or fled the country, and it became difficult for them to organize after losing existing networks and an operational framework. It took time for some to reorganize, to adapt to the new reality, to establish networks in Yemen and in the diaspora, and to rethink their advocacy work as the war took on international and regional dimensions. The UN, which is mandated to lead the peace process, watched as civil society was being suffocated in Yemen and did little to counter that or establish new operational frameworks for civil society to mobilize during the war period, particularly in the early years of the war. This demonstrates how, in practice, inclusion in the peace process continues to remain superficial. Women rights organizations, which form a dynamic and big part of civil society organizations in Yemen, were relegated after the outbreak of war to an advisory role with little power to affect change, shape peacebuilding approaches, or be included in direct negotiations. In the past few months, with the current UN special envoy, Hans Grundberg, there have been attempts for broader consultations. But it remains unclear whether these will result in anything meaningful. At the same time, you have an array of international NGOs (INGOs) and a few Yemeni NGOs working on middle- and grassroots levels of informal peace initiatives, which are more inclusive and flexible compared to the formal peace process. However, their work is still restricted by the priorities of the UN envoy’s office and is not without problems. There is always a question of power imbalances and hierarchical relationships in the context of INGOs and Yemeni organizations. Competition over resources and limited incentives for collective action and coordination make the work of INGOs on peace atomized and disconnected from each other. This again may be a result of a lack of an operational framework that could support and empower parallel tracks for peace building, especially local ones. It is important to note that no one organization or single initiative alone can or should be expected to achieve an adequate level of inclusion. This is only possible if the peacebuilding environment in Yemen, especially those efforts financed by international aid, becomes more conducive to collective initiatives and less restricted by a single formal peace track. Furthermore, we still need to investigate a bit more what we mean by “inclusion” in terms of who gets included. Do we include victims of violations? How do we go about including people in remote rural areas? How do we reach the 40% or more of Yemenis who are illiterate? What about ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities? I have not seen these questions tackled seriously by those leading the peace process in Yemen. In my view, without taking inclusion seriously and creating the frameworks and mechanisms that are permissible for it, we risk having a very short-lived peace that doesn’t address root causes of the conflict and reduces peace to a settlement deal shaped by the narrow interests of armed groups and a mere interlude before future conflicts—if we even reach that point at all. Stacey Philbrick Yadav: I couldn’t agree with Yasmeen more on the need to scrutinize the language (and practice) of inclusion. This is something that fascinates me, from a research standpoint. There really does appear to be a substantial gap between what international organizations and their representatives mean when they talk about inclusion and what it seems to mean to many of my Yemeni interlocutors. This is not a new distinction, either, but one that goes back (at least) as far as the post-2011 transitional framework. In very broad strokes, I characterize the two approaches as one that emphasizes the importance of voice and one that seeks to shape outcomes. There is a relationship between these two, of course—voice can be used to shape outcomes. But some people, particularly civil actors, express frustrations at being called to the table to offer “input” or share perspectives, knowing that actual decisions are being made by others. These others include humanitarian and international organizations, of course, but also conflict actors. I have seen some encouraging examples, usually in hyperlocal contexts, where being invited to offer input has resulted in the development of consensus and has produced identifiable outcomes, such as bringing members of previously-excluded groups into local government at the municipal level where they actually exercise some decision-making power. But I hear a lot from activists, researchers, and other civil actors who feel discouraged by years of giving input, to little effect. Yemen remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, with over 20 million people in need of assistance. How has the influx of aid operations from international donors and transnational aid organizations affected NGOs and think-tanks on the ground in Yemen? Yasmeen al-Eryani: Yemeni civil society, including NGOs, were very mobile and active in the decades prior to the war. They developed networks within human rights groups regionally and internationally, and some had experience in advocacy work and legislative reforms. Women’s organizations were, and remain, very active and dynamic. When the war broke out there was an obvious rupture in civil society: Many people involved in civil society organizations fled the country, became displaced, or were fearful of speaking up. The space for civil action shrank drastically over a period of a couple of months. Those who remained readjusted their operations from human rights and advocacy to humanitarian aid, which is—in principle—non-political. But the power dynamics in aid-funding mechanisms created unhealthy structures, with Yemeni organizations taking the highest risk while acting as subcontractors to international NGOs or UN agencies who have limited presence on the ground. However, I think politics always finds its way through the cracks. In the Sana’a Center, I work closely and on a long-term basis with NGOs from across Yemen , and I do not sense that they have become less political or have given up their work in advocacy, accountability, human rights, and women’s and youth participation. And, just as importantly, some gained commendable experience in peace processes and peacebuilding. This makes me hopeful that they will be the ones to do the heavy lifting once the guns fall silent. It is however important to empower them now and prepare for this transition to avoid yet another rupture. Stacey Philbrick Yadav: It is clear that donor-directed projects are shaping research, as well as programming. In a project I worked on that involved mapping peacebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) across the country, people talked a lot about the humanitarianization of peacebuilding, even if they didn’t always use this language to describe it. CSO staff talked about pressure that they have faced to abandon programming oriented toward reconciliation or mediation in favor of needs assessment and direct delivery of aid. On the one hand, it makes sense because CSO staff may have the research skills to do the assessments and the networks and capacity to deliver aid in areas that are inaccessible to international organizations. But, on the other hand, it also reflects a different understanding of the relationship between conflict and need, where Yemeni peacebuilders are more likely to view conflict as a driver of humanitarian crisis, not the reverse. And some worry that realigning their work is stripping the peacebuilding sector of important resources and reducing Yemeni agency in important ways. The Sana’a Center, where Yasmeen works, published an excellent series of papers on some of the ways that donor-driven humanitarianization is extending the war: It was a tough subject to take on, and I appreciate that they wrestled openly with internal discussions at the Sana’a Center about whether to even write it. It underscores the essential role that Yemeni-led organizations are playing as knowledge-producers and reflects an important perspective that helps explain, at least in part, why the war in Yemen, eight years in, remains so difficult to resolve. Before 2014, Yemen was one of the most dynamic sites of research in the Arab world. How has the war affected what is being studied in and about Yemen and how the country and its people are understood? What is not being studied now? Stacey Philbrick Yadav: There have been qualitative and quantitative changes to what is being written about Yemen, I think, especially if you consider materials produced in English. When I started doing research in Yemen in the early 2000s, there were relatively few foreign researchers there, and we tended to rely on ethnographic field research, whether or not we were in the field of anthropology. This was a function of research infrastructure and the kinds of questions people were asking. But this tended to produce an unavoidably fragmentary portrait of the country, where individual researchers knew a great deal about a specific place/time/question. The establishment of the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) in 2004 began to make systematic national-level surveys possible. And the YPC understood the necessity of training local researchers to do data collection under diverse conditions, among men and women, etc. Organizationally, I think it was a kind of bridge to the current situation, where Yemeni researchers have become vital to knowledge-production at all scales. These Yemeni researchers are not simply deploying the questions that others have designed but are playing a central role in the conceptualization and design of research. But most of this research is funded from abroad—with international organizations and government agencies funding research that Yemeni researchers design and execute. Yasmeen is one of the first people to publicly point out the distorting effect this has on the kinds of questions that are being asked, and it’s such an important observation.  Laurent Bonnefoy recently wrote a good overview of this , as well, from his vantage point as a longstanding researcher writing about Yemen for academic audiences. The war—mapping conflict dynamics, assessing needs, identifying peacebuilding resources at the local level—has thoroughly permeated research on Yemen for the past several years and has crowded out a lot of questions. I tend to view this shift, though, as substantial in another way. So many foreign researchers, myself included, have not been able to travel to Yemen during the war. This has shifted the balance of who is writing about Yemen and why. The war has created a previously unprecedented opportunity for Yemenis to be the primary narrators of the conflict in Yemen. There have also been some opportunities for collaborative research between foreign scholars and Yemeni partners. I have had the chance to work on several of these; they are not uncomplicated, but they are deeply enriching. A lot of the collaborative work that I am aware of has been initiated through organizations like the one where Yasmeen works: new “hybrid” research and advocacy organizations established primarily by Yemeni researchers. In my forthcoming book , I talk about the relationship between research, description, and narration: the way the story gets told, who tells it, and the advocacy purposes to which research is put. These are all important sources of political agency. In our conversations about this, Yasmeen has raised some good questions about risks raised by the current research environment, and I don’t want to minimize this at all. But I am excited, frankly, to encounter such a new terrain of knowledge-production. Yasmeen al-Eryani: Stacey raises a very important point when it comes to understanding the research landscape in Yemen: What kind of questions get to be asked and by whom? As someone directing research in a Yemeni organization and working closely with Yemeni researchers on the ground, the question about the ownership of narratives on Yemen is at the forefront of what I do. As I see it, the war affected social science research on Yemen in at least three ways. The first is access and research feasibility. The war made it very difficult to access large and populated areas to openly conduct research; survey and focus groups became even more difficult and too risky in highly policed or militarized areas. In these conditions, research participants would also likely self-censor, and this undermines research results. Existing challenges to research prior to the war had to do mostly with geography and reaching inhabitants of remote mountainous villages. But, today, access is hindered across large swathes of the country, making large-scale research difficult and risky. Under such conditions, the research center in which I lead the research department must now rely on personal networks to conduct key informant interviews and, albeit to a lesser extent, focus groups. Furthermore, and Stacey alludes to this in her research, this work is becoming highly securitized, putting anyone who handles data and information at risk. Second, the war changed who is carrying out research and who is funding it. International academics have lost almost all access to the field; even those with decades of experience conducting field research in Yemen are unable to do research as they did before. As for Yemeni academics, Yemeni universities had low publication rates even before the war. I have not seen specific figures, but I can imagine that the situation has worsened, given the dire conditions in which universities and faculty are operating. Many Yemeni academics have either left the country or lost their source of income, access to their research sites, and ability to travel abroad and participate in academic conferences. Many Yemeni academics also feel pressure to self-censor to avoid arbitrary detentions or worse. Nevertheless, I think the war led to the creation of a very important movement of Yemeni-led policy research centers, such as the Sana’a Center, the Yemen Policy Center, and a few others. These centers are led by young Yemenis, both inside and outside of the country, who want to reclaim the narrative when it comes to knowledge production on Yemen. The centers emerged at a time when there was a lot of interest to better understand Yemen and to talk to Yemenis who know the context well, and they managed to fill a gap in innovative and courageous ways, publishing extensively on various policy topics and training local experts in research methods. In contrast, we have UN agencies and their partner international and local NGOs that conduct research for humanitarian plans and for purposes of aid distribution and a few international policy research centers and think tanks, most of which have no direct access to the field. You also see hybrid publications that mix research and investigative journalism, which is also an interesting shift in that a good amount of research is now happening outside of academic institutions. Nevertheless, prior to the war, I had the sense that much of the research on Yemen lacked conceptual development with a tendency to under-theorize. Now, with fewer opportunities for immersive academic research and more international aid-driven policy research, we’re looking at knowledge production that can quickly become outdated. That being said, I am not completely pessimistic about how Yemen is being studied and understood now. I think that once the situation stabilizes and the space for research becomes more permissible, we will see very interesting work come along. Many of those researchers who have been on standby, following Yemen from afar, or those in Yemen keeping notes and waiting for the right and safe time to publish will have their moment. We could see research in Yemen take off in completely new directions than what we have been used to in the past. This takes me to the third, albeit related, way that the war has affected research in Yemen: What is being researched, and this is perhaps directly linked to what Stacey said, and “what questions get to be asked?” Prior to 2011, a lot of social science research on Yemen focused on certain geographical areas, particularly around the capital region and its surrounding villages. Research focused on the powerful tribes in these areas and the former regime’s modes of governance and patronage networks. Security was also a common theme when it came to Yemen, with a lot of attention on extremist groups post-9/11. From 2011 to 2014, there was a lot of interest in social movements and the uprising of 2011. But, during the war years, we have seen a shift in focus from northern tribes to tribes in the east, such as in Marib, Shabwa, and Mahrah. There has also been significant research on Yemeni minorities, the economy of war, and gaining a deeper understanding of local conflict drivers. We also see an abundance of the type of research that focuses on the geopolitical dimension of the war, one in which Yemen features superficially. Again, we see this rupture in the research space caused by the war reshaping research on Yemen. Overall, the interest in knowledge production and in research is growing among international donors and regional and international actors to better understand the context and define their interventions. However, these are transient research interests. It is important to build projects around supporting and reviving research in Yemen, supporting communities of knowledge and practice, and supporting Yemeni researchers to continue working and networking with adequate safety nets. And, most importantly, projects should ensure that the research taking place is held to ethical standards. Yemenis are already vulnerable to violations, and research can exacerbate these vulnerabilities. This is a serious matter that I think is not getting adequate attention at the moment. For more Crown Center publications on Yemen, see : "Fragmentation and Localization in Yemen's War: Challenges and Opportunities for Peace" and "A Passing Generation of Yemeni Politics." The opinions and findings expressed in this Conversation belong to the authors exclusively and do not reflect those of the Crown Center or Brandeis University.

• Opportunities

Invest in news coverage you can trust.

Donate to PBS NewsHour by June 30 !

Jon Gambrell, Associated Press Jon Gambrell, Associated Press

Leave your feedback

• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/in-conflict-with-yemens-houthi-rebels-u-s-navy-faces-most-intense-combat-since-world-war-ii

In conflict with Yemen’s Houthi rebels, U.S. Navy faces most intense combat since World War II

ABOARD THE USS LABOON IN THE RED SEA (AP) — The U.S. Navy prepared for decades to potentially fight the Soviet Union, then later Russia and China, on the world’s waterways. But instead of a global power, the Navy finds itself locked in combat with a shadowy, Iran-backed rebel group based in Yemen.

The U.S.-led campaign against the Houthi rebels, overshadowed by the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip, has turned into the most intense running sea battle the Navy has faced since World War II, its leaders and experts told The Associated Press.

READ MORE: Houthis may be running low on their weapons stocks as attacks on ships slow, U.S. commander says

The combat pits the Navy’s mission to keep international waterways open against a group whose former arsenal of assault rifles and pickup trucks has grown into a seemingly inexhaustible supply of drones, missiles and other weaponry. Near-daily attacks by the Houthis since November have seen more than 50 vessels clearly targeted, while shipping volume has dropped in the vital Red Sea corridor that leads to the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean.

The Houthis say the attacks are aimed at stopping the war in Gaza and supporting the Palestinians, though it comes as they try to strengthen their position in Yemen. All signs suggest the warfare will intensify — putting U.S. sailors, their allies and commercial vessels at more risk.

“I don’t think people really understand just kind of how deadly serious it is what we’re doing and how under threat the ships continue to be,” Cmdr. Eric Blomberg with the USS Laboon told the AP on a visit to his warship on the Red Sea.

“We only have to get it wrong once,” he said. “The Houthis just have to get one through.”

Seconds to act

The pace of the fire can be seen on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, where the paint around the hatches of its missile pods has been burned away from repeated launches. Its sailors sometimes have seconds to confirm a launch by the Houthis, confer with other ships and open fire on an incoming missile barrage that can move near or beyond the speed of sound.

“It is every single day, every single watch, and some of our ships have been out here for seven-plus months doing that,” said Capt. David Wroe, the commodore overseeing the guided missile destroyers.

One round of fire on Jan. 9 saw the Laboon, other vessels and F/A-18s from the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower shoot down 18 drones, two anti-ship cruise missiles and a ballistic missile launched by the Houthis.

Nearly every day — aside from a slowdown during the holy Muslim fasting month of Ramadan — the Houthis launch missiles, drones or some other type of attack in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait that connects the waterways and separates Africa from the Arabian Peninsula.

The Navy saw periods of combat during the “Tanker Wars” of the 1980s in the Persian Gulf, but that largely involved ships hitting mines. The Houthi assaults involve direct attacks on commercial vessels and warships.

“This is the most sustained combat that the U.S. Navy has seen since World War II — easily, no question,” said Bryan Clark, a former Navy submariner and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. “We’re sort of on the verge of the Houthis being able to mount the kinds of attacks that the U.S. can’t stop every time, and then we will start to see substantial damage. … If you let it fester, the Houthis are going to get to be a much more capable, competent, experienced force.”

Dangers at sea and in the air

While the Eisenhower appears to largely stay at a distance, destroyers like the Laboon spend six out of seven days near or off Yemen — the “weapons engagement zone,” in Navy speak.

Sea combat in the Mideast remains risky, something the Navy knows well. In 1987, an Iraqi fighter jet fired missiles that struck the USS Stark, a frigate on patrol in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, killing 37 sailors and nearly sinking the vessel.

There’s also the USS Cole, targeted in 2000 by boat-borne al-Qaida suicide bombers during a refueling stop in Yemen’s port city of Aden, which killed 17 on board. AP journalists saw the Cole patrolling the Red Sea with the Laboon on Wednesday, the same day the Houthis launched a drone-boat attack against a commercial ship there that disabled the vessel.

Rear Adm. Marc Miguez, the Navy’s commander for its Carrier Strike Group Two, which includes the Eisenhower and supporting ships, said the Navy had taken out one underwater bomb-carrying drone launched by the Houthis as well during the campaign.

“We currently have pretty high confidence that not only is Iran providing financial support, but they’re providing intelligence support,” Miguez said. “We know for a fact the Houthis have also gotten training to target maritime shipping and target U.S. warships.”

Asked if the Navy believed Iran picks targets for the Houthis, Miguez would only say there was “collaboration” between Tehran and the rebels. He also noted Iran continues to arm the Houthis, despite U.N. sanctions blocking weapons transfers to them.

Iran’s mission to the United Nations told the AP that Tehran “is adept at thwarting the U.S. strategy in a way that not only strengthens (the Houthis) but also ensures compliance with the pertinent resolutions.”

The risk isn’t just on the water. The U.S.-led campaign has carried out numerous airstrikes targeting Houthi positions inside Yemen, including what the U.S. military describes as radar stations, launch sites, arsenals and other locations. One round of U.S. and British strikes on May 30 killed at least 16 people, the deadliest attack acknowledged by the rebels.

The Eisenhower’s air crews have dropped over 350 bombs and fired 50 missiles at targets in the campaign, said Capt. Marvin Scott, who oversees all the air group’s aircraft. Meanwhile, the Houthis apparently have shot down multiple MQ-9 Reaper drones with surface-to-air missile systems.

“The Houthis also have surface-to-air capabilities that we have significantly degraded, but they are still present and still there,” Scott said. “We’re always prepared to be shot at by the Houthis.”

A stalemated war

Officers acknowledge some grumbling among their crew, wondering why the Navy doesn’t strike harder against the Houthis. The White House hasn’t discussed the Houthi campaign at the same level as negotiations over the Israel-Hamas war.

There are several likely reasons. The U.S. has been indirectly trying to lower tensions with Iran, particularly after Tehran launched a massive drone-and-missile attack on Israel and now enriches uranium closer than ever to weapons-grade levels.

Meanwhile, there’s the Houthis themselves. The rebel group has battled a Saudi-led coalition into a stalemate in a wider war that’s killed more than 150,000 people, including civilians, and created one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters.

The U.S. directly fighting the Houthis is something the leaders of the Zaydi Shiite group likely want. Their motto long has been “God is the greatest; death to America; death to Israel; curse the Jews; victory to Islam.” Combating the U.S. and siding publicly with the Palestinians has some in the Mideast praising the rebels.

While the U.S. and European partners patrol the waterways, Saudi Arabia largely has remained quiet, seeking a peace deal with the Houthis. Reports suggest some Mideast nations have asked the U.S. not to launch attacks on the Houthis from their soil, making the Eisenhower’s presence even more critical. The carrier has had its deployment extended, while its crew has had only one port call since its deployment a week after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel.

Meanwhile, the Houthi attacks continue to depress shipping through the region. Revenue for Egypt from the Suez Canal — a key source of hard currency for its struggling economy — has halved since the attacks began. AP journalists saw a single commercial ship moving through the once-busy waterway.

“It’s almost a ghost town,” Blomberg acknowledged.

Jon Gambrell, the news director for the Gulf and Iran for The Associated Press, has reported from each of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran and other locations across the world since joining the AP in 2006.

Support Provided By: Learn more

Support PBS NewsHour:

Educate your inbox

Subscribe to Here’s the Deal, our politics newsletter for analysis you won’t find anywhere else.

Thank you. Please check your inbox to confirm.

In Pictures

Photos: 7 years of Yemen war, 7 things that changed for 7 people

With unstoppable inflation and civilian casualties on the rise, the war in yemen will enter its eighth year on march 26..

The ruinous war in Yemen will enter its eighth year this week.

A military coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened in late March 2015 to support Yemen’s government against the Houthi rebels, who had seized the country’s populous central and northern highlands, including the capital, Sanaa.

Since then, tens of thousands of people have been killed and about four million displaced, while two-thirds of the nearly 30 million population still depend on humanitarian assistance to survive.

The beginning of 2022 was marked by a sharp escalation in the conflict. January alone saw more civilian casualties than all of 2021, with almost one person being killed or wounded every hour.

In addition to the daily fights on front lines, air raids and cross-border attacks, the conflict is also fought economically.

The different parties try to control commodities, natural resources, trade flows, taxes and fuel revenues and the impact disproportionally affects civilians. As a result, the Yemeni currency in the south dropped to an unprecedented low at the end of last year, creating a domino effect on people’s lives when they were already facing steep inflation and rising fuel prices.

People earn the same money, but they have to pay for more basic things. But this is just one of the many things that have changed in the daily life of Yemenis since the war began. Here are seven things that changed for seven people in the last seven years.

Some names* have been changed to protect their identity.

This photo essay is provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council 

UN envoy warns Yemenis not to return to the battlefield

Facebook Twitter Print Email

After months of relative stability in Yemen between Government and Houthi forces, a return to all-out war is looking inevitable unless the current escalation in violence is halted, the top UN envoy for the country said on Thursday.

Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yemen Hans Grundberg warned ambassadors in the Security Council that recent months have seen a “gradual increase” in fighting in several locations, as well as consistent threats by all sides to return to war.

If the parties continue the current escalatory trajectory the “question is not if, but when”, they return to the battlefield, he added.

A Saudi-led coalition siding with Government forces have been embroiled in fighting with the Houthis and their allies since 2015 but a UN-brokered ceasefire which lapsed in 2022, continued to hold for months as peace talks continued.  

Mediation efforts have stalled and with the onset of the war in Gaza, the Houthis pledged out of solidarity to attack what they deemed to be pro-Israeli shipping interests along the Red Sea coast using the Suez Canal.  

The situation remains unresolved, with the Houthis – formally known as Ansar Allah – having increased its strikes on commercial and military ships.

For its part, a United States (US)-led coalition defending shipping in the Red Sea has continued its airstrikes in areas controlled by Houthis in Hudaydah, the capital Sana’a and Ta’iz.

Crackdown on UN, NGOs

Mr. Grundberg also highlighted the precarious situation for the civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the UN, who have become the target of a crackdown by Ansar Allah.

Last week, 13 UN personnel, five staff members of international NGOs, and many more from national NGOs and civil society were detained by the group. They remain in incommunicado detention, adding to four UN staff members who have been held since 2021 and 2023 (two each year) respectively.

“The United Nations is present to serve Yemenis. Such arbitrary detentions are not the expected signal of an actor who is seeking a mediated solution to conflict ,” the Special Envoy said, calling for the immediate of all UN and NGO personnel.

Zero-sum game

He went on to note that despite his efforts to advance on a process leading to a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the warring parties in Yemen “have reverted to a zero-sum game”.  

“ Instead of putting the Yemenis first, they have opted for measures they believe will strengthen their own position . This risks jeopardizing the viability of the commitments made earlier.”

The zero-sum game is most evident in the dire economic situation.

The banking system in disarray and financial institutions in Ansar Allah-controlled Sana’a are cut off from international systems, impacting trade and remittances.

Catastrophic ramifications

Elaborating on the banking crisis, Edem Wosornu, the Director of Operations at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ( OCHA ), warned of the catastrophic ramifications, including serious repercussions for humanitarian relief operations.

A potentially imminent decision to exclude banks based in Sana’a from using the SWIFT banking system would prevent the banks there from facilitating international financial transactions.

Together with other issues plaguing the sector, this threatens to further fragment and weaken Yemen’s already struggling economy, she said, likely worsening poverty and hunger, and increasing reliance on humanitarian assistance.

“ The increasingly volatile banking environment has worsened an existing liquidity crisis , making it very difficult for humanitarian organizations to pay staff salaries or to procure and pay for the many services they rely on for their operations,” she said, calling for urgent solutions from the international community to alleviate the crisis.

• security council

We've detected unusual activity from your computer network

To continue, please click the box below to let us know you're not a robot.

Why did this happen?

Please make sure your browser supports JavaScript and cookies and that you are not blocking them from loading. For more information you can review our Terms of Service and Cookie Policy .

For inquiries related to this message please contact our support team and provide the reference ID below.

Advertisement

Houthis Attack Merchant Ship in Red Sea Off Yemen’s Coast

The Iran-backed militia has launched dozens of attacks on shipping vessels in the vital sea route in support of Palestinians in Gaza.

• Share full article

By Anjana Sankar

• June 12, 2024

Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked a merchant ship in the Red Sea on Wednesday in the latest escalation of the Iran-backed militia’s campaign against shipping in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

A British government maritime agency said the vessel was “hit on the stern by a small craft” about 66 nautical miles southwest of the Houthi-held port of Hodeida in Yemen.

After the attack, the ship was “taking on water, and not under command of the crew,” the agency, The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, said in a statement on its website. The statement said the ship’s master had reported it was also “hit for a second time by an unknown airborne projectile.”

A Houthi military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said in a televised speech that the group had used unmanned surface boats, a number of drones and ballistic missiles to target the ship, which he identified as the Tutor, a Greek-owned bulk carrier. He claimed the ship was seriously damaged and could sink.

On Wednesday, the Houthis said they launched two joint military operations with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, on the Israeli cities Ashdod and Haifa, a claim Israel denied.

Since November, the Houthis have launched dozens of attacks on ships in the vital sea route in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, stifling global maritime trade.

In retaliation, the U.S. and British navies have been intensifying airstrikes against Houthi targets, the latest coming on June 7 after the rebel group detained 11 United Nations employees in Yemen.

The U.S. Central Command said its forces had destroyed four aerial drones and two anti-ship missiles in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen last Friday, as well as a Houthi patrol boat in the Red Sea.

In February, American military officials said the United States struck five Houthi military targets, including an undersea drone they described as an “unmanned underwater vessel” that they believed the Houthis could have received from Iran.

• Election 2024
• Entertainment
• Newsletters
• Photography
• Personal Finance
• AP Investigations
• AP Buyline Personal Finance
• AP Buyline Shopping
• Press Releases
• Israel-Hamas War
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Global elections
• Asia Pacific
• Latin America
• Middle East
• Election Results
• Delegate Tracker
• AP & Elections
• Auto Racing
• 2024 Paris Olympic Games
• Movie reviews
• Book reviews
• Personal finance
• Financial Markets
• Business Highlights
• Financial wellness
• Artificial Intelligence
• Social Media

A missile strike from Yemen’s Houthi rebels sets a cargo ship on fire in Gulf of Aden

A fighter jet parks on the deck of the USS aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, also known as ‘IKE’, in the Red Sea, Tuesday, June 11, 2024. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

The USS aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, also known as ‘IKE’, sails in the Red Sea on Wednesday, June 12, 2024. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

A fighter jet takes off from the USS aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, also known as ‘IKE’, in the Red Sea, Tuesday, June 11, 2024. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

• Copy Link copied

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Yemen’s Houthi rebels launched two anti-ship cruise missiles and struck a commercial ship Thursday in the Gulf of Aden off Yemen, setting it on fire and severely wounding one civilian mariner, authorities said.

The M/V Verbena was still ablaze and the mariner was flown by a U.S. helicopter based on the USS Philippine Sea to another nearby ship for medical treatment, the U.S. military’s Central Command said.

In a statement, Central Command said the Verbena is a Palauan-flagged, Ukrainian-owned and Polish-operated bulk cargo carrier that had docked in Malaysia and was on its way to Italy carrying wood. “The M/V Verbena reported damage and subsequent fires on board. The crew continues to fight the fire,” the statement said.

The attack is the latest such assault in the Houthis’ campaign over the Israel-Hamas war.

Earlier Thursday, the British military’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center said a vessel had been attacked and had caught fire. And the private security firm Ambrey said a merchant vessel made a radio distress call saying it had been struck by a missile.

The Houthis later claimed the attack on the Verbena, as well as attacks on two other ships in the Red Sea. Central Command said the Houthis had launched two ballistic missiles in the Red Sea that caused “no injuries or significant damage.”

The UKMTO said one vessel earlier missed by the Houthis was hit by a “third projectile” that caused “minor damage.” The vessel was able to remain underway, it said.

The attack on the Verbena follows the Houthis launching a boat-borne bomb attack against a commercial ship in the Red Sea on Wednesday.

Central Command also said it destroyed a Houthi drone boat and two patrol boats in the Red Sea, as well as one airborne drone.

The Houthis, who seized Yemen’s capital nearly a decade ago and have been fighting a Saudi-led coalition since shortly after, have been targeting shipping throughout the Red Sea corridor .

They say the attacks are aimed at stopping the war and supporting the Palestinians, though the attacks often target vessels that have nothing to do with the conflict .

The war in Gaza has killed more than 36,000 Palestinians there, according to Gaza health officials, while hundreds of others have been killed in Israeli operations in the West Bank. It began after Hamas-led militants attacked Israel on Oct. 7, killing about 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostage.

The Houthis have launched more than 50 attacks on shipping, killed three sailors, seized one vessel and sunk another since November, according to the U.S. Maritime Administration. A U.S.-led airstrike campaign has targeted the Houthis since January, with a series of strikes May 30 killing at least 16 people and wounding 42 others, the rebels say.

Also Thursday, the Washington-based National Democratic Institute said three of its staff were detained by the Houthis earlier this month. Their detention comes as staff of United Nations agencies and those working for aid groups also have been detained in a widening crackdown by the rebels.

“This arbitrary and inhumane treatment of Yemeni citizens involved in humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, democracy and human rights, peacemaking and civil society development is entirely without foundation and must be ended immediately,” the institute said. It called for the “swift release by the Houthi regime of our staff, and of all individuals who have been unjustly detained.”

The institute is a democracy promotion organization that has worked in Yemen since 1993. It receives funding from the U.S. government and others.

Associated Press writer Lolita C. Baldor in Washington contributed to this report.

We use cookies to enhance our website for you. Proceed if you agree to this policy or learn more about it.

• Essay Database >
• Essay Examples >
• Essays Topics >
• Essay on Middle East

Example Of War In Yemen Essay

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: Middle East , Saudi Arabia , Politics , Violence , War , Iran , Government , Muslim

Words: 2750

Published: 10/24/2021

ORDER PAPER LIKE THIS

The crisis in Yemen, which is known to be a poor country with corrupted rulers, began in the year 2012 with the revolution against Ali Abdullah Saleh, who, as president of the country, had led Yemen for more than twenty years. Saleh resigned office in 2012 as per an earlier agreement between the Government of Yemen and the opposition groups. Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, the former vice president of Saleh wished to unite the fragmented landscape of Yemen by defending the threat to the country from forces trying to revolt from different sides. Yemen had to face the Al Qaeda threat from the Arabian Peninsula and the revolting Houthi militants in the northern region of the country for many years. The Houthi fighters went to the extent of sweeping into the capital city of Sana’a in 2014 and forced Hadi toward negotiating a united government along with the diverse political factions of the country. The continuous pressure from the rebels further weakened the nation, and on his private residence and presidential palace witnessing attack by the militant groups, President Hadi had to resign along with his colleagues in January 2015. This led the Houthis to declare themselves as having taken over the Government of Yemen the following month. The Houthis dissolved the parliament and installed a provisional Revolutionary Committee, which was led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. The crisis did not end here, the resigned President Hadi, on escaping to Aden, declared that he is still the legitimate president of the country while proclaiming Aden as the temporary capital of the country. He also sought the support of the military and officials of the royal government to rally in favor of him before seeking asylum in Saudi Arabia following the rebellion of Houthis loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. By that time, protest against the Gulf Initiative got strengthened in many parts of Yemen, beyond the control of the government (Glosemeyer).

Internal Crisis in Yemen

Ever since both the north and south Yemen united in 1990, deep divisions continued to persist between both the north and south. Yemen was facing many challenges from militants linked to al Qaeda and separatists in the southern region and rebels of Zaydi Shia in the northern region by the year 2011. The political instability of Yemen has to do a lot with several internal crises. For example, the country has got very limited natural resources, and the average water availability to each Yemeni citizen per year is as low as 140 cubic meters as against the Middle Eastern average of 1,000 cubic meters per year (Heffez). The groundwater table in Yemen is known to deplete at a faster pace thereby making pursuing farming as a livelihood means very difficult. However, instead of growing food crops most of the farmers of Yemen grow a narcotic crop qat, most Yemeni men are fond of chewing. This makes Yemen incapable of fulfilling the food security of its population and makes it dependent on other countries for feeding the people. Even as the outsiders repeatedly hear about proxy wars fought between different factions supported by foreign countries, most of the conflicts occurring in rural Yemen are on water. About 80 percent of conflicts happening in the rural areas of Yemen are attributed to the less water availability for cultivation and drinking. Besides, every year 40,000 people get killed due to land and water related disputes, which is more than the number of people falling prey to terrorism, says an estimate of Yemen’s Interior Ministry (Heffez). Obviously, water shortage is one of the reasons why people flee the country in large numbers. During the ancient times, Yemen was known for abundant agricultural production as evidenced in the Bible about the greenery of the Kingdom of Sheba. Hence, Yemen still can hope to restore its past legacy if the rulers concentrate on conserving and managing its precious natural resources and winning back the confidence of its fleeing citizens. Thus, the failure of the local government to win the confidence of its own citizens by concentrating on the internal welfare measures has made the situation in Yemen still worse and prompting outsiders to manipulate the interests of diverse groups within the country.

Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni Interest

Yemen by virtue of sharing a long boundary with Saudi Arabia, has been popularly known as the back garden of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, facing threat from its natural enemy Iran and Shiites from the north of Yemen had always perceived Yemen as a friendly Sunni-dominated neighbor. In fact, Bab el-Mandeb, the strait on the southern coast of Yemen gives Saudi access to the Suez Canal and red sea apart from the ports located in the Western part of Saudi Arabia, known for exporting the highest quantity of crude oil. Thus Riyadh’s interest in the affairs of Yemen is quite evident to the rest of the world. The politics of Yemen has always been one of Saudi Arabia’s priorities even as the relationship between the two nations has been filled with a lot of complications. Saudi Arabia had a long history of political influence on Yemen that started from the 1930s. Even as the United Nations and Saudi Arabia jointly lobbied in 2011 for the smooth transition of power in the country from the former ruler Saleh to a democratically elected government, the attempt failed miserably. During the past years, Riyadh had significantly influenced Yemeni politics; in 1978 Riyadh played a crucial role in facilitating Ali Abdullah Saleh come to power, and in 1990 Saudi Arabia played its due role in the unification of north and south Yemen. Saudi Arabia also stood behind Saleh while he assumed power back in the year 1978. Saleh’s relations with Saudi Arabia soured temporarily during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s’ when the Yemeni president declared his support to Saddam Hussein, former Iraqi dictator. During the civil war of 1994, even as the Saudis and other Gulf countries expelled migrant Yemeni workers from their countries, the relationship between Saleh and Saudi continued to flourish.

Saudi Arabia’s Intervention in Yemen

Saudi Arabia, leading a coalition of nine Arab countries, started airstrikes against Yemen on March 2015. ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ is the codename of the attack that began following the response to pleas for help from the worldwide recognized but still locally contested Yemeni government led by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The request for help followed an allegedly Iranian funded Houthi offensive targeting the interim capital of Aden. Subsequently, Hadi fleed Yemen and left to Saudi Arabia as airstrikes were launched by Saudi Arabia and its allies against the Houthis and armed forces sympathetic to former ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was overthrown during the 2011 Arab uprisings. Warplanes from the other eight allies of Saudi Arabia including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco were also actively involved in the operation. The United States of America has promised logistical and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners. Countries such as India, Pakistan and China have evacuated their citizens from Yemen even as many fled to neighboring Djibouti and Somalia. Saudi Arabia and its Sunni coalition nations announced the end of their military operations on 21st April 2015. The coalition has also announced that having achieved their military goals, they would enter a new ‘political phase’ characterized with focus on counter-terrorism, aid, security and the hunt for an unbiased political solution to the Yemeni crisis.

Why Saudi Arabia started fighting the Houthis?

Also the weak nature of the Saudi Yemen border always posed a security threat to Saudi Arabia. Chances of terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda penetrating Saudi Arabia through Yemen is another reason why Saudi Arabia wants to take control of the political system of Yemen (Glosemeyer). The merger of both factions of Al-Qaeda in the year 2009 exposed Saudi Arabia to free intrusion of the banned militants through Yemen. The infiltration of Al-Qaeda militants throughout Yemen and Houthis rebelling in the northern regions of Yemen literally put the security of Saudi Arabia in peril. When the balance of power in Yemen shifted in favor of the Houthis, Saudi Arabia literally felt powerless, that prompted Saudi Arabia to attack the Houthis with its allies. Earlier, Saudi Arabia was instrumental in sponsoring the Gulf Initiative of 2011 that resulted in Saleh resigning in favor of his deputy and the Saudi-desired Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to become the next president of Yemen. Saudi believed that Hadi along with his allies the Ahmer clan would be strong enough to take independent actions and rule the country. But, the series of military and political victories scored by the Houthis disproved the calculations of Saudi Arabia. The events that led Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar to flee Sanaa and seek refuge in Riyadh following defeat by the Houthis and the subsequent stepping down of Hadi as president of Yemen made Saudi Arabia take a strong stand to fight the Houthis with the help of its allies. Also, a favorite of the Houthis succeeding Hadi would prove fatal to Saudi Arabia’s future relations with Yemen besides jeopardizing its vested interests. With the Houthis taking control of Sanaa and deliberating on backing up a sympathizer as the future president had made Saudi Arabia along with most of its neighbors, perhaps in the first time during modern history, helplessly watching the developments in Yemen. Houthis, toward taking the Yemenis into confidence, also have strategic plans to reveal former Saudi-backed officials involved in misappropriating foreign grants, which would show Saudi in a poor light to the rest of the world. This strategy of the Houthis for gaining popularity among the citizens of Yemen who are already affected by mass poverty would have ended up Saudi Arabia losing Yemen to the Shia Houthi rebels thereby ending its role as a key player in the region.

Yemen – Victim of a Proxy War

The present day conflict in Yemen, resembling earlier developments in Iraq and Syria, appears more similar to a proxy war involving Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both Riyadh and Tehran seem to blatantly wrestle over each other for establishing supremacy in the region. Saudi Arabia started interfering in the internal affairs of Yemen citing security reasons. Iran had a long time strategic interest toward Yemen which is much logical and simple to understand. The fractious nature and poor governance of Yemen all through has been giving Iran hope to slowly enter Saudi Arabia through the traditional smuggling routes in Yemen. The 35 percent Shia population of Yemen has always given Iran hope for being a potential friendly base for its future operations against Saudi Arabia (Reardon). Besides, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence officials have always considered Yemen a weakest defense link in the bay and hence an easy target for Tehran to break in anytime and start its operations against the interests of Saudi Arabia. No wonder, Saudi Arabia would always avoid giving a chance to Iran to take advantage of the easier way in to Yemen. Hence fighting the Shia Houthis was Saudi Arabia’s strategy of keeping Iran away from Yemen and thus the Saudi territory even as the relationship between Tehran and the Houthis is still unclear (Glosemeyer). Sunni Saudi Arabia had been historically an old enemy of Shi’ite Iran. But the two enemies always avoided direct confrontation or war; instead, they always fought through their supportive proxies in the Middle East. From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, Iran might use its military strength to influence the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) apart from the Shi’ite minority population in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Berti and Yoel). Saudi Arabia started the war by launching airstrikes aimed at Houthi rebels in Yemen backed by Iran, Saudi’s great all time enemy which gradually engulfed the entire Middle East region. In reality, even though the attack was meant to warn Iran, it turned the poorest country in the region into a battleground killing many innocent civilians. The Houthis’ daring response to the war even attracted the attention of world’s greatest powers like the United States, Russia and Great Britain. Apart from the direct assistance from Saudi’s eight Middle East allies, the United States too has offered intelligence and logistical support to Saudi Arabia. Even as the southern parts of Yemen, known for frequent Al-Qaeda intrusion, had been a frequent target for American drone attacks, attack by Saudi Arabia by killing civilians has made the situation still worse. Given the current situations, it is highly likely that the Yemenis, on giving options between foreign interventions and Houthi rule, are more probable to settle for the option of Houthi rule. Hence, Saudi Arabia is confronted with the challenge of fighting the Houthis without affecting the internal peace of Yemen for the safety of the Yemenis and its own Yemeni interests in the long run.

Importance of the war to Saudi Arabia and Yemen

First and foremost, Saudi Arabia has always perceived Iran’s interest in accumulating nuclear weapons as a threat to the entire Gulf region (Berti and Yoel) Also, most of the countries partnering with Saudi Arabia in the fighting, including the United States, want to do away with the Al-Qaeda from southern Yemen. But the Houthis and the Al-Qaeda militants being staunch enemies, the war gives Houthis the opportunity of sanitizing the region of the Al-Qaeda, if they are really interested in the security and safety of the nation they want to rule, snatching power from the erstwhile government known for corruption and dictating. In that sense the war has got the strategic advantage of helping Saudi Arabia fight both the enemies with the help of its allies. As for Yemen, the Houthis may not ensure a corrupt-free regime. Hence, intervention of Saudi along with its allies in fighting the Houthis has the advantage of Saudi helping the nation in future with the post-war rehabilitation works. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda also has got the strategic advantage of expanding its hold and consolidation in Yemen by taking advantage of the chaos prevailing right now in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has always restricted its involvement in the Yemeni politics by its strategy of quiet meddling. Although Saudi Arabia has been involved in the internal affairs of Yemen right from the old Imamate period and the earlier days of the creation of Yemen, it never launched a major military attack of this stature. Even the current bombing perpetrated by Saudi Arabia along with its allies is meant to target the Houthis and invite them to the negotiating table. But, the Houthis would not be in a position to come to the negotiating table unless Saudi ends its hostilities and ensures peace in Yemen. No doubt, the bombing has resulted in damaging bridges and other infrastructures along with loss of civilian lives. But Saudi, as an aspirant and legitimate member of the international community, may not wish to eliminate the Houthis completely. Rather, Saudi would wish to restore peace in Yemen which apart from having many strategic advantages would boost Saudi’s image in the international arena as a strategic partner for greatest powers including United States, Great Britain and Russia. Saudi’s strategy of inviting its allies including United States to fight the Houthis in Yemen speaks volumes about its intention of inviting the attention of the entire world to restore democracy in war-torn Yemen.

Could the war have been avoided?

Conclusion I do hope that the existence of a number of power centers in Yemen only means that any settlement to end the present crisis would not be acceptable unless it proves to be a better alternate choice against the erstwhile corrupt regimes in the country. Hence, partially, decentralization and fragmentation seems to be an inevitable option to settle the current Yemeni crisis (Glosemeyer) I also do strongly believe that the way forward right now for finding a more amicable settlement to the Yemen issue is to establish a power balancing the interests of all the traditional leadership structures available in the country. This would include giving due representation to true local, tribal and religious groups in the new coalition government. At the same time, negotiation or an amicable settlement would only come when the most powerful have achieved all their goals by fighting their long-time enemies.

Works Cited

Berti, Benedetta, and Yoel Guzansky. "Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War." Israel Journal of Foreigh Affairs VIII:3 (2014): 25-34. Print. Glosemeyer, Iris. "Yemen Without Ali Abdallah Saleh?" Protest, Revolt and Regime Change in the Arab World February 2012 (2012): 27-30. Print. Heffez, Adam. "How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry." Foreign Affairs.com. 23 July 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2015. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139596/adam-heffez/how-yemen-chewed-itself-dry>.

Cite this page

Share with friends using:

Removal Request

Finished papers: 2153

This paper is created by writer with

If you want your paper to be:

Well-researched, fact-checked, and accurate

Original, fresh, based on current data

Eloquently written and immaculately formatted

275 words = 1 page double-spaced

Get your papers done by pros!

Other Pages

My style of writing essay examples, essay on culture and daily life in new spain, nursing pernicious anemia reply post essay examples, essay on persuasive letter, adult education case study examples, information research paper, essay on the importance of copyright in canada, music in native american culture essay examples, good essay about 4 c stanton, example of essay on there are number of questions that will be completed in this part and every answer, free essay about solving the homeless problem on 50th and madison st, good essay about corporate social responsibility, good case study about procedure relatedness, free special senses essay sample, my book on where the red fern grows reports examples, good example of rite of spring analysis essay, free book review about cannery row summary response literacy analysis, essay on s6 workforce managers employees, example of essay on putnam meaning aint in the head, good the life of a college student essay example, healthcare system of zimbabwe a digest research paper example, free essay about my personal goals, sample essay on estimating project cash flows, good essay about the role of public relations in building reputation of the hollywood stars, good essay about google glass, good example of human resource management literature review, billingsley essays, andy johnson essays, beca essays, astley essays, aqil essays, arrt essays, banana fish essays, agosto essays, oligarchy book reviews, market value book reviews, old boy book reviews, geisha book reviews, interference book reviews, essential book reviews, century book reviews.

Password recovery email has been sent to [email protected]

Use your new password to log in

You are not register!

By clicking Register, you agree to our Terms of Service and that you have read our Privacy Policy .

Now you can download documents directly to your device!

Check your email! An email with your password has already been sent to you! Now you can download documents directly to your device.

or Use the QR code to Save this Paper to Your Phone

The sample is NOT original!

Short on a deadline?

Don't waste time. Get help with 11% off using code - GETWOWED

No, thanks! I'm fine with missing my deadline

War In Yemen Essays

Specific war happening in a country (interview writing assignment), the war on yemeni borders, popular essay topics.

• American Dream
• Artificial Intelligence
• Black Lives Matter
• Bullying Essay
• Career Goals Essay
• Causes of the Civil War
• Child Abusing
• Civil Rights Movement
• Community Service
• Cultural Identity
• Cyber Bullying
• Death Penalty
• Depression Essay
• Domestic Violence
• Freedom of Speech
• Global Warming
• Gun Control
• Human Trafficking
• I Believe Essay
• Immigration
• Importance of Education
• Israel and Palestine Conflict
• Leadership Essay
• Legalizing Marijuanas
• Mental Health
• National Honor Society
• Police Brutality
• Pollution Essay
• Racism Essay
• Romeo and Juliet
• Same Sex Marriages
• Social Media
• The Great Gatsby
• The Yellow Wallpaper
• Time Management
• To Kill a Mockingbird
• Violent Video Games
• What Makes You Unique
• Why I Want to Be a Nurse
• Send us an e-mail