should gay marriage be legal argumentative essay

Should Gay Marriage Be Legal?

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On June 26, 2015, the US Supreme Court ruled that gay marriage is a right protected by the US Constitution in all 50 states. Prior to their decision, same-sex marriage was already legal in 37 states and Washington DC, but was banned in the remaining 13. US public opinion had shifted significantly over the years, from 27% approval of gay marriage in 1996 to 55% in 2015, the year it became legal throughout the United States, to 61% in 2019.

Proponents of legal gay marriage contend that gay marriage bans are discriminatory and unconstitutional, and that same-sex couples should have access to all the benefits enjoyed by different-sex couples.

Opponents contend that marriage has traditionally been defined as being between one man and one woman, and that marriage is primarily for procreation. Read more background…

Pro & Con Arguments

Pro 1 To deny some people the option to marry would be discriminatory and would create a second class of citizens. Same-sex couples should have access to the same benefits enjoyed by heterosexual married couples. On July 25, 2014 Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Sarah Zabel ruled Florida’s gay marriage ban unconstitutional and stated that the ban “serves only to hurt, to discriminate, to deprive same-sex couples and their families of equal dignity, to label and treat them as second-class citizens, and to deem them unworthy of participation in one of the fundamental institutions of our society.” [ 105 ] As well as discrimination based on sexual orientation, gay marriage bans discriminated based on one’s sex. As David S. Cohen, JD, Associate Professor at the Drexel University School of Law, explained, “Imagine three people—Nancy, Bill, and Tom… Nancy, a woman, can marry Tom, but Bill, a man, cannot… Nancy can do something (marry Tom) that Bill cannot, simply because Nancy is a woman and Bill is a man.” [ 122 ] Over 1,000 benefits, rights and protections are available to married couples in federal law alone, including hospital visitation, filing a joint tax return to reduce a tax burden, access to family health coverage, US residency and family unification for partners from another country, and bereavement leave and inheritance rights if a partner dies. [ 6 ] [ 86 ] [ 95 ] Married couples also have access to protections if the relationship ends, such as child custody, spousal or child support, and an equitable division of property. [ 93 ] Married couples in the US armed forces are offered health insurance and other benefits unavailable to domestic partners. [ 125 ] The IRS and the US Department of Labor also recognize married couples, for the purpose of granting tax, retirement and health insurance benefits. [ 126 ] An Oct. 2, 2009 analysis by the New York Times estimated that same-sex couples denied marriage benefits incurred an additional $41,196 to $467,562 in expenses over their lifetimes compared with married heterosexual couples. [ 7 ] Additionally, legal same-sex marriage comes with mental and physical health benefits. The American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and others concluded that legal gay marriage gives couples “access to the social support that already facilitates and strengthens heterosexual marriages, with all of the psychological and physical health benefits associated with that support.” [ 47 ] A study found that same-sex married couples were “significantly less distressed than lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons not in a legally recognized relationship.” [ 113 ] A 2010 analysis found that after their states had banned gay marriage, gay, lesbian and bisexual people suffered a 37% increase in mood disorders, a 42% increase in alcohol-use disorders, and a 248% increase in generalized anxiety disorders. [ 69 ] Read More

Pro 2 Gay marriages bring financial gain to federal, state, and local governments, and boost the economy. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2004 that federally-recognized gay marriage would cut the budget deficit by around $450 million a year. [ 89 ] In July 2012 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that gay marriage had contributed $259 million to the city’s economy in just a year since the practice became legal there in July 2011. [ 43 ] Government revenue from marriage comes from marriage licenses, higher income taxes in some circumstances (the so-called “marriage penalty”), and decreases in costs for state benefit programs. [ 4 ] In 2012, the Williams Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) found that in the first five years after Massachusetts legalized gay marriage in 2004, same-sex wedding expenditures (such as venue rental, wedding cakes, etc.) added $111 million to the state’s economy. [ 114 ] Read More

Pro 3 Legal marriage is a secular institution that should not be limited by religious objections to same-sex marriage. Religious institutions can decline to marry gay and lesbian couples if they wish, but they should not dictate marriage laws for society at large. As explained by People for the American Way, “As a legal matter, marriage is a civil institution… Marriage is also a religious institution, defined differently by different faiths and congregations. In America, the distinction can get blurry because states permit clergy to carry out both religious and civil marriage in a single ceremony. Religious Right leaders have exploited that confusion by claiming that granting same-sex couples equal access to civil marriage would somehow also redefine the religious institution of marriage… this is grounded in falsehood and deception.” [ 132 ] Nancy Cott, PhD, testified in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that “[c]ivil law has always been supreme in defining and regulating marriage.” [ 41 ] Read More

Pro 4 The concept of “traditional marriage” has changed over time, and the idea that the definition of marriage has always been between one man and one woman is historically inaccurate. Harvard University historian Nancy F. Cott stated that until two centuries ago, “monogamous households were a tiny, tiny portion” of the world’s population, and were found only in “Western Europe and little settlements in North America.” [ 106 ] Official unions between same-sex couples, indistinguishable from marriages except for gender, are believed by some scholars to have been common until the 13th Century in many countries, with the ceremonies performed in churches and the union sealed with a kiss between the two parties. [ 106 ] Polygamy has been widespread throughout history, according to Brown University political scientist Rose McDermott, PhD. [ 106 ] [ 110 ] Read More

Pro 5 Gay marriage is a civil right protected by the US Constitution’s commitments to liberty and equality, and is an internationally recognized human right for all people. The NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), on May 21, 2012, named same-sex marriage as “one of the key civil rights struggles of our time.” [ 61 ] In 1967 the US Supreme Court unanimously confirmed in Loving v. Virginia that marriage is “one of the basic civil rights of man.” [60] In 2014, the White House website listed same-sex marriage amongst a selection of civil rights, along with freedom from employment discrimination, equal pay for women, and fair sentencing for minority criminals. [ 118 ] The US Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in the 1974 case Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur that the “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause” of the US Constitution. US District Judge Vaughn Walker wrote on Aug. 4, 2010 that Prop. 8 in California banning gay marriage was “unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” [ 41 ] The Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution states that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” [ 111 ] The Equal Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment states that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” [ 112 ] Since 1888 the US Supreme Court has declared at least 14 times that marriage is a fundamental right for all. [ 3 ] Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees “men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion… the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.” [ 103 ] Amnesty International states that “this non-discrimination principle has been interpreted by UN treaty bodies and numerous inter-governmental human rights bodies as prohibiting discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation. Non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation has therefore become an internationally recognized principle.” [ 104 ] Read More

Pro 6 Marriage is not only for procreation, otherwise infertile couples or couples not wishing to have children would be prevented from marrying. Ability or desire to create offspring has never been a qualification for marriage. From 1970 through 2012 roughly 30% of all US households were married couples without children, and in 2012, married couples without children outnumbered married couples with children by 9%. [ 96 ] 6% of married women aged 15-44 are infertile, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [ 97 ] In a 2010 Pew Research Center survey, both married and unmarried people rated love, commitment, and companionship higher than having children as “very important” reasons to get married, and only 44% of unmarried people and 59% of married people rated having children as a very important reason. [ 42 ] As US Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan noted, a marriage license would be granted to a couple in which the man and woman are both over the age of 55, even though “there are not a lot of children coming out of that marriage.” [ 88 ] Read More

Con 1 The institution of marriage has traditionally been defined as being between a man and a woman. Civil unions and domestic partnerships could provide the protections and benefits gay couples need without changing the definition of marriage. John F. Harvey, late Catholic priest, wrote in July 2009 that “Throughout the history of the human race the institution of marriage has been understood as the complete spiritual and bodily communion of one man and one woman.” [ 18 ] [ 109 ] In upholding gay marriage bans in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee on Nov. 6, 2014, 6th US District Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton wrote that “marriage has long been a social institution defined by relationships between men and women. So long defined, the tradition is measured in millennia, not centuries or decades. So widely shared, the tradition until recently had been adopted by all governments and major religions of the world.” [ 117 ] In the Oct. 15, 1971 decision Baker v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that “the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.” [ 49 ] Privileges available to couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships can include health insurance benefits, inheritance without a will, the ability to file state taxes jointly, and hospital visitation rights. [ 155 ] [ 156 ] New laws could enshrine other benefits for civil unions and domestic partnerships that would benefit same-sex couple as well as heterosexual couples who do not want to get married. 2016 presidential candidate and former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina stated that civil unions are adequate as an equivalent to marriage: “Benefits are being bestowed to gay couples [in civil unions]… I believe we need to respect those who believe that the word marriage has a spiritual foundation… Why can’t we respect and tolerate that while at the same time saying government cannot bestow benefits unequally.” [ 157 ] 43rd US President George W. Bush expressed his support for same-sex civil unions while in office: “I don’t think we should deny people rights to a civil union, a legal arrangement, if that’s what a state chooses to do so… I strongly believe that marriage ought to be defined as between a union between a man and a woman. Now, having said that, states ought to be able to have the right to pass laws that enable people to be able to have rights like others.” [158] Read More

Con 2 Marriage is for procreation. Same sex couples should be prohibited from marriage because they cannot produce children together. The purpose of marriage should not shift away from producing and raising children to adult gratification. [ 19 ] A California Supreme Court ruling from 1859 stated that “the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procreation.” [ 90 ] Nobel Prize-winning philosopher Bertrand Russell stated that “it is through children alone that sexual relations become important to society, and worthy to be taken cognizance of by a legal institution.” [ 91 ] Court papers filed in July 2014 by attorneys defending Arizona’s gay marriage ban stated that “the State regulates marriage for the primary purpose of channeling potentially procreative sexual relationships into enduring unions for the sake of joining children to both their mother and their father… Same-sex couples can never provide a child with both her biological mother and her biological father.” [ 98 ] Contrary to the pro gay marriage argument that some different-sex couples cannot have children or don’t want them, even in those cases there is still the potential to produce children. Seemingly infertile heterosexual couples sometimes produce children, and medical advances may allow others to procreate in the future. Heterosexual couples who do not wish to have children are still biologically capable of having them, and may change their minds. [ 98 ] Read More

Con 3 Gay marriage has accelerated the assimilation of gays into mainstream heterosexual culture to the detriment of the homosexual community. The gay community has created its own vibrant culture. By reducing the differences in opportunities and experiences between gay and heterosexual people, this unique culture may cease to exist. Lesbian activist M.V. Lee Badgett, PhD, Director of the Center for Public Policy and Administration at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, stated that for many gay activists “marriage means adopting heterosexual forms of family and giving up distinctively gay family forms and perhaps even gay and lesbian culture.” [14] Paula Ettelbrick, JD, Professor of Law and Women’s Studies, wrote in 1989, “Marriage runs contrary to two of the primary goals of the lesbian and gay movement: the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the validation of many forms of relationships.” [15] Read More

Con 4 Marriage is an outmoded, oppressive institution that should have been weakened, not expanded. LGBT activist collective Against Equality stated, “Gay marriage apes hetero privilege… [and] increases economic inequality by perpetuating a system which deems married beings more worthy of the basics like health care and economic rights.” [ 84 ] The leaders of the Gay Liberation Front in New York said in July 1969, “We expose the institution of marriage as one of the most insidious and basic sustainers of the system. The family is the microcosm of oppression.” [ 16 ] Queer activist Anders Zanichkowsky stated in June 2013 that the then campaign for gay marriage “intentionally and maliciously erases and excludes so many queer people and cultures, particularly trans and gender non-conforming people, poor queer people, and queer people in non-traditional families… marriage thinks non-married people are deviant and not truly deserving of civil rights.” [ 127 ] Read More

Con 5 Gay marriage is contrary to the word of God and is incompatible with the beliefs, sacred texts, and traditions of many religious groups. The Bible, in Leviticus 18:22, states: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination,” thus condemning homosexual relationships. [ 120 ] The Catholic Church, United Methodist Church, Southern Baptist Convention, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, National Association of Evangelicals, and American Baptist Churches USA all oppose same-sex marriage. [ 119 ] According to a July 31, 2003 statement from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and approved by Pope John Paul II, marriage “was established by the Creator with its own nature, essential properties and purpose. No ideology can erase from the human spirit the certainty that marriage exists solely between a man and a woman.” [ 54 ] Pope Benedict stated in Jan. 2012 that gay marriage threatened “the future of humanity itself.” [ 145 ] Two orthodox Jewish groups, the Orthodox Agudath Israel of America and the Orthodox Union, also oppose gay marriage, as does mainstream Islam. [ 13 ] [ 119 ] In Islamic tradition, several hadiths (passages attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) condemn gay and lesbian relationships, including the sayings “When a man mounts another man, the throne of God shakes,” and “Sihaq [lesbian sex] of women is zina [illegitimate sexual intercourse].” [ 121 ] Read More

Con 6 Homosexuality is immoral and unnatural, and, therefore, same sex marriage is immoral and unnatural. J. Matt Barber, Associate Dean for Online Programs at Liberty University School of Law, stated, “Every individual engaged in the homosexual lifestyle, who has adopted a homosexual identity, they know, intuitively, that what they’re doing is immoral, unnatural, and self-destructive, yet they thirst for that affirmation.” [ 149 ] A 2003 set of guidelines signed by Pope John Paul II stated: “There are absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family… Marriage is holy, while homosexual acts go against the natural moral law.” [ 147 ] Former Arkansas governor and Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee stated that gay marriage is “inconsistent with nature and nature’s law.” [ 148 ] J. Matt Barber, Associate Dean for Online Programs at Liberty University School of Law, stated, “Every individual engaged in the homosexual lifestyle, who has adopted a homosexual identity, they know, intuitively, that what they’re doing is immoral, unnatural, and self-destructive, yet they thirst for that affirmation.” [ 149 ] A 2003 set of guidelines signed by Pope John Paul II stated: “There are absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family… Marriage is holy, while homosexual acts go against the natural moral law.” [ 147 ] Read More

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Evidence is clear on the benefits of legalising same-sex  marriage

PhD Candidate, School of Arts and Social Sciences, James Cook University

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Emotive arguments and questionable rhetoric often characterise debates over same-sex marriage. But few attempts have been made to dispassionately dissect the issue from an academic, science-based perspective.

Regardless of which side of the fence you fall on, the more robust, rigorous and reliable information that is publicly available, the better.

There are considerable mental health and wellbeing benefits conferred on those in the fortunate position of being able to marry legally. And there are associated deleterious impacts of being denied this opportunity.

Although it would be irresponsible to suggest the research is unanimous, the majority is either noncommittal (unclear conclusions) or demonstrates the benefits of same-sex marriage.

Further reading: Conservatives prevail to hold back the tide on same-sex marriage

What does the research say?

Widescale research suggests that members of the LGBTQ community generally experience worse mental health outcomes than their heterosexual counterparts. This is possibly due to the stigmatisation they receive.

The mental health benefits of marriage generally are well-documented . In 2009, the American Medical Association officially recognised that excluding sexual minorities from marriage was significantly contributing to the overall poor health among same-sex households compared to heterosexual households.

Converging lines of evidence also suggest that sexual orientation stigma and discrimination are at least associated with increased psychological distress and a generally decreased quality of life among lesbians and gay men.

A US study that surveyed more than 36,000 people aged 18-70 found lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals were far less psychologically distressed if they were in a legally recognised same-sex marriage than if they were not. Married heterosexuals were less distressed than either of these groups.

So, it would seem that being in a legally recognised same-sex marriage can at least partly overcome the substantial health disparity between heterosexual and lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.

The authors concluded by urging other researchers to consider same-sex marriage as a public health issue.

A review of the research examining the impact of marriage denial on the health and wellbeing of gay men and lesbians conceded that marriage equality is a profoundly complex and nuanced issue. But, it argued that depriving lesbians and gay men the tangible (and intangible) benefits of marriage is not only an act of discrimination – it also:

disadvantages them by restricting their citizenship;

hinders their mental health, wellbeing, and social mobility; and

generally disenfranchises them from various cultural, legal, economic and political aspects of their lives.

Of further concern is research finding that in comparison to lesbian, gay and bisexual respondents living in areas where gay marriage was allowed, living in areas where it was banned was associated with significantly higher rates of:

mood disorders (36% higher);

psychiatric comorbidity – that is, multiple mental health conditions (36% higher); and

anxiety disorders (248% higher).

But what about the kids?

Opponents of same-sex marriage often argue that children raised in same-sex households perform worse on a variety of life outcome measures when compared to those raised in a heterosexual household. There is some merit to this argument.

In terms of education and general measures of success, the literature isn’t entirely unanimous. However, most studies have found that on these metrics there is no difference between children raised by same-sex or opposite-sex parents.

In 2005, the American Psychological Association released a brief reviewing research on same-sex parenting. It unambiguously summed up its stance on the issue of whether or not same-sex parenting negatively impacts children:

Not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to children of heterosexual parents.

Further reading: Same-sex couples and their children: what does the evidence tell us?

Drawing conclusions

Same-sex marriage has already been legalised in 23 countries around the world , inhabited by more than 760 million people.

Despite the above studies positively linking marriage with wellbeing, it may be premature to definitively assert causality .

But overall, the evidence is fairly clear. Same-sex marriage leads to a host of social and even public health benefits, including a range of advantages for mental health and wellbeing. The benefits accrue to society as a whole, whether you are in a same-sex relationship or not.

As the body of research in support of same-sex marriage continues to grow, the case in favour of it becomes stronger.

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The strongest argument against same-sex marriage: traditional marriage is in the public interest

by German Lopez

Opponents of same-sex marriage argued that individual states are acting in the public interest by encouraging heterosexual relationships through marriage policies, so voters and legislators in each state should be able to set their own laws.

Some groups, such as the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, cited the secular benefits of heterosexual marriages, particularly the ability of heterosexual couples to reproduce, as Daniel Silliman reported at the Washington Post .

”It is a mistake to characterize laws defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman as somehow embodying a purely religious viewpoint over against a purely secular one,” the bishops said in their amicus brief . “Rather, it is a common sense reflection of the fact that [homosexual] relationships do not result in the birth of children, or establish households where a child will be raised by its birth mother and father.”

Other groups, like the conservative Family Research Council, warned that allowing same-sex couples to marry would lead to the breakdown of traditional families. But keeping marriage to heterosexual couples, FRC argued in an amicus brief , allows states to “channel the potential procreative sexual activity of opposite-sex couples into stable relationships in which the children so procreated may be raised by their biological mothers and fathers.”

To defend same-sex marriage bans, opponents had to convince courts that there’s a compelling state interest in encouraging heterosexual relationships that isn’t really about discriminating against same-sex couples.

But a majority of Supreme Court justices and most of the lower courts widely rejected this argument, arguing that same-sex marriage bans are discriminatory and unconstitutional.

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Gay Marriage Is Good for America

Subscribe to governance weekly, jonathan rauch jonathan rauch senior fellow - governance studies @jon_rauch.

June 21, 2008

By order of its state Supreme Court, California began legally marrying same-sex couples this week. The first to be wed in San Francisco were Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, pioneering gay-rights activists who have been a couple for more than 50 years.

More ceremonies will follow, at least until November, when gay marriage will go before California’s voters. They should choose to keep it. To understand why, imagine your life without marriage. Meaning, not merely your life if you didn’t happen to get married. What I am asking you to imagine is life without even the possibility of marriage.

Re-enter your childhood, but imagine your first crush, first kiss, first date and first sexual encounter, all bereft of any hope of marriage as a destination for your feelings. Re-enter your first serious relationship, but think about it knowing that marrying the person is out of the question.

Imagine that in the law’s eyes you and your soul mate will never be more than acquaintances. And now add even more strangeness. Imagine coming of age into a whole community, a whole culture, without marriage and the bonds of mutuality and kinship that go with it.

What is this weird world like? It has more sex and less commitment than a world with marriage. It is a world of fragile families living on the shadowy outskirts of the law; a world marked by heightened fear of loneliness or abandonment in crisis or old age; a world in some respects not even civilized, because marriage is the foundation of civilization.

This was the world I grew up in. The AIDS quilt is its monument.

Few heterosexuals can imagine living in such an upside-down world, where love separates you from marriage instead of connecting you with it. Many don’t bother to try. Instead, they say same-sex couples can get the equivalent of a marriage by going to a lawyer and drawing up paperwork – as if heterosexual couples would settle for anything of the sort.

Even a moment’s reflection shows the fatuousness of “Let them eat contracts.” No private transaction excuses you from testifying in court against your partner, or entitles you to Social Security survivor benefits, or authorizes joint tax filing, or secures U.S. residency for your partner if he or she is a foreigner. I could go on and on.

Marriage, remember, is not just a contract between two people. It is a contract that two people make, as a couple, with their community – which is why there is always a witness. Two people can’t go into a room by themselves and come out legally married. The partners agree to take care of each other so the community doesn’t have to. In exchange, the community deems them a family, binding them to each other and to society with a host of legal and social ties.

This is a fantastically fruitful bargain. Marriage makes you, on average, healthier, happier and wealthier. If you are a couple raising kids, marrying is likely to make them healthier, happier and wealthier, too. Marriage is our first and best line of defense against financial, medical and emotional meltdown. It provides domesticity and a safe harbor for sex. It stabilizes communities by formalizing responsibilities and creating kin networks. And its absence can be calamitous, whether in inner cities or gay ghettos.

In 2008, denying gay Americans the opportunity to marry is not only inhumane, it is unsustainable. History has turned a corner: Gay couples – including gay parents – live openly and for the most part comfortably in mainstream life. This will not change, ever.

Because parents want happy children, communities want responsible neighbors, employers want productive workers, and governments want smaller welfare caseloads, society has a powerful interest in recognizing and supporting same-sex couples. It will either fold them into marriage or create alternatives to marriage, such as publicly recognized and subsidized cohabitation. Conservatives often say same-sex marriage should be prohibited because it does not exemplify the ideal form of family. They should consider how much less ideal an example gay couples will set by building families and raising children out of wedlock.

Nowadays, even opponents of same-sex marriage generally concede it would be good for gay people. What they worry about are the possible secondary effects it could have as it ramifies through law and society. What if gay marriage becomes a vehicle for polygamists who want to marry multiple partners, egalitarians who want to radically rewrite family law, or secularists who want to suppress religious objections to homosexuality?

Space doesn’t permit me to treat those and other objections in detail, beyond noting that same-sex marriage no more leads logically to polygamy than giving women one vote leads to giving men two; that gay marriage requires only few and modest changes to existing family law; and that the Constitution provides robust protections for religious freedom.

I’ll also note, in passing, that these arguments conscript homosexuals into marriagelessness in order to stop heterosexuals from making bad decisions, a deal to which we gay folks say, “Thanks, but no thanks.” We wonder how many heterosexuals would give up their own marriage, or for that matter their own divorce, to discourage other people from making poor policy choices. Any volunteers?

Honest advocacy requires acknowledging that same-sex marriage is a significant social change and, as such, is not risk-free. I believe the risks are modest, manageable, and likely to be outweighed by the benefits. Still, it’s wise to guard against unintended consequences by trying gay marriage in one or two states and seeing what happens, which is exactly what the country is doing.

By the same token, however, honest opposition requires acknowledging that there are risks and unforeseen consequences on both sides of the equation. Some of the unforeseen consequences of allowing same-sex marriage will be good, not bad. And barring gay marriage is risky in its own right.

America needs more marriages, not fewer, and the best way to encourage marriage is to encourage marriage, which is what society does by bringing gay couples inside the tent. A good way to discourage marriage, on the other hand, is to tarnish it as discriminatory in the minds of millions of young Americans. Conservatives who object to redefining marriage risk redefining it themselves, as a civil-rights violation.

There are two ways to see the legal marriage of Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon. One is as the start of something radical: an experiment that jeopardizes millennia of accumulated social patrimony. The other is as the end of something radical: an experiment in which gay people were told that they could have all the sex and love they could find, but they could not even think about marriage. If I take the second view, it is on conservative – in fact, traditional – grounds that gay souls and straight society are healthiest when sex, love and marriage all walk in step.

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Read the essay that helped start the gay marriage movement in America

It started in 1989. 

Andrew Sullivan wrote a cover story for The New Republic arguing for gay marriage . It was at the time a radical proposition — although Sullivan's argument came from a philosophically conservative place. 

This was a key paragraph: 

Legalizing gay marriage would offer homosexuals the same deal society now offers heterosexuals: general social approval and specific legal advantages in exchange for a deeper and harder-to-extract-yourself from commitment to another human being. Like straight marriage, it would foster social cohesion, emotional security, and economic prudence. Since there’s no reason gays should not be allowed to adopt or be foster parents, it could also help nurture children. And its introduction would not be some sort of radical break with social custom. As it has become more acceptable for gay people to acknowledge their loves publicly, more and more have committed themselves to one another for life in full view of their families and their friends, A law institutionalizing gay marriage would merely reinforce a healthy social trend. It would also, in the wake of AIDS, qualify as a genuine public health measure. Those conservatives who deplore promiscuity among some homosexuals should be among the first to support it. Burke could have written a powerful case for it.

Related stories

There is plenty of history of the gay marriage movement before Sullivan's essay, but his advocacy helped bring it in to the mainstream.

In a post on his blog, The Daily Dish , Sullivan recalls a moment debating gay marriage on TV shortly after his essay came out. "It was Crossfire, as I recall, and Gary Bauer’s response to my rather earnest argument after my TNR cover-story on the matter was laughter. 'This is the loopiest idea ever to come down the pike,' he joked. 'Why are we even discussing it?'"  

No one is laughing anymore. 

A lot of the themes from Sullivan's original essay — inclusion, social cohesion, responsibility, and family support — are echoed in today's decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy . This is the powerful last paragraph:  

No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.

Sullivan is now officially a retired blogger. But he returned today to write about the decision. This is his response :

I never believed this would happen in my lifetime when I wrote my first several TNR essays and then my book, Virtually Normal, and then the anthology and the hundreds and hundreds of talks and lectures and talk-shows and call-ins and blog-posts and articles in the 1990s and 2000s. I thought the book, at least, would be something I would have to leave behind me – secure in the knowledge that its arguments were, in fact, logically irrefutable, and would endure past my own death, at least somewhere. I never for a millisecond thought I would live to be married myself. Or that it would be possible for everyone, everyone in America. 

Twenty-six years later, Sullivan's seemingly radical idea is the law of the land.

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Why same-sex marriage is unjust.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2016

Proponents of same-sex marriage often defend their view by appealing to the concept of justice. But a significant argument from justice against same-sex marriage can be made also, as follows. Heterosexual union has special social value because it is the indispensable means by which humans come into existence. What has special social value deserves special recognition and sanction. Civil ordinances that recognize same-sex marriage as comparable to heterosexual marriage constitute a rejection of the special social value of heterosexual unions, and to deny such special social value is unjust.

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1 I take this to be obvious, and I would not bother to mention it except for the fact that my argument pivots on this point. Shakespeare's Hamlet entertained the question whether it is better to live or not to live. Although some would answer negatively regarding his or similarly agonizing cases, as applied to the existence of humanity in toto the correct answer to Hamlet's question is clearly affirmative.

2 Furthermore, as some have observed, homosexuals do enjoy the privilege to marry, so long as they do so with someone of the opposite sex. This might seem to be an empty or even mocking point because it ignores the distinct sexual desires of homosexuals. But there are many other civil privileges the criteria for which are similarly unyielding to the unique desires of particular citizens, such as the disqualification of the severely visually impaired when it comes to obtaining a driver's license or joining the armed forces.

3 By most counts, there are over 1,100 benefits provided to married couples by the U.S. federal government and many more benefits provided at the state level, including automatic inheritance, divorce protections, burial determination privileges, automatic housing lease transfer, domestic violence protection, joint bankruptcy privileges, and wrongful death benefits.

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• Volume 15, Issue 43
• James S. Spiegel
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175616000075

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Gay Marriage Argument Essays: Should It Be Legalized

Type of paper: Argumentative Essay

Topic: Love , Same Sex Marriage , LGBT , Relationships , Marriage , Gay , Homosexuality , Family

Words: 2750

Published: 03/31/2020

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Introduction

The legalization of Gay marriage has stirred a lot of controversies in America, and the world in general. Traditionally, marriage has been rooted in many cultures, practices and even traditions, as the union of a man and a woman. Same sex marriages or relationships have been prohibited all along, and people that went against these practices were often termed as outcasts. But in the recent years, the rate of gay marriages and relationships has been on the rise. This has stirred a lot of debate on whether they should be legalized or not. Movements and societies have been formed to protects the gay rights and ensure that their traits are accepted by the society. The church and some individuals in the society, including politicians and Anti- gay movements, have been beating their heads on the wall trying to come up with reasons why it should not be legalized, and at the same time, trying to convince the states that have accepted same sex marriages to overturn the courts decisions. As the society evolves, the traits and changes that come with it should be embraced. The society has come from far concerning so many issues, from racism to accepting divorce in the marriage institution. All these factors do not matter in this day age and age in America. Same way as these was accepted in our society, so should homosexuality be accepted. Gay marriages should be legalized, amidst all the controversies that come with it, since intimate matters should be of private concern and the society is evolving.

The circus of Gay marriages

Gay marriages have been in the community for a long time, but the controversies of these relationships rose up in 1990’s, when a court in Hawaii ruled in favor of a gay couple that had been denied the right to marry each other, in 1996. This decision stirred a lot of debate where many people were against it and termed it as an abomination. The constitution was later changed to prohibit same sex marriages in the state. This debate became more than a state matter since it blew the interests of people to a national level. These debates have been ongoing up to date with parties from both the opposing and the supporting side exchanging words, each in favor of their side. Canada allowed same sex marriages1n 2004, saying that prohibiting gay couples from their rights will be a matter of discrimination. America has followed suit in legalizing gay marriages where states like Massachusetts passed a law to allow same sex couples to marry. It goes without saying that a great deal of politics has also been associated with homosexuality, where some of the politicians are against it, and others are in favor of it. The marriage institution is under both the law of any land, and under the laws of the church, or any religion for that matter. Some people therefore argue that each state should have laws governing the marriage institutions in their own states, others argue that as much as the church and the government have laws concerning the marriage institution, it should not be any of their concern especially when it comes to who marries who in the society (Burns 45). In America, sixteen states already allow marriages of the same sex couples. In 1996, the U. S congress passed the DOMA law (Defense of Marriage Act), in an attempt to define and limit marriage to only a man and a woman, and not people of the same sex. A group of activists took the matter to the high court in 2005, but the case was overturned by the U. S Eight Circuit Court of appeals the next year, 2006. Later in the year, the same court held that DOMA was unconstitutional and was depriving homosexuals the equality rights that they should be enjoying. The Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional for the federal government to deny same sex married couples their rights, saying that it was unconstitutional. They made this ruling on 26th June 2013, but it is only limited to the states that have legalized same sex marriages(Family Guy).

Anti- gay movements

Anti- gay movements have been widely recognized for not supporting same sex marriages. Their campaigns to stop legalization of gay marriages have worked in some states, where and have opposed any form of legal protections on gays. These restrictions include denying gays rights to protect their families and rights to bond with their children (Rimmerman and Wilcox 179). However, these movements have been associated with the spread of mere propaganda concerning gays in the community. Their claims on the ‘evils’ that these unions bring are baseless. Some of anti- gay people claimed that the gay people were mostly involved in crimes, and that they actually perpetrated most of the crimes in the country. They were accused of dealing in drugs, and being the, main of the widespread of sexually transmitted diseases. All the claims were baseless and they had no prove of them, because, for example, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, is also experienced among many straight marriages, especially due to infidelity.

Gay marriages and literary works

Many productions have been coming up recently, especially in the motion pictures word, all in support of gay marriages. They all depict families with gay people, from parents to the children and how they cope with each other, the love and harmony that they have in their families, despite their sexual orientations, for example, Family guy, the Simpsons and the likes. Comic books too have had their own share of the story with Astonishing X-Men comic series, depicting the marriage of the super hero, Jean-Paul Beaubier to his partner Kyle Jinadu. All these works at aiming at promoting the same sex marriage institution, and letting people know that the sexual orientations of individuals do not affect their productivity or their way of associating with other members of the society (Astonishing X-Men).

Why it should not be legalized

The marriage institution has been known over time to contain a relationship between a man and a woman; a relationship that is made through understanding, love and more importantly, the sexual relationship which is the proper pro- creation process. Gay couples cannot bear children of their own, even with the advanced technologies in the present day and age, which will force them to adopt children. One of the most important things of bringing up children in a family made up of a woman and a man is that, they will get to experience the worlds of having both a father and a mother. This will be hard for children brought up in gay marriages, because they will get to experience the worlds of having either two mothers or two fathers. This will be violence against the children’s development process as their world will not be in the best or the agreeable environment for human development (Burns 27). Its legalization will also be undermining the natural sex laws that people know, and have been practiced for ages now. Children will be brought up in confused society that does not know how to support and fight for the morality of its people.

Homosexuality and religion (why it should not be legalized)

Religious leaders have been on the front line to bar same sex marriages and relationships. The bible has been used as the main guide to morality in the society over the past centuries. Many verses can be quoted from the bible, where the institutions of same marriages have been termed as evil and unreligious. The punishment of these practices has also been detailed, with eternal life in hell being the main highlight (King James Bible, Rev. 21). Christian leaders argue that same sex marriage is not only prohibited in Christianity, but across all other religions. Their stand against this debate is one that has been held for a long time, and they are still going strong, with some even suggesting jailing and even killing of people found marrying from the same sex. Some of the religious institutions may be adamant on providing services like accommodation, employment, adoption and others to same sex partners. It still doesn’t matter whether these religious leaders support it or not, bottom line is, if homosexuality is legalized, this will be against the laws and commandments of God. From the beginning of the world and creation, in the Garden of Eden, God mad man (Adam), in His own image, and later on, made a woman for him from his rib, Eve, and told them to go fill the world (King James Bible, Gen. 1). Pro- creation and marriage institution was set to be between a man and a woman, right from the beginning of the world, not between a man and a man, or a woman and a woman. Legalization of these unions will therefore be against the laws of the church and the laws of creation in general.

Gay marriage and other laws (why it should not be legalized)

The legalization of same sex marriages has been argued to bring about a spin in the legalization of other unacceptable traits and behaviors. Many have argued that if it is legalized, laws on incest, polygamy and even bestiality. Many religious leaders and activists have associated homosexuality with bestiality, polygamy and pedophilia among others, and they argue that, if homosexuality is legalized, we will observe a wave of moral values erosion in the society. Children will be brought up in a society with no moral values and will be led to believe that homosexuality is an ideal lifestyle and an acceptable trait. The rates of children molestation will be on the rise in the society (Rimmerman and Wilcox 179). It is believed that the legalization will make homosexuality more acceptable in the society, lead to the fracture of the family system, and it also can be a major setback on the scale of the Supreme Court when it legalized abortion. Activists believe that the fight will be long with the court, so as to overturn the court’s decision.

Advantages of legalization

It is believed that legalization of gay marriages will lead to an improvement in the lives of heterosexuals. Due to the stigma that come a long with coming out of the closet; many gay people do not come into the light. The need to be accepted by the society, whether in family and social gatherings, the wish to be accepted by people around just like any heterosexual person and the fear of being denied employment and other societal values, have led gay people to unwanted marriages. Most of the gay people have been married to people they really do not love just to hide their identity from the society. These fraudulent marriages are not good, for both parties, and even the children. If the same sex marriage institution is legalized, the high rate of divorces that is being experienced at the moment will go down; since gays will stop marrying people of the opposite side to just enable them hide their sex orientation. A reduction in the divorce rates will promote more stable families in the society and due to this; many children will be brought up in stable families. Another advantage of these marriages is that many orphaned children will get stable families, and be brought up in much better conditions when they are adopted. This will lead to the improvement of struggling communities: for example, the number of children who will be homeless and in the foster system will go down (Alvear 1). Another importance of legalizing gay marriages and relationships is that the rate of suicides associated with gay teenagers will reduce. Teenagers and young man and ladies have been committing suicide for the reasons quiet obvious; negativities associated with homosexuality. They feel different from their age mates and they alienate themselves from their peers for fear of being bullied. This alienation and lack of somebody to talk to makes them feel lonely and they are usually in their own world mostly. This leads to suicide since they that feel no one understands. Others have turned to substance abuse to just relieve them from the guilt of being different from the rest of the world. All these factors, especially substance abuse, lead to high rates of crime in the country, especially among the youths and teenagers. Legalization of same sex marriages will help them feel acceptable to the society, and due to this, they will no longer have the urge to turn to drugs for refuge, or suicide for that matter(Moats 45). This discrimination against gay people hurts everyone in the society, whether they are gay or not. When the gay in the community are not accepted, they end up marrying people they do not love, and being in the closet about their sexual orientation, their partners may be really in love with them. The gay person in the marriage will be hurt, since they will feel unappreciated and not satisfied. A marriage should have the happiness and satisfaction of both parties, failure to which, it seizes to be a stable relationship, and it faces many challenges. The other party in the relationship will also not be satisfied because their partner will not be comfortable sharing the many aspects of intimacy with them. This is what leads to divorces, hurting both parties, especially those who had no idea that there partner was gay. If that family had children, their dreams and hopes of growing up in a complete and happy family are shattered. They become the laughing stock among their peers, who do not appreciate gay relationships, due to what they hear from the society about them. These factors can all be avoided if same sex marriages are legalized in the country, and in all the states(Gay Marriage opponents). Though Christians tend to hate on the gay people and condemn them, it leaves the question of what happened to the biblical commandment of loving one another. This legalization will be able to open up their minds and even their hearts to their gay brothers and sisters. In turn, this will promote the spirit of togetherness in America, where people can interact without hating each on other based on their sexual orientation. A more co-ordinate community, that is united by love and peace progresses both economically and socially, and this, will be at the advantage of everybody in the country.

Same sex marriage should be legalized in all states since it has many advantages, and with the changing society, people should learn to embrace these changes. When it is legalized, the perception of people will change over time and all will be the same within no time.

Works Cited

Alvear, Michael. “Q: Would thhttp://minfin.com.ua/currency/nbu/e Legalization of Gay Marriage Result in a Net Benefit to Heterosexuals? Yes: Divorce Rates Triggered by Fraudulent Marriages Will Go Down and More Children Will Grow Up in stable Homes.’’ Insight on the News 22 Dec. 2003: 1. Print Astonishing X-Men.Dir. Joss Whedon.Perf. John Cassady . Shout Factoey, 2012. DVD. Burns, Kate. Gay marriage. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2005. Print. Family Guy.Dir. Seth MacFarlane.Perf Seth Mac Farlene. 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2012.DVD. Gay Marriage opponents see Massachusetts legalization as major setback. Knight Ridder Tribune.Business News.McClatchy- Tribune Information Services. 2004. Highbeam Research. 14 Mar. 2014 <http/www.highbeam.com>. Moats, David. Civil wars: a battle for gay marriages. Orlando: Harcourt, 2004. Print. King James Bible.Ed. Gordon Campbell.Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Rimmerman, Craig A., and Clyde Wilcox.The Politics of same- sex marriage. Chicago:

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• In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as ’Inevitable’

Table of Contents

• Section 1: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Inevitability
• Section 2: Views of Gay Men and Lesbians, Roots of Homosexuality, Personal Contact with Gays
• Section 3: Religious Belief and Views of Homosexuality
• About the Survey

As support for gay marriage continues to increase, nearly three-quarters of Americans – 72% – say that legal recognition of same-sex marriage is “inevitable.” This includes 85% of gay marriage supporters, as well as 59% of its opponents.

The national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted May 1-5 among 1,504 adults, finds that support for same-sex marriage continues to grow: For the first time in Pew Research Center polling, just over half (51%) of Americans favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally. Yet the issue remains divisive, with 42% saying they oppose legalizing gay marriage. Opposition to gay marriage – and to societal acceptance of homosexuality more generally – is rooted in religious attitudes, such as the belief that engaging in homosexual behavior is a sin.

At the same time, more people today have gay or lesbian acquaintances, which is associated with acceptance of homosexuality and support for gay marriage. Nearly nine-in-ten Americans (87%) personally know someone who is gay or lesbian (up from 61% in 1993). About half (49%) say a close family member or one of their closest friends is gay or lesbian. About a quarter (23%) say they know a lot of people who are gay or lesbian, and 31% know a gay or lesbian person who is raising children. The link between these experiences and attitudes about homosexuality is strong. For example, roughly two-thirds (68%) of those who know a lot of people who are gay or lesbian favor gay marriage, compared with just 32% of those who don’t know anyone.

Part of this is a matter of who is more likely to have many gay acquaintances: the young, city dwellers, women, and the less religious, for example. But even taking these factors into account, the relationship between personal experiences and acceptance of homosexuality is a strong one.

Yet opposition to gay marriage remains substantial, and religious beliefs are a major factor in opposition. Just under half of Americans (45%) say they think engaging in homosexual behavior is a sin, while an equal number says it is not. Those who believe homosexual behavior is a sin overwhelmingly oppose gay marriage. Similarly, those who say they personally feel there is a lot of conflict between their religious beliefs and homosexuality (35% of the public) are staunchly opposed to same-sex marriage.

The survey finds that as support for same-sex marriage has risen, other attitudes about homosexuality have changed as well. In a 2004 Los Angeles Times poll, most Americans (60%) said they would be upset if they had a child who told them that they were gay or lesbian; 33% said they would be very upset over this. Today, 40% say they would be upset if they learned they had a gay or lesbian child, and just 19% would be very upset.

Favorable opinions of both gay men and lesbians have risen since 2003. Moreover, by nearly two-to-one (60% to 31%), more Americans say that homosexuality should be accepted rather than discouraged by society. A decade ago, opinions about societal acceptance of homosexuality were evenly divided (47% accepted, 45% discouraged).

The religious basis for opposition to homosexuality is seen clearly in the reasons people give for saying it should be discouraged by society. By far the most frequently cited factors –mentioned by roughly half (52%) of those who say homosexuality should be discouraged – are moral objections to homosexuality, that it conflicts with religious beliefs, or that it goes against the Bible. No more than about one-in-ten cite any other reasons as to why homosexuality should be discouraged by society.

Widespread Belief that Legal Recognition Is ‘Inevitable’

Despite the increasing support for legal same-sex marriage in recent years, opinions about the issue remain deeply divided by age, partisanship and religious affiliation.

By contrast, large majorities across most demographic groups think that legal recognition of same-sex marriage is inevitable.

Republicans (73%) are as likely as Democrats (72%) or independents (74%) to view legal recognition for gay marriage as inevitable. Just 31% of Republicans favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally, compared with majorities of Democrats (59%) and independents (58%).

Similarly, people 65 and older are 30 points more likely to view legal recognition of same-sex marriage as inevitable than to favor it (69% vs. 39%). Among those younger than 30, about as many see legal same-sex marriage as inevitable as support gay marriage (69%, 65%).

Just 22% of white evangelical Protestants favor same-sex marriage, but about three times that percentage (70%) thinks legal recognition for gay marriage is inevitable. Among other religious groups, there are smaller differences in underlying opinions about gay marriage and views of whether it is inevitable.

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Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Monday reversed a campaign promise to push for legalization of same-sex marriage. “That [same-sex marriage] won’t work for us. We’re Catholics,” he said in a speech before the Filipino community in Burma. “And there’s the Civil Code , which says that [a man] can only marry a woman.”

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The best argument against same-sex marriage

FILIPINOS, SPORTING #LoveWins hashtags and slapping rainbows onto their Facebook profile pictures, have been swept up in the euphoria over the US Supreme Court decision declaring same-sex marriage a fundamental human right. Law professors are heartened to see Justice Anthony Kennedy’s poetic Obergefell decision shared in social media. However, we must also read the powerful dissents and ask why we might prefer that our unelected justices decide this sensitive issue instead of our elected legislators.

Inquirer 2bu quoted teenagers opining that anyone with the capacity to love deserves to have his/her chosen relationship validated. Obergefell’s logic is equally simple. Forget “substantive due process,” “decisional privacy” and “equal protection.” It takes the simple premise that human liberty necessarily goes beyond physical liberty, and includes an unwritten right to make fundamental life choices. Choosing a life partner is one such fundamental choice and the decision of two people to formalize their relationship must be accorded utmost dignity.

The typical arguments against this simple idea are so intellectually discredited that Obergefell no longer discussed them. (My Philippine Law Journal article “Marriage through another lens,” 81 PHIL. L.J. 789 [2006], tried applying them to bisexual and transgender Filipinos.)

One cannot solely invoke religious doctrine, even if thinly veiled as secular “morality.” Religious groups may confront this issue but not impose their choices on others. Their often vindictive tone contrasts sharply with Kennedy’s, and increasingly alienates millennials who revel in individuality. Those criticized as religious zealots should at least strive to be up-to-date, more sophisticated religious zealots.

The most common argument, procreation, is also the easiest to refute. Philippine Family Code author Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy wrote: “The [Code] Committee believes that marriage … may also be only for companionship, as when parties past the age of procreation still get married.”

Another argument reduces marriage to a series of economic benefits and suggests a “domestic partnership” system to govern same-sex couples’ property and other rights. This parallels having separate schools for white and black children and claiming they are equal because both have schools. It implies that some relationships so lack dignity that they must be called something else.

Protecting the “traditional” definition of marriage is too subjective. Obergefell reminds that traditional definitions evolve and once prohibited interracial and accepted arranged marriages, and “it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”

Recent last-ditch arguments alleged harm to children. No party to Obergefell contested that same-sex couples may build nurturing families after adopting or tapping medical advances to produce babies with related DNA. Prohibiting same-sex marriage harms children by making such families unstable, as only one parent may legally adopt and have rights in relation to a child.

With all these discredited, the Obergefell dissents simply raised that marriage is so central a social institution that it is better redefined by democratic process than unelected judges. Proponents may consider opponents homophobic, bigoted, narrow-minded religious zealots, but none of these disqualifies one from being a citizen. Chief Justice John Roberts argued that proponents should have relied on how popular opinion was rapidly shifting in their favor than ending all debate by court order.

Justice Antonin Scalia decried how the US Constitution was turned into a “fortune cookie” in a “judicial Putsch” that declared a radical unwritten right. Roberts cautioned that the first cases to use similar doctrine upheld slavery and struck down labor regulations in the name of laissez faire economics. Although invoking human rights is not subject to an election, it is wise to consult society in defining these, and Obergefell stressed the lengthy public debates the United States experienced at every level.

One thus asks why an instant judicial solution is more appealing than backing Akbayan Rep. Barry Gutierrez’s proposed same-sex marriage bill. The Philippines has not had serious public debate given how we recently focused on reproductive health, and our high court has not even explicitly recognized “decisional privacy.” Further, the petition to legalize same-sex marriage recently filed at our high court is blatantly deficient.

The petition (like the anti-RH petitions) does not even identify a client. There is no actual Filipino same-sex couple, unlike the real Mr. Obergefell who sought to be named the spouse on his partner’s death certificate after their deathbed wedding. This violates the most basic rule that judicial power may only be used in an “actual case” and the high court should have instantly thrown out the no-case petition (like the anti-RH petitions). The petition also has glaring errors (like the anti-RH petitions). It invoked the Philippine privacy decision Ople vs Torres, which involved information in government databases and has nothing to do with the “decisional privacy” of US same-sex marriage debates. Even liberals should be hard-pressed to support this lest they be intellectually inconsistent and validate the anti-RH petitions’ worst features.

Any citizen lacking the patience to back Gutierrez’s bill has every right to short-circuit democracy by seeking an order from unelected judges. One hopes our high court insists that it be sought properly.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FISCHER v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 23-5572. Argued April 16, 2024-Decided June 28, 2024 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly "alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu- ment, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding." 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so." §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on Jan- uary 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered out- side the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the build- ing, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal com- plaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminal- izes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed- ings. Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. (a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in §1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding

21 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Syllabus words," Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute."" Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539). The Court considers both "the spe- cific context" in which (c)(2) appears "and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341. (1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal con- duct in specific terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated" by (c)(1). Re- public of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in §1512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps in the focused language of (c)(1). One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise" clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general princi- ples are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is "given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294. And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective term at the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled and defined by reference to those specific items that precede it. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458. These approaches to statu- tory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning- less the specific text that accompanies it. Under these principles, the "otherwise" provision of §1512(c)(2) is limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive con- duct beyond $1512(c)(1)'s focus on evidence impairment, Congress would have had little reason to provide any specific examples at all. And the sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to do. Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c) (1) recognizes the dis- tinct purpose of each provision. Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense conduct-four types of actions that, by their nature, im- pair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an official proceeding. Reading the "otherwise" clause as having been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) Syllabus 3 (c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the avail- ability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond the "record[s], document[s], or other object[s]" enumerated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible information. (2) It makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the history of the provision. The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loop- hole in §1512. At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred documents. But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who destroyed records himself. The parties agree that Congress enacted §1512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loop- hole. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress created a catch-all provision that reaches beyond the scenar- ios that prompted the legislation. (b) The broader context of §1512 in the criminal code confirms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings, much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive conduct. Given the Court's obligation to give meaning where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, the Court's narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one. An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in §1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction with penalties ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. The Govern- ment's reading would lump together under (c)(2) disparate types of conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate sentences. (c) The Government's theory would also criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison. Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to "resist reading" particular sub-provisions "to create a coverall statute." Yates, 574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion). Nothing in the text or statutory his- tory gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today. And the Government's interpretation would give prosecutors broad discre- tion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish with far shorter sentences. By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1), the Court affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the penalties for them. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600. 64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.

4 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Syllabus ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. Č. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-5572 JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 28, 2024] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liabil- ity on anyone who corruptly "alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so." §1512(c)(2). We consider whether this “otherwise” clause should be read in light of the limited reach of the specific provision that precedes it. I This case concerns the prosecution of petitioner Joseph Fischer for his conduct on January 6, 2021. That day, both Houses of Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol. As set forth in the criminal complaint against Fischer, some of the crowd eventually

2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court “forced entry” into the building, “breaking windows," and "assaulting members of the U. S. Capitol Police." App. 189. This breach of the Capitol caused Members of Congress to evacuate the Chambers and delayed the certification pro- cess. The complaint alleges that Fischer was one of those who invaded the building. According to the complaint, about an hour after the Houses recessed, Fischer trespassed into the Capitol and was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforce- ment. Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed police back about 25 feet," and that he “was inside the [Cap- itol] talking to police." Id., at 193–194. Body camera foot- age shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and po- lice who were trying to eject trespassers from the building. Id., at 195-196. A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indict- ment against Fischer. Six of those counts allege that Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and re- mained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes. See id., at 181-185; 18 U.S. C. §§111(a), 231(a)(3), 1752(a)(1), (a)(2); 40 U. S. C. §§5104(e)(2)(D), (G). Those six counts carry maximum penalties ranging from six months' to eight years' imprisonment. In Count Three, the only count now before us, the Gov- ernment charged Fischer with violating 18 U.S. C. §1512(c)(2). Fischer moved to dismiss that count, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. It concluded that the scope of Section 1512(c)(2) is limited by subsection (c)(1) and therefore requires the defendant to "have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object.' 2022 WL 782413, *4 (DC, Mar. 15, 2022) (quoting United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022)). 999

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 3 Opinion of the Court A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and re- manded for further proceedings. Judge Pan, writing for the court, held that the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) means that the provision unambiguously covers "all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than the conduct that is already covered by §1512(c)(1)." 64 F. 4th 329, 336 (2023). Judge Walker concurred in part and concurred in the judgment because he read the mens rea element of the statute—“corruptly”—as requiring a defend- ant to act with “an intent to procure an unlawful benefit." Id., at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Katsas dissented. In his view, the language in sub- section (c)(1) narrows the language that comes after the word "otherwise" in subsection (c)(2). He therefore con- strued Section 1512(c)(2) as applying “only to acts that," like the ones specified in (c)(1), “affect the integrity or avail- ability of evidence” at an official proceeding. Id., at 363. We granted certiorari. 601 U. S. _ (2023). II The controversy before us is about the scope of the resid- ual "otherwise" clause in Section 1512(c)(2). On the one hand, Fischer contends that (c)(2) “applies only to acts that affect the integrity or availability of evidence." Brief for Pe- titioner 8. On the other, the Government argues that (c)(2) “capture[s] all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)'s focus on evidence impairment.” Brief for United States 13. Resolving such a dispute requires us to determine how the residual clause is linked to its “surrounding words." Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 774–775 (2023). In doing so, "we must ‘give effect, if possi- ble, to every clause and word of [the] statute.”” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955)). To that end, we

4 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court consider both "the specific context" in which (c)(2) appears "and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robin- son v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997); see, e.g., Pul- sifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 133 (2024) (choosing between “two grammatically permissible ways” to read a sentencing statute “by reviewing text in context"). A 1 Section 1512 provides: "(c) Whoever corruptly— "(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or "(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, "shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." Subsection (c)(1) describes particular types of criminal conduct in specific terms. To ensure the statute would not be read as excluding substantially similar activity not men- tioned, (c)(2) says it is also illegal to engage in some broader range of unenumerated conduct. The purpose of the "otherwise” clause is therefore, as the parties agree, to cover some set of "matters not specifically contemplated" by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009); see Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for United States 12-13. The problem is defining what exactly Con- gress left for (c)(2). Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in Section 1512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest in one go. The point of (c)(1) would then be to illustrate just one type of conduct among many (c)(2) prohibits; it would be subsidiary to the overarching prohibition in (c)(2). But

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 10 5 Opinion of the Court (c)(2) could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed it with the focused language of (c)(1) in mind. Subsection (c)(1) would then prohibit particular types of obstructive conduct and (c)(2) would fill any inadvertent gaps that might exist. One way to discern the reach of an "otherwise" clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is "given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associ- ated." United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). That “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps." Gus- tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, “a ‘general or collec- tive term' at the end of a list of specific items" is typically "controlled and defined by reference to the specific classes ... that precede it." Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting first Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)); accord, Bis- sonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246, 252 (2024). These approaches to statutory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning- less the specific text that accompanies it. To see why, consider a straightforward example. A zoo might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.” If a vis- itor eats lunch in front of a hungry gorilla, or talks to a friend near its enclosure, has he obeyed the regulation? Surely yes. Although the smell of human food or the sound of voices might well disturb gorillas, the specific examples of impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with and harassment of the zoo animals. Merely eating or talk- ing is so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it

6 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court would be implausible to assume those activities were pro- hibited, even if literally covered by the language. The idea is simply that a general phrase can be given a more focused meaning by the terms linked to it. That prin- ciple ensures- es-regardless of how complicated a sentence might appear—that none of its specific parts are made re- dundant by a clause literally broad enough to include them. See Yates, 574 U. S., at 545–546 (plurality opinion). For instance, a football league might adopt a rule that players must not "grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.” If a linebacker shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind. See 64 F. 4th, at 365-366 (Katsas, J., dissenting). Similarly improbable consequences can result from un- tethering an "otherwise” provision from the rest of a crimi- nal statute. Take Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015)). The question there was whether driving under the influence qualified as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A “violent felony” was defined in relevant part by ACCA as a crime, punishable by more than a year's imprisonment, that "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten- tial risk of physical injury to another."" 553 U. S., at 139– 140 (quoting 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 ed.)). We recognized that, depending on the context, "the word 'oth- erwise' can"-though not “must”—“refer to a crime that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others." 553 U. S., at 144 (emphasis deleted). And we held that while driving under the influence certainly may

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 7 Opinion of the Court present a serious risk of physical injury, such an offense was so dissimilar from the previously enumerated exam- ples that it could not be classified as a “violent felony" under the statute. Id., at 142–146. The list of crimes that pre- ceded the residual clause-burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives-focused on "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." Id., at 144–145 (internal quotation marks omitted). And if that focus did not extend to the re- sidual clause, ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sen- tence would apply to a host of offenses “not typically com- mitted by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career criminals" and that were "far removed... from the delib- erate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms.”¹ Id., at 146–147. The "otherwise" provision of Section 1512(c)(2) is simi- larly limited by the preceding list of criminal violations. The offenses enumerated in subsection (c)(1) cover someone who "alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu- ment, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the ob- ject's integrity or availability for use in an official proceed- ing." Complex as subsection (c)(1) may look, it simply consists of many specific examples of prohibited actions un- dertaken with the intent to impair an object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding: altering a rec- ord, altering a document, concealing a record, concealing a document, and so on. That list is followed immediately by a residual clause in (c)(2). Guided by the basic logic that Congress would not go to the trouble of spelling out the list in (c)(1) if a neighboring term swallowed it up, the most sen- 1 The dissent explains that we subsequently held the ACCA residual clause void for vagueness. See post, at 8 (opinion of BARRETT, J.) (citing Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015)). That our answer to the narrow question presented in Begay did not resolve a broader consti- tutional defect in the statute says little about whether the reasoning of Begay is relevant here.

00 8 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sible inference is that the scope of (c)(2) is defined by refer- ence to (c)(1). If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers "all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)'s focus on ev- idence impairment,” Brief for United States 13, there would have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specific examples at all. The sweep of subsection (c)(2) would con- sume (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to do. Indeed, subsection (c) (1) would be an elaborate pumpfake: a list of four types of highly particularized con- duct, performed with respect to a record, document, or ob- ject and “with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” followed in the very next subsection-in the same sentence, no less—by a superseding prohibition on all means of obstructing, influ- encing, or impeding any official proceeding. Construing Section 1512 in such a way gets the “familiar” analysis we apply to these types of statutes “exactly backwards,” elimi- nating specific terms because of broad language that follows them, rather than limiting the broad language in light of narrower terms that precede it. Bissonnette, 601 U. S., at 252, 255. Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recog- nizes the distinct purpose of each provision. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 208 (2012) ("evident purpose" helps define scope of catchall provision). As we have ex- plained, subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or ob- jects for use in an official proceeding. When the phrase "otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding" is read as having been given more precise con- tent by that narrower list of conduct, subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 9 Opinion of the Court is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence―ra- ther than altering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Reich, 479 F. 3d 179, 185–187 (CA2 2007) (So- tomayor, J.) (prosecution under subsection (c)(2) for trans- mitting a forged court order). Subsection (c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding be- yond the "record[s], document[s], or other object[s]” enu- merated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible information. See, e.g., United States v. Mintmire, 507 F. 3d 1273, 1290 (CA11 2007) (prosecution under subsection (c)(2) based in part on the defendant's attempt to orches- trate a witness's grand jury testimony). The dissent supposes that because the word "otherwise" in (c)(2) can mean “in a different manner,” “by other means," or "in other respects," (c)(1) and (c) (2) are “distinct and independent prohibitions." Post, at 2, 5 (internal quo- tation marks omitted). But the word "otherwise" is not by itself "sufficient to demonstrate that the examples do not limit the scope of the clause." Begay, 553 U. S., at 144 (em- phasis deleted). “Otherwise” can link a set of examples to a general phrase and give it more definite meaning—even in statutory sentences that rival the complexity of Section 1512(c). See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431, 437–438 (1982); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67, 91– 92 (1989). 2 It makes sense to read subsection (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the history of the provision. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 1512 imposed criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly uses intimida- tion or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades an- other person" to, among other things, shred documents. 18 U. S. C. §1512(b)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). But the Enron account- ing scandal revealed a loophole: Although Enron's "outside

10 10 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de- stroyed potentially incriminating documents," the statute curiously failed to “impos[e] liability on a person who de- stroys records himself." Yates, 574 U. S., at 535-536 (plu- rality opinion). As a result, prosecutors had to prove that higher-ups at Enron and Arthur Andersen persuaded some- one else to shred documents rather than the more obvious theory that someone who shreds documents is liable for do- ing so. See S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 7 (2002). The parties agree that to plug this loophole, Congress en- acted Section 1512(c)—the provision at issue here—as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress actually hid away in the second part of the third subsection of Sec- tion 1512 a catchall provision that reaches far beyond the document shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legislation in the first place. The better conclusion is that subsection (c) (2) was designed by Congress to capture other forms of evidence and other means of impairing its integrity or availability beyond those Congress specified in (c)(1). B 1 The broader context of Section 1512 in the criminal code confirms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings. See 18 U. S. C. ch. 73. Much of that particularized legislation would be unneces- sary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive con- duct, as the Government contends. Section 1503(a), for ex- ample, makes it a crime to "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening . . . communication, endeavor[] to in- fluence, intimidate, or impede” any juror or court officer. Section 1504 covers attempting to influence jurors through written communications. Section 1505 covers anyone who

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 11 Opinion of the Court corruptly obstructs congressional inquiries or investiga- tions. Section 1507 covers picketing or parading in certain locations "with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice.” Section 1509 co- vers the obstruction of the exercise of rights or performance of duties under court orders. Section 1510(a) covers ob- struction of federal criminal investigations through bribery. Section 1511(a) covers certain obstruction of state or local law enforcement with the intent to facilitate illegal gam- bling. And Sections 1516, 1517, and 1518 address obstruc- tive acts in specific contexts, including federal audits, ex- aminations of financial institutions, and inquiries into healthcare-related offenses. If the Government were correct, then the "otherwise ob- structs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding" pro- vision—which is buried in subsection (c)(2) of Section 1512 would largely obviate the need for that broad array of other obstruction statutes. In light of our obligation to give meaning where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, our narrower interpre- tation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one. 2 An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in Section 1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction, with varying degrees of culpability and penalties ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. Section 1512(a)(2)(B)(iv), for exam- ple, authorizes up to 30 years' imprisonment for someone who uses or attempts to use physical force against another person with the intent of causing him to be absent from an official proceeding. See §1512(a)(3)(B)(ii) (specifying pun- ishment). Section 1512(d)(1), by contrast, authorizes only

12 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court three years' imprisonment for someone who harasses an- other person and thereby dissuades him from attending an official proceeding. Reading (c)(2) to cover all forms of obstructive conduct would override Congress's careful delineation of which pen- alties were appropriate for which offenses. Most instances of those prohibited acts would instead fall under subsection (c)(2)'s sweeping reach, which provides a 20-year maximum term of imprisonment. Such a reading of subsection (c)(2) would lump together disparate types of conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate penalties in (a)(2) and (d)(1).2 3 The Government's responses to this surplusage problem are not convincing. It first argues that because other provisions in Section 1512 would allow conviction in some circumstances on a "lesser mens rea than ‘corruptly,"" they have “a broader compass" than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34. For in- stance, the Government contends that subsection (b) can be violated by "knowing use of intimidation or threats, or mis- leading conduct." Id., at 35. But the Government concedes that "Congress did not define corruptly' for purposes of Sec- tion 1512." Id., at 44. And while the Government suggests that “corruptly” is “normally associated with wrongful, im- moral, depraved, or evil' conduct,” ibid. (quoting Arthur An- dersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 705 (2005)), it 292 2 The dissent maintains we have "glosse[d] over the absence of any prescribed minimum.' Post, at 14 (quoting Yates, 574 U. S., at 569 (KAGAN, J., dissenting)). Congress might have thought (c)(2) prohibited conduct of varying severity. But it does not follow that it designed (c)(2) to reach forms of conduct already covered in Chapter 73 with far lower maximum sentences. It would be improper to substitute for those fine- grained statutory distinctions the charging discretion of prosecutors and the sentencing discretion of district courts.

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 13 Opinion of the Court never persuasively explains how “knowingly us[ing] intim- idation" or "threat[s]” against someone is not "wrongful." §1512(b). The same is true for most other subparts of Sec- tion 1512 that the Government identifies as having a lesser mens rea than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34; see, e.g., §1512(a)(1)(A) (criminalizing anyone who “kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to" prevent attendance in an official proceeding); §1512(a)(2)(B)(iv) (criminalizing anyone who "uses physical force . . . against any person" in- tending to cause them to be absent from an official proceed- ing). None of those other provisions has a mens rea the Gov- ernment may more readily establish than the "corruptly" mens rea of subsection (c)(2). The Government also contends that its interpretation creates no surplusage because Section 1512's other “provi- sions sweep more broadly than an official proceeding.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 64; Brief for United States 34. To be sure, sub- sections (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2) criminalize various means of preventing someone from giving a judge or law enforcement officer information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or a violation of conditions of supervised release. And subsections (d)(3) and (4) make it a crime to harass someone and thereby dissuade them from arresting or prosecuting a person alleged to have committed a federal offense. None of these crimes requires an “official proceeding.” But not much if any conduct cov- ered by those provisions would escape the Government's ex- pansive interpretation of subsection (c)(2). For a person to have violated (c)(2), “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted.” §1512(f)(1). And be- cause interference with an arrest or with communications to authorities about federal offenses could very well ob- struct the initiation of future official proceedings, the Gov- ernment's reading of (c)(2) would still often consume viola- tions of (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2), (3), and (4).

14 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court The dissent tries to solve this surplusage problem by ar- guing that conduct only violates (c)(2) if it has a “relation- ship in time, causation, or logic”” with an official proceed- ing. Post, at 11 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 599 (1995)). Assuming there is such a requirement, it would simply mean that the defendant's actions “must have the natural and probable effect” of interfering with the pro- ceeding. Id., at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a bar on prosecutions based on “speculative” theories of obstruction, id., at 601, would hardly cabin the reach of (c)(2). The dissent points out that our reading creates some sur- plusage, too. See post, at 12–13. In a wide-ranging scheme like Chapter 73, it is true that some provisions will inevita- bly cover some of the same conduct. But “surplusage is nonetheless disfavored,” and our “construction that creates substantially less of it is better than a construction that cre- ates substantially more.” 64 F. 4th, at 374 (Katsas, J., dis- senting). III On the Government's theory, Section 1512(c) consists of a granular subsection (c)(1) focused on obstructive acts that impair evidence and an overarching subsection (c)(2) that reaches all other obstruction. Even setting surplusage aside, that novel interpretation would criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyists alike to decades in prison. As the Solicitor General acknowledged at oral argument, under the Government's interpretation, a peaceful protester could conceivably be charged under §1512(c)(2) and face a 20-year sentence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 51-52. And the Government would likewise have no apparent obstacle to prosecuting under (c)(2) any lobbying activity that “influences” an official proceeding and is undertaken “corruptly." Those peculiar results “un-

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 15 Opinion of the Court derscore[] the implausibility of the Government's interpre- tation." Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 394 (2021). Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “re- sist reading” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall" statute, as the Government would have us do here. Yates, 574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion); see also Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6-11 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U. S., at 703-704. And there is no reason to depart from that practice today. Nothing in the text or statutory history suggests that subsection (c)(2) is designed to impose up to 20 years' imprisonment on essentially all defendants who commit obstruction of justice in any way and who might be subject to lesser penalties under more specific ob- struction statutes. See, e.g., §§1503(b)(3), 1505. If Con- gress had wanted to authorize such penalties for any con- duct that delays or influences a proceeding in any way, it would have said so. Instead, Section 1512 mentions "rec- ord," "document,” or other “object” 26 times. See 18 U. S. C. §§1512(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), 1512(b)(2)(A), (B), (C), 1512(c)(1), 1512(f). Rather than transforming this evidence-focused statute into a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of justice, we cabin our reading of subsection (c)(2) in light of the context of subsection (c)(1). Doing so affords proper respect to "the prerogatives of Congress" in carrying out the quintessen- tially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the pen- alties for them. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600. We have long recognized that “the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department,” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820), and we have as a result “traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,”” Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11 (quoting Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600). The Government's reading of Section 1512 would intrude on that deliberate arrangement of constitutional authority over federal

16 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court crimes, giving prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20- year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish only with far shorter terms of imprisonment—for example, three years for harassment under §1512(d)(1), or ten years for threatening a juror under §1503. For all these reasons, subsection (c)(2)'s “surrounding words" suggest that we should not give this “otherwise” pro- vision the broadest possible meaning. Yates, 574 U. S., at 536 (plurality opinion). Although the Government's all-en- compassing interpretation may be literally permissible, it defies the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and (c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of statutory text mere surplusage. Given that subsection (c)(2) was enacted to address the Enron disaster, not some further flung set of dangers, it is unlikely that Congress re- sponded with such an unfocused and “grossly incommensu- rate patch." 64 F. 4th, at 376 (Katsas, J., dissenting). We therefore decline to adopt the Government's interpretation, which is inconsistent with "the context from which the stat- ute arose." Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 860 (2014). * * * To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Govern- ment must establish that the defendant impaired the avail- ability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of rec- ords, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so. See supra, at 9. The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the D. C. Circuit may assess the sufficiency of Count Three of Fischer's in- dictment in light of our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2). It is so ordered.

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 1 JACKSON, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-5572 JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 28, 2024] JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. On January 6, 2021, an angry mob stormed the United States Capitol seeking to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty to certify the electoral votes in the 2020 Presidential election. See ante, at 1-2. The peaceful transfer of power is a fundamental democratic norm, and those who attempted to disrupt it in this way inflicted a deep wound on this Nation. But today's case is not about the immorality of those acts. Instead, the question before this Court is far narrower: What is the scope of the partic- ular crime Congress has outlined in 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2)? In the United States of America, “men are not subjected to criminal punishment because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions or thwarts a general purpose sought to be effected by specific commands which they have not diso- beyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of offenses which the statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to define and condemn." Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 245 (1943). Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law requires the courts to faithfully apply criminal laws as writ- ten, even in periods of national crisis, see, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 46-48 (1945), and even when the conduct alleged is indisputably abhorrent, cf. Michaels v. Davis, 601 U. S. (2024) (JACKSON, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 3).

2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., concurring Notwithstanding the shocking circumstances involved in this case or the Government's determination that they war- rant prosecution, today, this Court's task is to determine what conduct is proscribed by the criminal statute that has been invoked as the basis for the obstruction charge at issue here. I join in the Court's opinion because I agree with the majority that §1512(c) (2) does not reach “all forms of ob- structive conduct”” and is, instead, “limited by the preced- ing list of criminal violations” in §1512(c)(1). Ante, at 7-8. I write separately to explain why and how that interpreta- tion of §1512(c) follows from the legislative purpose that this statute's text embodies. I Our goal in interpreting any statute should be "to give effect to the intent of Congress." United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940). There is no question that intent is generally expressed through the text of a statute. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). “[H]ewing closely to Congress's will" as embodied in the statute that it wrote "is especially important" when construing laws like this one, which im- plicate the possible imposition of punitive sanctions. Pugin v. Garland, 599 U. S. 600, 612 (2023) (JACKSON, J., concur- ring). Here, the majority rightly interprets the scope of §1512(c)(2) by “look[ing] for guidance from” the statutory "examples [that] come before" it those listed in §1512(c)(1). Ante, at 5. In my view, the examples that Con- gress opts to include in the text of a statute evince its inten- tions concerning what the rule covers and thereby help ex- press a particular legislative purpose. The majority's football-based example is illustrative. In a football league, says the majority, “a rule that players must not 'grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 3 JACKSON, J., concurring attack, assault, or harm any player,”” should not be inter- preted as being directed at hurt feelings, because the listed "prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind." Ante, at 6. I agree. I would add that it is like- wise clear from the listed prohibited acts that such a rule is also not addressing far more serious and unexpected con- duct than the kinds of acts that the preceding examples de- scribe, which can result in serious and foreseeable physical injuries during a rough-and-tumble football game. By con- trast, if a player were to shoot or poison another player, the rule's drafters would expect the police to be called, not a referee. Thus, we conclude that the rule is best understood to be inapposite with respect to conduct at both extremes of the universe of harmful acts in which a player might con- ceivably engage. We recognize this intuitive fact that there is a certain category of conduct the rule is designed to prohibit-be- cause we recognize, albeit implicitly, that the drafters of this rule have included these particular examples for a rea- son. We understand that, given the preceding list of exam- ples, this rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning its scope. So, though a broad conception of "harm” is “liter- ally covered by the language” of the rule, ibid., we appreci- ate that the rule's drafters did not intend for that term to take on its most expansive meaning. Instead, the examples help illuminate what the drafters actually intended the rule to cover. From the preceding list, we can confidently dis- cern that the drafters meant to proscribe only conduct that risks injuries with severity akin to facemask pulling, not trash talk or murder.1 1 The majority invokes the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem gen- eris to support this inference. See ante, at 5. Those canons are useful interpretive tools, but in my view, they are ultimately only devices used in furtherance of achieving our goal of determining “the intent of Con- gress." United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534,

4 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., concurring The upshot is that, when interpreting the scope of a par- ticular statute or rule, our assessment of the words that the drafters used informs our understanding of what the rule was designed to do.² Discerning the rule's purpose is criti- cal when a court is called upon to interpret the provision. II Turning to the statutory provision at issue here, the pur- pose of $1512(c), reflected in its text, is clear. Subsection (c)(1) is indisputably focused on persons who engage in a particular kind of obstructive conduct: Anyone who "cor- ruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, . . . with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official pro- ceeding." Subsection (c)(2), in turn, is directed at criminal conduct that “otherwise” achieves a similar result. I there- fore agree with the majority that §1512(c)(2)'s reach is nar- rower than the Government contends. As the majority holds, §1512(c)(2) “makes it a crime to impair the availabil- ity or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1)" and to “impai[r] the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond the 'record[s], document[s], or other object[s]' enumerated in (c)(1)." ... 542 (1940). "There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that inten- tion." Ibid. As one treatise explains, such canons are “not. rule[s] of law" but rather "one of various factors to be considered." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 212 (2012); see also id., at 196–198. We apply these canons because we understand that their principles are consistent with how users of language—including legislators convey meaning. See id., at 212 ("Any lawyer or legislative drafter who writes two or more specifics followed by a general residual term without the intention that the residual term be limited may be guilty of malpractice"). As such, they are valid indicia of Congress's pur- pose. 2 Other indicia of the drafters' intent, such as the rule's context or en- actment history, can further inform our understanding of the rule. See infra, at 5-8.

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) JACKSON, J., concurring 10 5 Ante, at 8-9. This understanding of §1512(c)'s text and purpose is en- tirely consistent with the statute's enactment history. Con- gress enacted §1512(c) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which "was prompted by the exposure of Enron's massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company's out- side auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de- stroyed potentially incriminating documents." Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 535–536 (2015) (plurality opinion). When introducing what later became §1512(c) on the Senate floor, Senator Lott emphasized that its principal purpose was to target document destruction, which was, at the time, prohibited “only if ... a subpoena ha[d] been is- sued for the evidence that ha[d] been destroyed or altered." 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10, 2002). “[T]his section,” he explained, "would allow the Government to charge obstruc- tion against individuals who acted alone, even if the tam- pering took place prior to the issuance of a grand jury sub- poena." Ibid. Similarly, the Senate Report accompanying the proposed statute noted that “current federal obstruction of justice statutes relating to document destruction [were] riddled with loopholes and burdensome proof require- ments." S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 6 (2002). According to the Senate Report, §1512(c) was drafted to fill these gaps: "When a person destroys evidence with the intent of ob- structing any type of investigation and the matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical legal distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution and punishment.” Id., at 7. Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Con- gress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute. As the majority notes, "[f]ederal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific crimi- nal acts and settings." Ante, at 10. Outside of the Govern- ment's proposed interpretation of §1512(c), Congress has never enacted “a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of

6 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., concurring justice.” Ante, at 15.³ Meanwhile, many States have done just that. See J. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Ob- struction of Justice in American Criminal Law, 65 La. L. Rev. 49, 77, and n. 236 (2004) (collecting statutes). 4 The drafters of the Model Penal Code, too, proposed such a gen- eral obstruction crime. See ALI, Model Penal Code §242.1, p. 201 (1980) ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he pur- posely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, phys- ical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act"). Given that Congress has never before passed a similarly broad obstruction law when others have long existed, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended for subsection (c)(2) to establish a first-of-its-kind general federal obstruction crime. Nothing in the enactment history of §1512(c) sug- gests that Congress believed that it was creating an all-en- compassing statute that would obviate the need for any other obstruction prohibitions. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, un- like §1512(c)(2), nearly all of the broad, all-purpose obstruc- tion statutes that various States have enacted are classified as misdemeanors. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(3) (2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2921.31(B) (Lexis 2024). As a 3 That is not to say, of course, that Congress could not enact such a statute if it so chose. "We have traditionally exercised restraint in as- sessing the reach of a federal criminal statute. . . out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress,” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600 (1995), not because broad criminal proscriptions are beyond the scope of Congress's power. 4 See also, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(1) (2023) ("A person commits obstructing government operations if he intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of a governmental function by a public serv- ant, by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interfer- ence or obstacle"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2921.31(A) (Lexis 2024) ("No person... shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties").

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 7 JACKSON, J., concurring result, these types of obstruction crimes are generally pun- ishable by up to a year of incarceration. See 1 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §1.8(c), pp. 557-558 (4th ed. 2015). That is so for a reason: As the Model Penal Code's drafters explained, “the existence of a residual misdemeanor offense" allows for the “appropri- ately narrow definition of the serious forms of obstruction carrying felony penalties." §242.1, Comment 2, at 203. "A broad residual offense. . . provides a hedge against the in- genuity of offenders," since "[n]ot all forms of obstruction can be anticipated and precisely proscribed in specific of- fenses." Ibid. But, at the same time, that kind of broad criminal statute “must incorporate certain limitations lest it nullify policy decisions expressed elsewhere." Ibid. In other words, these broad misdemeanor obstruction statutes are “amalgam[s] of generality and constraint.” Ibid. The Government's interpretation of §1512(c)(2), by con- trast, exhibits all the generality of these catchall misde- meanor obstruction provisions while displaying none of their restraint. Section 1512(c)(2) is a felony, and it im- poses a 20-year maximum sentence-one of the more severe potential punishments in Chapter 73 of the U. S. Code. That stands in contrast with Congress's specification that other serious obstructive acts warrant “far shorter terms of imprisonment—for example, three years for harassment under §1512(d)(1), or ten years for threatening a juror un- der $1503." Ante, at 16. Finally, it is worth remembering the statutory context in which Congress chose to prohibit the obstruction-related conduct we are considering today. The statute Congress wrote addresses this matter in a 13-word phrase, enumer- ated "2," that is located within subsection (c) of a much broader §1512, which itself consists of “a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction." Ante, at 11. However we might interpret Congress's drafting choices in other contexts, we should be wary of finding that

8 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., concurring a statute addresses significant criminal conduct when none of the available indicia of congressional intent, including the prohibition's placement, suggest that Congress in- tended that result. Here, it beggars belief that Congress would have inserted a breathtakingly broad, first-of-its- kind criminal obstruction statute (accompanied by a sub- stantial 20-year maximum penalty) in the midst of a signif- icantly more granular series of obstruction prohibitions without clarifying its intent to do so―not in the text of the provision itself, nor in the surrounding statutory context, nor in any statement issued during the enactment process. * * * In my view, the Court properly interprets §1512(c)(2) in the opinion it issues today. It also rightly vacates the judg- ment below and remands this case for further proceedings. Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) by corruptly obstructing “a proceeding before Congress, specif- ically, Congress's certification of the Electoral College vote." App. 183. That official proceeding plainly used certain rec- ords, documents, or objects—including, among others, those relating to the electoral votes themselves. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 65-67. And it might well be that Fischer's conduct, as alleged here, involved the impairment (or the attempted impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those specified in (c)(1)." Ante, at 8. If so, then Fischer's prosecu- tion under $1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed. That issue remains available for the lower courts to determine on re- mand.

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 1 BARRETT, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-5572 JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 28, 2024] JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. Joseph Fischer allegedly joined a mob of rioters that breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021. At the time, Con- gress was meeting in a joint session to certify the Electoral College results. The riot forced Congress to suspend the proceeding, delaying it for several hours. The Court does not dispute that Congress's joint session qualifies as an “official proceeding”; that rioters delayed the proceeding; or even that Fischer's alleged conduct (which includes trespassing and a physical confrontation with law enforcement) was part of a successful effort to forcibly halt the certification of the election results. Given these prem- ises, the case that Fischer can be tried for “obstructing, in- fluencing, or impeding an official proceeding” seems open and shut. So why does the Court hold otherwise? Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant what it said. Section 1512(c)(2) is a very broad provision, and admittedly, events like January 6th were not its target. (Who could blame Congress for that failure of imagination?) But statutes often go further than the problem that in- spired them, and under the rules of statutory interpreta- tion, we stick to the text anyway. The Court, abandoning that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—

2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting any way to narrow the reach of subsection (c)(2). I re- spectfully dissent. I The case for the Government's interpretation is straight- forward. It can be accomplished in three paragraphs, as compared to the Court's many, many more. Ante, at 4-12. Start with the verbs: To "obstruct" and to “impede” mean to "hinder" or "retard" something's "passage" or "progress." 10 Oxford English Dictionary 668 (2d ed. 1989); 7 id., at 705. We have previously explained that these words are "broad." Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 7 (2018). To “influence” is similarly expansive, meaning “[t]o affect the condition of” or “to have an effect on” something. 7 Ox- ford English Dictionary, at 940. The object of these verbs is an "official proceeding," defined to include “a proceeding be- fore the Congress." 18 U.S. C. §1515(a)(1)(B).¹ So (c)(2) covers all sorts of actions that affect or interfere with official proceedings. "[O]therwise," which introduces 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2), does not narrow its scope. “Otherwise” means “in a differ- ent manner,” “by other means,” or “in other respects." 10 Oxford English Dictionary, at 984; Webster's Third New In- ternational Dictionary 1598 (2002). It is often used to in- troduce a "catchall phras[e].” Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U. S. 519, 535 (2015). Here, “otherwise” tells the reader how (c)(1) and (c) (2) fit together. Subsection (c)(1) prohibits "alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a rec- ord, document, or other object” with “intent to impair [its] integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” In other words, (c)(1) targets document and object spoliation— 1 The D. C. Circuit held, and this Court does not dispute, that Con- gress's joint session on January 6, 2021, qualifies as an "official proceed- ing."" 64 F. 4th 329, 342 (2023).

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 3 BARRETT, J., dissenting classic means of obstruction. Subsection (c)(2) then prohib- its obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceed- ing by means different from those specified in (c)(1), thereby serving as a catchall. The “enumerated" crimes in (c)(1) and the "unenumerated crimes" in (c) (2) are similar “on one spe- cific dimension": "the particular similarity specified after the 'otherwise." Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137, 150–151 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Here, that means that each crime represents one means through which to obstruct, influence, or impede an official proceed- ing. Joseph Fischer allegedly participated in a riot at the Cap- itol that forced the delay of Congress's joint session on Jan- uary 6th. Blocking an official proceeding from moving for- ward surely qualifies as obstructing or impeding the proceeding by means other than document destruction. Fischer's alleged conduct thus falls within (c)(2)'s scope. II A Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take (c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the eviden- tiary focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2) only by "impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding." Ante, at 16. Other means of obstructing a proceeding—say, by shutting it down are out. This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute, because the limit comes from a related provision rather than thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive principles. “[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or ele- ments into a statute that do not appear on its face."" Dean v. United States, 556 U. S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v.

4 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29 (1997)). And “[w]here Con- gress includes particular language in one section of a stat- ute but omits it in another section of the same Act,"" we generally presume that Congress did so intentionally. Rus- sello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972) (per curiam)). The Court's reasons for departing from these rules are thin. 1 The Court begins with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons. Ante, at 5. The noscitur canon counsels that "words grouped in a list should be given related mean- ings." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law §31, p. 195 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is particu- larly useful when interpreting “a word [that] is capable of many meanings."" McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 569 (2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 573–575 (1995) (employing the canon to in- terpret “communication” in the statutory list “prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication""). The ejusdem canon applies when “a catchall phrase" follows “an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals." Scalia & Garner §32, at 199. We often interpret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects simi- lar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001). See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 375, 385 (2003) (employing the canon to construe the general term in the statutory list "execution, levy, at- tachment, garnishment, or other legal process""). These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to (c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw-it looks like it might work, but using it botches the job. Unlike the

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 10 5 BARRETT, J., dissenting pattern to which the noscitur canon applies, §1512(c) is not a list of terms that includes an ambiguous word. So the Court does not do what it does when applying noscitur: se- lect between multiple accepted meanings of the words "ob- structs,” “influences,” and “impedes." Instead, it modifies those words by adding an adverbial phrase: obstructs, in- fluences or impedes by “impair[ing] the availability or in- tegrity for use in an official proceeding of records, docu- ments, or objects." Ante, at 16 (emphasis added). The ejusdem canon is an equally poor fit. Unlike the pattern to which ejusdem applies, (c)(2) is “not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, (c)(1) and (c)(2) are "distinct and independent prohibitions." Ibid. Though they share a subject and an adverb—“[w]hoever corruptly"-the two clauses contain different verbs that take different objects. §1512(c). Moreover, (c)(1) has a separate mens rea provi- sion that further disrupts the connection between the clauses. To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these canons to a statute resembling §1512(c). Rather than iden- tify such a case, the Court invents examples of a sign at the zoo and a football league rule. Ante, at 5-6. The zoo exam- ple ("do not pet, feed, yell or throw objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them”) does not help, because it mim- ics the typical ejusdem format of specific words followed by a catchall. The list of specific verbs makes clear that the cleanup phrase (“otherwise disturb") is limited to conduct that involves direct interaction with the animals. But in the absence of a laundry list followed by a catchall, it is hard to see why the ejusdem canon fits. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008) ("The absence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem

6 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting generis that Congress remained focused on the common at- tribute when it used the catchall phrase"). And §1512(c) does not follow the laundry-list-plus-catchall pattern. The Court's football example is only slightly better. As a refresher: "[A] football league might adopt a rule that players must not 'grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.' If a linebacker shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind." Ante, at 6. Put aside that it is hard to imagine anyone describing “trash talk” as inflicting an “injury” or “harming" a player in a football game. The league rule plainly forecloses the possibility. Consistent with the noscitur canon, “harm” takes its meaning from its companions “attack” and “as- sault." And while the Court tries to track §1512(c)'s struc- ture by adding an extra intent clause, the two clauses in its example are still tightly focused on actions directed at the player. (After all, who is wearing the facemask, helmet, or other equipment?) Given that shared theme, it is easy to understand that the first clause's focus on physical conduct limits the (only slightly) more general clause. But §1512(c)'s subsections are not so closely related―(c)(1) fo- cuses specifically on objects in a proceeding, and (c)(2) broadens the lens to the proceeding itself. Consider a rule that actually mirrors §1512(c): "Any player who: "(1) punches, chokes, or kicks an opposing player with the intent to remove him from the game; or "(2) otherwise interrupts, hinders, or interferes with

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 7 the game, BARRETT, J., dissenting "shall be suspended." While the specific verbs in the first clause involve actions directed at an opposing player, the second clause is a sepa- rate prohibition with an entirely different object. Imagine that, just before the opposing team's kicker attempts a field goal, players leave the sidelines and storm the field, some tackling referees in the process. Those players have surely “interrupt[ed], hinder[ed], or interfer[ed] with the game,” even though they have not physically injured any opponent. This hypothetical, not the Court's, is analogous to §1512(c) and it supports the Government's interpretation. 2 The Court next recruits help from Begay, which inter- prets an "otherwise" clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Ante, at 6; 553 U. S., at 140. The ACCA defines a "vi- olent felony" as a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extor- tion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves con- duct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Begay holds that the example crimes limit the catchall clause to "crimes that are roughly similar . . . to the examples themselves." 553 U. S., at 143. So too here, the Court reasons, the list of crimes in (c)(1) limits the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2). But §1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in Begay. While §1512(c) contains two distinct criminal pro- hibitions (c)(1) and (c)(2)—the statutory definition in Be- gay contained a list of examples followed immediately by a residual clause. The latter structure more readily supports interpreting the general clause in light of the specifics, much like a statute to which the ejusdem canon would ap- ply. Moreover, the residual clause at issue in Begay called out for a limiting principle—what is a “serious potential risk of physical injury?" The breadth itself was a cue that

8 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting the interpreter should read back to find some limit. See id., at 142–143. Subsection (c)(2)'s “otherwise” clause, by con- trast, stands on its own. Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held ACCA's residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory interpretation. 3 The Court argues that "there would have been scant rea- son for Congress to provide any specific examples” in (c)(1) if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct. Ante, at 8. Conduct like destroying and concealing records "obstructs, influences, or impedes a[n] official proceeding,” so Congress could have enacted just (c)(2) and been done with it. On the Government's interpretation, the Court asserts, the second prohibition swallows the first. If (c)(1) has any function, it must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2). What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also elim- inates the need for (c)(1)'s examples. The Court's interpre- tation assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step approach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integ- rity or availability of records, documents, or other objects for use in an official proceeding." So why didn't Congress just say that? And if the Court is right about what (c)(2) means, why do we need the specific examples in (c)(1)? Those acts are already covered. The problem of (c)(2) sub- suming (c)(1) is therefore not unique to my theory. It bears emphasis, though, that the broad overlap makes sense, given the statute's backstory. When the Enron scan- dal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was taken aback to discover that seemingly criminal conduct was actually not a federal crime. As it then existed, §1512 had a loophole: It imposed liability on those who persuaded others to destroy documents, but not on the people who

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 9 BARRETT, J., dissenting themselves destroyed documents. Ante, at 9–10. Congress enacted §1512(c) to close this “Enron gap.” Subsection (c)(1) deals with the particular problem at hand-document de- struction. Subsection (c)(2) reflects Congress's desire to avoid future surprises: It is “a catchall for matters not spe- cifically contemplated-known unknowns." Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009). So contrary to the Court's suggestion, it would not be “pe- culiar" for (c)(2) to cover conduct “far beyond the document shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legisla- tion in the first place." Ante, at 10. Enron exposed more than the need to prohibit evidence spoliation-it also ex- posed the need to close statutory gaps. And in any event, statutes often reach beyond the “principal evil” that ani- mated them. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998). That is not grounds for narrowing them, because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed." Ibid. While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot seem to settle on the "common attribute" in the first subsec- tion that cabins the second. See Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. On one hand, the Court says that “(c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding." Ante, at 8 (emphasis added). This “physical evidence” limitation tracks the Dis- trict Court's interpretation. See United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022). On the other hand, the Court says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or in- tegrity of other things used in an official proceeding," such as "witness testimony” or “intangible information." Ante, at 9. This broader “evidence impairment” theory resembles Judge Katsas's interpretation. 64 F. 4th 329, 363 (CADC 2023) (dissenting opinion).

10 10 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting Both formulations are problematic—and not only because both are atextual. The first, focused solely on physical items, would leave (c)(2) with almost no work to do. Sub- section (c)(1) already prohibits “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mu- tilat [ing], or conceal[ing]" documents, records, or objects. This essentially covers the waterfront of acts that impair the integrity or availability of objects. True, (c)(2) could also encompass "cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false entry in” a record or document. See 18 U. S. C. §1519. But it seems “unlikely" that Congress used the “expansive” lan- guage of (c)(2) “to address such narrow concerns." 64 F. 4th, at 344. The somewhat amorphous “other things” limitation has the benefit of giving (c)(2) a wider berth, but it is un- clear how the Court landed on it. The term does not appear in (c)(1) or in §1512's surrounding subsections, which refer specifically to records, documents, objects, and testimony. The "other things” formulation comes from the Court, not Congress. The Court's uncertainty about the relevant “common at- tribute" is a tell that Congress did not intend to define (c)(2) by reference to (c)(1). Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to limit [§1512(c)(2)]'s reach" as the Court asserts, it "easily could have written” the catchall to say “otherwise impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, objects, or other things for use in an official proceeding." Ali, 552 U. S., at 227; see ante, at 8-9.2 It did not, and we should not pretend that it did. B The Court relies on statutory context to "confir[m] that 2 Indeed, Congress could have looked to 18 U. S. C. §1505 as a model. That statute makes it a crime to "willfully withhol[d], misrepresen[t], remov[e] from any place, concea[1], cove[r] up, destro[y], mutilat[e], alte[r], or by other means falsif[y] any documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony" with the intent to obstruct "any civil investigative demand.” §1505 (emphasis added).

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 11 BARRETT, J., dissenting (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1)." Ante, at 10. As the Court sees it, interpreting (c) (2) according to its plain text would render other obstruction provisions, within §1512 and throughout Chapter 73, superfluous. Ante, at 10–12. The Court exaggerates. Subsection (c)(2) applies only to conduct that obstructs an “official proceeding." The Court highlights several provisions that cover obstruction of in- vestigations. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§1510(a), 1511(a), 1516, 1517, 1518, 1519. The circuits have held that criminal in- vestigations do not qualify as “official proceedings." See, e.g., United States v. Ermoian, 752 F. 3d 1165, 1172 (CA9 2013); United States v. Ramos, 537 F. 3d 439, 463 (CA5 2008). Likewise, not every provision in §1512 relates to an official proceeding; instead, several target the obstruction of communications to judges and law enforcement about the commission of federal offenses. 18 U. S. C. §§1512(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (d)(1)(2). The Court responds by stressing that for purposes of §1512, "an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted." §1512(f)(1); ante, at 13. Because obstruc- tion of investigations or communications could end up ob- structing the initiation of a future official proceeding, the Court reasons that (c)(2) may still swallow those other pro- visions. But we have previously construed federal obstruc- tion offenses similar to §1512(c) to require a tighter link be- tween the obstructive conduct and the relevant proceeding. Under the "nexus” requirement, the defendant's conduct must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic” with the proceeding. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 599 (adopting nexus requirement for §1503's omnibus clause). And the defend- ant must act in “contemplation” of a “particular official pro- ceeding." Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 708 (2005) (adopting nexus requirement for §1512(b)(2)). The circuits have unanimously applied this requirement to §1512(c). See United States v. Young, 916 F. 3d 368, 386 (CA4 2019) (collecting cases). This element

12 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting eliminates much of the overlap that the Court perceives be- tween (c)(2) and the provisions that do not require an “offi- cial proceeding.” Moreover, §§1512(a)(1)(A) and (d)(1) prohibit preventing the mere attendance of any person in an official proceeding. Preventing attendance will not always have the effect of ob- structing, influencing, or impeding the proceeding. And §1512(d)(1) makes it a crime to intentionally harass some- one and thereby dissuade her from testifying in an official proceeding. In contrast to (c)(2), this provision—which car- ries a significantly lower maximum penalty-does not re- quire a defendant to act “corruptly." This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordi- nary meaning-overlaps with several offenses in Chapter 73. See ante, at 10-11. Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy amount of work for other obstruction offenses. And besides, "substantial" overlap "is not uncommon in criminal stat- utes." Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4 (2014); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 714, n. 14 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J.). "The mere fact that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar con- duct says little about the scope of either.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 358, n. 4 (2005). That is espe- cially true here, because Congress enacted (c)(2) after it had already enacted other subsections of §1512, as well as ob- struction offenses like §§1503 and 1505. The redundancy argument would have more force if (c)(2) “render[ed] super- fluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the same Act." Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). As it stands, the canon against surplusage does not provide any reason to ar- tificially narrow (c)(2)'s scope. In any event, the Court's formulation does not begin to cure the statutory overlap. Killing a person with the intent to prevent the production of a record in an official proceed- ing constitutes conduct that impairs the availability of a

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 13 BARRETT, J., dissenting record for an official proceeding. 18 U. S. C. §1512(a)(1)(B). Using physical force against a person to influence testi- mony in an official proceeding counts as impairing the in- tegrity of "other things" used in an official proceeding. §1512(a)(2)(A). And impairing the availability or integrity of documents for use in an official proceeding will often “in- fluenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e] . . . the due administration of justice." §1503(a); see also §1515(a)(1)(A) (“official pro- ceeding"" includes “a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States"). Examples abound. See, e.g., §§1505, 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1). “[T]he canon against surplusage merely favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage”—and on that score, the Court's inter- pretation fares no better than mine. Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012). In fact, the broader statutory context works against the Court's interpretation. Congress did not select the verbs "obstruct," "influence,” and “impede” at random. Those words were already in §1503, which prohibits “corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or commu- nication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] . . . the due administration of justice." We have described this "Omnibus Clause"" as a "catchall," because it follows sev- eral specific proscriptions against coercive behavior toward jurors and court officers. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 598. Courts have routinely declined to "rea[d] the omnibus clause” as limited to "acts similar in manner to those prescribed by the statute's specific language.” United States v. Howard, 569 F. 2d 1331, 1333, 1335 (CA5 1978) (collecting cases). And Justice Scalia agreed that ejusdem generis did not apply to limit the Omnibus Clause, “one of the several distinct and independent prohibitions contained in §1503 that share only the word 'Whoever,' which begins the statute, and the penalty provision which ends it." Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 615 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Section 1512(c) follows the very same pattern.

14 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT, J., dissenting C The Court concludes with an appeal to consequences: Construing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lob- byists alike to decades in prison." Ante, at 14. This fear is overstated. To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof that a defendant acted “corruptly.” The meaning of this term is unsettled, but all of its possible definitions limit the scope of liability. On one proposed interpretation, a defend- ant acts corruptly by “us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing] with an unlawful purpose, or both."" United States v. Rob- ertson, 103 F. 4th 1, 8 (CADC 2023) (approving jury instruc- tions for (c)(2)). On another, a defendant acts "corruptly" if he “act[s] ‘with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit ei- ther for himself or for some other person."" 64 F. 4th, at 352 (Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Marinello, 584 U. S., at 21; alterations omitted). Under either, the “corruptly” element should screen out in- nocent activists and lobbyists who engage in lawful activity. And if not, those defendants can bring as-applied First Amendment challenges. The Court also emphasizes (c)(2)'s 20-year maximum penalty. Ante, at 14-15. But it simultaneously "glosses over the absence of any prescribed minimum." Yates, 574 U. S., at 569 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). “Congress presuma- bly enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut from major to minor." Ibid. Indeed, given the breadth of its terms, (c) (2) naturally encompasses actions that range in severity. Congress presumably trusted District Courts to impose sentences commensurate with the defendant's particular conduct. * * * There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an ex- pansive statute. Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the

Cite as: 603 U. S. (2024) 15 BARRETT, J., dissenting "pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly." United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984). Once Congress has set the outer bounds of liability, the Executive Branch has the discretion to select particular cases to prosecute within those boundaries. By atextually narrowing §1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the prerogatives of the political branches. Cf. ante, at 15. I re- spectfully dissent.