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Tillich’s Doctrine of Religious Symbolism

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• Battista Mondin s.x.  

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Paul Tillich was born in Brandeburg in 1886 and was educated in the German universities. His early academic career was set against the German scene; but since 1933 he has been in America at the Union Theological Seminary of New York. Since September 1955 his work continues at the Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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“This man (Tillich) is most significant for theology in the contemporary West. It can be maintained without rashness that he is the most impressive figure in today’s Protestant theology, which is distinguished by many great names both in Europe and America” (G. Weigel, “The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,” in Cross Currents 1956, p. 141). “Through his lectures and writings Tillich undoubtedly exerts a seminal influence on American Protestantism. His fame is at a peak. Even in the most unexpected quarters the urge to speak a Tillichian language is strong. “ (G. H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message ; New York: Scribners, 1962, p. 164).

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Chicago, University Press, 1951 and 1957. The third volume has not yet appeared. The other basic works for the understanding of Tillich’s theology are as follows: The Protestant Era , Chicago: University Press, 1948; The Courage to Be , New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952; The Shaking of the Foundations , New York: Scribners, 1953; The New Being , New York, Scribners, 1955; The Dynamics of Faith , New York: Harper, 1956.

P. Tillich, “Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,” in Theology of P. Tillich , ed. G. W. Kegley (Macmillan, 1952), p. 333.

P. Tillich, “Theology and symbolism” in Religious Symbolism , ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107–108.

The article first appeared in 1928 in Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie B. I, H. 4. It first appeared in English in 1940 with the title The Religious Symbol in The Journal of Liberal Religion Vol. II (1940), pp. 13–33. It has been recently reedited in Daedalus 1958 (Summer), pp. 3–21.

See especially “Theology and Symbolism” in Religious Symbolism , ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107–116; “Religious and our Knowledge of God,” The Christian Scholar , XXXVIII (1955), pp. 189–197; “Existential Analysis and Religious Symbol” in Contemporary Problems in Theology , ed. H. A. Basilius (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1956), pp. 35–55. In these essays Tillich treats of the religious symbols in general. In our opinion the best exposition of the doctrine of religious symbolism and its application to the fundamental theological problems is contained in Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper, 1957).

Cf. Liddle-Scott, Greek-English Lexikon, “ςμβολον”.

Cf. De Interpretation , I, 16a, 4 ff. According to Aristotle the relation between words and concepts is conventional: “We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention. No sound is by nature a noun: it becomes one becoming a symbol. Inarticulate noises mean something — for instance those made by brute beatss. But no noises of that kind are nouns” ( De Interpretation II, 16a, 27 ff.).

Cf. De Sophisticis Elenchis I, 1, 165a, 6–7. 3 Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philo , I, pp. 115–138.

Cf. Enceclopedia Cattolica , “Simbolo e Simbolismo.”

For Maimonides see The Guide for the Perplexed , especially Part I; for Bonaventura see Gilson, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventura , especially ch. vii, “L’Analogie Universelle.”

E. Cassirer, Die Begriffsform im Mythischen Denken (Berlin, 1922);

E. Cassirer Language and Myth (New York, 1946);

W. M. Urban, Language and Reality , (New York, 1939); R. Niebuhr, “The Truth in Myths” in Nature of Religious Experience , Essays in honor of D. G. Mackintosh, pp. 117–136;

C. Morris, Signs, Language and Behaviour (New York, 1946);

A. N. Whitehead, Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect (New York, 1927).

“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 189; see also “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 108; Dynamics of Faith , p. 41.

“Religious Symbol,” Daedalus (Summer, 1958), p. 3.

In the past the distinction between sign and symbol has always been vague. The terms “sign” and “symbol” have frequently been used interchangeably. Symbol has been used for things pointing beyond themselves without participating in the thing signified (cf. Aristotle, De Interpretation 16a). Sign has been used for things pointing to something wherein they participate (cf. Aquinas, S. Theol. III, 60, 2 & 4). In modern thought symbol is more frequenly used for things which participate in the object to which they point; sign is generally used for things which point beyond themselves by convention. For an excellent Neo-Thomistic discussion of the concepts of sign and symbol see J. Maritain’s “Signe et Symbole” in Quatre Essais sur l’Esprit , pp. 59–124.

Cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 189–190; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109; Systematic Theology , I, p. 177; II, p. 9; Dynamics of Faith , p. 42, etc.

This should not mislead the reader into thinking that Tillich conceives the relation between language and reality to be conventional, for this is not the case. With slight change through the years Tillich has always maintained that words are symbols rather than signs. See, for example, S. Theol. II, p. 19, “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Protestant Era , p. 61; “Religious Symbols and the Knowledge of God,” p. 190, etc.

“The Religious Symbol,” pp. 3–4.

Ibid. ; cf. Dynamics p. 42; Protestant Era , p. 69.

“The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Dynamics , pp. 42–43; “Religious Symbol and Our Knowledge of God,” p. 192, etc.

“The Religious Symbol,” p. 17.

Systematic Theology , II, p. 9.

Systematic Theology II, p. 9. It is important to notice that these are two aspects of the same reality. It is the same reality considered either in its literal or in its symbolic meaning. In its literal meaning it signifies itself; in its symbolic meaning it points to something else.

See, for example, Interpretation of History , p. 225, where the profane and the holy are conceived as two “attitudes” of man towards the same reality. Also the relation between philosophy and theology is conceived in this way. See Systematic Theology I, pp. 22 ff.

See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 108 ff. In his recent writings, especially Systematic Theology II, where Tillich openly discloses his Platonic heritage (pp. 21 ff.), he tends to abandon the first view of the relation between transcendent and empirical aspect. He proclaims with decision the transcendent reality of the object symbolized. This view is the view of classical theology, of which Bonaventura in this respect is probably the best representative.

“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 190–191. Of course these two functions are not exclusive to symbolic knowledge. Existential analysis has recently shown that most of our sensory and intellectual knowledge is two-sided; it reveals both subject and object in the same act.

The terms “subjective” and “objective” are not foreign to Tillich’s terminology. In Dynamics of Faith p. 96 he distinguishes between two sides of faith “a subjective and an objective side.” In Systematic Theology I, pp. 75 ff. he distinguishes between subjective and objective function of reason.

Ibid , and also Dynamics p. 42; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109.

“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191; see also Dynamics , pp. 42–43: “A great play gives us not only a new vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our being. Thus we are able to receive what the play reveals to us in reality. There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through symbols, as melodies and rhythms in music.”

“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191.

Cf. “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191; Dynamics , pp. 42–43; “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 117 ff. For the same division here Tillich uses also the terminology: intuitive and active, or mythical and ritual.

“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.

“The Religious Symbol,” pp. 4–5.

I believe that the source of Tillich’s error is a failure to make a distinction between the different levels of reality to which symbols may point. Symbols may point to something which is only mentally real, or to something physically real, or to something spiritually real.

“The Religious Symbol,” p. 5.

Op. cit. , p. 8.

Op. cit. , p. 5.

Op. cit. , p. 6. Since Tillich seems to have no aversion for the terminology “objective” and “subjective”, I would suggest to call the negative theories subjective and the positive theories objective. Cf. Tillich “Mythus und Mythologie,” Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen. 1930), p. 364, where Tillich describes his theory of myth as symbolical-realist.

Cf. “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 42–43; “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 192. where we read: “Symbols are born out of the womb which is usually called today the ‘group unconscious’ or ‘collective unconscious’... It is not invented intentionally; and even if somebody would try to invent a symbol, as sometimes happens, then it becomes a symbol only if the unconscious of a group says “yes” to it.”

C. Dynamics , p. 43 and 58.

See, for example, “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 190–191; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 42–43; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109; “The Religious Symbol,” pp. 5 ff.

“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193.

“The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.

The identification of the user of the symbol with the creator of the symbol, and, therefore, the identification of the user of the symbol with the “object” symbolized, is a characteristic of subjective theories of symbol. Such are the theories professed by many sociologists of primitive communities, who study the religious symbols of a community in order to have a better understanding of the community, and not in order to have a better knowledge of God. In dealing with “historical” symbols Tillich sometimes seems to maintain a subjective theory of symbol. He accepts or rejects “historical” symbols as religious symbols only on the ground that they have been accepted or rejected by the collective unconscious, independently as to whether any historical event did actually happen, i.e., independently as to whether the “historical” symbols were produced by the “object” to which they point or not. For example, the symbol of the “Virgin Birth” was for many centuries a good religious symbol although based on “a most obviously legendary story,” (“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196). So too polytheistic gods were good religious symbols for polytheistic communities although based on legendary ground (ibid. 192). See also Dynamics , p. 45–46. In re-editing the essay “The Religious Symbol” in Daedalus (Summer, 1958) Tillich has largely checked the subjective bent of his theory of symbol. Passages like “religious symbols have no basis either in the empirical order or in the cultural order of meaning. Strictly speaking they have no basis at all. In the language of religion, they are objects of faith” have been eliminated. For a similar criticism of the subjectivistic bent of Tillich’s doctrine of symbols see G. H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and The Christian Message , pg. 57–58.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 96–97 together with 42–43; cf. “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196; “Existential Analysis and Religious Symbols,” p. 55.

Sometimes Tillich calls the sides “functions,” cf. p. 123.

Cf. Dynamics of Faith , pp. 96–97; “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 96–97.

The rejection of the reduction of adequacy to acceptance will not compel Tillich to adopt a criterion of truth of empirical verification. His recognition of different dimensions of objective reality enables him to protect the religious dimension from empirical criticism. What matters in Tillich’s case is to give priority to the objective side of the symbol. Only a recognition of the priority of the objective side will save his theory of symbolism from subjectivism and idealism. In a private conversation Tillich has told me that now he no longer uses the criterion of acceptance as a criterion of truth for symbols. Yet in his recent edition of “The Religious Symbol” ( Daedalus , Summer 1958 cf. p. 4) he still preserves it.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 9–10; pp. 20–25; II, pp. 30–31; The Protestant Era , pp. 84–89

Protestant Era , pp. 85–87, Dynamics of Faith , pp. 90 ff.

Systematic Theology I, pp. 22–23; Dynamics of Faith , 90 ff.

Another frequent misinterpretation of Tillich’s principle of correlation is to confuse correlation with polarity. But polarity is not a relation of interdependence, but a relation of tension. “Tension refers to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite directions” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 198). Elements in correlation, on the contrary, tend to move in the same direction. Moreover, polarities are not in a relation of correlation because polarities can disintegrate “through the breaking of the ontological tensions and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure.” Op. cit. , p. 199. For example, finite individualization “produces a dynamic tension with finite participation; the break of their unity is a possibility” ( Ibid. ). But the break is impossible between elements that are in a relation of correlation: the separation can never be complete.

Cf. Protestant Era , pp. 83 ff.; Systematic Theology I, pp. 64, 67–68, etc., and especially Dynamics of Faith , pp. 74–94.

Systematic Theology , I, p. 60.

Systematic Theology I, pp. 62–64.

Systematic Theology I, p, 64.

Systematic Theology I, p. 65; cf. II, 13: “In this method, question and answer are independent of each other since it is impossible to derive the answer from the question or the question from the answer.”

Systematic Theology I, p. 25; cf. Protestant Era , pp. 88–89.

Systematic Theology I, p. 25.

Systematic Theology I, p. 21; cf. Protestant Era , pp. 88–89.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 90–91; cf. also Protestant Era , pp. 85–88.

Systematic Theology I, pp. 64–66; II, pp. 6–8.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 85–89.

This is explicitly stated of the correlation between philosophy and theology, which we have seen to consist in a relation of question and answer. Tillich explicitly says that “man is the question” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 62) and that “God is the answer” (p. 64).

Although the last two chapters of Dynamics of Faith where the various manifestations of the divine human correlation are examined may be condisered as a systematic analysis of the same.

“Man is the question” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 62); “God is the answer” (p. 64); cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 13.

Here are a few passages in which the divine human relation is expressed in terms of finite and infinite: “man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated and for which he is longing. Man is totally concerned, about the totality which is his true being and which is disrupted in time and place” ( S. Theol. I, p. 14); “although man is actually separated from the infinite, he could not be aware of it if he did not participate in it potentially” ( S. Theol. II, p. 9); “man is finite, excluded from the infinity to which he belongs” ( Ibid. p. 31); “in the complete reunion with the divine ground of being... the finite is taken into the infinite” ( Dynamics of Faith , p. 103).

See especially pp. 21–44; cf. also Systematic Theology I, pp. 252 ff.

This is true also of all the other correlations.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 251 ff.; Dynamics of Faith , p. 103.

See Systematic Theology II, pp. 39–47.

Systematic Theology II, pp. 14, 33, 45 etc.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 78–79.

Cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 16. There is, however, a major drawback that Tillich is not willing to admit, i.e., the ontological use of the principle of correlation for the relation of God and man, as we have suggested above. He maintains (in a letter that he kindly wrote to us) that “correlation is a method of approach not an ontological concept.” We do not doubt that such is his intention; but what he says, especially in Systematic II, does not convey this message.

From the point of view of content (not of method) God’s transcendence is one of the central doctrines, if not the central doctrine of Tillich’s theology. God is frequently said to be beyond the elements of the correlations: “God is beyond finitude and infinity” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 144); “God is beyond freedom and destiny” ( Ibid. , p. 185); “God transcends essence and existence” ( Systematic Theology II, p. 34); cf. also Systematic Theology I, p. 61; 271; II, p. 7, 13, 22 etc.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 256; II, pp. 43–44.

In Tillich’s interpretation of the doctrines of Creation and Fall there is much evidence that a method of correlation cannot make a real distinction between Creation and Fall. See Systematic Theology II, p. 44.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 60.

Tillich himself usually gives this justification for the principle of symbolism. See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; Dynamics of Faith , p. 58; Interpretation of History , pp. 98, 106–107; 222. Frequently Tillich gives other justifications, that in my opinion are only secondary and, sometimes, rather ad hominem , as for example, when he says that “man’s ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate” ( Dynamics of Faith , p. 41); or when he says that omnipotence, omnipresence, providence, etc., “become absurdities and contradictions when taken literally.” “Existential analysis of the religious symbol”, p. 49; see also “Religious symbol and our knowledge of God,” p. 194.

Also the principle offcorrelation, on which the principle of symbolism rests, “is a theological assertion” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 8). In Dynamics of Faith (p. 99) Tillich declares that all what is said there about faith end religious symbols “is derived from the expericene of actual faith”; see also pp. 58–59.

Cochrane, who classifies Systematic Theology as a systematic philosophy, as “a book which is not a witness to Christ but to ‘being itself,” disregards Tillich’s intention entirely. See Cochrane, Existentialists and God , p. 91 and ff.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 110, 112, 116–117, 140, 147, 155–158, etc. Also this statement is theological. Sometimes Tillich seems to give philosophical arguments for it. See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; Interpretation of History , pp. 222 ff.; Dynamics of Faith , p. 58. Actually they are not arguments but assertions about God, the ground of being, that can be made only after God has revealed Himself. The most reason can do is to experience its finitude and the shock of nonbeing, which is a condition to the experience of the ground of being. Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 110 ff.; Dynamics , pp. 99–100 & 10–11.

Cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 192–193, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; II, p. 9; Dynamics of Faith , p. 58.

Dynamics of Faith , pp. 44–45; Systematic Theology I, pp. 118 ff.

Systematic Theology II, p. 16. A similar formulation is found also in Dynamics of Faith , where it is said that “in relation to the ultimate we are always receiving and never giving. We are never able to bridge the infinite distance between the infinite and the finite from the side of the finite” (p. 105). See also Systematic Theology I, p. 64; “Die Idee der Offenbarung,” Zeitschriftfür Theologie und Kirche (1927), p. 406. The fifth proposition, then, states that nothing becomes an actual symbol without God’s action: it is not the task of man to turn finite reality into actual symbols “for God is manifest only through God.” This proposition, together with Tillich’s objective theory of symbolism require that symbols have both a subjective and an objective side, and exclude the view that symbols are man’s creations. But, as already pointed out in the section on symbolism in general, Tillich occasionally teaches that man himself is the creator of religious symbols, and frequently seems to disregard the factual aspect, especially in historical events. This tendency to subjectivism is constantly present also in his theory of the religious symbol in general, and in his teaching of Jesus as the Christ in particular. See infra , p. 137–8.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff.; II, 88 ff., etc.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 137, where Tillich says that “the event which is called ‘final revelation’ was not an isolated event. It presupposed a revelatory history which was a preparation for it and in which it was received. It could not have occurred without having been expected, and it could not have been expected if it had not been preceded by other revelations which had become distorted. It would not have been the final revelation if it had not been received as such, and it would lose its character as final revelation if it were not able to make itself available to every group in every place.” According to Tillich “the center of history divides the whole process into preparatory and receiving revelation” ( Op. cit. , p. 133). The bearer of the receiving revelation is the Christian Church. The bearer of preparatory revelation is not only the Jewish people of the Old Testament but “all the religious cultures (still) outside the Church” (p. 144). Cf. Protestant Era pp. XIX, 46–47; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 48, 58, 70, etc.

Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff.

Systematic Theology I, p. 136.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, 135 ff.; II, pp. 158 ff.; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 104, 125.

Systematic Theology II, p. 93.

Ibid. and 112.

Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff.; II, p. 93.

Systematic Theology I , pp. 133 ff.

See Systematic Theology I, p. 255: “Before creation man is hidden in the divine ground of being.” Cf. Dynamics of Faith p. 126; “Die Idee der Offenbarung”, Zuschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1927), p. 146.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, 130; I, pp. 101 ff.; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 86–88, etc. 3 Systematic Theology II, p. 108; Dynamics of Faith , p. 87.

The Interpretation of History , p. 265; cf. Systematic Theology II, pp. 101 ff.

Systematic Theology I, p. 130; c. “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.

Cf. Systematic Theology II, pp. 104 and 114.

Systematic Theology I, p. 130; II, p. 108; Dynamics of Faith , p. 87; “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.

Systematic Theology II, p. 107.

Systematic Theology II, p. 98.

The Interpretation of History , p. 242; see also pp. 243 ff. and “A reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation” Church Quarterly Review vol. 147 (Jan.-March 1949).

The elimination of the historical element in Jesus would be particularly dangerous in Tillich’s system. Because according to the principles of correlation and symbolism it is through the historical Jesus that the New Being becomes manifest. Therefore, if the historical reality of the symbol becomes questionable, then the manifestation of the object symbolized becomes doubtful. (Cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 115). Nobody will accept as a symbol what is recognized to be mere fiction, even if it is the creation of an unconscious community. It is therefore necessary to maintain that historical truth has at least a negative relation to faith, namely it makes impossible to be ultimately concerned with what is known to be mere fiction. Hence between faith and history there cannot be complete indifference and separation. It is because they are not separated but interpenetrated that we must witness to a constant struggle between faith and reason with regard to historical events: reason condemning statements of faith that seem to conflict with its evidence; faith repudiating views of reason in conflict with its doctrine. Cf. D. Emmet “Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation,” in Theology of P. Tillich , pp. 212–213.

Supra , p. 123.

Systematic Theology I, p. 111, cf. p. 117: “revelation is the manifestation of the depth of reason and of the ground of being.”

This is well said both in the first and second volumes of Systematic Theology. In the first volume it is said that “the final revelation, like every revelation, occurs in a correlation of ecstasy and miracle. The revelatory event is Jesus as the Christ. He is the miracle of the final revelation, and his reception is the ecstasy of the final revelation.” (p. 136) In the second volume Tillich insists that “Jesus as the Christ is both a historical fact and a subject of believing reception. One cannot speak the truth about the event on which Christianity is based without asserting both sides... Only their unity creates the event upon which Christianity is based. According to later symbolism, the Christ is the head of the Church, which is his body. As such, they are necessarily interdependent” (pp. 98–99).

“Theology and Symbolism,” pp. 114–115. Also in Dynamics of Faith Tillich distinguishes three levels of religious symbols: (1) God, (2) divine attributes and (3) manifestations of the divine in things and events, in persons and communities, in words and documents (see Dynamics of Faith , pp. 45–48). This threefold classification departs from that of “Theology and Symbolism” inasmuch as here no distinction is made between the liturgical and the sacramentel level.

“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 114–115. In “The Religious Symbol” (pp. 14 ff.) Tillich distinguishes two main levels of religious symbols, which he calls the level of the objective religious symbol and the level of the transcending religious symbol.

This view that theological language is always symbolic leads Tillich to a radical demythologization of many traditional concepts, as it has been rightly pointed out by G. Tavard. “Tillich’s attitude to dogmas, like his approach to the Bible, is one of demythologization. The Councils, and whatever other ecclesiastical authorities formulated the traditional dogmas, did but discover, in their apperception of the revelatory events of the Christ, symbols, or sets of symbols, pointing to the Christian message. This they formulated in propositions and rational statements. Combining these symbols, they constructed Christian myths. Thus the Creeds, with their picture of a divine being descending in the flesh and ascending to heaven again after passing through, and triumphing over, death, are mythological epics. Their truth does not lie in the historical exactness of every detail of the picture, but in the ability of those symbols to express the Unconditional appearing under the conditions of existence. Their value to the Church lasts as long as, and no longer than, their symbolic meaning is perceived. Dogmatic myths must be ‘broken’, that is, understood symbolically. If we take them literally, we undermine their religious dimension. Creeds and dogmas then become intellectual taboos that must be defended without regard to scientific honesty.” (Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message , p. 116). For Tavard’s critique of Tillich’s demythologization of Christian dogmas see o.c. p. 117 and ff.

Cf. Dynamics of Faith , pp. 51–42; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.

Cf. Dynamics of Faith , pp. 52–54; Protestant Era , pp. 62–65 & 119; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193.

Systematic Theology I, p. 140; cf. “Mythus und Mythologie,” p. 364; Interpretation of History , pp. 102 ff.; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 60–62.

But it seems to us that Tillich’s criticism of this danger is badly stated if not completely irrelevant. For, the danger of symbolism does not consist, as Tillich seems to believe, in an identification of the symbolic material with the symbolic meaning, or of the symbolic sense with the literal meaning (cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193; Protestant Era , p. 119; Dynamics of Faith , pp. 51 ff.). For instance, assuming that the symbolic sense of a flag is a nation and that its symbolic material is a piece of cloth, who would confuse the symbolic sense of the flag with its symbolic material? The danger of symbols does not come from their literal aspect but from their symbolic sense. Since the literal aspect is open to inspection, no mistake is possible about it. The symbolic sense, on the contrary, is hidden and because it is hidden one can be mistaken about it. Therefore the danger of symbolism is not an identification of the symbolic meaning with the symbolic material, but a misplacement of the symbolic meaning either by putting a symbolic meaning where there is none or by attributing to an object a symbolic meaning different from the one it has. An example of the first misplacement would be the cult of the stones of Mount Washington; an example of the second misplacement would be the adoration of Moses or Elias.

See Dynamics of Faith , pp. 51–52; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.

Sometimes Tillich defines theology as the study of religious symbols (cf. for instance “Relations of Metaphysics to Theology” in Review of Metaphysics (1956), p. 59; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 108); other times he defines theology as the study of divine revelation (for instance in Systematic Theology I, pp. 3, 6, 8, etc.) I think that the second definition should be considered as complementary of the first, since revelation is a function of religious symbols. It is not the task of theology to create religious symbols. “Theology as such has neither the duty nor the power to confirm or to negate religious symbols. Its task is to interpret them according to theological principles and methods” ( Systematic Theology I, p. 240). The theologian cannot discard traditional Christian symbols; that they are symbols and, as such, endowed with divine power, is enough for him. This cuts the ground from under much of liberal Protestantism and its rejection of Catholic symbols. Yet the theologian should criticize symbols: he “may discover contradictions between symbols.” ( ibid. ) He may also by his prophetic insight contribute to the surge of a new revelatory situation out of which new symbols will grow. This, for Tillich, condemns the “static character which he attributes to Catholic sacramentalism and Catholic theology.”

“Theology and symbolism,” pp. 111–113.

In Theological Studies (1950), p. 201; cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p. 131.

Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 79, 131; II, p. 34; Theology of Paul Tillich , p. 339.

It is by means of a distinction within analogous names between the mode of signification and the thing signified ( modus significandi and res significata ) that analogy is able to preserve an element of literalness even in the names of God. The names of God are predicated literally with regard to the thing signified. Tillich is not entirely unaware of the distinction between mode of signification and perfection signified. With regard to “personality,” for example, he says that it is predicated of God only symbolically because the perfection of personality is identified with its realization in man ( Protestant Era , pp. 62 ff.). Another time he says that “in the notion of God we must distinguish two elements: the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God” ( Dynamics of Faith , p. 46). See also Theology of P. Tillich , p. 334, where Tillich speaks of a via negationis and a via symbolica. Cf. G. Weigel, “Myth, Symbol and Analogy” in Religion and Culture , ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), p. 127.

Tillich allows only one exception to this universal symbolism. There is a statement about God that must be understood literally. This statement is that God is “being-itself” (cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 146; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 193–194). In Systematic Theology II Tillich seems to abandon this view and to maintain that the only non-symbolic statement about God is the statement that “everything we say about God is symbolic” (p. 9). In my opinion neither proposition is a correct statement of Tillich’s view on non-symbolic predication. For he insistently argues, for instance, that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically (cf. Systematic Theology I, 110 & 140 ff.; II, 20 etc.). Therefore also the statement that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically must be included among the nonsymbolic statements. And in general, symbolists have always maintained that all negative predication is to be understood literally, This is, for instance, Maimonides’ view. Tillich has not offered an adequate treatment of the difference between negative and affirmative predicates.

On this point see G. Weigel, “The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,” Cross Currents (1956), pp. 141–155;

On this point see G. Weigel “Myth, Symbol and Analogy” in Religion and Culture , ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), pp. 120–130;

C. Rhein, Paul Tillich (Stuttgart, 1957) pp. 173 ff.

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Mondin, B. (1963). Tillich’s Doctrine of Religious Symbolism. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6574-9_6

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Religious Symbols in Public Schools: Key Issues and Debates

2019, CEPS Journal

• When discussing Religious Education, the topic of religious symbols in educational spaces is largely overlooked in academic literature and often side-lined in political considerations as well. This paper examines the issue of religious symbols in public schools by highlighting two foci: how the Muslim veil is managed in public schools in select European countries and zooming in on specific suggestions for managing religious symbols in public schools in Slovenia. By combining a broader, comparative perspective with practical, small-scale policy suggestions, the paper highlights the need to include a discussion of religious symbols in public schools in our academic and political considerations of religion and education.

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Religious diversity, while being an important part of contemporary social landscapes, represents a source of tensions and conflicts that often require a judicial solution, both at national and at supranational level. In this paper we will focus on a specific topic within this wide field, i.e. the use of religious symbols in European public schools. Some cases about the display of symbols inside school premises, and about the use of religious symbols or dresses by pupils or teachers, were settled by national courts or reached the Europan Couurt of Human Rights. In the paper we will review the most relevant ones (such as the Bavarian "crucifix case", the Moise v. Ministry of education case in Romania, the cases against the french regulation on headscarves and Lautsi v. Italy case) focusing on the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine as tools allowing the EHR Court to set a balance between religious rights and other legitimate general interests.

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Abstract: The European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959 as the unit of the Council of Europe, is the judicial authority that resolves individual, legal personality and international problems within the scope of fundamental rights defined in the 'European Convention on Human Rights' and other protocols. Historically, the European Court of Human Rights has taken various decisions that are considered within the scope of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The Court defines in its decision, and in particular, what it can be judged within the context of the religious symbol, from a secular point of view. The court recognized the right to freedom of belief and religion, on the other hand, described this right as a declaration of belief in public. The study was designed with a 'conceptual screening model' approaching religious symbols on the basis of freedom of religion and belief. Although this study seems to be in essence a literature review, conceptual screening differs from the literature review method in that it examines the different aspects of a concept within the scope of different science and disciplines. The purpose of this study is to determine the attitude of the European Court of Human Rights to the religious symbols of schools. As a consequence of this work, the nature and scope of local and forbidden legal initiatives against the growing religious symbolism in European schools over the last years have been determined. However, the place of religion in European educational systems and the "church-state relationship" within the social system is another consequence of this study. This study also specifies that the decisions of the courts should be shaped to express religious beliefs and traditions freely in the public sphere. Summary: From the European reconstruction era, the presence of religious symbols, in many cases Islamic symbols, has increasingly become a problem in modern Europe, especially in public spaces and especially in public schools. This has led to a large-scale debate and social distinctions about the limits of the concept of religious freedom. At the same time, the fact that the constitutional courts of the countries have declared that the symbols specific to certain cultures can be freely represented by the society have caused new debates. This study is mainly focused on the view of the European legal systems, and in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), on the basis of the religious symbolism and freedom of religion and belief. This study gives places to discussions regarding the use of crosses and other religious symbols in schools in Germany, Italy, and Romania. Moreover, the ambivalent attitude of the local courts and the ECHR against the religious symbols are discussed in the study. In Europe has a historically shaped state, public and religious institutions. The European States has legislative, executive and judicial institutions evolving over the Greek and Roman Civilizations. Additionally, the nations connected to each other by the concept of common religion and culture constitute European public opinion in general. In Europe, religious institutions have adopted a belief system traditionally shaped in Roman times. Although there are sectarian differences across Europe, the Christianity has generally been adopted. The Catholic church (Vatican), which has played a very dominant role in all social areas since the Middle Ages, has lost this power since the age of illumination. Along with the Enlightenment, European states have begun to adopt the traditional view of secularism, which separates religion and state relations and reduces the influence of religion on state organs. Thus, the dominant religious power over the states has weakened and the church has continued its life in society and the public sphere. The ECHR, established in 1959 as an organ of the Council of Europe, is tasked with resolving disputes between individuals and legal entities, and between themselves, and with the states, in the exercise of the fundamental rights of various contracts. The ECHR lays down the depletion of domestic legal channels primarily as a condition for application because of the high nature of the court. Plus, the ECHR has adopted a compromise approach to solving the problems. The ECHR clearly states that citizens freely express their freedom of religion, conscience, and belief, while its provisions depend on secularism as well. Some ECHR verdicts reshape the definition of public space in accordance with the principle of ‘secularity’ instead of the ‘neutrality’. According to Decision 1804 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the state, religion, secularism and human rights, religion is regarded as an important place in European history, but in the practice requires the separation of church and state. Despite this decision, the Council and the Court have not succeeded in recognizing the different views of the member states in matters such as the role of religion in schools. There is a dominant view that the secular states in which the public decision-making processes are based solely on secular debates in the ECHR are in accordance with the principles of liberal European democracy. In the decisions of local courts in Europe, human rights are increasingly being taken into account. In doing so, the courts are failing to determine the ideological nature of secularism. The judgments of the courts result in the suppression of the religious views of individuals by liberal values. From all the discussions that have been made, it can be determined that the ECHR and, indeed, the local courts and the society are historically more biased towards non-Christian religions and cultures, despite adopting a secular understanding. Besides, it is noteworthy that in many of the countries' public sphere, Islamic religious symbols are mostly restricted. The main reason for these restrictions is thought to be Islamophobia and xenophobia. In European societies and in western societies in general, religious symbols are seen as belonging, and along with the growing Islamophobic and far-right trends, especially Christian symbols are used extensively in public spaces. In addition, it is also possible to ban the use of symbols identified in particular in Islam (such as headscarves) in public sphere and even punish those who use them, in various countries, including France and Austria. Besides, the use of religious symbols in schools should not be regarded as a cultural value alone. Religious symbols are an important part of a religion and concrete indications of its existence in a society. It would be more accurate to see the symbols of Christianity in schools as a means of assimilation rather than as a means of culture.

CEPS Journal

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Whether and how to accommodate students' personal religious symbols worn in public schools are part of a mounting global debate. The competing claims of the body politic and the religious or cultural identity of minority groups came to a head in what the French called the "affair of the veil." This chapter examines the problem of the veil from a cross-cultural perspective, comparing the United States to several other western democracies. The comparison involves both legal and cultural premises. In each instance, the analysis must consider the fundamental values of the body politic, the laws and covenants that govern decision-making, and the society's basic premises about the relation between religion and the state. The inquiry is further complicated by broader claims of the sub-groups with which parents and children identify. Part one of this chapter discusses the cultural significance of dress, and briefly summarizes the apparel associated with certain religions a...

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Religious Symbolism Research Paper

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1. Religious Symbols: Their Nature And Functions

1.1 symbols, transcendence, and salvation.

Religious symbols arise out of the tension which exists between consciousness and the world. Indeed, the raison d’etre of religious symbolism is to transcend that tension and move beyond, into ‘the other,’ into the world of transcendence. Religious symbols in other words are bridges between consciousness, the world, and the sacred. They are not just boundaries between the sacred and the profane, they are also means and processes of their inversion and transformation. Through symbols the material becomes spiritual and the spiritual becomes empirical and is communicated in visible form. As Eliade (1959, p. 12) put it: ‘By manifesting the sacred any object becomes something else, yet it continues to remain itself, for it continues to participate in the surrounding cosmic milieu.’ To transcend the world is to give it meaning at another level and attempt to transform it through symbols. A symbol, as Geertz (1975, p. 91) defines it, may be ‘any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception.’ For Geertz, as for Sperber (1975), to symbolize is to conceptualize. Religious symbols, thus, serve as vehicles of conceptualization of this world in terms of another world. Along with conceptualizing the sacred they also serve as means to separate it and conceal it from the profane. In mediating transcendence, symbols function at the same time as vehicles of transformation and stabilization of the world, but the conservative or revolutionary political function of symbols is a matter of degree and depends on political and socioeconomic conditions.

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There is an intentional and existential element in religious symbolism which links ultimate reality, social reality, and the quest for salvation which is innate in the human condition and, in one sense or another, underpins all religions. The limitations posed by the human biological, psychological, and social life and above all death, become embodied in religious images which transcend these limitations and give meaning to an otherwise chaotic reality. From this premise Marx, following Feuerbach, and without any theoretical elaboration of the symbolic, produced a reductionist, compensatory theory of religion and understood all religious symbols to be projections and epiphenomena of unfulfilled material needs and limitations imposed by socioeconomic conditions. Freud also produced a reductionist theory of religious symbols in the framework of his psychoanalytic theory. Religious symbolism underwent sophisticated analysis, especially in anthropology during the twentieth century, but its religious meaning per se and the problem of salvation were rarely taken on board. Reductionist interpretations of religious symbols have declined in the last decades of the twentieth century but the postmodernists have been criticized for their extreme relativism (Gellner 1992). Weber (1948, p. 280) did not get involved in the analysis of symbols and rituals but he argued that ‘the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the track along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of human interest.’ He made these images central to his sociology of religion and explored them as an integral part of human action in the pursuit of salvation. The symbolic representation of salvation then, as pursued within the various religious images of the world in various social and historical contexts, form the general framework of the functions and meanings of religious symbols.

Durkheim (1915 p. 47) described ‘sacred things’ as ‘set apart and forbidden.’ Yet in the context of salvation the world of the sacred and that of the secular must be, and are, brought into interaction. Salvation means that chaos, limitation, and disunity are surmountable and God meets humankind. Within the Abrahamic faiths especially, salvation means to bring everything under the unity of God. The forces of evil and death must, and can, be overcome. A bridge between God and humans must be built with the initiative of God and the synergy of humankind. Because of this symbols, as tools of transcendence and salvation, are essentially ambiguous. Their ultimate function is to mediate, reveal, express, and communicate that which in essence cannot be fully grasped, spoken of, or communicated. God is both: known and unknown, present and absent, hidden and revealed, God and humans. As Martin (1980, p. 7) points out, ‘To transcend is to go beyond. So we must name it and refuse to name it.’ What Rudolf Otto (1953) has called mysterium tremendum et fascionum cannot be contained in ordinary human knowledge and logic. So the believer’s attitude to the sacred is basically one of faith, awe, fascination, and submission.

For the same reason the sacred is not subject to the ordinary rules of formal logic. The nonlogical, the miraculous, and the extraordinary are basic properties of the sacred. Leach (1976, pp. 69–71) calls the logic involved in religious discourse ‘mytho-logic’ and argues that ‘One characteristic feature of such nonlogic (mytho-logic) is that metaphor is treated as metonymy.’ Sacred agents can be here, there, and everywhere simultaneously and according to the believer this is not just metaphorical language. It expresses (describes) true properties of divine agents which human agents cannot possess because they are limited, because they are human. Unlike humans, gods can do anything they please, whenever they please. If their doings are to make sense at all they must be in terms of some general scheme of salvation. They are not subject to biological and physical constraints (Christ walking on the water or moving through closed doors). The anthropomorphic, physical features of divine agents are usually represented in exaggerated and distorted form. The Hindu pantheon is characteristic for its multisemic, multiform, and weird symbolic representation. God Siva’s commonest representation, for instance, is the ‘linga’ (the phallus curved on stones) and the sacred bull. Victor Turner (1968, p. 580) describes trickster gods as agents of liminality and antinomian character with ambiguous sexual characteristics. Thus the Greek god Hermes was represented as hermaphrodite and was symbolized by ithyphallic statues and the Yoruba god Eshu is represented with a long headdress curved as a phallus.

Christian symbolism is full of ambiguity and paradox which makes sense primarily in terms of salvation and the Kingdom. God the Son ‘begotten’ of God the Father, becoming man in Christ, being born of a virgin, dying on the cross, rising from the dead and ascending into heaven, and coming again in glory to judge the quick and the dead: all this is part of the Nicene Creed which is the symbol of the Church. The body and blood of Christ, ‘eaten’ and ‘drunk’ by Christians, are symbols of reconciliation (redemption) between humans and God. Adam is restored through Christ, the new Adam, who is God-Man (indivisible and without confusion according to the christological doctrine). A dominant, condensed symbol (Turner 1967, pp. 28–30, Douglas 1970, p. 10, Firth 1973, pp. 87–93), which reenacts and represents all that and more, is the Christian liturgy or Eucharist. The point to be stressed here is that religious symbols as units do not make sense in isolation and are systematically related in terms of corresponding schemes of salvation which at the same time correspond to world images and social experience. That may, of course, be above all a theological interpretation of religious symbolism which may be rejected by many sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. David Martin (1980), however, has demonstrated that a deep and very sophisticated sociological analysis and interpretation of Christian symbolism can take place by encompassing transcendence in the context of the general soteriological scheme of Christianity. The point to be stressed, in any case, is that without taking seriously the implications for salvation no sociological, anthropological, or psychological interpretation of religious symbolism will be adequate. Indeed, reductionist interpretations may distort the essential anthropological meaning of religious symbols.

1.2 Symbols, Boundaries, Inversion, And Power

Religious symbolism acquired specific cultural significance and potency within what have been called axial civilizations (Eisenstadt 1986). In the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam transcendence and unity, and the eschatology implicit in them, became central cultural forces with a cosmic historical dialectic. Transcendence and the pursuit of salvation necessitate boundaries. To go beyond is to move from one boundary to the next, from one set of conditions to another or from one status to another. To be redeemed means to be reborn. The Kingdom of God makes good sense in the context of imperfect, unjust, and corrupt human kingdoms. The heavenly city, where ‘there shall be tears no more, no sorrow, no death’ (Rev. 21:4), is the opposite of earthly cities where sin, death, suffering, injustice, misery, and tears abide. So the polar oppose of the city of God is the city of Babylon. Within the Kingdom there is unity and divine bliss. Divisions of any kind, injustice, and biological and social boundaries do not apply. Blood bonds and other social bonds as well as divisions of all kinds are characteristic of this fallen world. There are no churches or temples in heaven but the sacred and the profane realms, though separate, are interdependent because the Kingdom, where God shall be all in all, has not come yet. The two kingdoms are separated by ambiguous symbolic boundaries of which paradox and inversion are basic characteristics. Sacred symbols function as sacred markers which challenge or reinforce the powers of this world with a power of their own.

Entering a church, a synagogue, a mosque, or any sacred place one crosses a boundary: the boundary between the world of everyday life and that of another world of sacred, cosmic power and significance. Within the sacred places there are other boundaries designating a hierarchy of meaning reaching up to the highest, the most sacred and the ineffable. In those specifically sacred parts, the holy of holies, only persons of special sacred status may enter in order to perform specific ritual acts. These acts guarantee that the holiness, the perfection, and the autonomy of the sacred are protected and maintained, while symbolically mediated to the secular world. In the Christian Eucharist the priest carries out the sacrifice of Christ on behalf of Christ, the congregation, and humankind. So hierarchy and status become intertwined from the highest to the lowest levels and transition from one status to another require rites de passage (Van Gennep 1960). Such rites symbolize losing the old status and entering a new one and involve what Turner (1969, p. 80) has called a state of liminality, a state ‘betwixt and between,’ rich in ambiguous symbolism linked ‘to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness … .’ In the early church, to be baptized meant to enter the community of the saints, to pass from death to life. Immersion in, and rising out, of the water stood for purification, death, and resurrection. This is symbolized by stripping off the old clothes and putting on new white robes. The color white has transcultural symbolic significance linked to life and to light, as black signifies darkness and death.

Martin (1980), Leach (1976), Douglas (1970), Turner (1969), and others have shown that inversion and status reversal are central mechanisms in religious symbolism. Christ, the Lord and Master of all, washes the feet of the disciples. Humility and hierarchy go together, as the irreconcilable tension between hierarchy and its total abolition are endemic in Christianity. Biological and social reproduction and family and social bonds are counteracted by the concept of virginity and the forming of celibate brotherhoods and sisterhoods. Being born again means entering spiritually and physically the community of the elect. ‘Those who will lose their life will gain it.’ God defeats death through death. Such inversions and logical contradictions form the substance of religious symbolism.

Symbolic boundaries link the spiritual power that ‘moves mountains’ and the powers of this world which permeate the human condition. Again, in most religions, this is through paradox and inversion. For Christianity, ‘the infinite power of the Almighty’ is demonstrated by Christ’s suffering on the cross and by

 icons like that of the Pantocrator in Daphni outside Athens. A thin and weak man like Ghandi could challenge the British Empire by advocating non-violence. Mary Douglas (1970, pp. 37–53) mentions the ‘bog Irish’ in London and the Apocryphal characters of old Eleazar in ancient Israel (2 Macc. 6:18) as exercising symbolic religious power against secular power, one by abstaining from meat on Friday and the other by refusing to eat pork on pain of death. The ultimate clash between the powers of this world and the power of heaven and glorious and total victory of the latter over the former is depicted most colourfully in the book of Revelation. Yet for Christianity, as for all religions, the tension between the two kingdoms is always present because the Kingdom of God is yet to come. There is a specific kind of formidable power which is generated through martyrdom which the powers and the rulers of this world seem to fear most. Millenarists down the centuries have celebrated the imminence of the Apocalypse by burning their homes and possessions, by weird behavior, by noise and ecstasy or by total silence, or, paradoxically, by adopting rigid absolute rules in their effort to reject all rules. But the Apocalypse remains in the future and nonviolent religious movements like early Christianity became in time powerful Churches embodying both sacred and secular power. However, as long as the Kingdom is not fully and finally here, religious symbols will continue to reveal and conceal the sacred, and their eschatological pull will continue to move the world.

Icons represent the sacred in condensed pictorial form. In iconography the holy is grasped not by reasoning but by feeling. As Langer (1980, p. 15) argues ‘the thing we do with images is to envisage a story.’ Icons speak to the heart and according to St John of Damascus ‘they are to the eye what speech is to the ear’ (Uspenski 1976, p. 9). Religious images engage the emotions and express and communicate the sacred directly. Iconography, in most religions, is anthropomorphic and this is true of ‘primitive,’ Indian, Egyptian, Hindu, Buddhist, Greco-Roman as it is of Christian religion. Central feature of icons is the human body although in certain religions it is presented in a distorted form. In Hinduism, for instance, God Visnu is invariably represented with four hands which symbolize his various attributes. In Judaism, the making of images of God or idols are strictly prohibited (Ex. 20:4, Dt. 4:15–18, Dt. 27:15) so iconography did not develop. In Islam, although the Qur’an does not prohibit divine images, pictorial representations were forbidden from the beginning so abstract, geometric, decorative designs and calligraphy developed instead (Schimmel 1987, p. 64).

In a restricted sense, icons refer to the specific form of iconography which developed within Eastern Christianity during the Byzantine period. They constitute the almost exclusive type of religious art in the Orthodox Church to the present day as frescoes, mosaics but mostly painted on wood (Sendler 1988, Kokosalakis 1995). Icons developed out of the early Christian iconography of the catacombs which, in large part, conveyed coded messages of basic Christian themes. Christ, for instance, was represented as fish, which in Greek is ΙΧΘΥΣ, which is an acronym for: Ιησου , Χριστο , Θεου, Υιο , Σωτηρ (Jesus Christ Son of God Savior). By the fourth century icons could be found in most Christian communities and constituted a central part of Christian teaching parallel to biblical texts. The formalization of the Christian doctrine during the fourth and fifth centuries consolidated with it the basic themes of Christian iconography: Christ, the Virgin, the saints, and various biblical themes. The representation of Christ in particular went through a long evolution and for certain icons, especially of the Virgin, it was believed that they were not made by human hand (αχειροποιητοι).

By the end of the sixth century icons occupied a central place in collective and private worship in Byzantium but their theological meaning became explicit during the iconoclastic period ( AD 726–843) when Byzantine society was shaken to its foundations. Devotion to icons had led to excesses and Emperor Leo III, supported by some bishops and certain heretical groups who rejected external worship, issued the first decree against icons in AD 726. There followed a long period of theological controversy and social unrest which, apart from religious, had also serious political and economic etiology. Icons were finally and decisively reinstated in AD 843 by Empress Theodora and since then have occupied a central place in Orthodox theology and worship.

Icons in the Orthodox Church are religious symbols par excellence with central cultural significance. They are related to neoplatonic ideas about the expression of spiritual reality in matter with a substantive religious meaning around the concept of the person/image which refers directly to both the creation of humans in the image of God (κατ’ εικονα) and their salvation through the incarnation of the word of God. Icons embody the universal and the particular simultaneously. Some icons are attributed thaumaturgical powers by the faithful. In Eliade’s (1959, pp. 24–29) terms such icons constitute ‘theophanies.’ Orthodox pictorial art adopted the inverted, two-dimensional perspective so that the image enters the viewer instead of the viewer entering the image. For the Orthodox Church, icons are windows of revelation and vehicles of direct communication with divine agents.

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