the cold war china essay

The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy

The year 1949 proved pivotal in changing the dynamics of post-World War II international relations. In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China(PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) after the Chinese Communists won a nationwide victory in the civil war and drove the Nationalist government to Taiwan. The collapse of the Nationalist cause shocked the American public, which had idealized “free China” as a democratic ally and valiant protégé. Now, a Communist China, comprising a quarter of the world’s population, had inevitably extended the Cold War to East Asia. The PRC’s foreign policy during the Cold War went through several distinctive stages.

“Lean to One Side” (1949-1959)

On June 1949, about three months prior to the founding of the PRC, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong announced that New China would support the Soviet Union in international affairs. The Truman administration settled on a policy of non-recognition of the PRC. As the United States had been supporting the Chinese Nationalists during the Chinese civil war, and Washingto nrefused to cut off relations with the Nationalist government in Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party regarded the U.S.as a serious threat to the PRC.Beijing was seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union to offset theU.S.threat. The Chinese and Soviet leaders signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,Alliance, and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. The alliance was mainly a military agreement, which committed the two sides to come to each other’s aid if either were attacked by Japanor the United States.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 disrupted any possible stabilization of the Sino-American relations. The PRC and the United States would be locked into a deadly three-year war in the Korean peninsula from June 1950 to July 1953. After China entered the Korean War in October 1950, the U.S.would perceive the PRC as a major threat to its key interest in Asia, and to the security of Japan. During the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance worked reasonably well as the Soviet Union provided China with air support, a great deal of military supplies and economic aid. Given China’s hostility, Washington took a hard line by toughening the U.S.economic embargo against the PRC, which first started in fall 1950, firming up support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan, blocking the PRC’s membership in the UN, and further isolating the PRC politically. The PRC’s hostility toward the U.S.and Washington’s reciprocation intensified the Cold War in the region.

The PRC’s shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy) in 1954 was designed mainly to foil the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty as Beijing worried about the division between mainland China and Taiwan. As tension rose between the United States and China during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-55, both Washington and Beijing felt more urgency to maintain communications, even at a higher level and on a more regular footing. The first Taiwan Strait crisis, in a way, launched the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in August 1955. The ambassadorial talks continued throughout the Eisenhower administration without much progress on the issues such as Taiwan, the renunciation of force,U.S.embargo of China, and cultural exchanges.

Meanwhile, in the first half of the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet relationship was cordial and the top priority of the PRC’s diplomacy. The contacts between the two governments were frequent, and bilateral negotiations were often conducted between top leaders. But in the second half of the 1950s, the CCP started to disagree with the Soviets on how to evaluate Stalin, and the direction which the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was leading the International Communist movement. The Chinese quarreled with the Soviets over the issue of de-Stalinization, the Soviet proposal of building a joint long-wave radio station and nuclear submarine fleet in China, differing interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev’s attempt to reach an accommodation with the West, and the USSR’s refusal to support China during its conflict with India in the second half of 1959 and early 1960. In July 1960, Moscow announced the abrupt removal of Soviet advisers and technical personnel from China. By the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet dispute spread from ideology to state-to-state relations. Tensions rose along the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-Soviet alliance collapsed.

Revolutionary Self-Reliance (1960-1969)

Mao Zedong and his associates began to reassess the changing balance of power between the two opposing blocs in the early 1960s. The perception of threat in relation to the United States tended to be determined by both domestic pressure and international challenges.Beijing was interested in maintaining a communication channel with Washington. The Sino-American ambassadorial talks that took place in Warsaw continued in the 1960s. Although no official diplomatic relations existed between the two countries at that time, these Warsaw talks proved useful in facilitating relations between China and the U.S., offering a ready avenue for information exchange and crisis management.

In the 1960s, although Washington believed that the Soviet threat was still the predominant one, the Third World became a major battleground for the great power contention. The rise of nationalism as a result of Communist infiltration seemed to have posed an increasing threat to the United States and “Free World.” It was within this area that China stood out as the world’s leading revolutionary state, threatening not only Western democracy, but also Moscow’s claim to a leadership role within the Socialist bloc.

Since its founding in 1949, the PRC had given high priority to its relations with the Third World. Mao pointed out that a strong coalition of countries in the Third World could be decisive in Cold War confrontations.China’s first effort to assume influence in the Third World came in April 1955, when it attended the Bandung Conference of Asian and African states.China’s strategy emphasized building political coalitions in the Third World at two different levels. First, China supported “national liberation struggle” both to force out the remaining colonial regimes and to overthrow those independent Third World governments that were most closely allied with the West. Second, China attempted to build close cooperative relations with the rest of the independent Third World governments, urging them to reject the West. As China could offer very little in the way of economic assistance or advanced military equipment, its effort during the 1960s and 1970s to shape the Third World into a third force in international politics opposed to both the two superpowers largely failed.

Triangular Diplomacy (1970-1989)

The perception of grave threat from the Soviet Union pushed Mao Zedong to lift existing conceptual restrictions in order to improve relations with the United States in early 1970s.

Nixon’s high-profile summit meetings in February 1972 with the Chinese leaders, in effect, replicated Henry Kissinger’s earlier visits to Beijing in July and October 1971. Determined to move ahead but firm on principal issues, the leaders of both sides proved worthy negotiation opponents. At the core of the U.S.-China summit diplomacy were the common concerns over the Soviet threat; each side aspired to utilize the other to balance that threat. This was the beginning of U.S.-China-Soviet triangular diplomacy during the Cold War. But Mao did not follow the policy of détente with the U.S. to its fullest extent. Throughout his life, Mao had a constant and consistent goal: China was the model for the “liberation” of all the oppressed nations and peoples of the world.

After a brief power struggle following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping became China’s de facto leader in the late 1970s over Mao’s own anointed successor, Hua Guofeng. Deng charted a course for China’s rapid economic development that combined successful reform and openness to capitalistic international economy with the continued one-party rule of the CCP. In foreign policy, Deng shared Mao’s goal to strive for China’s equality and to restore China’s lost glory. He was the architect of China’s foreign policy from 1978 until the early 1990s. Deng virtually brought to an end China’s remaining practical support for revolutionary movements abroad and significantly reduced China’s aid to the Third World.China carried on a foreign policy more balanced between the two superpowers, which was called “an independent foreign policy” at the 12th National Congress of the CCP in 1982. Under Deng’s leadership, Communist rule in China survived the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union—the motherland of Communism. The PRC weathered the end of the Cold War. As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet bloc quickly disintegrated,China gradually emerged as a nascent superpower.

The Cold War was originally a confrontation between two contending ideologies — Communism and liberal democracy. The Chinese leaders persisted in proclaiming “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” as the ideological foundation of China during the Cold War. Many scholars have contended that the primary causes of the Sino-Soviet split stemmed from their conflicting national interests, which overwhelmed their shared ideological beliefs. The historian Chen Jian contends that ideology, while it played a decisive role in bringing Communist countries together, also contributed to driving them apart.

From a geopolitical perspective, China was neither in the vital area that both superpowers vied for—West and East Europe—nor was it on the periphery of the Cold War, like many other “Third World” countries.China’s influence sprang mainly from its huge population and territory. In the words of Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, “During the Cold War,China was the only major country that stood at the intersection of the two superpower camps, a target of influence and enmity for both.” Despite its confrontations with the United States in the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Vietnam, by the early 1970s, Sino-American rapprochement helped to create the conditions that led to the limited détente of the 1970s. Ironically, the great Sino-Soviet rivalry not only led to the collapse of the Communist bloc, but contributed to the end of the Cold War as well.

Yafeng XIA is an associate professor of East Asian and Diplomatic history at Long Island University, Brooklyn. He is the author of Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-72 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).  He has also published numerous articles in such publications as Diplomacy & Statecraft, Journal of Cold War Studies, The International History Review, The Chinese Historical Review among others. He is currently working on a monograph on the history of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tentatively titled Burying the “Diplomacy of Humiliation”: New China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1949-1956.

Bibliography

Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet  Union, 1948-1972 .Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Chen, Jian. Mao’s China and The Cold War . Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Kirby, William C. Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, eds., Normalization of U.S.-China  Relations: An International History . Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.

Levine, Steven I., “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Robinson, Thomas, and David Shambaugh, eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 30-46.

Luthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Nathan, Andrew J. and Robert S. Ross. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security .New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.

Ross, Robert, and Jiang Changbin, eds. Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 .Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2001.

Van Ness, Peter. “Chinaand the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference,” in Kim, Samuel S., ed. China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998), 151-70.

Xia, Yafeng. Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 .Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam War . Chapel Hill:University o fNorth Carolina Press, 2000.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Soviet Foreign Policy in the Early 1980s: A View from Chinese Sovietology
• US and British Foreign Policy from One Regime Change to Another
• Opinion – Emerging Elements of a New US-China Cold War
• Cuban Cold War Internationalism and the Nonaligned Movement
• The ‘Exceptional’ Chinese Soft Power: Outlier or Pioneer?
• Cold War Theories, War on Terror Practices

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8 China and the Cold War

Rana Mitter, is Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China at Oxford University. He is the author of The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), for which he was named Times Higher Education Supplement Young Academic Author of the Year; and Modern China: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). His articles have appeared in scholarly journals including The China Quarterly, The Historical Journal, and Modern Asian Studies. In 2007–12 he ran a major project funded by the Leverhulme Trust on the experience, legacy, and memory of World War II in China. He is a regular broadcaster on BBC radio, and has written for publications including the Financial Times, Times Literary Supplement, and History Today.

• Published: 28 January 2013
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This chapter examines the role of China in the Cold War. It describes the origins of Cold War in China and the participation of nationalist China in World War 2 and the Cold War, and suggests that China played a pivotal role as the third (albeit shorter) leg of a cold war tripod. The chapter contends that the Cold War era in China is inseparable from the political supremacy Mao Zedong, and highlights the impact of the split between China and the Soviet Union on the role of China in the Cold War. It also argues that the 1972 Sino-United States rapprochement contributed to the fading of China from the Cold War narrative.

The cold war era in China is inseparable from the political supremacy of one man: Mao Zedong. “Mao's China” and “Cold War China” are interchangeable terms in the minds of many, and the chairman's long tenure in power from 1949 to 1976 had a major influence on the progression of the cold war in Asia and beyond.

Nevertheless, understanding Mao's role is not sufficient to understand the cold war's effect on China. After all, the cold war lasted for over a decade following Mao's death. No less crucially, during the critical period between the end of World War II and the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, real political alternatives for China were in conflict with one another. Just as 1945–50 was a turning point in the European cold war, so it was in China. And just as in Europe, China inherited the massive displacements of World War II.

China played a pivotal role as the third (albeit shorter) leg of a cold war tripod. If this suggests a certain unsteadiness, that is not inappropriate. The cold war was also the era of decolonization, and China managed to maintain a simultaneous narrative about itself that was highly convincing to many emerging non-Western states. It used the Bandung Conference in 1955 to argue that it was a new, cooperative force in what would become known as the Third World. However, it also proclaimed itself the savior of the revolutionary world, spearheading anti-imperialist liberation. In saying this, it contrasted itself implicitly, then after 1960, explicitly, with the Soviet Union.

The origins of cold war China: Nationalist China in world war and cold war

When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was officially declared on October 1, 1949, it was the child of a vicious civil war between the CCP and its predecessor, the Nationalists (Guomindang) under Chiang Kai-shek. That war was, in turn, the immediate successor to a devastating world war. In 1945 Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, emerged victorious against the Japanese, although his victory was a pyrrhic one; the capacity of his state had been deeply compromised. The areas of communist control in China during the war had expanded rapidly, with some 100 million (of the total of 900 million) in broadly CCP-dominated areas by August 1945.

The war against Japan transformed China's future. In the 1920s and 1930s it had been riven by militarist violence. Although nominally united under the Nationalist government established by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928, China suffered from poverty, political corruption, human rights abuses, and repeated outbreaks of civil war. Nonetheless, the country progressed, with new railways, roads, and telecommunications established and international assistance from the League of Nations used to develop flood prevention and new crop varieties. By 1936 the CCP was on the run: the “Long March,” which became part of the party's foundational myth, was actually a retreat by a party that had been shattered by Nationalist attacks.

The outbreak of war between China and Japan in the summer of 1937 destroyed the fitful modernization of the previous decade. The Nationalist government was forced to retreat to the inland city of Chongqing, while the Japanese occupied most of China's eastern heartland. In the north and east communist control expanded. The Nationalist government nearly collapsed under the strains of the war. By 1945 it was beset by corruption, and its military was profoundly dysfunctional. This breakdown resulted largely from four years of fighting almost alone against Japan, the difficulties of running a government under constant aerial bombardment, dealing with refugee displacement running into millions of people, and being forced into a geographical isolation from the sea. By 1945 the Nationalists were exhausted. 1

After 1945 mediators, including the American General George C. Marshall, attempted to broker a coalition government between the Nationalists and Communists. Marshall abandoned his effort when it became clear that neither side was willing to compromise. The civil war erupted in 1946 and raged until 1949. 2 It became a deadly ideological conflict. Yet much of Chiang's motivation was similar to the underpinnings of foreign policy under the CCP after 1949. In particular, Chiang's actions portended a cold war phenomenon: decolonization and nation-building among non-European peoples. It was the Nationalists, not the Communists, who negotiated an end to the hated “unequal treaties” with the European imperial powers in the late 19th century. As a result, China emerged from war in 1945 as truly sovereign for the first time since the end of the Opium War in 1842. In addition, Nationalist China had been designated one of the “Four Policemen” by Franklin D. Roosevelt and given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The Nationalists and the CCP used significantly different methods in their relationship with the international community, but their aims were not that different, particularly on the question of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The civil war took place in the middle of a rapidly changing global situation as the cold war took shape. Until 1948 the US and USSR predicated their policies for Asia on the idea that China would be united under the Nationalists. This would have generated a US-oriented East Asia, as Chiang's government would have oriented itself toward the US, and Japan would also have been an American satellite. Stalin was initially complicit with this assumption, and his relations with the CCP waxed hot and cold as he sought to calculate what side was more likely to win the civil war. Nonetheless, the hardening of the global cold war forced Chiang to choose sides; Stalin would not let him accept support from both the US and the USSR. Chiang chose the US as the lesser of two evils. 3

The CCP never forgot the way that Stalin had toyed with its loyalty. Their victory, largely a consequence of the collapse of the Nationalist administration, was not long in coming. Chiang's government was too compromised by its own flaws, which had been seriously aggravated by the experience of the war against Japan. Rebuilding state capacity when so much of the country had been destroyed would have been hard enough, but to engage in a major civil war almost immediately afterward was too much. Combined with human rights abuses, corruption, and an unwillingness to compromise on the control of political power, the Nationalists’ brief experiment in sovereign government came to an end with the communist victory in autumn 1949.

Communist victory and the cold war

On October 1, 1949 the chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, stood at the Tiananmen Gate in the center of Beijing and announced that the People's Republic of China, the world's most populous state, was now a communist country.

The cold war was central to the shaping of the new state domestically as well as internationally. Militarism had become a major factor as the state atrophied from the late Qing dynasty onward, but the mass dislocations produced by the war against Japan altered society profoundly. Many of the competing regimes within China—the Nationalists in exile in the southwest, the Communists in the north, and Wang Jingwei's collaborationist Nationalists who claimed to have “reorganized” the true Nationalist party in Nanjing—demanded greater contributions from society and offered a wider social vision in return. Although the communist vision proved most compelling, most modern political actors in China saw the need for a wider vision of social reform, which was frequently linked to militarization. Mao's years in charge of the PRC were heavily militarized in many ways (the Cultural Revolution is a notorious example). Propaganda stressed this element of social control at all times. 4

The new divisions imposed by the cold war were visible in the PRC's most pressing domestic issue: the economy. There is much historical evidence that China's economy was improving until 1937. The eight years of war changed that: most of China's fledgling industrialization was in the eastern seaboard cities that Japan took over (with much of the plant destroyed by bombing). The war broke up traditional trade routes and economic networks. 5

A Nationalist-run China would have drawn on economic assistance from the US. The CCP's victory made that impossible. The United States refused to recognize the new government in Beijing, maintaining that Chiang's government in exile in Taipei was China's legitimate government (in the United Nations Security Council, the “China” seat was also retained by the Republic of China, which held it until 1971). Instead, the country became embedded in the emergent socialist world economy that Stalin's USSR promoted after 1945. 6 Although China never joined Comecon, which controlled trade within the socialist bloc, its economy became highly integrated with the organization's members from 1953, when the PRC's first Five Year Plan began. A common cold war point of contrast was between the command economy of the Eastern bloc and free markets of the West, but in fact both bloc leaders sacrificed short-term economic advantage to strengthen the commitment of the parts of East Asia under their control. The US allowed members of its bloc to obtain an economic advantage in return for support by allowing the East Asian developmental states (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) to maintain highly protected economies for decades. The USSR offered goods within its bloc at advantageous prices to cement the socialist community: for instance, one ton of Chinese frozen pork became enough to buy five tons of steel products. The importance of cementing bloc alliances also led to strategic trade: during the 1953 riots in East Berlin, China sent 50 million rubles worth of foodstuffs to help shore up the fledgling GDR government. 7 From its origin, China was brought into the fold of the world socialist economy.

The Korean War

The newly established PRC was almost immediately plunged into another brutal conflict: the Korean War. The war confronted the rulers of the new state with a hard choice. On the one hand, the PRC desperately needed time for domestic consolidation: the regime had won a military victory but had not yet secured all China's territory. On the other, the commitment of the party and Mao Zedong in particular to anti-imperialist liberation was genuine. The war in Korea presented an opportunity for the new state to show its credentials and gain ideological influence.

Part of the Chinese motivation to enter the war in Korea came from frustration over their perception that their Soviet partners regarded them as supplicants. CCP Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi visited Stalin in the months before the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 to discuss a variety of issues. It became clear that Mao was unhappy with the patronizing flavor of Stalin's demands. 8 The USSR wanted special rights to operate in the parts of China that bordered the USSR (the northeast and northwest). For Mao, Stalin's proposals implied new “unequal treaties.”

So the emergence of a crisis on the Korean peninsula, on China's northeastern border, gave Mao a chance to demonstrate his revolutionary credentials. The emergence of new documentation since the early 1990s, however, shows Stalin and Mao were playing a complex game with each other. 9 At stake were ideas about revolutionary anti-imperialism and the leadership of the communist world. The catalyst was the request in April 1950 by Kim Il-Sung, leader of the new communist North Korean state, for approval to invade the south. Stalin eventually acceded. He seems genuinely to have felt that the Western forces were in a position of weakness at that time, and the prospect of success was realistic. However, he was also conscious that he needed to maintain leadership within the communist bloc: having declined the chance to support communist movements in Greece and Indochina, his prestige could have further eroded had he turned his back on the revolution in Korea as well. 10 Mao hesitated. The new People's Republic was deeply unstable in 1950, with pockets of resistance to the CCP still to be found in peripheral areas, and the country reeling from the effects of two major wars in quick succession. Nonetheless, Mao had a vision of spreading anti-imperialist communist revolution, and the opportunity opened up by Kim was hard for him to turn down. To undertake support for the Korean War would make a powerful statement of ideological intent.

Stalin proved an uncertain ally during the Korean War, failing to provide much-desired air cover for Chinese troops at a crucial moment in 1950. He had believed that the West would not force a confrontation over a North Korean invasion and was discomfited by the rapid success of UN forces in recapturing the south. Mao, however, having gambled by entering the war, insisted on sticking by Kim. Stalin ultimately provided support, if not actual Soviet troops, for the war effort. While Mao could not claim complete victory, by 1953 the stalemate allowed the new regime to argue that it had prevented the establishment of a hostile state on its borders.

Mao had also made his campaign of domestic consolidation dependent on mobilizing popular support for the war with the “Resist America, Aid Korea” campaign. 11 This use of the Korean War to influence domestic politics reflected a dynamic that accompanied the CCP's rise to power in the years before 1949: the radicalizing and pragmatic trends in CCP thought were in conflict not only within the party but also within Mao himself. “Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought” was often pragmatic, as shown by its turn toward the cross-class alliance of “New Democracy” during the war against Japan and the early PRC period. In 1940 Mao had defined the term “New Democracy” as a means of creating a unified society in which the Chinese Communist Party would be paramount, but also cooperate with other elements in society (such as capitalists and entrepreneurs). This adoption of temporary pragmatic politics by Mao, however, did not mean an abandonment of a radical view of the world and of China's future. Mao's vision revolved around class warfare at home and anti-imperialism abroad in the service of an ever-renewing revolutionary stance. This should have been no secret to those who had observed the Rectification ( Zhengfeng ) movements that marked Mao's radicalization of politics and concentration of it in his own person in the years after 1941. The Korean War became the first test of that commitment in the PRC; by its end society was considerably more radicalized than it had been at the start.

Taiwan crisis, Bandung cooperation

Wider cold war tensions were reflected in confrontations between Mao and Chiang. After his defeat in 1949, Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan, maintaining that he remained the legitimate ruler of the Republic of China. Mao, of course, regarded the continued irredentism of his great rival as an affront to his new state. In 1954–5 the PRC military shelled the island of Jinmen (Quemoy) and succeeded in capturing smaller Nationalist- held islands off the coast of Zhejiang province. 12 Just three years later Taiwan's outlying islands once again came under fire from the PRC. This event had more to do with cold war tensions than any particular urgency caused by the situation within Taiwan itself. Mao's relations with Nikita Khrushchev had deteriorated further after 1956, and he was displeased by the Soviet leader's attempts to discredit Stalin, which he (correctly) thought were an oblique way to criticize Mao himself. Mao was also angry that Khrushchev was seeking to ratchet down tensions with the US without consulting him first. Therefore, Mao initiated the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu in August 1958 as a means of heightening general tension rather than as a response to a particular political event. 13 Throughout the crisis, as Khrushchev's memoirs attest, the Chinese kept the Soviets in the dark about their intentions. 14 The crisis eventually subsided and was not repeated. However, for the inhabitants of Jinmen memories of the bombardment of their small fishing island, along with the militarization of everyday life, became central to their everyday existence. 15 The offshore islands became a frontier in the cold war world and affected the lives of ordinary inhabitants in many ways, including the greater militarization of society and the development of a mentality that reflected a permanent state of crisis.

Despite the confrontations over Taiwan, China's international behavior during the 1950s also had a cooperative face, symbolized above all by the 1955 Bandung Conference. This was the first grouping of African and Asian countries which would become known as the Non-Aligned Movement. At Bandung, China projected itself as a leading voice of international engagement and development which was not required to follow the path of “modernization” defined by the American or Soviet bloc. During the conference, China's credentials were measured not only as a rival to Moscow or Washington, but also against the newly independent India. Jawaharlal Nehru was pursuing a program of parliamentary democratic socialism. China's ideological radicalism may have been as much a disadvantage as a benefit in this context, and Zhou Enlai's presence as an advocate of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” served as a message that the PRC was capable of compromise as well as confrontation. (Zhou used the occasion of his presence at Bandung to announce a halt in the offshore bombing of Taiwan in 1955.) Yet China's closeness to the USSR and radical politics made it an uneasy bedfellow for many of the newly emerging independent states.

The Sino-Soviet split

Even while it tried to carve out a new status for itself in postwar international society, the PRC remained highly dependent on its relationship with its patron, the USSR. Nevertheless, relations between the two giant communist states led to a split in the early 1960s, which was perhaps the most momentous internal event within the communist bloc during the entire cold war. Although the fissure had been brewing for years, it took many Western observers by surprise. The split was never total, but it was nearly three decades before it was overcome with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in 1989.

Mao and the CCP were wary of Soviet intervention in their revolution from the very earliest days of the PRC. All Chinese nationalists, whether communists or not, had long memories of the “century of humiliation,” in which foreign imperialists (including Russia) had occupied large parts of China's territories. In addition, Stalin's demands for special rights in China's borderlands in 1949–50 had angered Mao greatly. The seeds were sown that would eventually lead to the split with the Soviets. On the one hand, Mao's government wanted to stress that its revolution was indigenous, that it had come to power through its own strategic choices, and that it was genuinely rooted in a popular revolution. On the other hand, for reasons of ideological commitment and economic and strategic need, it had to be close to the USSR.

The relationship between Mao and Stalin had always been marked by distrust as well as admiration: Mao believed that much of Stalin's advice to the CCP before 1949 had been mistaken, and Stalin disliked Mao's independence of thought. However, the two had sufficient respect for each other to maintain effective relations between their two countries. Mao had little respect for Stalin's ultimate successor, Nikita Khrushchev. Furthermore, Mao regarded Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in the secret speech of 1956 as a coded attack on Mao's own cult of personality, which had been developing since the wartime Rectification movements.

The international and domestic tensions came together during 1956–9, in the wake of the Khrushchev thaw in the USSR. Despite China's involvement with the socialist international economic bloc, Mao was deeply suspicious of the Soviet proposal to intervene by military means in the Polish uprisings of 1956: at a Politburo meeting on October 20, 1956, he observed, “This is serious big-power chauvinism, which should not be allowed under any circumstances.” 16 Chinese representatives, including Liu Shaoqi, stressed to Khrushchev their uneasiness about Moscow's intervention in the decisions of other socialist countries. The Chinese position altered during the Hungarian crisis later that year, however. Although its initial response toward intervention was negative, the Chinese leadership became alarmed about the nature of the uprising, which they considered “anti-communist” rather than just “anti-Soviet.” 17

The theoretical questions raised by the 1956 uprisings in Eastern Europe profoundly influenced the development of Chinese domestic policy. Mao took away the message that the Eastern European parties had not been strong enough to combat “reactionary” forces, and that Moscow had also been heavy-handed in its management of those crises.

The effect of this was a contradictory turn within domestic Chinese politics. In 1956–7 Mao supported the Hundred Flowers Movement, which actively called for constructive criticism of the Party from the wider population. He intended that the CCP should glean suggestions on how to reform itself. By 1957, however, Mao had become alarmed at the harsh level of criticism that had emerged through the Hundred Flowers; he launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign in which thousands of people who had criticized the party were arrested.

1956 saw the Chinese more enthused about their efforts to have Beijing replace Moscow as the ideological focal point of world communism. Yet the language that Moscow and Beijing used between themselves over the events of 1956 was shared: language, rhetoric, and political understandings genuinely linked the socialist countries and shaped their understanding of what bound them together against the Western bloc. This disparity, in which the PRC and the USSR shared goals while disagreeing on approaches, was another factor that would lead to their split. 18

Between 1956 and 1961 relations continued to deteriorate as Mao demanded more radicalism in the face of Soviet attempts to lessen tensions with the Western bloc. Khrushchev had become increasingly disillusioned by what he saw as both Mao's willingness to risk confrontation with the West and his establishment of a cult of personality. Khrushchev was also motivated by a racism that found it hard to take the Chinese seriously. The most symbolic moment was the withdrawal of all Soviet advisors from China in 1960: so sudden was their departure that they left the bridge under construction across the Yangtze at Nanjing half-built. By that stage, the alliance between the two sides was in tatters.

The split with the Soviets meant that China had a new freedom to exercise its influence as a revolutionary actor on the global stage. China projected itself as a role model at a moment when scores of Asian and African countries were decolonizing and seeking to shape their emerging nation-states. While China and the USSR remained allied for the first decade of the PRC's existence, it was clear that China had an authenticity about its rhetoric of anti-imperialist liberation that the Soviet Union lacked (as did the US). Eastern Europe was essentially a colony of Moscow. China's revolution, in contrast, was genuinely indigenous, even if it had received significant Soviet assistance. After the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, China's rhetoric became much more explicitly anti-Soviet, haranguing Soviet “revisionism and social imperialism.” In his 1965 declaration “Long Live the Victory of People's War,” Lin Biao sneered at the “Khrushchev revisionists,” whom he accused of collaborating with the US “imperialists” trying to sabotage the Chinese-led ideas of “people's war.” 19

The Vietnam War

The worsening relationship between the PRC and the USSR was also reflected in the Chinese involvement in the war in Vietnam. China provided support for the Vietnamese in their struggle against French colonialism from its earliest days, and then for the North Vietnamese in their war to unify Vietnam under their control. From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, the CCP exploited their long ties with the Vietnamese Communist movement to offer them support. As with Korea, Chinese policy linked an ideological commitment to a more pragmatic mode of operation. The latter was particularly evident in the 1954 Geneva Accords, through which postcolonial Vietnam's borders were defined. These marked one of the major diplomatic successes of Zhou Enlai, China's foreign minister and prime minister. Nonetheless, the Accords did represent an ideological retreat, as Zhou (and the Soviets) pressured Ho Chi Minh not to press for an immediate unification of the two halves of Vietnam but to accept a “temporary” division of the country—something which Mao later came to regret. Chinese involvement in Vietnam would soon intensify significantly.

During much of the 1960s, the North Vietnamese found themselves in the curious position of accepting assistance from both the PRC and the USSR even while hostility between the latter two states increased. 20 Some 320,000 Chinese troops were deployed across the border into North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. The troops took part in fighting (operating gun positions) and also undertook significant construction work, thereby freeing up Vietnamese soldiers for the assault into South Vietnam. This involvement was never formally acknowledged, nor did the US seek to draw attention to it. Still, it is a marker of the seriousness with which China took its cold war mission. In assisting the North Vietnamese, the Chinese drew attention to their own path for anti-imperialist liberation, which combined allegiance to ideas of radical social change with a strong sense of non-European nationalism. On both these points the USSR was unable to trump China. By intervening in Vietnam, Beijing also made up for those occasions when it had had to draw back from involvement, such as the failure to conquer the south in the Korean War or the inability to prevent a right-wing coup in Indonesia in 1965 against a leadership that seemed to be orienting itself toward Beijing. 21

However, that nationalism also caused one of the major rifts between China and Vietnam, and illustrated a wider problem—that China continued to have a highly sinocentric attitude toward its neighbors. Mao's comments on the countries of East Asia that “we belong to the same family and support one another” strongly signaled that he considered China to be the “elder brother” in the relationship. 22 Such attitudes and the continuing realization of the Vietnamese that they would have to choose between support from the USSR and from China led to the breakdown of relations between Vietnam and China and the final withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1970.

The opening to the US

The mid-1960s likewise witnessed the most convulsive social change in the whole of Mao's period in power, the Cultural Revolution, which eventually precipitated the biggest ideological shift in China's international behavior: the opening to the United States. The Cultural Revolution was Mao's revolt against his own party: fearing that he was being sidelined and that the PRC as a whole was losing revolutionary fervor, he launched a campaign in 1966 which exhorted China's population to rise up and “bombard the headquarters” of the CCP itself. The result was a massive radicalization of domestic policies for the next three years. However, as the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution ended, prominent figures in the leadership began to feel China's lack of global allies keenly. By 1969 the relationship between Beijing and Moscow had become so bad that the two sides feared that war might break out over control of territories on China's northeastern border. There were significant reasons for China to reopen relations with its “most respected enemy,” particularly as it became clear that the newly elected American president, Richard Nixon, held similar sentiments. As early as 1967 Nixon had written in an editorial, “[W]e simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.” 23

The reasons that Mao's government reversed its ideological strategy and invited the representatives of the greatest capitalist nation on earth to the heart of Beijing were domestic as well as international. The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution were exposing the contradictions in Mao's vision of modernity. After the departure of Soviet advisors in 1960, it no longer had the indigenous capacity to develop technology, particularly as the Cultural Revolution's initial phase was predicated on breaking down any pretensions to high technical knowledge or expertise. Although various areas of scientific endeavor, such as the Chinese atomic bomb program, remained protected from the Cultural Revolution, overall the movement was immensely destructive to the country's knowledge base. It was clear by the early 1970s that some source of external technical knowledge was needed to replace the Soviets.

Mao himself became a strong supporter of the opening to the US, having read and noted what he took as positive signals from Nixon. The latter's inaugural address had made it clear that he would not be bound simply by ideology in his decisions as to which countries to talk to. However, it seems that Mao's putative successor, Lin Biao, was not favorably inclined toward an opening toward the US. 24 The situation changed with Lin's death in 1971. He appears to have been involved in an attempted coup against Mao, and his disappearance from the scene meant that the Chinese leadership became more unified toward the opening toward the US.

After a series of maneuvers and false starts, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger arrived under conditions of top secrecy in Beijing in 1971. He was subjected to robust conversations by Zhou Enlai and other Chinese officials, and this helped to clear the way for the visit by Nixon. On February 21, 1972, Nixon arrived in Beijing. His visit was only a week long, but it was highly public (more so to the outside world than within China itself) and demonstrated clearly that the cold war structures had been reoriented. With the emergence of détente in Europe, the US became the only superpower to have active engagement with the other two major powers, the USSR and China. 25

The myth that “only Nixon could go to China” (that is, only a right-wing Republican could do so without accusations of going soft on communism) is now widely dismissed. Both Kennedy, and more so Johnson, had experimented with greater communication with the PRC. From 1966, however, these efforts were hampered by the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, which made it difficult to have any meaningful communications with the Beijing government. 26 The rapprochement between the two countries had as much to do with changes in China as did the arrival of a new US president: even Mao realized that his beloved Cultural Revolution had run out of steam and that to continue it risked domestic collapse and even international conflict. Furthermore, Mao was disturbed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and this may well have inclined him toward seeking an ally against a future attack by Moscow. 27

The odd alliance of convenience between the US and China would last for some two decades. When cold war crises emerged, China would side with the West: China attended the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics when they were boycotted by the USSR and most Eastern European countries, and the West and China both chose to support the Khmer Rouge in 1979 when the Soviet-backed Vietnamese ousted that genocidal regime. The neutralization of China enabled the US to concentrate on the European front of the cold war.

The other government that was most affected by the switch in US policy was the Republic of China on Taiwan, the rump state controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. For much of the high cold war, Taiwan was a major factor in right-wing US politics (in particular the so-called “China Lobby”), but Democratic as much as Republican presidents found it hard to abandon Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's regime was clearly underpinned by US support; without the US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, there would have been little to prevent the PRC retaking the island. Chiang had one overriding agenda, which he repeatedly pressed on his American backers: the recapture of the mainland. However, Taiwan under his rule also achieved certain domestic successes that Chiang had failed to gain on the mainland. The major social change that emerged under American pressure was land reform, the issue on which the Communists had won over much of the peasantry on the mainland. 28 Thus Taiwan became a model of a cold war developmental state.

The political constraints of the cold war also allowed Taiwan to maintain a highly protected economy and currency in return for fealty to the US. This enabled it to build a powerful manufacturing base which enabled the island to become a major exporter from the 1970s onward. In political terms, the Republic of China was an authoritarian dictatorship. The Nationalist government committed many human rights abuses. The regime was particularly discriminatory against ethnic Chinese who had been born on the island as opposed to emigrating from the mainland after 1945 or 1949, as well as the island's aboriginal population. Yet it also followed the example of US-backed societies such as authoritarian South Korea and democratic Japan in using its economic policies to drive down income inequality. Chiang's death in 1975 brought his son Chiang Ching-kuo to power, and moves began to legalize the pro-democracy civil society groups, which had started to form on the island. As Taiwan became more diplomatically isolated, it began to use its democratic credentials rather than its anti-communist ones to justify its reluctance to reunify with the mainland.

The culture of cold war China

The language within which China expressed and understood the cold war was in large part a subset of the period's global linguistic environment: a dispute between two differing versions of the Enlightenment, in which the vocabulary of “freedom” and “democracy” became the terrain of contestation between the two blocs. In China, the local variation of this dispute was linked to two different historical streams. The first was the May Fourth Movement, a liberal and anti-traditional strain of Enlightenment thought which had embraced the ideas of “science and democracy” as the key to combating imperialism and renewing China's politics in the 1910s. The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, was just one product of the period. 29

The second source was the legacy of the wartime period. China, more than perhaps any belligerent during World War II, had seen the “world war of values” fought on its own soil. The Nationalists and Communists had engaged in a deadly dispute, but they had both sought ownership of the language of democracy. Nationalist China had called itself “Free” China to the outside world, and Mao's major wartime theoretical innovation had been the concept of “New Democracy.” During the cold war, Mao's regime continued to speak of itself as being “democratic.” In doing so, it drew on the pre-1949 tradition of political reform without openly acknowledging that it was doing so.

China also used another commonplace term of the era, “modernization,” to define its own distinctive path. Modernization theory is probably the social scientific phrase most associated with the cold war. It refers to the postwar idea, accepted in the USSR as well as in the West, that technological progress could come through a carefully mapped and defined pathway from “tradition” to “modernity.” 30

China provided an alternative view of modernization that shared much of the desire for progress, as well as the goals of “modernization,” but found different pathways to achieve it. For a start, because China remained a less developed and more agrarian country than either the US or USSR, its policies were tied to the countryside more than in the other two countries. Furthermore, Mao's engagement with modernity and progress was always tempered by his dislike of China's “intellectual” classes, which he regarded as insufficiently committed to the revolution and too linked to their Confucian predecessors. Therefore, there were strong elements that ran through the Chinese revolution that differentiated it from the Soviet view. The mobilization of the countryside was central to Mao's view of modernization in the Great Leap Forward of 1958–62.

The Leap was a disaster, leading to a massive famine that killed more than 20 million Chinese. Nonetheless, Mao remained enchanted by the idea of an alternative model of modernization in which the power of rural-dwellers could be unleashed. Other aspects of the Chinese experience did prove inspiring to radical groups and governments as far apart as India and East Africa, and in some cases were assisted by formal Chinese assistance. The TanZam railway, linking Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to landlocked Zambia, was one of the most prominent projects to use Chinese assistance to construct infrastructure in decolonized Africa as an alternative to Western or Soviet assistance.

One element of China's discourse that was specifically tied to the cold war was the fetish that it made of the atomic bomb. The cold war globally was associated with a romantic view of technology and its possibilities. Of course, this was not unprecedented (Futurism was just one of the artistic trends in the early 20th century which was underpinned by an obsession with technology), but nuclear technology in particular is associated inextricably with the wider trajectory of the cold war. For smaller, post-imperial powers such as Britain and France, acquisition of atomic weapons became symbolic of national prowess. The US and USSR found themselves torn between stressing the power that atomic weaponry bestowed and reflecting on its destructiveness. Japan, in contrast, heavily tied its postwar self-image to having been a victim of the only atomic bombs dropped.

The PRC was unequivocal about stressing the search for an atomic weapon as a powerful symbol of national virility. Attitudes on this issue were shaped at the very top: Mao had shocked Khrushchev by declaring, as the two of them relaxed by a swimming pool in Beijing, that the atomic bomb was a “paper tiger.” 31 Lin Biao, China's defense minister, gave a pithy example of the metaphor's power when he spoke of Mao Zedong's thought as being “a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power.” This was an image which could never have been used in Japan, or most of postwar Europe. In general, the PRC embraced the romanticism of technology wholeheartedly, and unashamedly combined it with politics.

A new world: from Nixon to the end of the cold war

China tends to fade from the global narrative of the cold war after the Sino-US rapprochement in 1972. After the traumas of the Cultural Revolution, it became clear that China had reversed its policy of international revolutionary intervention. The death of Mao and the arrest of the “Gang of Four,” as the leaders of the Cultural Revolution Central Group became known, were further signs of the move away from radical policies. Nonetheless, Chinese policy had begun to change several years before Mao's death. In 1971 the PRC finally replaced Taiwan at the United Nations. This development was a first step toward socializing the country into the wider international community.

The opening to America had been preceded, not followed, by the opening of relations with Japan. This had happened partly as an act of pique; Prime Minister Satô Eisaku had been angered at the “Nixon Shocks” of 1971–2, when the US president had abandoned the Bretton Woods monetary system and opened channels to China without informing Tokyo in advance. Satô's successor, Tanaka Kakuei, visited Beijing in 1972 and signed the Zhou-Tanaka communiqué, which established the first sustained diplomatic relations between a sovereign Japan and the Chinese mainland since 1938. Another important area that showed a real shift by the PRC in the 1970s was its policy toward Southeast Asia. By the early 1970s China's relations with Vietnam had become frostier, as the latter tied its fortunes to the USSR. However, Beijing continued to maintain a stake in the success of the rival Khmer Rouge movement in neighboring Cambodia. Among the last conversations recorded between Mao and foreign leaders was a dialogue with Pol Pot, in which it is clear that Mao's ideological radicalism had remained undimmed. Beijing offered support for the Khmer Rouge during its four years in power, and in 1979, after the Vietnamese had ousted Pol Pot, Beijing allied with the Western powers in continuing to recognize the Khmer Rouge representative at the UN. In addition, in February 1979 China launched an invasion of northern Vietnam, ostensibly to counter discrimination against ethnic Chinese in the area, but also as a wider warning to Vietnam that they could not act against China and its allies with impunity. For Beijing, the war was a disaster; People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops were expelled fast. The Sino-Vietnamese War remains the last occasion that Chinese troops have been deployed in anger outside Chinese territory.

The late cold war also saw significant changes in the Chinese historical memory of the recent past. In 1949 the Mao regime had decreed that the Nationalist government that preceded it should be treated in public pronouncements and educational materials as villains and rogues: corrupt, in thrall to foreign powers, and worst of all, unwilling or unable to fight the Japanese while the CCP led the war effort. After the 1980s this viewpoint changed significantly. Within China there was widespread disillusionment at the chaos wrought by the Cultural Revolution, and it became clear to the post-Mao leadership that a new source of domestic legitimacy, drawing on nationalism, was needed to substitute for ideological radicalism. Then, the death of Chiang in 1975 and Mao in 1976 removed some of the personal venom from the ideological wars of the previous half-century.

In addition, the politics of the Mao years had stressed the danger from Chiang much more than it had paid attention to the memory of the many war crimes committed in China by the Japanese during the years 1937–45. The PRC had wished to detach Japan from the cold war embrace of the US, and this made it less politic to stress past atrocities. However, once the 1972 Shanghai communiqué had been signed, it became politically useful to remind the Japanese of their past record as a stimulant for domestic nationalism. The emphasis in modern history moved away from the Civil War and back to the War of Resistance against Japan (as the Sino-Japanese War was known in China). The new historiographical turn, which was supported at the highest level in government, saw new museums, books, and films appear. One of the most striking aspects was the remembering of Japanese war crimes, most notably the Nanjing Massacre (“Rape of Nanking”) of 1937–8; a memorial museum was opened in 1985 on the site of one of the mass murders.

But equally notable was the stark, if unstated, shift in cold war historiography with regard to the Nationalist government's wartime role. The major museum in Beijing commemorating the War of Resistance (opened in 1987) stressed the importance of Nationalist victories such as the Battle of Taierzhuang in 1938, in which the CCP had played no part. The new history still emphasized the leading role of the CCP, but it no longer dismissed the Nationalists as useless or cowardly. Instead, the role of the Chiang regime in resisting the Japanese for eight years was given due seriousness. Even Chiang's old mansions in eastern China were rehabilitated as museums and his role given a respectful description: this would have been unthinkable in the era of Mao. 32

Uncertain endings

From China, the end of the cold war looks different from the view from the West. In the West, a very clear overarching narrative emerged. One side, the West, “won.” Key figures—notably Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev but also Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl—gave a human face to the narrative. Most importantly, there was a clear shift of regimes from communist to non-communist governance.

This left Asia as a seeming anomaly. The continuing existence of North Korea, Vietnam, and most of all, the People's Republic of China as states still run by communist parties that had no intention of relinquishing power was made to seem like a global outlier. The killings of protestors in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on June 4, 1989, seemed to seal China's fate as a dinosaur of history: the emergent superpower of the early 21st century did not appear that way after the Beijing Spring of 1989 had ended. Yet it may be that the most important shifts that ended the cold war structure emerged first in Asia rather than Europe.

The Nixon visit of 1972 and the rapprochement with Japan marked a re-engagement by the PRC with the non-communist world, even while the Cultural Revolution continued and the cold war remained cold. But it is important not to read these events as they have been understood in retrospect—that is, with the knowledge that the USSR would collapse and that communism would end in Eastern Europe. For even in the last years of the cold war, its structures did not appear to be weakening. To many, the appearance of leaders such as Reagan, Thatcher, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko made the cold war still seem very chilly. It was in this context that China's reforms in the 1980s, leading up to 1989, need to be viewed. At the time, they were seen in Beijing not as a way of overcoming communism but of reinterpreting it for a new world in which the US and USSR would both play a role.

The 1980s, then, have some similarity with the years 1945–50 with which this chapter started. In both cases China's story seems in retrospect to be part of a clearly defined wider global narrative: in 1949, one that ended with the establishment of the PRC and the establishment of a cold war Asia, and in 1989, one that ended with the collapse of Eastern European communism and the discrediting of classic state socialism. Yet the major actors did not make decisions at the time with the knowledge of the end result. In 1945, neither the Nationalists nor Communists knew that the latter would win; in 1978, when the Chinese economic reforms started, nobody in Beijing believed that the Soviet Union had only a decade more of existence left. China's final cold war decade was shaped by an understanding that the world would remain under the influence of the superpowers that had dominated it for thirty years. In practice, it was the implosion of one of those superpowers that allowed China to become the power with the global reach that it had craved for decades. And at the start of the 21st century, the question that exercises at least some analysts in the West is whether the end of the old cold war with the USSR has paved the way for a new one with China instead. In the 1950s, there was real debate over whether the Soviet bloc provided an alternative model of modernization that, in Khrushchev's word, might “bury” the West. As the West is racked in the present day by economic crisis and political self-doubt, one of the key questions of the decades to come is whether a Chinese model may pose an equally important challenge, and whether that alternative may prove more lasting than the failed Soviet model.

1. An important revisionist work on the Nationalist record is Hans van de Ven , War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003) .

2. Odd Arne Westad , Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) .

3. Odd Arne Westad , Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) ; Chen Jian , Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), ch. 2 .

4. On rival nationalisms, see Timothy Brook and Andre Schmidt , Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000) .

5. On China's pre-1937 economy, see Loren Brandt , “Reflections on China's late 19th and early 20th century economy,” The China Quarterly 150 (June 1997) : 282–308.

6. William C. Kirby , “China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic: Dreams of a Socialist World Economy,” The China Quarterly 188 (December 2006): 884.

Kirby, “China's Internationalization,” 887.

8. Chen, Mao's China , 52–3.

9. Chen, Mao's China , 89–90.

10. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov , Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 55, 62.

11. Chen Jian , China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

12. Chen, Mao's China , 168–70.

13. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin , 220–1 . See also Thomas Christiansen , Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) .

14. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin , 222–4.

15. Michael Szonyi , Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

16. Chen, Mao's China , 147.

17. Chen, Mao's China , 155.

18. Lorenz M. Lüthi , The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 345.

19. Thomas W. Robinson, “Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh , eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 558.

20. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 , 135 ; Chris Connolly , “The American Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–1972,” Cold War History 5/4 (November 2005): 501–527.

21.   Peter Van Ness , Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970).

22. Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 , Cold War International History Project Working Paper 22 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 185–6.

23. Chen, Mao's China , 245 . He Di , “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao's Perceptions of the United States,” The China Quarterly 137 (1994) :144–158.

24. Chen, Mao's China , ch. 9 .

25. Margaret MacMillan , Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2007).

26. Michael Lumbers , Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China during the Johnson Years (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

27. Chen, Mao's China , 243, 245.

28. John Copper , Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

29. Rana Mitter , A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

30. Odd Arne Westad , The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

31. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin , 219.

32.   Rana Mitter , “Old ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics”,  Journal of Contemporary History 38/1 (2003) :117–131; Parks M. Coble , “China's ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945,” The China Quarterly 190 (2007) :394–140.

Select Bibliography

Chen Jian . China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation . New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 .

Chen Jian . Mao's China and the Cold War . Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001 .

Google Scholar

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Foot, Rosemary . The Practice of Power: US-China relations since 1949 . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 .

Lüthi, Lothar M.   The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008 .

Qiang Zhai . China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 . Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000 .

Radchenko, Sergey . Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2009 .

Szonyi, Michael . Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Frontline . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 .

Westad, Odd Arne . Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946 . New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 .

Westad, Odd Arne , ed. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 . Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 1998 .

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The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War

In 1969, China and the Soviet Union, the two largest communist states, were engaged in a series of ferocious military conflicts that nearly brought them to a general and nuclear war.

The background for the crisis of 1969 between Beijing and Moscow is multifaceted and complicated. At the time, both China and the Soviet Union were largely discredited by their own political madness. For China, it was Mao’s bloody ongoing Cultural Revolution aimed at eradicating “China’s Khrushchevs” inside the Chinese Communist Party, and cleansing itself of Soviet “Revisionism,” a CCP attack-phrase meaning Moscow’s apostasy from orthodox Marxism–Leninism. For the Soviet Union, its leadership role inside the global communist movement was severely damaged by its brutal crackdown of the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine that said Eastern Bloc countries under the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had only limited sovereignty, since Moscow had the right to invade to serve the larger purpose of protecting the world communist movement. Eastern Bloc countries such as Romania and Yugoslavia openly rebelled against the USSR’s such claim.

Mao engineered a fierce conflict with the Soviet Union along the border in the Soviet and Chinese Siberia region in early March 1969, which escalated to a series of intermittent skirmishes for more than half a year. Mao had three purposes in mind. First, he wanted to exploit the opportunity of the Soviet Union’s weakened position and tarnished reputation after the suppression of the Prague Spring, in order to regain China’s lost ideological reputation within the world communist movement. A border fight with the Soviet Union would greatly enhance his reputation. Secondly, Mao was in the midst of a national military mobilization to fulfill his strategic vision of a “Protracted People’s War.” He would use semi-regular military personnel, such as armed militia and border guards, in a real battle situation to beef up his “Every Citizen a Soldier” call to arms. Third, Mao was preparing for a landmark 9 th Party Congress scheduled to take place in early April 1969 to exalt his Cultural Revolution triumphs and delegate his chosen heirs in waiting, notably his wife Jiang Qing and Marshal Lin Biao. He needed a military victory over a major adversary to hype and glorify his political maneuvers.

On March 2, 1969, on a seasonal sandy island––which China calls Zhenbao and Russia calls Damansky in the middle of the Ussuri river demarcating the Soviet-Chinese border in the northeastern Chinese province of Helongjiang––a Soviet military team was ambushed by a waiting Chinese border patrol unit, killing over a dozen Soviet Red Army soldiers. In the ensuing two weeks, hundreds of Chinese and Soviet troops conducted back-and-forth fights for the control of Zhenbao (Damansky) island, with tens of thousands of artillery rounds being fired upon each other, resulting in the deaths of about 70 soldiers on each side, and hundreds wounded. The most notable action took place after the ceasefire on March 17. On March 21, the Soviets attempted to retrieve a submerged T-62 main battle tank on the island, only to meet concentrated Chinese shelling, after which Chinese divers pulled the T-62 tank, the most advanced main battle tank of the USSR at the time, from the river. China would reverse engineer it to become the Chinese Type 69 main battle tank. The original captured Soviet T-62 tank is still on display at the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Museum in Beijing.

After Mao showcased the Zhenbao island battle heroes during the April CCP 9 th Party Congress, China became more belligerent toward the Soviets, who were equally riled up by Mao’s brazenness. Four months later, China and the USSR fought another series of small but dangerously escalating battles along their thousand-plus-mile-long border in China’s northwestern Uyghur region of Xinjiang. Since Mao’s murderous Great Famine of the Great Leap Forward, ethnic Uyghurs and Kazaks living inside Xinjiang had made dangerous exoduses crossing the border into the Soviet Union, outraging the CCP. In August 1969, Chinese and Soviet troops in Xinjiang conducted violent scuffles and fierce gunfights in places such as Tasiti, Bacha Dao, and Tielieketi, killing several dozen soldiers on each side. The Soviet leadership was so incensed by this series of new Chinese provocations that Moscow was seriously considering a nuclear strike against China, which had also developed its own nuclear weapons since 1964.

The timely death of the Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh in early September 1969 finally provided an opportunity for Beijing and Moscow to start the process of ending the escalating military actions and the near-war status between the two communist countries, both being North Vietnam’s strong backers. China’s Premier Zhou Enlai and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin both went to Ho’s funeral in Hanoi. The ensuing difficult but fruitful negotiations would not settle the border disputes, but both sides agreed to disagree with neither gaining anything meaningful from the pre-conflict status quo.

However, the 1969 Sino-Soviet conflicts exerted a profound geopolitical impact as a key turning point in the Cold War. After the war, Mao ordered a nationwide buildup of China’s strategic depth, speeding up logistical preparation for a protracted long war with the Soviet Union and the United States, which was deeply entangled in the Vietnam War; deepening his command control over all elements of China’s armed forces; and further emasculating his heir apparent Marshal Lin Biao, to Lin’s great chagrin (Lin would attempt a defection to the Soviet Union in September 1971 but was killed during the unsuccessful move.). For the United States, President Richard Nixon saw an opportunity to befriend China. Richard Nixon arduously courted Romania, Pakistan, and India as go-betweens for him. Despite repeated, humiliating rejections by Beijing, Nixon finally received a positive response from Mao for talks, resulting in Nixon’s 1972 trip to Beijing.

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World History Project - Origins to the Present

Course: world history project - origins to the present   >   unit 7.

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READ: Connecting Decolonization and the Cold War

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• READ: Cold War — An Overview
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• READ: And Then Gandhi Came — Nationalism, Revolution, and Sovereignty
• BEFORE YOU WATCH: Decolonization and Nationalism Triumphant
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• WATCH: Conflict in Israel and Palestine
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• End of Empires and Cold War

First read: preview and skimming for gist

Second read: key ideas and understanding content.

• How, according to the authors, did the Cold War begin even before the Second World War ended?
• What were some regional confrontations that were also Cold War battles between 1945 and 1990?
• What were some colonies that gained independence before 1960?
• Why was 1960 called “the year of Africa”?
• What are two ways in which the Cold War and decolonization were entangled?
• On what basis do some historians argue that both superpowers were building empires of their own?

Third read: evaluating and corroborating

• The author argues that we see different things when we look at this era from different perspectives. Focusing on individual struggles for independence tells a very different story than does highlighting how all these individual struggles are part of a global Cold War confrontation. What are the advantages of looking at each struggle independently? What are some advantages of looking at the bigger pattern?

Connecting Decolonization and the Cold War

Timelines of the cold war and the end of empire, the cold war timeline, the decolonization timeline, entanglements i: the view of anti-colonial leaders, entanglements ii: the view from the two superpowers, differing perspectives, want to join the conversation.

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Cold War History

By: History.com Editors

Updated: June 26, 2023 | Original: October 27, 2009

The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension marked by competition and confrontation between communist nations led by the Soviet Union and Western democracies including the United States. During World War II , the United States and the Soviets fought together as allies against Nazi Germany . However, U.S./Soviet relations were never truly friendly: Americans had long been wary of Soviet communism and Russian leader Joseph Stalin ’s tyrannical rule. The Soviets resented Americans’ refusal to give them a leading role in the international community, as well as America’s delayed entry into World War II, in which millions of Russians died.

These grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity that never developed into open warfare (thus the term “cold war”). Soviet expansionism into Eastern Europe fueled many Americans’ fears of a Russian plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they perceived as U.S. officials’ bellicose rhetoric, arms buildup and strident approach to international relations. In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was entirely to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.

Containment

By the time World War II ended, most American officials agreed that the best defense against the Soviet threat was a strategy called “containment.” In his famous “Long Telegram,” the diplomat George Kennan (1904-2005) explained the policy: The Soviet Union, he wrote, was “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi [agreement between parties that disagree].” As a result, America’s only choice was the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

“It must be the policy of the United States,” he declared before Congress in 1947, “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation…by outside pressures.” This way of thinking would shape American foreign policy for the next four decades.

Did you know? The term 'cold war' first appeared in a 1945 essay by the English writer George Orwell called 'You and the Atomic Bomb.'

The Cold War: The Atomic Age

The containment strategy also provided the rationale for an unprecedented arms buildup in the United States. In 1950, a National Security Council Report known as NSC–68 had echoed Truman’s recommendation that the country use military force to contain communist expansionism anywhere it seemed to be occurring. To that end, the report called for a four-fold increase in defense spending.

In particular, American officials encouraged the development of atomic weapons like the ones that had ended World War II. Thus began a deadly “ arms race .” In 1949, the Soviets tested an atom bomb of their own. In response, President Truman announced that the United States would build an even more destructive atomic weapon: the hydrogen bomb, or “superbomb.” Stalin followed suit.

As a result, the stakes of the Cold War were perilously high. The first H-bomb test, in the Eniwetok atoll in the Marshall Islands, showed just how fearsome the nuclear age could be. It created a 25-square-mile fireball that vaporized an island, blew a huge hole in the ocean floor and had the power to destroy half of Manhattan. Subsequent American and Soviet tests spewed radioactive waste into the atmosphere.

The ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation had a great impact on American domestic life as well. People built bomb shelters in their backyards. They practiced attack drills in schools and other public places. The 1950s and 1960s saw an epidemic of popular films that horrified moviegoers with depictions of nuclear devastation and mutant creatures. In these and other ways, the Cold War was a constant presence in Americans’ everyday lives.

HISTORY Vault: Nuclear Terror

Now more than ever, terrorist groups are obtaining nuclear weapons. With increasing cases of theft and re-sale at dozens of Russian sites, it's becoming more and more likely for terrorists to succeed.

The Cold War and the Space Race

Space exploration served as another dramatic arena for Cold War competition. On October 4, 1957, a Soviet R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile launched Sputnik (Russian for “traveling companion”), the world’s first artificial satellite and the first man-made object to be placed into the Earth’s orbit. Sputnik’s launch came as a surprise, and not a pleasant one, to most Americans.

In the United States, space was seen as the next frontier, a logical extension of the grand American tradition of exploration, and it was crucial not to lose too much ground to the Soviets. In addition, this demonstration of the overwhelming power of the R-7 missile–seemingly capable of delivering a nuclear warhead into U.S. air space–made gathering intelligence about Soviet military activities particularly urgent.

In 1958, the U.S. launched its own satellite, Explorer I, designed by the U.S. Army under the direction of rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, and what came to be known as the Space Race was underway. That same year, President Dwight Eisenhower signed a public order creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a federal agency dedicated to space exploration, as well as several programs seeking to exploit the military potential of space. Still, the Soviets were one step ahead, launching the first man into space in April 1961.

That May, after Alan Shepard become the first American man in space, President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) made the bold public claim that the U.S. would land a man on the moon by the end of the decade. His prediction came true on July 20, 1969, when Neil Armstrong of NASA’s Apollo 11 mission , became the first man to set foot on the moon, effectively winning the Space Race for the Americans. 

U.S. astronauts came to be seen as the ultimate American heroes. Soviets, in turn, were pictured as the ultimate villains, with their massive, relentless efforts to surpass America and prove the power of the communist system.

The Cold War and the Red Scare

Meanwhile, beginning in 1947, the House Un-American Activities Committee ( HUAC ) brought the Cold War home in another way. The committee began a series of hearings designed to show that communist subversion in the United States was alive and well.

In Hollywood , HUAC forced hundreds of people who worked in the movie industry to renounce left-wing political beliefs and testify against one another. More than 500 people lost their jobs. Many of these “blacklisted” writers, directors, actors and others were unable to work again for more than a decade. HUAC also accused State Department workers of engaging in subversive activities. Soon, other anticommunist politicians, most notably Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908-1957), expanded this probe to include anyone who worked in the federal government. 

Thousands of federal employees were investigated, fired and even prosecuted. As this anticommunist hysteria spread throughout the 1950s, liberal college professors lost their jobs, people were asked to testify against colleagues and “loyalty oaths” became commonplace.

The Cold War Abroad

The fight against subversion at home mirrored a growing concern with the Soviet threat abroad. In June 1950, the first military action of the Cold War began when the Soviet-backed North Korean People’s Army invaded its pro-Western neighbor to the south. Many American officials feared this was the first step in a communist campaign to take over the world and deemed that nonintervention was not an option. Truman sent the American military into Korea, but the Korean War dragged to a stalemate and ended in 1953.

In 1955, the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made West Germany a member of NATO and permitted it to remilitarize. The Soviets responded with the Warsaw Pact , a mutual defense organization between the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria that set up a unified military command under Marshal Ivan S. Konev of the Soviet Union.

Other international disputes followed. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy faced a number of troubling situations in his own hemisphere. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis the following year seemed to prove that the real communist threat now lay in the unstable, postcolonial “Third World.” 

Nowhere was this more apparent than in Vietnam , where the collapse of the French colonial regime had led to a struggle between the American-backed nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem in the south and the communist nationalist Ho Chi Minh in the north. Since the 1950s, the United States had been committed to the survival of an anticommunist government in the region, and by the early 1960s it seemed clear to American leaders that if they were to successfully “contain” communist expansionism there, they would have to intervene more actively on Diem’s behalf. However, what was intended to be a brief military action spiraled into a 10-year conflict .

The End of the Cold War and Effects

Almost as soon as he took office, President Richard Nixon (1913-1994) began to implement a new approach to international relations. Instead of viewing the world as a hostile, “bi-polar” place, he suggested, why not use diplomacy instead of military action to create more poles? To that end, he encouraged the United Nations to recognize the communist Chinese government and, after a trip there in 1972, began to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.

At the same time, he adopted a policy of “détente”—”relaxation”—toward the Soviet Union. In 1972, he and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which prohibited the manufacture of nuclear missiles by both sides and took a step toward reducing the decades-old threat of nuclear war.

Despite Nixon’s efforts, the Cold War heated up again under President Ronald Reagan (1911-2004). Like many leaders of his generation, Reagan believed that the spread of communism anywhere threatened freedom everywhere. As a result, he worked to provide financial and military aid to anticommunist governments and insurgencies around the world. This policy, particularly as it was applied in the developing world in places like Grenada and El Salvador, was known as the Reagan Doctrine .

Even as Reagan fought communism in Central America, however, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. In response to severe economic problems and growing political ferment in the USSR, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (1931-2022) took office in 1985 and introduced two policies that redefined Russia’s relationship to the rest of the world: “glasnost,” or political openness, and “ perestroika ,” or economic reform. 

Soviet influence in Eastern Europe waned. In 1989, every other communist state in the region replaced its government with a noncommunist one. In November of that year, the Berlin Wall –the most visible symbol of the decades-long Cold War–was finally destroyed, just over two years after Reagan had challenged the Soviet premier in a speech at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” By 1991, the Soviet Union itself had fallen apart. The Cold War was over.

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The Cold War (1945-1989) essay

The Cold War is considered to be a significant event in Modern World History. The Cold War dominated a rather long time period: between 1945, or the end of the World War II, and 1990, the collapse of the USSR. This period involved the relationships between two superpowers: the United States and the USSR. The Cold War began in Eastern Europe and Germany, according to the researchers of the Institute of Contemporary British History (Warner 15).  Researchers state that “the USSR and the United States of America held the trump cards, nuclear bombs and missiles” (Daniel 489). In other words, during the Cold War, two nations took the fate of the world under their control. The progression of the Cold War influenced the development of society, which became aware of the threat of nuclear war. After the World War II, the world experienced technological progress, which provided “the Space Race, computer development, superhighway construction, jet airliner development, the creation of international phone system, the advent of television, enormous progress in medicine, and the creation of mass consumerism, and many other achievements” (Daniel 489). Although the larger part of the world lived in poverty and lacked technological progress, the United States and other countries of Western world succeeded in economic development. The Cold War, which began in 1945, reflected the increased role of technological progress in the establishment of economic relationships between two superpowers.   The Cold War involved internal and external conflicts between two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, leading to eventual breakdown of the USSR.

• The Cold War: background information

The Cold War consisted of several confrontations between the United States and the USSR, supported by their allies. According to researchers, the Cold War was marked by a number of events, including “the escalating arms race, a competition to conquer space, a dangerously belligerent for of diplomacy known as brinkmanship, and a series of small wars, sometimes called “police actions” by the United States and sometimes excused as defense measures by the Soviets” (Gottfried 9). The Cold War had different influences on the United States and the USSR. For the USSR, the Cold War provided massive opportunities for the spread of communism across the world, Moscow’s control over the development of other nations and the increased role of the Soviet Communist party.

In fact, the Cold War could split the wartime alliance formed to oppose the plans of Nazi Germany, leaving the USSR and the United States as two superpowers with considerable economic and political differences. The USSR was based on a single-party Marxist–Leninist system, while the United States was a capitalist state with democratic governance based on free elections.

The key figure in the Cold War was the Soviet leader Gorbachev, who was elected in 1985. He managed to change the direction of the USSR, making the economies of communist ruled states independent. The major reasons for changing in the course were poor technological development of the USSR (Gottfried 115). Gorbachev believed that radical changes in political power could improve the Communist system. At the same time, he wanted to stop the Cold War and tensions with the United States. The cost of nuclear arms race had negative impact on the economy of the USSR. The leaders of the United States accepted the proposed relationships, based on cooperation and mutual trust. The end of the Cold War was marked by signing the INF treaty in 1987 (Gottfried 115).

• The origins of the Cold War

Many American historians state that the Cold War began in 1945. However, according to Russian researchers, historians and analysts “the Cold War began with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, for this was when the capitalist world began its systematic opposition to and effort to undermine the world’s first socialist state and society” (Warner13). For Russians, the Cold War was hot in 1918-1922, when the Allied Intervention policy implemented in Russia during the Russian Civil War. According to John W. Long, “the U.S. intervention in North Russia was a policy formulated by President Wilson during the first half of 1918 at the urgent insistence of Britain, France and Italy, the chief World War I allies” (380).

Nevertheless, there are some other opinions regarding the origins of the Cold War. For example, Geoffrey Barraclough, an outstanding English historian, states that the events in the Far East at the end of the century contributed to the origins of the Cold War. He argues that “during the previous hundred years, Russia and the United States has tended to support each other against England; but now, as England’s power passed its zenith, they came face to face across the Pacific” (Warner 13). According to Barraclough, the Cold War is associated with the conflict of interests, which involved European countries, the Middle East and South East Asia. Finally, this conflict divided the world into two camps. Thus, the Cold War origins are connected with the spread of ideological conflict caused by the emergence of the new power in the early 20-th century (Warner 14). The Cold War outbreak was associated with the spread of propaganda on the United States by the USSR. The propagandistic attacks involved the criticism of the U.S. leaders and their policies. These attacked were harmful to the interests of American nation (Whitton 151).

• The major causes of the Cold War

The United States and the USSR were regarded as two superpowers during the Cold War, each having its own sphere of influence, its power and forces. The Cold War had been the continuing conflict, caused by tensions, misunderstandings and competitions that existed between the United States and the USSR, as well as their allies from 1945 to the early 1990s (Gottfried 10). Throughout this long period, there was the so-called rivalry between the United States and the USSR, which was expressed through various transformations, including military buildup, the spread of propaganda, the growth of espionage, weapons development, considerable industrial advances, and competitive technological developments in different spheres of human activity, such as medicine, education, space exploration, etc.

There four major causes of the Cold War, which include:

• Ideological differences (communism v. capitalism);
• Mutual distrust and misperception;
• The fear of the United State regarding the spread of communism;
• The nuclear arms race (Gottfried 10).

The major causes of the Cold War point out to the fact that the USSR was focused on the spread of communist ideas worldwide. The United States followed democratic ideas and opposed the spread of communism. At the same time, the acquisition of atomic weapons by the United States caused fear in the USSR. The use of atomic weapons could become the major reason of fear of both the United States and the USSR. In other words, both countries were anxious about possible attacks from each other; therefore, they were following the production of mass destruction weapons. In addition, the USSR was focused on taking control over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. According to researchers, the USSR used various strategies to gain control over Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the years 1945-1980. Some of these strategies included “encouraging the communist takeover of governments in Eastern Europe, the setting up of Comecon, the Warsaw Pact, the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe, and the Brezhnev Doctrine” (Phillips 118). These actions were the major factors for the suspicions and concerns of the United States. In addition, the U.S. President had a personal dislike of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his policies. In general, the United States was concerned by the Soviet Union’s actions regarding the occupied territory of Germany, while the USSR feared that the United States would use Western Europe as the major tool for attack.

• The consequences of the Cold War

The consequences of the Cold War include both positive and negative effects for both the United States and the USSR.

• Both the United States and the USSR managed to build up huge arsenals of atomic weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
• The Cold War provided opportunities for the establishment of the military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
• The Cold War led to the emergence of the destructive military conflicts, like the Vietnam War and the Korean War, which took the lives of millions of people (Gottfried13).
• The USSR collapsed because of considerable economic, political and social challenges.
• The Cold War led to the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the two German nations.
• The Cold War led to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact (Gottfried 136).
• The Cold war provided the opportunities for achieving independence of the Baltic States and some former Soviet Republics.
• The Cold War made the United States the sole superpower of the world because of the collapse of the USSR in 1990.
• The Cold War led to the collapse of Communism and the rise of globalization worldwide (Phillips 119).

The impact of the Cold War on the development of many countries was enormous. The consequences of the Cold War were derived from numerous internal problems of the countries, which were connected with the USSR, especially developing countries (India, Africa, etc.). This fact means that foreign policies of many states were transformed (Gottfried 115).

The Cold War (1945-1989) essay part 2

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Essay: No, The Cold War Isn’t Really Over

I t seems that the cold war is over. Official word came not in the usual communique from the capitals but in a Doonesbury cartoon. A rethinking of the cold war is taking place at higher levels too. When a senior Democratic Senator noted in conversation that the cold war might indeed have ended, he was saying no more than Ronald Reagan said upon his return from the Moscow summit when he talked of the end of the postwar era. Since postwar has always meant cold war, the President was signaling the advent of some historic change.

Is the cold war really over? No doubt the withdrawal from Afghanistan marks a change. It signifies the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine, first enunciated with the invasion of Czechoslovakia exactly 20 years ago. Brezhnev declared that socialism will suffer no losses: countries that come under Marxist- Leninism remain under Marxist-Leninism. Afghanistan is the first breach in that doctrine. (Grenada is too small to count.) Enthusiastic believers in the demise of the cold war also point to Gorbachev’s words to show that the Soviet Union, apostle of revolution (“national liberation”), has become the defender of stability. A favorite quote: “We favor socialism, but we do not impose our convictions on anyone. Let everyone choose for himself.”

This will come as news to Poles and Czechs and East Germans. But grant that outside Eastern Europe, in the Third World, the Soviets are indeed falling back. Why is that happening? Conventional wisdom has it that Gorbachev needs to rebuild his economy and restructure his society. He cannot do that while expending energy, treasure and occasional blood in foreign adventures. Internal retrenchment requires external calm. He needs a respite: a stable international arena and good relations with the U.S. Hence the cold war, like other old thinking, must go.

In this light, the Soviet pullback in the Third World is an autonomous Soviet decision, the first fruit of Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” The problem with this theory is that it overlooks one fact. In this sense it is very much like the common explanation of Gorbachev’s acquiescence to American terms for the INF treaty. Did Gorbachev withdraw his SS-20s from Europe because of a change in ideology? Because he wanted to turn his attention to domestic tasks? In fact, he withdrew because he met resistance that he could not overcome. The U.S. responded to the SS-20s by deploying a powerful INF force of its own, despite the best Soviet efforts to stop it. As a result, the SS-20 adventure turned into a net loss for the Soviets (because the American missiles are more threatening: they can reach Soviet territory, whereas the SS-20s cannot reach American territory). Having met resistance and lost the game, Gorbachev wisely decided to cut his losses and withdraw.

Similarly, the Soviets are not withdrawing from Afghanistan because they have suddenly come to believe in “not imposing convictions on anyone” and “letting everyone choose for himself.” Does anyone doubt that if the Afghan resistance had been overcome, Gorbachev would still be in Afghanistan, communizing? Gorbachev is withdrawing because he lost the war. Writes Afghan Expert Zalmay Khalilzad in the National Interest: “1986 was the turning point in the Afghan war.” What happened? “The most crucial change in this period was the provision of U.S. Stinger ((antiaircraft)) missiles to the mujahedin.” To put it bluntly, the Soviets are not leaving Afghanistan because they changed their minds. They are leaving because they lost their air cover. A change of minds followed.

Another recent elaboration in the press of the conventional wisdom puts it this way: “In the heyday of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union tried hard to promote Communism in the Third World . . . Now, under what might be called the Gorbachev Doctrine, the Kremlin has adopted a more cautious stance, backing away from confrontation.” Why? Because “the Kremlin has been disappointed by the inability of Third World Marxists to impose stable Communist systems on underdeveloped societies.”

But the chief cause of that instability in the 1980s is resistance. The Gorbachev Doctrine became necessary because the Brezhnev Doctrine failed. The Brezhnev Doctrine failed because it met armed resistance. And that resistance drew strength and sustenance from the U.S., more precisely from the Reagan Doctrine, the American policy of supporting anti-Communist guerrillas in the newest outposts of the Soviet empire: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua.

Throughout the 1980s, American critics have attacked the Reagan Doctrine as too grandiose and expensive an undertaking for the U.S. They saw it as a form of imperial overstretch, to use the now famous phrase of Professor Paul Kennedy. This critique is unintelligible. The effects of the Reagan Doctrine have been precisely the reverse. It turned out to be an extremely cost- effective form of Western resistance to the Soviet expansion of the ’70s. It made the new Soviet outposts expensive liabilities. The Reagan Doctrine demonstrated — to the Politburo, ultimately — that it was the Soviet empire that had overreached.

When applied, the Reagan Doctrine worked. Which one factor best predicts the locus of a Soviet imperial withdrawal? The answer is not a colony’s proximity to the Soviet Union, nor its ideological purity, nor the amount of Soviet investment. The single factor that best predicts a Soviet retreat is the strength and consistency of foreign support for the anti-Soviet resistance. American aid to the Afghan resistance has been massive, and the policy has ( enjoyed universal support at home. The Soviets are retreating. In Cambodia and Angola, American support for the guerrillas has been less intense but still generally bipartisan. Moreover, China and South Africa have provided steady support to the anti-Soviet forces. The Soviets are now exerting pressure on their clients to compromise. The one place where American support for the resistance vacillated and finally collapsed was Nicaragua. Not surprisingly, Nicaragua is also the one place where the Soviet client remains firmly entrenched and where Gorbachev shows no sign of bending.

Where Gorbachev has retreated, it is not because he has abandoned Soviet foreign policy objectives. It is because he was defeated. Where he has not been defeated, he has not retreated. Gorbachev has not given up the socialist mission. He is trying to save it from Brezhnev’s excessive ambition.

What, then, is Gorbachev’s imperial strategy? The same as his domestic strategy: not retreat but retrenchment. The tactics too are the same. Discard losing policies. Keep those that work. In foreign policy, the Gorbachev Doctrine is imperial triage. Discard the losers. Deal away the marginals. Keep the jewels.

Afghanistan is a loser, and the Soviets are leaving. Angola and Cambodia would be nice to have, but neither is a crossroads of the world, and the Soviet clients there are locked in bloody, draining stalemate. Moreover, Cambodia is a great irritant in relations with China, and Angola in relations with the U.S. The Soviets are dealing.

Gorbachev’s eye is on the jewels, three great geopolitical prizes, for the achievement of which he has husbanded most of his foreign policy resources:

CENTRAL AMERICA. Soviet support for Nicaragua has not wavered, despite wishful reports to the contrary. The contras, having been disarmed by the U.S., are in the process of being defeated by the Sandinistas. El Salvador and Panama are becoming less stable. Even Honduras, the American linchpin in Central America, is stirring. Central America is a high priority for the Soviets. The Kissinger commission argued 4 1/2 years ago that Soviet penetration of Central America would be a great strategic asset for the Soviets. It would distract and divert U.S. attention to a region that had historically been secure. It is not that a Red Army is going to march from Managua to Harlingen, Texas, but that the vast military, political and strategic energy that Washington would have to redirect to this region would necessarily be drawn from elsewhere. This would result in a net weakening of the American position in the world.

CHINA. An even bigger prize. Gorbachev wants rapprochement with China but has been rebuffed until he clears away what the Chinese call the Three Obstacles: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Soviet-Chinese border dispute. Gorbachev is taking care of Afghanistan and the border dispute. And one reason he is putting pressure on the Vietnamese to solve the Cambodia problem is that the China card is worth more to him than Cambodia and Viet Nam combined. The next great shift in U.S.-Soviet relations may be Gorbachev doing a Nixon in China. It will not have been an accident.

EUROPE. The grand prize. Gorbachev’s Westpolitik — the INF treaty, his subtle wooing of the West Europeans with the notion of a “common European homeland,” his gestures toward disarmament that have already propelled him in European public opinion polls higher than the President of the U.S. — is calculated to advance the most important Soviet geopolitical objective of all, the detachment of Western Europe from America. The road to the breakup of the U.S.-European alliance is the denuclearization, leading to the neutralization, of Europe. This is a traditional Soviet objective. But ironically it may prove necessary for the success of perestroika. It may be, as the dissident writer Vladimir Bukovsky suggests, that the only way for the Soviets ultimately to salvage their bankrupt system is by neutralizing Europe and harnessing its energy, technology and vast wealth — not by occupation but by the domination that would follow a detachment of Europe from the U.S.

The goal of Gorbachev’s foreign policy is not to end the cold war and certainly not to lose it, but to continue the struggle with the subtlety and finesse that befits the modern man he is. He is cutting his losses not because he is a sudden convert to friendship and harmony and coexistence, not because he has lost the nationalist or ideological faith that underlies Soviet realpolitik, but because he knows that what the times demand is discrimination. And in an age of triage, that means concentrating on supreme geopolitical objectives and making sacrifices at the periphery.

Gorbachev’s strategy should elicit neither shock nor dismay. He is simply pursuing his country’s interests in the most economical manner possible. This is not cynicism. This is realism. No need for us to be scandalized. Just forewarned, and perhaps a bit envious. Would that our leaders had his foresight and command.

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Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China

Authors: James Carafano , Michael Pillsbury , Jeff Smith and Andrew Harding

Key Takeaways

The People’s Republic of China is an adversary of the United States, and the two countries are embroiled in a New Cold War.

The U.S.’s decades-long engagement strategy toward China, an even more capable adversary than the USSR, has left the American people and economy vulnerable.

Protecting the U.S. homeland and prosperity and diminishing China’s ability to harm the U.S. will require a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

Select a Section 1 /0

Kevin Roberts, PhD

The greatest existential threat facing the United States today is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), led and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Whether politicians and pundits in Washington care to acknowledge it or not, the United States is in a new Cold War with the PRC, an adversary even more capable and dangerous than the Soviet Union was at the height of its power.

The reason for this is twofold.

First, during the Cold War, the United States was able to assemble a robust international coalition of nations that were committed to containing and defeating the Soviet Union. No such coalition exists today: The West is fractured on how to confront China and how to eliminate the growing threat from the CCP.

Second, the United States and its allies effectively severed their economic ties to the Soviet Union. The use of economic warfare coupled with American soft power proved to be essential in the collapse of the USSR in 1991. With China now the largest trading partner for many international capitals, the U.S. cannot rely on the free world to economically isolate the PRC the same way it did with the USSR.

Somewhere along the way, the U.S. government forgot the lessons of the last Cold War even as China grew more belligerent and leveraged access to American financing and technology to fuel its rise economically and militarily.

Instead of adapting to the threat, multiple Administrations pursued closer engagement with the PRC, all assuming that they could guide China on a path to greater economic openness and, ultimately, more political freedom. That gambit failed disastrously. Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, the PRC has grown more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.

America’s engagement strategy, fueled by trade and manufacturing policies that empowered the CCP, have left the U.S. dependent on the Chinese economy. Critical supply chains, from vital rare-earth elements to key pharmaceutical products, remain largely or wholly dependent on the PRC. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed just how much of the U.S. economy is reliant on the PRC for essential goods and services.

Even worse, the failed engagement strategy left the American people exposed to a wide range of malicious CCP activities here on American soil. The PRC has established a presence on U.S. college campuses and operates secret police stations in American cities. Popular Chinese social media apps transmit the data of millions of American citizens back to China while Chinese surveillance drones are “donated” to fire and police departments in the U.S.

Decades of systemic, unprecedented corporate espionage by the PRC have bled the U.S. economy of trillions of dollars in intellectual property theft. PRC hackers have compromised the sensitive personal data of tens of millions of Americans.

Chinese “friendship associations” and agents of the United Front Work Department peddle influence in Washington and Wall Street alongside CCP-funded lobbyists and consulting firms. Meanwhile, fentanyl and other synthetic opioids largely sourced from China contributed to a nationwide drug epidemic and were responsible for more than 70,000 deaths in the U.S. in 2021.

These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the nefarious ways in which the CCP mixes statecraft with economic policy: China’s national security laws effectively make every Chinese company and entity subject to the whims, and intelligence requests, of the CCP. Meanwhile, ostensibly “American” businesses, especially Big Tech companies, seem happy to sacrifice the privacy, jobs, and security of everyday Americans for greater access to Chinese markets.

In the pursuit of Chinese financing and Chinese students paying full tuition, American universities skirted their own responsibilities to ensure that the campus is a safe place for open academic debate free from the influence of foreign adversaries. In pursuit of profits, Hollywood and major sports leagues, such as the National Basketball Association, censor voices critical of China’s lamentable human rights record. Following years of controversial scientific cooperation with their Chinese counterparts, U.S. public health experts blunt efforts to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and hold China accountable for its role in the pandemic.

Inside China, the space for academic, religious, economic, and political freedom has evaporated. The CCP’s genocide of China’s Uyghur minority and mistreatment of Christians, Tibetans, Hong Kong residents, and any form of political dissident has grown more systematic, and the police state, more draconian. Access to open markets did not lead China to economic and political freedom. It empowered the police state and enhanced the CCP’s grip over the economy.

Abroad, the PRC is increasingly determined to establish hegemony, supplant U.S. leadership, and intimidate its Indo–Pacific neighbors into submission. It is conducting mock blockades of Taiwan, clashing with Indian troops in the Himalayas, and sending fighter jets to probe Japanese airspace. It has launched economic coercion campaigns against South Korea and Australia while taking Canadian citizens hostage as political prisoners. It is backing Russia’s deadly invasion of Ukraine and keeping the rogue North Korean regime afloat.

The PRC lays claim to the entire South China Sea—and with it some of the world’s most important sea lanes of trade—where it has militarized new artificial islands and deployed a maritime militia to bully its neighbors. It has harassed U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels operating legally in international waters in an ongoing series of dangerous encounters. And, most recently, a Chinese spy balloon penetrated American airspace and crossed over sensitive military installations as it traversed the continental U.S.

These are not imagined sleights. This is the behavior of an adversary, not a competitor. A course correction is long overdue. To date, the U.S. government’s response has been inadequate.

It is time to acknowledge reality: The United States is in a New Cold War with the PRC. It is past time for a plan—for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society effort—that serves American interests and protects the American people and economy from malicious actions by the CCP. The Heritage Foundation’s “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China,” a major research collaboration reflecting inputs by more than two dozen foreign policy, legal, military, economic, and energy experts from Heritage and other organizations, does just that. This is not the end of our work to combat the CCP threat, but the beginning.

Kevin Roberts, PhD, is President of The Heritage Foundation.

Executive Summary

The Heritage Foundation’s “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China” offers the U.S. government, business community, and civil society a comprehensive policy agenda for securing a prosperous American future while confronting the greatest external threat the U.S. has faced since the collapse of the USSR.

This plan deliberately invokes the legacy of the Cold War. While U.S. officials have been reluctant to frame the rivalry with China in these terms, their apprehension ignores a simple reality: China adopted a Cold War strategy against the U.S. long ago. “It does us little good to repeat again and again that we aren’t seeking a new Cold War when the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] has been stealthily waging one against us for years,” former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger testified before the newly established House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party in 2023.

To win the New Cold War, this plan calls for sustained U.S. economic growth, greater political will, stronger external partnerships, secure borders, synchronized economic and security policies, resilient supply chains, enhanced military deterrence, and U.S. energy independence. It articulates the steps necessary to protect the homeland, protect U.S. prosperity, diminish China’s capacity to harm the U.S. and hold it accountable, reorient America’s defense posture, and exercise global leadership.

Finally, this plan simultaneously exposes the Chinese Communist Party’s aggressive tactics against the U.S. and represents a call-to-arms for all segments of U.S. society, including state and local governments, the private sector, the American people, and U.S. allies and partners abroad.

“Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China” is divided into three sections.

Part I describes the rationale for the plan, examining the current state of the New Cold War between China and the U.S., weighing respective strengths and weaknesses. Recent trends driving the CCP to act with more aggression abroad and more repression at home are likely to continue, particularly after Xi Jinping secured a third term as the head of the Communist Party in 2022, consolidating power and sidelining what remains of opposing factions.

Part II, the heart of the plan, exposes the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) aggressive tactics against America and proposes U.S. policy responses across dozens of fronts: from banning CCP lobbyists to arming Taiwan, from enhancing nuclear deterrence to expanding export controls, from addressing China’s role in the fentanyl crisis to shutting down illegal CCP police operations in the U.S.

Part III summarizes key action items from Part II and offers guidance for implementation by the U.S. government. Contending with an adversary as capable as the CCP will require close coordination between the executive and legislative branches, federal agencies and law enforcement, state and local governments, U.S. allies and partners, and the private sector. Above all, proper implementation of the plan will require leadership from the White House and a National Security Council capable of effectively operationalizing the President’s vision.

Summary of Key Recommendations

To protect the U.S. homeland, the U.S. must:

Stop Malign CCP Activities in Higher Education. The executive branch should ban, at a federal level, all Confucius Institutes, as they are sponsored by the CCP, and all collaborations between U.S. institutions and Chinese entities affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security or other security and intelligence agencies. The U.S. State Department, which conducts background investigations of student visa applicants, should deny citizens of the PRC, and those of other U.S. adversarial countries, access to Department of Defense–funded research programs.

Crack Down on Illegal Chinese Police Operations in the U.S. The Department of Justice should reinstate the China Initiative and immediately shut down illegal CCP police operations in the U.S. It should ensure that these operations, which predominantly victimize Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals living in America, are a focus of a revitalized China Initiative.

Ban Dangerous Chinese Apps. Under the authority of the powers given to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Congress should direct CFIUS to continuously review the activities of all Chinese mobile app companies and recommend specific apps to be banned on national security grounds. TikTok should be immediately banned in the United States.

Engage State and Local Governments. State governments must prevent Chinese companies from obtaining contracts to build critical infrastructure, resist purchasing Chinese products and technology that can pose espionage or national security risks, limit and roll back nefarious PRC activities on U.S. university campuses, encourage public funds—particularly pension funds—to divest from problematic Chinese entities, prevent the purchase of sensitive land or property near critical infrastructure or strategic farmland by PRC agents, and identify and halt lobbying of state and local governments by Chinese agents.

Prevent Malicious Land Use. Congress should require that the U.S. Department of Agriculture be included in the CFIUS process for reviewing land purchases by adversarial countries. The Department of Homeland Security should define and locate critical infrastructure that could be affected by proximity-based purchases of land near military installations and facilities of concern.

Ban CCP Lobbyists. Congress should ban lobbying by agents of the Chinese government, passing legislation that requires lobbyists representing Chinese government-controlled companies to register as foreign agents. Congress should also pass a law that prohibits foreign agents from lobbying representatives or agents of U.S. national or sub-national government entities on behalf of these companies or the Chinese government.

Ensure Border Security and Immigration Enforcement. To curb the flow of Chinese-origin fentanyl into the U.S. and secure America’s sovereign borders, Congress must fully fund thorough border and immigration enforcement and close loopholes in the system that have long been exploited by cartels and illegal traffickers.

Address China’s Role in the U.S. Drug Crisis. The U.S. should sanction individuals and entities in China, Mexico, and the U.S. that are involved in enabling the trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids and rigorously enforce the sanctions regime.

Ban the Import and Sale of Chinese Manufactured Drones. Congress should reinsert language preventing federal government acquisition of Chinese drones in the next National Defense Authorization Act and sign it into law. In anticipation of a legislative solution, the White House should implement a ban on the federal purchase and use of Chinese drones through executive order.

Protect the U.S. from Life Science and Biotechnology Threats. Congress should appoint a blue-ribbon commission of security-cleared, non-governmental experts to assess the military-related life sciences and biotechnology threats emanating from China. The CIA’s recent creation of the China Mission Center and Transnational and Technology Mission Center should address biotechnology threats as part of a broader focus on addressing dual-use life science threats.

To protect and advance U.S. prosperity, the U.S. should:

Strengthen the U.S. Economy. The executive branch must reverse the current explosion in business regulations, particularly mandates for environment and energy, as well as labor, environmental, social, and governance (ESG), and equity policies, and Congress must return to producing annual budgets aimed at systemic reductions in debt and deficit spending.

Ensure Reliable Semiconductor Supply Chains. Congress must eliminate security loopholes and add additional oversight mechanisms in the funding and execution of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act. Congress should further improve the tax environment for capital investments for semiconductors where current recovery periods heavily disadvantage the construction of commercial infrastructure, such as chip fabricators.

Secure Critical Mineral Supplies. To expand the mining of vital rare-earth elements in the U.S., the government must reform outdated federal and state environmental statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act, eliminating redundant state regulatory barriers while maintaining commonsense environmental standards.

Risk-Manage Inbound Investment. Congress must add regulation of private equity and venture capital financing for designated “countries of concern” and sensitive transactions as defined in the 2018 CFIUS reform. New legislation should define critical sectors, and CFIUS should review acquisitions by countries of concern to ensure that they do not compromise supply-chain integrity in these sectors. This legislation should expand CFIUS review to cover PRC greenfield investments and ensure that Congress’s intent to require CFIUS review for emerging and foundational technologies is implemented.

Protect Intellectual Property. Regulators must better define the term “sensitive data” to include “personally identifiable information” and “geolocation data,” limiting the commercial transfer of such data to Chinese entities. Congress should direct the Federal Communications Commission to review and reject approvals for the export of advanced technology equipment to Chinese state-linked entities more aggressively. To address future threats, the U.S. government should expedite post-quantum cryptography plans, beginning with rapidly identifying public-key cryptography and how it is used within government agencies.

Promote “Reshoring,” “Nearshoring,” and “Friendshoring.” For critical industries vital to U.S. national security and economic well-being, the U.S. government should encourage and incentivize firms to divest from China and must be prepared to employ punitive policy measures to enforce compliance in the most sensitive industries, including sanctions and entity-list restrictions.

Reject Damaging Environmental, Social, and Governance Policies. Congress should establish legal mandates that prevent state and federal agencies from imposing regulatory requirements that make critical infrastructure or a company’s supply chain more dependent on China. Proactive measures can be undertaken through educational briefings and partnerships with state Attorneys General, Treasurers, Governors, and state and federal legislators to inform them of the ways in which China manipulates ESG to its advantage.

Address Energy and Climate Challenges. America is well endowed with natural resources and should reject plans to transition to “green energy” technologies dominated by China. The U.S. should continuously highlight China’s abhorrent use of forced labor in the energy-technology sector, ensure that U.S. firms importing Chinese green technologies comply with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021, and find innovative ways to highlight China’s poor environmental stewardship.

Promote Good Corporate Governance. Corporate boards should consider the following steps: diversifying critical supply chains by beginning to move production out of China, diversifying export markets to reduce CCP leverage over their decision-making, refusing deals that involve exposing or transferring advanced U.S. technology or trade secrets to any CCP-linked entity, rejecting ESG and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) compliance measures that undermine U.S. competitiveness and advantage Chinese competitors, and applying due diligence to prospective employees and counterparties that may have connections to the CCP.

To reorient America’s defense posture, the U.S. must:

Recalibrate America’s Defense Posture to Meet the China Threat. A Naval Act of 2023 should authorize and appropriate the funds necessary for a large block purchase of naval assets for a total of $152.3 billion before anticipated savings. Ships covered by this purchase should only be those with approved, stable designs and that are in production today at numbers already stipulated in the current Future Years Defense Program that runs through 2027.

Restore Conventional Deterrence in the Indo–Pacific. The United States should immediately adopt and resource a strategy of deterrence by denial against the People’s Liberation Army. The Administration and Congress should prioritize providing the U.S. Indo–Pacific Command with the funding and capabilities identified as requirements in the Commander’s annual independent assessment under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. The U.S. government must make determined efforts to develop and regionally deploy ballistic and cruise missiles formerly prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Enhance Nuclear Deterrence. The U.S. should increase the size of its nuclear arsenal by more quickly utilizing its capacity to transfer additional warheads to deployed forces in crisis scenarios and by planning to procure more modernized nuclear systems. The U.S. needs to develop additional capabilities tailored specifically to deter China, investing in the development of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and accelerating timelines for developing new warheads and increasing production of plutonium pits for storing nuclear warheads.

Urgently Increase Munitions Production and Arm Taiwan. When the Administration sends capabilities that are backlogged for Taiwan to other places, it should be required to justify the decision to Congress with full transparency about the trade-offs to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. It should use the drawdown authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to arm Taiwan with critical munitions to fill the gap until delayed platforms are delivered.

Foster Innovation in the U.S. Maritime and Shipping Sectors. Congress should repeal and replace the antiquated Jones Act with a naval act that makes American shipping globally competitive. Any revolution in shipping must consider redesigning twenty-foot-equivalent-unit (TEU) containers, allowing new, more competitive means of managing, packaging, and shipping goods.

Align National Security Spending with National Security Priorities. Congress should require the Administration to double the share of foreign assistance spending in the Indo–Pacific within two years, bringing the Indo–Pacific to approximately 15 percent of annual foreign assistance. Congress should consider establishing an Indo–Pacific companion to the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account with a dedicated line item in appropriations legislation.

To diminish the CCP’s influence and hold it accountable, the U.S. must:

Expand Export Controls. The Bureau of Industry and Security should provide written justifications and public testimony to relevant congressional committees on previous and future rulings on granted licenses for exports to China since 2018. After a review, Congress should decide if transferring export-control authority elsewhere is warranted. Congress should also authorize at least one national security agency in the export-control license decision-making process to veto license approvals to malign PRC entities.

Restrict Outbound Investment into China. The U.S. government should insist on greater disclosure by American funders of significant investments in China. For large-scale investments in critical economic sectors, the U.S. government should require American entities investing in China to submit information on their counterparties and anticipated use of funds for approval prior to investing, under a presumption of denial. This includes joint ventures with PRC entities.

Counter Xi’s Big Data Ambitions. In the immediate term, the Department of Commerce must begin robust implementation of executive orders relating to the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain, including by publishing and enforcing final ICTS supply-chain regulations. Congress should enact a personal data privacy law to protect Americans’ privacy, reform sanctions laws to ensure that relevant data flows can be blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and legislate extended export controls over commercial transfers of data which threaten national security.

Address China’s Abuse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S. government should make the case that China has violated the 1999 Agreement on Market Access between the PRC and the U.S., as well as its WTO accession commitments, including its commitment not to condition approval of foreign investments on “the transfer of technology.” The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) should conduct a comprehensive review of China’s compliance with its WTO commitments, as recommended by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. If the USTR assesses China to be noncompliant, Congress should consider legislation to revoke permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status.

Make Limited Use of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers. The U.S. government should be less risk-averse in selectively implementing and enforcing tariffs to punish Chinese predatory behaviors and facilitate reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring.

Hold China Accountable for Its Role in the COVID-19 Pandemic. The U.S. should continue to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and advocate a truly independent, international investigation both to advance the principle of accountability and to better prepare for the future. Until a transparent and thorough investigation is conducted with full Chinese cooperation, the U.S. should suspend funding and cooperation with Chinese laboratories on biomedical research.

Expose CCP Influence Over U.S. Cultural Institutions. Congress should organize public hearings to shine a transparent light on the ways in which the CCP coerces U.S. firms operating in China to avoid falling afoul of the CCP’s policies and priorities. Congress should exercise its subpoena powers to force senior executives of U.S. firms and cultural enterprises to explain to the American public the ways in which they have been coerced to meet censorship demands and questioned on cases in which they engaged in blatant self-censorship.

Combat Malicious CPP Activity in International Organizations. The U.S. government should conduct a detailed assessment of China’s expanding reach in international organizations and the tactics it deploys to exert influence and advance its preferred candidates to leadership positions, sharing its findings and coordinating with partners to counter those efforts. The U.S. should advocate Taiwan’s participation in an array of appropriate international organizations.

Highlight the CCP’s Abhorrent Human Rights Record. The U.S. should highlight the CCP’s lamentable human rights record at every opportunity and offer safe haven by issuing “Priority 2” refugee status to limited numbers of persecuted Uyghurs and Hong Kongers. The U.S. should also enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and identify additional means at its disposal to shift the CCP’s risk calculus and alter its willingness to continue its human rights violations.

Address the Persecution of Christians. The U.S. government should look for ways to support organizations and initiatives that advocate for Christians and religious liberty in China, such as ChinaAid. Further, the U.S. should apply Global Magnitsky sanctions and other applicable sanctions to Chinese officials involved in the torture, sexual abuse, or death of prisoners who are in state custody because of their religion.

Revitalize the Blue Dot Network. The U.S. should disaggregate the Blue Dot Network (BDN) from the Biden Administration’s Build Back Better World and focus on promoting better standards, greater transparency, and a new vision for regional connectivity. The U.S. should also align aid and economic engagement agencies in execution of the BDN and support Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development proposals for BDN certification.

Address Illegal Fishing and Maritime Militia Activities. The U.S. must draft a clear declaratory policy against China’s illegal fishing practices, directly attributing the fleet’s actions to the CCP. Further, the U.S. should increase its global maritime presence, enhancing naval and Coast Guard patrols in the Arctic, in strategically sensitive international waters, and in the exclusive economic zones of U.S. partners and allies where welcomed.

To exercise global leadership, the U.S. must:

Diminish China’s Threat to Taiwan. In addition to providing robust military support as required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. should deepen economic ties with the island, including by negotiating a free trade agreement. Following the authorization of up to $10 billion of military aid to Taiwan over five years in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. government must ensure that those funds are actually appropriated and are used to bolster Taiwan’s defense by prioritizing the most effective military platforms.

Enhance Regional Stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S. should continually affirm its extended deterrence guarantees to Japan and South Korea while maintaining current levels of U.S. forces in the region until the North Korean threat has been reduced. The U.S. government must craft an unambiguous policy to uphold U.N. resolutions and U.S. law requiring North Korean denuclearization backed by strategic and conventional deterrence.

Diminish the Value of Russia as China’s Ally. U.S. policy should promote the robust forward defense of NATO, a strong and independent Ukraine, a more resilient Georgia and Moldova, and greater Eastern European cooperation through the Three Seas Initiative. The U.S. must continue to provide responsible military assistance to Ukraine with substantial transparency and accountability, push European capitals to provide more civilian and military aid, and press all parties involved to develop a responsible plan for reconstruction.

Expand Economic and Security Cooperation with India. The U.S. should aid India in developing the capabilities necessary to prevent continued Chinese incursions across the two countries’ disputed border and the naval capacity to remain a responsible steward of the Indian Ocean. Finally, in order to realize stronger cooperation with India on China, Washington should engage with New Delhi in setting an agenda for the Western Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

Prioritize the Pacific Islands. The U.S. should prioritize renewing the Compacts of Free Association agreements with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau through which the U.S. provides financial assistance in exchange for military access and responsibility for the defense of those islands. It should make the U.S.–Pacific Island Country Summit an annual event, and the U.S. President should tour the Pacific Island states. It should also encourage more Coast Guard engagement and agreements with Pacific Island nations to help to combat illegal fishing and establish a new Coast Guard station on American Samoa.

Stay Engaged in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Navy should keep a robust pace of freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, ideally two per quarter, to both reassure regional partners of America’s enduring commitment and signal to China that the U.S. will not be intimidated into abandoning its rights to fly, sail, and operate where international law allows. The U.S. should ensure that it has senior representation at regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–led diplomatic forums. Finally, the U.S. should work with the Philippines to enhance and accelerate implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, including through expanding U.S. access to new military bases in the Philippines and enhancing the U.S. presence at existing ones.

Establish and Resource an Atlantic Strategy. The U.S. should include an Atlantic Strategy as a priority in the next President’s National Security Strategy to ensure that policymakers across the U.S. government coordinate their respective responses to strategic challenges from the CCP in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. can host an Atlantic Summit of like-minded allies and designate the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to execute the strategy.

Expand Economic Partnerships in Eurasia. The U.S. should support Eurasian development through four interrelated projects: (1) the European Three Seas Initiative (3SI); (2) the reconstruction of Ukraine; (3) an international campaign for a “free and open” Black Sea; and (4) the “Middle Corridor,” an expanse of energy production and distribution, value-added supply chains, and transport infrastructure stretching from Central Asia to the Mediterranean.

Establish a Quad Select Initiative. Non-Quad nations should be selectively invited to join Quad meetings, initiatives, and even military exercises, improving coordination and joint planning activities among a network of strategically aligned democracies in the Indo–Pacific. The four Quad capitals—Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington—should collaboratively work to complement and enhance the Blue Dot Network and the Clean Network initiatives to promote responsible infrastructure in the Indo–Pacific.

Improve U.S.–Canadian Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. government must work with Canada to build consensus and operationalize measures to counter China’s growing role in the Arctic, screen sensitive Chinese investments in North America, and resist repressive and subversive Chinese activities, particularly in universities and other civic institutions. The U.S. should support implementation of Canada’s Indo–Pacific Strategy provisions that combat the CCP.

Facilitate Strategic Economic Partnerships with Deal Teams. The U.S. should create effective government interagency coordination mechanisms, including re-energizing the Deal Team Initiative, to support U.S. firms competing with foreign firms backed by foreign governments. The Administration should coordinate Deal Team activities with the National Security and Domestic Economic Councils, integrating actions with the Administration’s broader China strategy. Deal Teams should consider the strategic competition with China and transactions relevant to that competition and U.S. national security as their overwhelming priority.

The measures outlined in this plan are comprehensive and ambitious. They will require coordinated action across multiple government agencies and Congress, state and local governments, and partner nations. Ultimately, however, China is foremost an Oval Office problem: The U.S. President must exercise leadership in directing a national plan, as the President’s predecessors did during World War II and the Cold War. The President must galvanize Congress to act.

Edited by James J. Carafano, PhD, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and E. W. Richardson Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; Andrew J. Harding , Research Assistant in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation; Michael Pillsbury, PhD, Senior Fellow for China Strategy in the Davis Institute; and Jeff M. Smith , Director of the Asian Studies Center.

Introduction: The New Cold War

The authoritarian regime in Beijing—its global ambitions, growing power, and values diametrically opposed to America’s own—poses the greatest threat the United States has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In both word and deed, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a one-party state ruled by the CCP, has made it abundantly clear that it is determined to supplant U.S. global leadership, establish hegemony over the Indo–Pacific, and rewrite the international order in the CCP’s image.

Since the turn of the millennium, the PRC has pilfered trillions of dollars from the U.S. economy through industrial espionage and intellectual property theft, deployed diplomatic threats and military coercion against the U.S. and its partners and allies, unlawfully laid claim over some of the world’s most vital shipping lanes, harassed U.S. military vessels operating in international waters, compromised the security of countless Americans with malicious apps and spyware, and exported aspects of its authoritarian model abroad, including on U.S. college campuses and through covert police stations operating in U.S. cities.

Under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping, the PRC has charted a dramatically more aggressive and repressive path in recent years, alarming global capitals with the rapid growth of Chinese military capabilities, aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy, growing military intimidation of China’s neighbors, and abusive trade practices.

The PRC has deployed economic coercion tactics against a wide variety of U.S. partners and allies, from South Korea to Australia and Canada to Norway, REF even as its approach to its numerous outstanding territorial disputes has grown far more belligerent. The PRC has raised tensions with a variety of regional capitals across the Indo–Pacific with expansive claims and provocative “grey zone” intimidation tactics. This approach extends from China’s unlawful claims over virtually the entire South China Sea—where it has constructed militarized artificial islands and deployed an expanding “maritime militia”—to its encroachments and harassment activities around Taiwan and the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, to deadly skirmishes with Indian soldiers along the disputed Himalayan border.

This is why the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) labeled the PRC’s “coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo–Pacific region” as America’s “most consequential and systemic challenge.” So acute is the threat that the NDS contends that deterring PRC aggression in the Indo–Pacific takes precedence even over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its highly destabilizing activities in Europe. REF

It is past time for a plan to protect the American homeland from nefarious PRC actions and take the fight to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Heritage Foundation’s plan for countering China deliberately invokes the legacy of the Cold War. While American officials have been reluctant to frame the rivalry with China in these terms, their trepidation ignores a simple reality. “China pursues its own Cold War strategy against America,” Heritage Foundation senior fellow for China Strategy Michael Pillsbury observed in his 2015 best seller The Hundred-Year Marathon . REF

“It does us little good to repeat again and again that we aren’t seeking a new Cold War when the CCP has been stealthily waging one against us for years,” former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger testified before the new House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party in 2023. REF

The origin of the term “Cold War” is often ascribed to a 1945 essay by George Orwell, REF later entering the popular discourse to describe the state of hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union between the end of World War II and the collapse of the USSR in 1991. A Cold War is now defined as a state of “open yet restricted rivalry,” that is “waged on political economic and propaganda fronts.” REF Others define it as a “condition of rivalry, mistrust, and often open hostility short of violence.” REF What distinguishes a Cold War from other inter-state rivalries of this nature is the participation of rival super powers quarreling on a global scale, with global implications. By any widely accepted definition of the term, the China–U.S. relationship today increasingly bears the hallmarks of a Cold War.

The Chinese leadership will object to this framing. For years, Beijing has sought to discredit the U.S. for adopting a “Cold War mentality,” any time the U.S. has taken action to counter malign CCP activities. Beijing is likely to portray any discussion of a New Cold War as further evidence of U.S. “warmongering.”

However, one of the defining characteristics of the last Cold War was the absence of direct military conflict between the U.S. and USSR. America was able to win that contest without fighting. That remains the goal today, although China is a very different adversary from the Soviet Union and this Cold War is unlikely to bear great resemblance to the last.

On the upside, the U.S. and China are unlikely to engage in the kind of costly and bloody proxy wars that were all too common in the last Cold War. The PRC today is less likely to support revolutionary military insurgencies abroad or seek to overthrow foreign governments by force, preferring instead to purchase its influence and use economic coercion to achieve its geopolitical aims.

The PRC also has its own vulnerabilities to contend with, from an aging population, to major environmental and public health challenges, to an increasingly anxious neighborhood. In recent years, Beijing has threatened and alienated a wide variety of its Indo-Pacific peers, improving the operating environment for the U.S. and invigorating balancing coalitions like the Quad and AUKUS.

On the other hand, the PRC is in several ways a more capable adversary than the USSR ever was . The Soviet Union was a military powerhouse but never a true economic peer of the U.S. The PRC, by contrast, enjoys the economic engine and emerging military capabilities to sustain or even surpass the U.S. if Washington fails to act.

As a result, the PRC is less susceptible to some of the strategies the U.S. deployed in the last Cold War. After decades of engagement, China is deeply enmeshed in global governance institutions and the global economy, a top trading partner not only of the U.S. but a broad cross section of global capitals and U.S. allies. Even today, amid growing geopolitical tensions, the COVID-19 pandemic, tariffs and trade wars, and ongoing decoupling efforts, China-U.S. bilateral trade is still growing, and breaking new records.

While a major rebalancing of the economic relationship is long overdue, the U.S. cannot rely on the free world to sever all economic ties with China as it once did with the USSR. Nor can it count on crippling the PRC by outspending it in a costly arms race.

As concerning, America’s economy and society are far more exposed to the PRC than they ever were to the USSR, creating new vulnerabilities for espionage, supply chain disruptions, or influence operations. Chinese entities freely raise capital in American markets, purchase American land, and lobby U.S. government officials. China’s state-run model of capitalism has blurred the lines between private enterprise and the dictates and priorities of the CCP. Many Chinese companies are forced to embed Communist Party agents in their corporate governance structures. All Chinese companies, including a TikTok app that boasts 150 million active American users, are required by law to share information with Chinese intelligence services upon request.

While recent years have witnessed growing recognition of the scope of the threat from the PRC in Washington, the U.S. government has been too slow to respond. It has failed to implement a comprehensive plan that protects the U.S. homeland from the nefarious activities of the PRC while degrading China’s ability to harm the United States and its citizens, allies, and partners.

In crafting an effective response, the U.S. government must protect the American economy and public from exploitation and malicious actions by the CCP. Doing so will require an offensive-defensive mix, including vouchsafing Americans and their interests from Chinese actions that undermine U.S. competitiveness and prosperity as well as active measures to degrade Beijing’s ability to threaten America and its partners and allies. Washington must develop a plan that will impose costs on China and make Chinese economic aggression against America unaffordable for Beijing while ensuring that the U.S. economy continues to grow and thrive.

The plan for countering China consists of three parts. Part I describes the rationale for U.S. actions, examining the nature of the China–U.S. rivalry and the strengths and weaknesses of the two countries. Part II presents a comprehensive integrated mix of policy actions to prevail over the China threat. These policy actions represent the heart of the plan. Part III summarizes key points from Part II and how the U.S. government must operationalize the plan.

Part I. The Foundation of the Plan

A strategic competition is defined by a contest of action and counteraction between determined and capable foes. From military brinksmanship in the South China Sea to sparring over international trade standards, China and the U.S. are locked in an intense competition to shape the global operating system of the 21st century.

To be clear, the U.S. respects the Chinese people and their rich history and storied culture. U.S. disagreements are with the communist autocracy that not only acts belligerently abroad but oppresses the Chinese people. It is worth recalling the wisdom of President Ronald Reagan, who repeatedly insisted that the United States took issue with the Soviet government while supporting the Russian people in their quest for freedom and human dignity.

Strategic and conventional military deterrence, as well as the terrible consequences of military escalation, have to date restrained both sides from engaging in traditional armed conflict. Nevertheless, the China–U.S. relationship is at its most acrimonious and volatile stage in decades.

All signs point to a continuing worsening of the rivalry in the years ahead. Crafting a balance of power in favor of the U.S. and its allies and partners requires understanding the critical strengths and weaknesses of both competitors as a prerequisite for determining which offensive and defensive actions are most advisable and consequential.

China: Assessment and Implications

This assessment is informed by two major research papers by Heritage Foundation analysts that offered a deep dive into analyzing Chinese behavior and offering policy recommendations, many of which were adopted by the previous Administration. REF This assessment also draws from The Heritage Foundation’s China Transparency Index project, which gathered a coalition of researchers from around the world to conduct high-quality open-source analysis of China’s domestic and international activities. REF

This plan also draws from The Heritage Foundation’s 2022 Index of Economic Freedom , the 2023 U.S. Index of Military Strength (which also assesses Chinese military power), and the Atlantic Council’s 2022 Freedom and Prosperity Index . REF The plan was further informed by Heritage analysis of the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022 in Beijing, which cemented General Secretary Xi Jinping’s hold on power for a third term, REF and by prior research conducted by co-editor and Heritage Senior Fellow for China Strategy Michael Pillsbury. REF

Finally, this plan is the product of direct contributions from over two dozen reputable experts both inside and outside The Heritage Foundation (listed under “Contributors”) as well as consultations with a wider range of national security professionals and regional experts.

China hopes in the near-term to offset America’s military advantages in the Indo–Pacific and significantly improve the strategic balance (nuclear weapons and delivery systems) between the two countries. The CCP also seeks dominance over what may prove to be the defining commodities of the 21st century: information and technology. It continues to make substantial investments in cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, while pursuing greater technological self-sufficiency to reduce Washington’s ability to exert leverage in times of crisis, especially over “chokepoint technologies.” REF

As general secretary, Xi has further cemented his control over the Communist Party and all organs of the Chinese state, eliminating term limits and purging opposing factions. It is likely that Beijing will increasingly resemble an echo chamber where political expediency and fear of disappointing Xi drive policymaking, resulting in groupthink and raising the potential for miscalculation. Xi’s success in circumventing the informal precedent that limited Chinese party leaders to two terms has also raised longer-term questions about political stability. With no successor in place, Chinese politics could be highly destabilized if Xi were abruptly incapacitated. However, in none of the foreseeable scenarios does the CCP abandon its long-standing goal of supplanting U.S. global leadership.

For now, Xi will continue to dominate the Politburo as the key decisionmaker and position the Communist Party at the center of politics, culture, the economy, and the military. His government will continue to crack down on civil society and deprive Chinese citizens of basic political and religious freedoms. While measures will be taken in the short term to reinvigorate an economy battered by nearly three years of strict pandemic controls, the long-term focus will continue to be on enhancing the party’s control rather than enacting liberal reforms or expanding private enterprise. While this focus is unlikely to lead to large-scale nationalizations or a return to Mao-era communes, these measures will make the Chinese economy progressively less growth-oriented and more hostile for foreign businesses that operate there.

The Chinese leadership also believes that it can drive the pace of “decoupling” from the United States and other Western powers, eventually creating a self-sufficient mercantile market of resources, production, and consumers. In the near term, however, China will need continued access to foreign capital, markets, and expertise, while seeking to establish economic dominance in key strategic sectors.

Like many regimes lacking democratic legitimacy, the CCP seeks international prestige and influence in international organizations. While the United States remains, by far, the largest donor to key international organizations, REF in recent years the CCP has proven adept at co-opting multilateral institutions, populating their leadership with loyalists determined to advance standards and norms that are to China’s advantage. REF

In sum, trends to expect from China in the years ahead include:

• Ever-greater party control over all aspects of domestic politics, culture, and economics.
• Continued movement away from free-market reforms and decelerating economic growth.
• Increased efforts to establish dominance over information, data, and cutting-edge dual-use technologies.
• Ongoing and systemic attempts to steal American commercial secrets and intellectual property at a devastating cost to the American economy.
• Continued efforts to dominate international organizations and set global standards and laws in opposition to the democratic, free-market norms that undergird the U.S.-led international system.
• Continued efforts to establish spheres of economic dominance and control in the Indo–Pacific and beyond.
• Continued use of economic coercion tactics to punish and coerce capitals that fall afoul of Beijing.
• Continued expansion in qualitative and quantitative terms of China’s conventional and strategic forces.
• Increased domestic oppression and gross human rights abuses, including the ongoing genocide against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, draconian restrictions on Christians, and mass violations of political and religious freedom in Tibet.
• Continued efforts to harass and intimidate Chinese citizens and dissidents abroad, including through the establishment of overseas Chinese police stations and programs, such as Operation Fox Hunt. REF
• Increased pressure on Taiwan and other countries embroiled in territorial disputes with the PRC, including India, Japan, and the Philippines.

Some of these developments represent potential vulnerabilities for the regime. Xi’s China is at growing risk of strategic overreach, particularly in an era of structurally declining economic growth REF and substantial demographic challenges resulting from the one-child policy that Beijing adopted between 1980 and 2015. REF China now faces a demographic timebomb with a drastically shrinking working-age population and an expanding cadre of senior citizens while Chinese families refuse to have more children despite the elimination of the one-child policy. REF These trends will confront Beijing with more difficult policy choices in allocating scarce resources while limiting the capital at its disposal to support overseas investments and other foreign policy objectives.

Meanwhile, Xi’s controversial domestic policies have already generated some consternation among Chinese elites and common citizens, as witnessed by the unprecedented protests that seized multiple Chinese cities in November 2022, in part to protest draconian lockdowns under Beijing’s “zero-COVID” policy. REF While such discontent is unlikely to present a real challenge to Xi’s rule, particularly after his further consolidation of power at the 20th Party Congress, China may witness an increase in the flight of Chinese elites and capital from this increasingly repressive environment.

In addition, the increasingly aggressive tenor of Chinese foreign policy has provoked a backlash abroad, alienating free nations and anxious neighbors REF and increasing scrutiny of China’s predatory economic policies. REF The backlash is generating greater criticism of Chinese overseas investments, its military intimidation tactics, espionage activities, and coercive practices. A growing number of foreign capitals are considering greater restrictions on Chinese inbound investments and outbound exports to China of advanced, sensitive, or dual-use technologies.

These developments further exacerbate one of China’s key strategic weaknesses: its relative paucity of allies and strategic partners. At the same time, these weaknesses present America with opportunities to leverage one of its greatest strengths: building coalitions with like-minded partners and allies, from the Philippines to South Korea and Canada to Europe, from the AUKUS initiative involving Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., to the Quad grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.

United States: Assessment and Implications

The assessment of the state of the U.S. and the China–U.S. relationship is based on a wide breadth of research and consultations with a broad range of experts. The assessment was informed by the recognition that the United States is a global power with global interests and responsibilities. Any U.S. strategy toward China must consider and respect other vital American interests and the prime imperative to keep the American people free, safe, and prosperous. REF Thus, an effective China plan must adequately safeguard the full spectrum of America’s vital interests. REF

This assessment proceeds from the understanding that the economic and military competitions with the PRC are both relevant and intertwined. To be successful, the United States must produce sufficient “guns” (military capacity and capability) and “butter” (economic power) to prevail. The United States currently faces headwinds on both fronts.

The most recent Index of U.S. Military Strength for the first time rated the American Armed Forces as “weak.” REF Part of this score results from insufficient investments in defense by the U.S. government, but also reflects the growing relative power of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

America is an open society and the CCP leverages that openness to its geostrategic advantage. High levels of interdependence between the two economies create strategic vulnerabilities that the CCP has been eager to exploit. While America remains a leading economic power, powered by a U.S. dollar that remains the global reserve currency of choice, decades of irresponsible fiscal policies and reckless government spending have pushed the U.S. national debt past $30 trillion and to 124 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022. REF While more than two-thirds of that debt is held by U.S.-based institutions and actors, China owns just under $1 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds, roughly 15 percent of all foreign-owned debt, although China’s holdings of U.S. Treasury bills have steadily declined since peaking at more than $1.3 trillion in 2013.

More concerning, the CCP has marshalled considerable government resources toward an unprecedented corporate espionage campaign targeting the intellectual property of foreign competitors. While virtually all of China’s major trading partners have been subjected to this campaign, arguably no country has suffered more than the United States, with even conservative estimates suggesting that trillions of dollars have been siphoned out of the U.S. economy as a result of Chinese intellectual property theft over the past few decades. REF

The CCP routinely forces U.S. companies seeking access to the Chinese market to share intellectual property with domestic partners. REF Often that intellectual property is transferred to a domestic Chinese alternative only to have the American company squeezed out of the market, either through underhanded administrative tactics or non-market pricing by local competitors.

While selective decoupling has already begun, China remains one of America’s top three trading partners. In 2021, U.S. bilateral goods trade with China reached roughly $650 billion, just below the $660 billion in goods traded with Canada and with Mexico. America’s next-largest trading partner was Japan, at $210 billion in goods trade. REF

Chinese exports account for nearly 20 percent of the goods imported by the U.S., REF the single largest source of imports for the U.S. REF The top three U.S. imports from China are machinery and electrical goods, industrial imports, and consumer goods. REF While China has strong incentives not to interrupt this lucrative trading relationship, which accounts for a significant share of China’s GDP and millions of jobs, REF it confronts the U.S. with potential vulnerabilities on the scale of U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil in the 1970s.

For example, the United States relies on China for a range of mining, electronic, and pharmaceutical products that could cause vulnerability in the event of armed conflict or enforced disruptions in bilateral trade. These dependencies pose risks even outside conflict scenarios, given the disruptions that companies already routinely face in China due to COVID-19 lockdowns, REF workplace safety incidents, REF and environmental inspections, REF injecting uncertainty and unreliability into the supply chain.

On the other hand, China is also dependent on the U.S. economy. Many Chinese goods, for both domestic consumption and export, depend on critical U.S. inputs, such as higher-end microchips or software. For example, American software accounts for more than 94 percent of China’s computer and smart phone operating systems. REF The United States still has the deepest capital markets in the world, and access to those markets reduces financing costs for Chinese firms.

The United States has a far healthier demographic pyramid than China, in part due to higher birth rates and in part due to net gains through immigration. Of late, the latter has become a double-edged sword, as it also reflects a massive spike in illegal immigration, particularly during the Biden presidency as the result of an increasingly chaotic open border. During prior periods of accelerated immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. made a concerted effort at all levels of government to assimilate immigrant communities to American laws, customs, and traditions. When immigration is legal and consistent with these principles, it has made a healthy contribution to U.S. population growth. The United States has always been a more attractive immigration destination than the PRC and will remain so for all people immigrating to the country legally.

The United States is also an energy superpower with abundant natural resources, yet current climate policies prioritize a transition to electric vehicles, and electricity generated by wind and solar power, which is more costly and less efficient. These technologies also make the United States progressively more dependent on Chinese supply chains, with the PRC increasingly dominating “green energy” technologies, manufacturing, and exports. This is an imprudent approach. At current usage rates, the United States’ recoverable petroleum reserves are large enough for two centuries of supply REF and U.S. firms continue to make new discoveries and improve technology to access and use resources more efficiently. REF The increase of natural gas use made a far greater contribution to the reduction in U.S. carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions than the introduction of any green technology. The United States also has the capacity and expertise to safely and cleanly expand the use of nuclear power; it requires only the political will. REF

Similarly, there is growing evidence that Beijing is co-opting divisive environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives to undermine U.S. competitiveness and bipartisan will to take decisive action against the CCP’s malicious behavior. Indeed, China has a history of using environmental causes to extract concessions from the U.S. and other Western countries, dangling the prospect of vague, intangible cooperation on climate issues in exchange for the U.S. and others acceding to its geopolitical demands. REF The CCP also uses both official state organs and covert methods to amplify political divisions in the U.S. and spread disinformation about legitimate national security initiatives. REF

Finally, while American universities lead the world by a significant margin in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields, China exploits America’s open academic environment and world-class expertise in critical technologies. It has effectively purchased influence with countless universities through gifts and grants, establishing Confucius Institutes and other forms of academic exchange that it can use to access key researchers and labs, in some cases embedding intelligence officers in U.S. institutions as students or researchers. Universities often turn a blind eye to China’s expanding reach on their campuses, afraid of jeopardizing funding.

In summary, key factors to consider are:

• The United States is progressively losing its once-decisive advantage in the balance of strategic and conventional military forces.
• China has proven adept at exploiting America’s openness and dynamism to advance its own intertwined industrial policies, military expansion, and geopolitical objectives.
• Under current forecasts, U.S. economic growth is likely inadequate to prevent China from continuing to narrow the gap between the two countries.
• The U.S. economy is hamstrung by an increasingly poor regulatory and business environment and unsustainable levels of spending and debt.
• The United States remains reliant on strategic supply chains that are vulnerable to disruption by China.
• China is likely to continue to whittle away America’s edge in technology superiority, now producing nearly twice as many STEM doctoral graduates as the U.S. annually.
• U.S. research and educational institutions are vulnerable to exploitation by the CCP.
• Counterproductive climate, DEI, and ESG policies are negating some of America’s inherent advantages vis-a-vis China.

Key efforts to shore up American vulnerabilities must include the following. The U.S. must:

• Better synchronize defense requirements with broader security and economic policies and procurement strategies, especially in resuscitating a capable and robust defense industrial base.
• Address the growing need to reform regulations, social programs, fiscal and tax policies, and infrastructure regulations restricting U.S. growth.
• Address the urgent need to pursue more sustainable public spending and debt policies, including entitlement reform.
• Make necessary reforms to climate policies that are obstructing responsible efforts to develop energy resources.
• Address inadequate intellectual property protections, infrastructure resilience, and safeguards in U.S. higher education.
• Seize opportunities to build wider coalitions, including in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo–Pacific to address common economic and security threats posed by China.
• Work with partners to address malicious CCP actions in international organizations and standard-setting bodies.

The assessment concludes that for the plan to counter China to be effective, it must consider the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and vulnerabilities, of the United States and China, as well as their relationships and networks of allies and partners. Overall, the plan must mitigate the potential of escalating armed conflict through conventional and strategic deterrence in combination with eliminating critical vulnerabilities wrought by economic interdependence.

The plan must protect the U.S. economy from malicious exploitation by China. The United States must pursue energy independence and maintain a decisive edge in critical technology sectors. The United States must resist attempts by China to dominate international organizations that can infringe on U.S. sovereignty or establish global norms and standards that are at odds with U.S. interests. The United States must establish and lead coalitions with like-minded partners to protect the free and open commons, and the U.S. must expand “reshoring,” “nearshoring,” and “friendshoring” to move sensitive manufacturing industries out of China and back to the U.S., to countries in the Western Hemisphere, and to partner or allied nations.

Part II. The Plan to Counter China

Part II of the plan examines dozens of fault lines in China–U.S. relations and offers recommendations for policy action. Topics are divided into five categories of collective action:

A. Protect the Homeland

B. safeguard and advance u.s. prosperity.

C. Reorient America’s Defense Posture

D. Diminish the CCP’s Influence and Hold It Accountable

E. exercise global leadership.

Each subsection of Part II follows a standardized format:

Issue: A description of the Chinese activities, or lack of U.S. response, that are threatening U.S. interests.

Action: The laws, regulations, policies, or activities that the U.S. should enact or undertake to address the issue.

Implementation: Guidance on how to operationalize the proposed action.

Impact: The impact these actions will have on China, the U.S., or their strategic competition.

Allies: The measures needed to educate or engage allies and partner nations on this issue.

Each subsection addresses the “what, why, and how,” supporting the goals and outcomes outlined in this plan. To be sure, there are many other issues and actions worthy of attention within the broad scope of meeting the China challenge. REF However, the issues covered in Part II represent some of the most important issues and consequential policy actions that will shape the future of the New Cold War.

Stop Malign CCP Activities in Higher Education.

Issue: PRC interference and operations in U.S. higher education institutions pose a long-term economic and national security threat. Confucius Institutes, ostensibly used to promote Chinese language education and cultural exchange, give CCP agents a foothold on U.S. campuses and have been used to compromise faculty research, steal intellectual property, surveil overseas Chinese students, and spread pro-CCP propaganda.

Many top research universities have financial ties to organizations linked to the CCP through donations, joint programs, and investments by university endowments. The Department of Education has warned that foreign donors often influence teaching and research. REF Some U.S. institutions have exchange programs with Chinese universities known to serve as feeder schools for China’s intelligence services. REF

A small but dangerous minority of Chinese citizens who study in the U.S. have relationships with Chinese intelligence or military organizations and are involved in sensitive research and technologies that could pose national security threats. They provide the CCP access to and influence on university campuses as well as opportunities to reward, educate, control, discipline, and utilize Chinese citizens to the party’s benefit. REF

Action: The U.S. government and academia must ensure that U.S. universities and their students are not subject to influence and exploitation operations by foreign adversaries. The Administration must expose and counter CCP efforts to subvert and exploit American higher education. The U.S. government must seek to identify and roll back education partnerships linked to the CCP and entities responsive to Chinese-government direction. The U.S. government and academia must apply far greater scrutiny to Chinese applicants to programs with military, dual-use, or high-technology applications, beginning with the presumption of denial for programs deemed most sensitive to national security.

The State Department must review visa applications from adversarial countries to ensure that the background and research plan of every applicant for a student visa are thoroughly vetted on national security grounds. Individuals deemed to pose a national security threat due to their personal or professional ties to the CCP, background, or research focus on sensitive technologies should be denied visas.

Implementation: The Department of Education should immediately enforce existing laws by requiring institutions of higher learning to report foreign gifts and grants. The Administration should also ban, at a federal level, all Confucius Institutes and all collaborations between U.S. institutions and Chinese entities affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security or other security and intelligence agencies. Congress and state legislatures should pass laws to defend U.S. academic institutions from CCP influence. These should include threats to withhold state and federal funds—including loan and grant support, research funding, Department of Education funding, and ROTC program funding—from colleges and universities that resist efforts to eliminate CCP influence operations. Background investigations into student visa applicants should deny citizens of the PRC, and those of other U.S. adversarial countries, access to Department of Defense–funded research programs.

Impact: Rolling back CCP influence on U.S. campuses will restore American higher education primarily to the service of the American people. The loss of research funding and cooperation with Chinese organizations, as well as a likely decrease in enrollment by Chinese students in sensitive research programs, will cause financial repercussions that may make many colleges and universities uncooperative. The greatest hardship will likely be felt by elite STEM graduate programs, which have historically had a large number of students from China researching cutting-edge technologies and have been leading recipients of Chinese cooperation and funding. REF These changes are nevertheless necessary for the protection of U.S. institutions and intellectual property from the CCP.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage allied and partner nations facing similar threats to take action. There is already momentum building for such actions abroad, including in the U.K. REF Sharing information with allies and partners on the extent of Chinese influence operations within colleges and universities and coordinating best responses should be a priority. The U.S. will also have to work with international partners to prevent China from using other nations as conduits for Chinese agents aiming to infiltrate U.S. colleges and universities.

Crack Down on Illegal Chinese Police Operations in the U.S.

Issue: Chinese security personnel routinely conduct illegal operations in the U.S., making a mockery of U.S. sovereignty and violating the rights of their victims. REF These include actions under Operation Sky Net, a CCP campaign aimed at repatriating Chinese “fugitives” abroad, as well as broader surveillance and intimidation of Chinese students, activists, ethnic minorities, and others inside U.S. borders. Chinese agents often direct operations remotely from China, harassing their victims via social media, threatening their victims’ relatives in China, and hiring local thugs to stalk and intimidate their victims. Sometimes, Chinese agents visit the U.S. on tourist visas and conduct operations in person.

Chinese police departments have also begun opening overseas outposts in other countries, including the U.S. REF They are ostensibly designed to provide Chinese citizens with standard “clerical services,” but reports by human rights organizations have implicated these facilities in illegal law enforcement operations. REF The U.S. government is aware of these illegal activities, and as early as 2015 warned China to stop sending police officers on covert missions to the U.S. REF Nevertheless, U.S. law enforcement rarely prosecutes such activities. When it does, U.S. officials usually do not press charges until after the Chinese agents have returned to China, where they can continue to operate remotely and with impunity. REF Some of these operations are conducted from Chinese embassies and consulates in the U.S.

Action: The U.S. government must take China’s blatant disregard of American sovereignty seriously and take persistent, concrete action to convince Beijing that the costs of continuing these operations on American soil are prohibitively high. The Trump Administration’s forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas, in 2020 offered an important example. While it gave no specific reason, the State Department noted that China had “engaged for years in massive illegal spying and influence operations” and that the State Department made the move “in order to protect American intellectual property and Americans’ private information.” REF A whole-of-government response is needed, to include diplomatic pressure, legislation, and bold, consistent action by federal law enforcement to bring Chinese agents involved in these activities into custody.

Implementation: These efforts must be led by the executive branch, and officials up to the U.S. President must be willing to raise this issue frequently with their Chinese counterparts. U.S. law enforcement should recognize that Chinese agents do as much damage remotely in China as they do in America, and should take every opportunity to bring them into custody, even if it means luring agents implicated in such cases to the U.S. or countries with extradition agreements with the U.S. The Department of Justice should reinstate the China Initiative and ensure that the CCP’s repressive efforts in the U.S., which predominantly victimize Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals living in America, is a focus of that initiative. As most cases are never reported, the U.S. government must promote policies to help to educate Chinese immigrant communities in understanding their constitutional rights and opportunities to report malicious CCP activities without fear.

Impact: High-profile arrests of senior Chinese agents in the U.S. will impose costs on Beijing for continuing to conduct illegal law enforcement and intelligence activities on U.S. soil, as well as penalties for American collaborators with Chinese agents, although some may be unaware that they are collaborating with Chinese security services. The U.S. government must prepare for Beijing to retaliate through further hostage diplomacy and avoid the practice of trading CCP criminals for hostages.

Allies: China’s illegal police operations are a global phenomenon. U.S. allies and partners also struggle with these actions, and some—including Australia REF —have had residents of Chinese origin kidnapped on their own soil and smuggled to China by Chinese agents. U.S. leadership is crucial for showing the path forward in confronting this threat and spurring other countries to action.

Ban Dangerous Chinese Apps.

Issue: Chinese apps are widely used on digital devices in America. TikTok, for example, claims to enjoy150 million active users in the U.S. Capitalizing on the paralysis of U.S. regulators, Chinese app makers, such as ByteDance and Tencent, have abused an ever-expanding suite of applications used in the U.S. to obtain critical information on American citizens. On the surface, the activities of these Chinese firms differ little from those of American app makers, which also collect vast amounts of data. The risks posed by Chinese apps are much greater, however, due to China being an adversarial state and Chinese laws that require companies to provide data to, and cooperate in the intelligence work of, the Chinese government upon request. REF

China has already weaponized mobile applications as a tool for data harvesting and surveillance. Through exploiting weak security protocols on mobile app stores and the absence of real oversight, the CCP has infiltrated the mobile devices of over one hundred million Americans, gaining unfettered access to troves of personal data, including the geolocation patterns of Americans, keystroke logs, and sensitive login information. REF Analysts have identified these kinds of activities to collect and exploit data as integral to the Chinese methods of information warfare. REF Beyond data security and privacy concerns, the widespread adoption of CCP-controlled social media platforms in the United States represents a major national security threat. Today, TikTok is the most popular social media platform self-reported by U.S. teens and plays an increasingly prominent role in U.S. electoral messaging. REF Given the CCP’s leverage over ByteDance due to the aforementioned laws and a “golden share” of the company owned by a Chinese government entity, TikTok is an unacceptable vector for election interference, disinformation campaigns, and other malign intelligence-collection activities.

Action: The U.S. government should ban TikTok. In addition, the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce should institute a risk-based framework for assessing potential bans from the U.S. market on foreign-owned digital platforms that meet specific criterion for a national security justification. This action is vital to address malicious exploitation of Americans’ data and personal information as well as to mitigate impacts of potential foreign influence operations conducted by and on these platforms. Congress should also consider the merits of updating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. REF

Implementation: Congress should consider delisting applications that meet stated criteria via an agreed upon risk-based framework from app stores operating in the U.S. Under the authority of the powers given to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018, Congress should direct CFIUS to continuously review the activities of all Chinese mobile app companies and recommend specific apps to be banned on national security grounds. REF Some state governments have already acted. More than 20 states have banned or acted against TikTok in one form or another. REF Others should consider similar actions. At the very least, all levels of the U.S. government should immediately ban Chinese apps from devices used by government employees.

Impact: Banning Chinese apps that pose security risks will inhibit a key element of China’s information-warfare strategy against the U.S. The removal of these applications will also result in a more secure environment for consumers with better protections for their privacy and personal data. For too long, applications, such as ByteDance’s TikTok and Tencent’s WeChat, have successfully evaded regulatory action while collecting invaluable and incalculable volumes of sensitive American data.

Allies: In prohibiting Chinese apps with national security risks from operating in the U.S. the U.S. can share best practices with partners and allies. There is growing momentum for these actions. Other nations, such as India, have identified similar threats and risks, banning hundreds of Chinese apps in recent years. REF The U.S. should lead the charge among free nations promoting a comprehensive and cooperative effort to reform the mobile application markets and add stronger security protocols to digital marketplaces.

Engage State and Local Governments.

Issue: The PRC has engaged in systematic and aggressive influence operations at the state and local level that threaten U.S. interests. The CCP’s strategy for exploiting subnational governance to advance its objectives is led by its official foreign influence agency, the United Front Work Department (UFWD). The UFWD, through its various front organizations, including the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, has established an extensive network of associations, sister cities, cultural groups, friendship societies, and business forums in all 50 states.

In July 2022, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center issued a bulletin warning that “Leaders at the U.S. state, local, tribal, and territorial levels risk being manipulated to support hidden PRC agendas. PRC influence operations can be deceptive and coercive, with seemingly benign business opportunities or people-to-people exchanges sometimes masking PRC political agendas.” REF Furthermore, the U.S. intelligence community noted that “financial incentives may be used to hook U.S. state and local leaders.” REF The advisory concluded that “geopolitical reality has placed state and local officials in the United States on the front lines of national security.” REF

Action: The scope of CCP influence and activities at the state and local level are vast and complex, requiring a whole-of-nation effort to mitigate. “We must take this opportunity to expeditiously advise, inform and detail the threat to every fabric of our society and why it matters,” insists former director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, William Evanina. REF State legislatures bear significant responsibility for meeting this threat by formulating legislation to confront China’s influence in areas under their jurisdiction. Governors can also take executive action, including through the issuance of executive orders to address threats posed by the CCP at the state level. Mayors and local government officials need to remain vigilant and educated about nefarious CCP actions at the local level.

Implementation: State and local governments must address vulnerabilities that the CCP is exploiting. REF They must prevent Chinese companies from obtaining contracts to build critical infrastructure, resist purchasing Chinese products and technology that can pose espionage or national security risks, limit and roll back nefarious PRC activities on U.S. university campuses, encourage public funds—particularly pension funds—to divest from problematic Chinese entities, prevent the purchase of sensitive land or property near critical infrastructure or strategic farmland by PRC agents, and identify and halt lobbying of state and local governments by Chinese agents.

Impact: More robust state and local action will mitigate PRC efforts to exploit unprepared state and local government officials and regulations as the weak links through which to advance its broader aims in the U.S. and to exploit economic and national security vulnerabilities.

Allies: The U.S. government must share best practices in terms of state actions and lessons learned with friendly allied nations grappling with their own challenges related to PRC influence and activities at sub-national governance levels.

Prevent Malicious Land Use.

Issue: Undisclosed and unregulated investments in U.S. agricultural assets and acquisition of land by Chinese individuals, state-owned enterprises, or affiliated entities can present a national security risk. The greatest concerns relate to the purchase of land in sensitive areas, particularly near U.S. military installations and critical infrastructure. Since 2017, U.S. officials have “investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure…and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.” REF Yet, not all current and previous land purchases have been subject to adequate review. While purchases of land by Chinese actors remain limited, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) found that Chinese land investments in the United States grew from roughly 14,000 acres in 2010 to 194,000 acres in 2020—more than a tenfold increase. If joint ventures are included, the total exceeds 350,000 acres. REF

Action: Protecting U.S. military and critical infrastructure installations is of paramount importance. The PRC has a long and proven track record of taking advantage of American openness to conduct espionage activities and could leverage ownership of U.S. land in a variety of ways that are detrimental to U.S. national security interests. The U.S. must take additional measures to prohibit, limit, or scrutinize Chinese land acquisitions, particularly when they are located near sensitive U.S. facilities.

Several states already have various prohibitions, conditions, and disclosure requirements on foreign agricultural land ownership, but more must be done at both the state and federal level to harmonize and enforce the patchwork of legislation. REF That will require not only greater scrutiny of future investments, but assessments of past purchases as well. Effective action will also require a greater understanding of Chinese tactics to obscure financing and ownership structures that could pose national security risks or contribute to intellectual property theft and transfer.

Implementation: New federal and state reforms must require greater transparency of foreign agricultural and land purchases from countries of particular concern. This action must include additional information on downstream ownership mechanisms, and greater enforcement of penalties for non-disclosures. While CFIUS can seek input and data from the USDA, the USDA currently sits outside the formal review process. To counter downstream and convoluted ownership structures designed to obfuscate and circumvent restrictions, Congress should require that the USDA be included in the CFIUS process. The Department of Homeland Security should define and locate critical infrastructure that could be affected by proximity-based purchases of land near installations and military facilities of concern, coordinating with the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, and other departments or agencies as appropriate.

Impact: Mitigating threats from acquisitions of agricultural, industrial, and commercial property and other infrastructure in the U.S. by CCP-linked entities, including ventures with U.S. co-ownership, will reduce China’s ability to compromise U.S. security near sensitive infrastructure and military assets.

Allies: The U.S. should engage with allies and partner nations on this issue, raising awareness about the threats posed by Chinese land acquisitions, and encouraging them to conduct their own internal threat assessments and create their own review mechanisms. Information sharing among allies and strategic partners will aid in identifying problematic Chinese acquisitions and setting standards to identify Chinese exploitation tactics.

Ban CCP Lobbyists.

Issue: The CCP conducts widespread lobbying campaigns targeting U.S. officials and influencers at the federal, state, and local levels. While influence operations by foreign governments require disclosure under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), most of China’s lobbying activities are conducted indirectly, including through businesses, allowing lobbyists to skirt disclosure requirements under FARA. Chinese businesses tied to the CCP spend considerable sums on lobbying efforts and, in some cases, are represented by prominent former U.S. officials, few of whom are ever required to register as a foreign agent. REF These officials are often able to register under the more lenient, and less stigmatizing, Lobbying Disclosure Act, which is administered by House and Senate clerks rather than the Justice Department, which administers FARA. There is often confusion over who must register and under which regime, which has led to the underenforcement of existing laws.

Action: The U.S. government must seek to increase the transparency and accountability of the Chinese government’s lobbying activities in the U.S. and, where necessary, ban them outright. There is no constitutional prohibition against such action: Restrictions on some forms of lobbying activities by Americans are already in place. REF Furthermore, foreign governments, foreign political parties, and foreign corporations lack the same legal standing in the U.S. as their American counterparts, as indicated by the restrictions on their contributions to U.S. political campaigns. The U.S. government should also increase the penalties on U.S. citizens and non-citizens for failing to disclose foreign lobbying activities.

Implementation: Congress should ban lobbying by agents of the Chinese government. It should pass legislation that requires lobbyists representing Chinese government-controlled companies to register as foreign agents, as well as a law that prohibits foreign agents from lobbying representatives or agents of U.S. national or sub-national government entities on behalf of these companies or the Chinese government. Taken together, these actions would make it illegal for individuals—American or Chinese—to lobby the U.S. government on behalf of either the Chinese state or Chinese companies.

Impact: Prohibiting lobbying by Chinese agents—including agents of Chinese government-controlled companies—will reduce the amount of influence an adversarial regime can exert on local, state, and federal governments. It will not completely eradicate the problem, though. These measures will not prevent U.S. companies from lobbying the U.S. government on behalf of their China-related business interests. U.S. businesses frequently oppose U.S. actions that will damage their interests either directly or indirectly by inviting retaliatory action by Beijing, as is their right under the U.S. Constitution. Those rights would be unaffected by these recommendations.

Allies: Banning lobbying by agents of China will not significantly harm U.S. allies. Other countries would be unaffected and allowed to continue regular lobbying activities. These actions would set a precedent that some allied and partner countries might want to replicate.

Ensure Border Security and Immigration Enforcement.

Issue: The Biden Administration has an open-border policy that has facilitated illegal entry and presence in the United States. At the current pace of illegal immigration, the illegal population in the country will more than double by the end of Joe Biden’s term. These policies will negatively affect the U.S. economy in a variety of ways, from increased transnational criminal activity to drug overdose deaths, human trafficking, and massive additional burdens on U.S. taxpayers. In addition, open borders pose national security threats specifically related to China. These include China’s role in global drug trafficking, exploiting instability in the U.S. and Latin America caused by illegal migration, and using opportunities to undermine American security through its uncontrolled borders. The U.S. government should close loopholes in immigration law and policy that China is exploiting.

Action: The Administration must reverse its current open-border policies. The U.S. should move quickly to regain operational control of the border, blocking illegal border crossings, interdicting transnational criminal activity, and denying illegitimate asylum and refugee claims. Further, the U.S. must more aggressively enforce U.S. immigration laws and detain and deport illegal aliens as quickly as possible, in as large numbers as possible, to show consequences for illegal behavior in order to deter the flow of current and future illegal immigration.

Implementation: States and local governments should move aggressively to complement federal border and immigration enforcement. REF Congress must reassert its authority and undo much of the Biden Administration’s destructive immigration policies. In particular, Congress should insist on fully funding thorough border and immigration enforcement and explicitly reject amnesty for violators of immigration law. Furthermore, Congress should exercise more expansive oversight of federal activities as well as close loopholes in the system that have long been exploited by the cartels and human traffickers. REF Finally, the Administration should implement a full spectrum of reforms to ensure a secure border and regular legal immigration system. REF

Impact: Effective border and immigration enforcement will benefit the U.S. economically by significantly reducing unnecessary burdens on American taxpayers and the associated costs of criminal, drug, and human trafficking activity. U.S. national security objectives require a secure border.

Allies: The U.S. must insist on cooperation from other nations in combating human trafficking, illegal migration, and refugee and asylum abuse. In particular, U.S. policies must foster cooperation with Latin America that discourages illegal migration and combats transnational criminal activity. Further, the U.S. government should return to a requirement and enforcement of the “safe third country” concept. This means that a migrant fleeing his home country to protect his life must request that protection in the first safe country he enters, not traverse multiple countries to claim asylum in the U.S. Because the “safe third country” directly affects Mexico and Central American countries, the U.S. must also pursue new Asylum Cooperative Agreements with those governments.

Address China’s Role in the U.S. Drug Crisis.

Issue: China is contributing to a deadly drug crisis in the U.S. that is devastating American communities, harming the U.S. economy, and exacerbating national security concerns by facilitating transnational criminal activity and making the open U.S. border even more dangerous. In recent years, the U.S. homeland has been flooded with fentanyl, a synthetic opioid drug of Chinese origin that has 50 times the potency of heroin and 100 times the potency of morphine. REF Chinese fentanyl reaches American shores in two primary ways: as nearly pure fentanyl shipped directly from China and in much larger proportions as shipments of “cut” or diluted fentanyl manufactured by Mexican cartels using chemical precursors from China.

In 2019, authorities from the U.S. and Mexico seized enough fentanyl to kill the entire population of the U.S. more than three times over. REF Since then, things have only gotten worse, producing a crisis that has in a single year resulted in the death of more than 70,000 Americans. REF Although Beijing is very effective at controlling drugs within its borders, it lacks the same dedication when it comes to controlling the export of controlled substances to other countries. In 2019, China made a commitment to President Trump to schedule all fentanyl derivatives as controlled substances. REF This was important, as fentanyl, a synthetic substance, could be altered in minor ways to distinguish its chemical structure from pure fentanyl while retaining—or even enhancing—the same level of lethality and addictiveness. Yet, enforcement in China has been lackluster, as Chinese precursors remain the number one source of Mexican-developed fentanyl. REF

Action: The U.S. must adopt a family of policies and actions aimed at forcing China to end the export of dangerous precursor chemicals to Mexico. The U.S. should not allow the CCP to establish linkages between gaining China’s cooperation in drug trafficking—a responsibility Beijing already has—in exchange for U.S. cooperation on other issues.

Implementation: U.S. sanctions on China for non-compliance should be direct, punitive, and severe. The U.S. should sanction individuals and entities within China, Mexico, and the U.S. that are involved in enabling this drug trade and rigorously enforce the sanctions regime.

Impact: Preventing Chinese fentanyl precursor chemicals from reaching Mexico could substantially disrupt the production of fentanyl, significantly increasing the cost and decreasing supply. Reductions in drug-trafficking volume will help to address the U.S. drug crisis. In addition, by highlighting how the CCP is a “silent partner” in this deadly drug trade, the U.S. will diminish the legitimacy of China’s claim that it is a responsible global actor.

Allies: The U.S. must encourage its allies to schedule fentanyl, fentanyl derivatives, such as Alfentanil, Sufentanil, Remifentanil, and Carfentanil, and fentanyl precursor chemicals as controlled substances. While fentanyl serves an important function in hospital settings, the ease of abuse requires significant oversight in all nations. It will also be important to engage with other major drug-making countries, such as India, which have also begun exporting more precursor chemicals to Mexico to compete with Chinese companies.

Ban the Import and Sale of Chinese Manufactured Drones.

Issue: Aerial drones and other unmanned vehicles represent key present and future technologies with both significant military and economic implications. REF Most recreational and commercial drones used in the U.S. are manufactured in China and the associated operating systems are both impressive and troubling. REF A growing number of drones employed by federal, state, and local agencies are also Chinese origin. The collection capabilities of these systems have improved dramatically, as miniaturization brings capabilities once associated with large drones to those used for recreation. The data collected by those systems is stored on servers owned by Chinese corporations that are legally obligated to share that data with the CCP upon request, effectively giving the Party access to government, corporate, and private data on request. REF

The Chinese corporation Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) accelerated the introduction of these systems in April 2020 by providing drone-collection systems free of charge to 45 law enforcement and first responder organizations across 22 U.S. states during the COVID-19 crisis. Those “gifts,” along with hundreds of other purchased systems are now being used in major metropolitan areas to monitor every aspect of life in these cities. The data and images collected hold the precise location of critical infrastructure and other sensitive information, including the location of influential figures, their movements, and interactions. REF

Action: The U.S. government must prohibit any federal agency from purchasing, operating, or deploying Chinese drones, and it must encourage states and local jurisdictions to take the same preventive measures. Several bipartisan attempts have been made to prohibit the use of federal funds to purchase or operate unmanned aircraft systems made by foreign entities through language in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These amendments, however, were stripped out in the conference committee process. Language preventing federal government acquisition of these systems should be reinserted the next time the NDAA is re-authorized and signed into law. Once implemented, Congress should task federal agencies with educating officials at the state and local level about the goal of both preventing the purchase of future systems and removing existing platforms.

Implementation: In anticipation of a legislative solution, the White House should implement a ban on the federal purchase and use of Chinese drones through executive order. The ban could include exceptions for agencies capable of significantly altering the operating code of these systems to ensure that they can no longer transmit data to entities accountable to the CCP. Once the ban is in place at the federal level, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security should present briefings to state and local entities and compel them to take similar actions.

Impact: Although Chinese attempts to infiltrate data portfolios and information systems within the U.S. will continue, eliminating drones will significantly reduce their collection capabilities and the associated threat to the US. Further, the banning of drones will highlight the broader risks of doing business with technology companies linked to the CCP.

Allies: The precedent set by a U.S. drone ban could influence allies and strategic partners to take similar measures to protect their own vital security interests. This could also stimulate more global competition, innovation, and development in drone technology and a more robust and resilient industrial base.

Pr otect the U.S. from Life Science and Biotechnology Threats.

Issue: China has one of the world’s most advanced life sciences research and development (R&D) enterprises and is striving to become the world’s biotechnology leader. Chinese civilian and military institutions are engaged in national security–related work in life sciences and biotechnology programs that could threaten U.S. and global security. The Pentagon has already registered concerns about Chinese biotechnology developments, especially in several life sciences subfields, including precision medicine, biological warfare, enhanced soldier performance with gene-editing technologies, and human–machine teaming. REF

China, according to the U.S. Defense Department, also continues to develop “biotechnology infrastructure and pursue scientific cooperation with countries of concern.” REF Previous security issues and leaks of pathogens at medical research labs REF and continuing questions about the origins of COVID-19 highlight additional risks associated with this work. Finally, China possessed a biological weapons (BWs) program from the 1950s to the late 1980s that Beijing still refuses to acknowledge, REF and questions remain about China’s compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Action: The U.S. must significantly limit dual-capable life sciences technology transfers to China, especially biotechnology, for national security reasons. These prohibitions should include stricter “guardrails” on technology transfers, greater transparency of approved transfers, and greater oversight of academic and commercial joint R&D in life sciences and biotechnology with Chinese entities. Finally, the intelligence community must increase attention and resources dedicated to Chinese military and security-related R&D in the life sciences.

Implementation: Congress should appoint a blue-ribbon commission of security-cleared, non-governmental experts to assess the military-related life sciences and biotechnology threats emanating from China and the U.S. This assessment should serve as the basis for an updated framework of controls and counter actions. A final report should include public policy recommendations to mitigate conceivable threats and an unclassified report for public consumption. Congress should provide oversight, including additional resources and authorities needed for the intelligence community to properly evaluate these threats. For example, the CIA’s recent creation of the China Mission Center and Transnational and Technology Mission Center REF should address these biotechnology threats as part of a broader focus on addressing dual-use life science threats. Finally, the executive branch should consider additional appropriate International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions specifically aimed at China.

Impact: Decisive action could help to prevent more severe future biological and technological threats. The CCP has identified life sciences and biotechnology as critical for future strategic dominance. U.S. leadership in the science of biotechnologies and protection of intellectual property and research will undercut Beijing’s plan to both dominate the global biotechnology and life science industries and to weaponize these capabilities as national security threats.

Allies: In concert with like-minded international partners, the United States should pressure China to comply fully with the BWC and challenge Chinese leadership positions under the BWC while these questions linger. Finally, the U.S. should halt or restrict Department of Defense and National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding for overseas research partners involved in programs that could contribute to a Chinese BW program. The United States should establish further ties with international partners on life sciences R&D while sharing, where applicable, intelligence on Chinese efforts to obtain military and national security–related life sciences technology from leading institutions globally.

Strengthen t he U.S. Economy.

Issue: America enjoys a stronger and more vibrant free-market economy than China yet has consistently squandered its economic advantages. The U.S. enjoys an enormous domestic consumer market; advanced technology research, development, and expertise; and deep, low-cost capital markets. China takes advantage of these American strengths, sending its citizens to be trained in America’s world-class research institutions, legally and illicitly obtaining advanced U.S. technology, and raising capital in America’s financial markets. The stock of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. stood at $1.5 trillion in 2021, REF dwarfing domestic Chinese IPO issuance of just $58 billion that year (with an additional $13 billion in Hong Kong). REF

However, some of America’s economic advantages are rapidly fading. Since 2000, the U.S. real GDP growth per capita has slowed by nearly half compared to the previous 50 years to just 1.1 percent per year. REF Washington’s failure to implement pro-growth policies has squandered opportunities to take advantage of President Xi’s economic mismanagement, which has dramatically cut China’s own growth rates. REF

Action: To outcompete China, the U.S. must pursue pro-growth economic policies that can simultaneously meet unprecedented federal debt obligations while fully funding U.S. defense requirements and sustaining the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency. Tax reforms, long-term entitlement reforms, restrained discretionary non-defense spending, and relief from growing regulatory burdens are essential reforms to ensure that the U.S. economy can outcompete China’s for the foreseeable future.

Implementation: America cannot prevail without reforming an unsustainable social welfare state and dismantling a spending model that is on course to cripple America’s economic foundations. While taxes on business and investment were eased during the Trump Administration, policymakers must oppose efforts by the Biden Administration to raise them again. REF Meanwhile, the current explosion in business regulations, particularly mandates in environment and energy, as well as labor, ESG, and equity, must be reversed. REF Further, the U.S. Congress must return to producing annual budgets aimed at systemic reductions in debt and deficit spending. REF

Impact: Beyond strengthening U.S. leverage against China, pro-growth policies strengthen America’s negotiating position with other countries, including in market-access negotiations across Europe and Asia. Furthermore, pro-growth policies buttress America’s international influence and coalition-building efforts by combating perceptions of the U.S. as a declining power incapable of sustaining a long-term competition with China while making America a more attractive partner for friendly capitals and trading partners.

Allies: The U.S. is the top export market for a wide variety of U.S. allies and partners, and robust U.S. growth benefits their economies as well. As the size and gravity of the U.S. economy expands, it draws trade and investment away from adversarial regimes. Stronger growth also allows the U.S. to offer more credible alternatives to emerging markets and developing economies, building responsible economic partners for U.S. workers and producers. Strong trade ties between free-market nations can complement national security objectives. Expanding economic freedom helps to create a community of nations with shared interests, including protecting their right to exchange goods, services, and ideas freely.

Ensure Reliable Semiconductor Supply Chains.

Issue: Semiconductors, also known as microchips, are omnipresent, critical to the function of every electronic device from smartphones to fighter jets. As a result, semiconductors are vital to U.S. national security and economic prosperity. Secure supply chains of critical goods are especially vital during war time and war mobilization, including in any potential conflict scenario in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, semiconductor supplies are vulnerable to disruption. The geographic distribution of critical semiconductor supply chains is heavily weighted toward East Asia. Taiwan alone accounts for a disproportionate share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity: Taiwanese company TSMC fabricates 92 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, with South Korean company Samsung accounting for the remaining 8 percent. REF

The PRC, meanwhile, is investing considerable resources in expanding its own semiconductor production capabilities. Beijing’s Made in China 2025 plan sets goals for China to achieve 70 percent self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2025, although to date Chinese companies have faced considerable challenges in realizing these ambitions. COVID-19-related disruptions demonstrated that fragile supply chains can threaten the resilience of many economic sectors. Although calls for more diversified and secure supply chains are increasingly bipartisan, effective solutions have been lacking. The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act passed in 2022, for example, fails to address this issue comprehensively. REF

Action: The U.S. must ensure that developments in U.S. industrial policy address the national security and competitiveness shortcomings of the CHIPS and Science Act. The U.S. should increase American competitiveness by cutting red tape, removing regulatory burdens, reducing federal spending, reforming the tax code, and addressing delays at the federal, state, and local levels. In particular, the U.S. should remove punitive taxes on investments that expand the economy. Returning to allowing full and immediate expensing of R&D and capital expenditures would foster expanding opportunities to advance manufacturing and research and development in the U.S. In 2022, TSMC announced a new $40 billion investment to build a second semiconductor-chip plant in Arizona. REF Productive efforts such as this will be greatly facilitated by pursuing pro-growth tax reforms. An absence of reforms to remove burdensome and punitive taxation on investments and business operations will hinder any effort to stop offshoring of U.S. industrial capacity to China.

Implementation: Congress must eliminate security loopholes and add additional oversight mechanisms in the funding and execution of the CHIPS and Science Act. REF Additional investments in counterintelligence education and capabilities will reduce insider threats and legal and illegal technology transfers that boost the PRC’s semiconductor industry. Congress should further improve the tax environment for capital investments for semiconductors where current recovery periods heavily disadvantage the construction of commercial infrastructure, such as chip fabricators. Pro-growth tax and regulatory reforms would incentivize semiconductor reshoring, encouraging companies to move manufacturing to the United States. Furthermore, Congress should instruct the Development Finance Corporation—an institution created ostensibly to promote strategic investments to counter the PRC—to prioritize foreign investment support in sensitive high-technology sectors where China is gaining ground, such as semiconductor supply chains.

Impact: Securing reliable semiconductor supply chains will mitigate a critical U.S. national security vulnerability and improve self-reliance and sustainability for strategic industries. It will prevent China from weaponizing semiconductor supply chains (as it did when it restricted rare-earth exports to Japan amid geopolitical tensions in 2010) and build resilience and flexibility in America’s industrial base while creating high-quality manufacturing jobs and facilities in the U.S.

Allies: The U.S. should pursue further bilateral and multilateral trade initiatives to enhance semiconductor supply-chain resilience. Encouraging allies and like-minded partners to harmonize export-control measures to deny the CCP advanced semiconductor technology with those of the United States should be a diplomatic priority. The U.S. government should further diversify the technology industrial base by pursuing arrangements with strategic partners, such as Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Finally, Taiwanese firms should be encouraged to continue building more resilient industrial capacity and infrastructure, including through making new investments in semiconductor production capacity inside the United States.

Secure Critical Mineral Supplies.

Issue: China’s domination of the critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs) supply chains is a core vulnerability that threatens U.S. national and economic security. REEs can be found in everything from mobile phones to nuclear-powered submarines and fighter aircraft. In 2021, the Department of the Interior identified 35 minerals as critical to sustaining America’s national defense, economic growth, and manufacturing base. REF The U.S. is 100 percent dependent on imports for at least 20 of them. REF According to the International Energy Agency, although China only has around 36 percent of the world’s REE reserves, REF it controls more than 70 percent of the world’s extraction capability and nearly 90 percent of processing capacity. REF

Action: The U.S. must reform the permitting process and update federal and state regulatory policies to allow additional mining production without compromising air and water quality standards. At present, it can take up to a decade for a new REE mine to receive government approval. REF Excessive red tape, including one dozen major environmental statutes and competing federal, state, and local rules, inhibit U.S. competitiveness. REF The U.S. already has the means to more cleanly process and handle waste from REE mining and processing than China. Thus, U.S. recalcitrance is a greater environmental threat than expanding mining operations in America.

Implementation: The U.S. must reform outdated federal and state environmental statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act, eliminating redundant state regulatory barriers while maintaining commonsense environmental standards. This should include prohibiting pre-emptive and retroactive vetoes under Section 404 of the CWA, empowering states to manage their water resources, preventing abuse of Section 401 of CWA for non-water matters, and significant reforms to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). REF The federal government must also identify and account for all land subject to administrative withdrawal for critical mineral mining purposes and streamline fruitful underwater REE mining potential. Further, as a report by the Congressional Research Service concludes, it is unclear if production and process independence “could be achieved relying on markets alone.” REF The U.S. should be prepared to use tariffs for national security reasons to ensure that materiel vital to the U.S. military can be sourced domestically and from strategic allies.

Impact: Proactive policies can help to counter China’s use of REE as leverage over the U.S. and other countries with significant economic and national security implications. Alongside its international partners, the U.S. will be positioned to build a more resilient, environmentally friendly, and secure supply chain of critical minerals. Not only would China’s leverage over U.S. supply chains be reduced, but these efforts would support a resurgent manufacturing and industrial base. Domestic mining and processing of REEs protects U.S. industries, the Armed Forces, and consumers from potential supply shocks from adversaries, ensuring a more stable and resilient economy and robust military capabilities.

Allies: Critical minerals are a crucial issue for U.S. partners and allies. China will continue to seek to drive a wedge between America and its allies by leveraging its dominance in critical mining and processing markets. Partners and allies should embrace actions that, with U.S. leadership, break Chinese bottlenecks. Major consuming economies are seeking more resilient suppliers. Producing countries are also concerned about their environmental conditions and economic opportunities. They should see U.S. willingness to mine and produce as a signal to upgrade their own competitive efforts. In turn, the U.S. will need to work closely with allies, including Quad partners, Canada, Mexico, and those in South America, Africa, and Europe, to collectively diversify REE processing. The executive branch should use Development Finance Corporation authorities more proactively and direct financing support toward critical mineral development and processing capabilities in allied and partner nations. REF

Risk-Manage Inbound Investment.

Issue: According to a report requested by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinese foreign direct investment in American companies peaked at more than $15 billion in 2015. REF Yet, an independent accounting that tracked Chinese money funneled through third countries showed the true figure to be closer to $53 billion. REF Wary of capital outflows, the Chinese government began cracking down on “irrational” outbound investment in 2017.

In 2018, the U.S. Congress implemented significant reforms to the regulator for inbound investments under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to strengthen and modernize CFIUS. REF Among other things, the reforms added protection of personal data as a criterion for CFIUS to review transactions. REF By 2021, the annual volume of inbound investment from the PRC was estimated to have fallen to below $2 billion. REF Some asserted that a tighter review of Chinese investments would harm the American economy. There has, however, been no noticeable impact so far. Moreover, allies did not rush to court investments blocked by the U.S.; rather, they upgraded their own review mechanisms. REF In that regard, CFIUS reform was a success. However, the U.S. government’s foreign investment review process can be strengthened further to address CCP threats. While large-scale Chinese spending in the U.S. has substantially declined, Chinese investments in the U.S. with national security implications remain an ongoing concern.

Action: The U.S. must improve review of and strengthen control over inbound investments from China. Among other things, CFIUS must address the lack of information about China’s participation in private-equity deals, where an American entity is the lead but a substantial Chinese stake in the investment could result in access to sensitive technology or data. Addressing this challenge requires a combination of better monitoring capabilities and harsher penalties. PRC greenfield investments REF in the United States that present national security concerns must also be subject to CFIUS review. While FIRRMA requires mandatory CFIUS review over transactions involving emerging and foundational technologies, REF the Commerce Department is solely empowered to implement this provision of the law and has refused to do so. Other CFIUS members, such as the Department of Defense, should be granted authority by Congress to assert that a technology meets the FIRRMA criteria.

Implementation: Congress must add regulation of private equity and venture capital financing for designated “countries of concern” and sensitive transactions as already defined in the 2018 CFIUS reform. U.S. companies deliberately concealing Chinese participation in this subset of activities should face severe penalties. The U.S. must enhance situational awareness of potential threats by re-establishing and refocusing the Department of Justice’s China Initiative. REF The executive branch should direct the Department of Commerce’s more than 100 offices across the U.S. to educate state and local government investment offices about the threats and risks of Chinese investments. Finally, new legislation should define critical sectors, and CFIUS should review acquisitions by countries of concern to ensure that they do not compromise supply-chain integrity in these sectors. This legislation should expand CFIUS review to cover PRC greenfield investments and ensure that Congress’s intent to require CFIUS review for emerging and foundational technologies is implemented.

Impact: Fixing loopholes in the CFIUS process and ensuring proper implementation of the legislative intent of FIRRMA will protect the country from national security threats emanating from CCP investments that continue to exist following the 2018 passage of FIRRMA.

Allies: The U.S should consult with allies on the oversight of critical sectors and protecting supply chains from malicious Chinese investments. The U.S. should continue to encourage other nations to establish CFIUS-type mechanisms of their own, while pressing them not to allow these tools to be manipulated to create non-tariff barriers to legitimate and competitive trade and investment or hinder joint national security and defense ventures with partners and allies. The U.S. government must also work to ensure that problematic private-equity transactions denied by the U.S. government do not simply shift to allied jurisdictions.

Protect Intellectual Property.

Issue: China engages in wide a range of malicious cyber activities ranging from espionage and information warfare to potential threats to national infrastructure. REF Of perhaps greatest concern, China’s ongoing intellectual property (IP) theft stifles innovation and creates opportunities for the CCP to exploit U.S. government and private-sector data for significant economic gain and threaten U.S. national security. In 2022 alone, Chinese-sponsored hacking groups compromised hundreds of gigabytes of sensitive information in the U.S. REF China’s expansive IP theft operations are estimated to cost the American economy upwards of $600 billion annually. In addition, Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE use their technology infrastructure to illegally capture the corporate data of U.S. companies and the personal data of Americans. REF China also utilizes bulk data collection to steal American IP. REF Finally, China seeks to dominate the U.S. in the future information-warfare competition by seeking an overwhelming advantage in the application of emerging technologies in AI and quantum computing.

Action: The U.S must substantially limit the employment of Chinese technology in the U.S. that could pose national security threats and expand prohibitions on outbound investments in Chinese military-related and surveillance-related companies by prohibiting joint ventures and R&D partnerships with Chinese state-owned entities in these fields. REF The U.S. must expedite the development of countermeasures to thwart emerging Chinese AI- and quantum-related security threats. The U.S. should also expand cooperative action with allies to ban the import of Chinese technologies that pose espionage and national security threats.

Implementation: Congress should direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to review and reject approvals for the export of advanced technology equipment to Chinese state-linked entities more aggressively. Regulators must better define the term “sensitive data” to include “personally identifiable information” and “geolocation data,” limiting the commercial transfer of such data to Chinese entities. These actions would also prevent further proliferation of Chinese tech products that facilitate corporate espionage. REF

To address future threats, the U.S. government should expedite post-quantum cryptography plans, beginning with rapidly identifying public-key cryptography and how it is used within government agencies. While experts lack consensus on when the cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will become capable of breaking public-key cryptography, there are legitimate concerns that China or another state-based adversary may acquire these capabilities before the U.S., exposing it to massive risks. This is a significant concern and should be a priority for action.

Impact: The U.S. government has a responsibility to help to ensure that foreign adversaries do not rob American citizens and American firms of the fruits of their labor. The actions outlined here will help to ensure that the creative spark of the American people is not dimmed by the PRC. These policy proposals are measured and targeted to prevent the CCP from stealing valuable American IP without inhibiting the engines of the U.S. economy or harming America’s trading partners. Greater IP protections will complement other policies in this Special Report to drive economic growth and retain America’s leadership position in the global economy.

Allies: The U.S. should coordinate measures with allies and partners to prevent the adoption and proliferation of Chinese technologies that jeopardize the sensitive data of both the private and public sector. The U.S. should expand its Clean Network initiative and promote world-class digital trust standards. REF In the ever-evolving digital environment, cooperation with allies will be a critical aspect of preventing Chinese dominance of future technology sectors. REF

Promote “Reshoring,” “Nearshoring,” and “Friendshoring.”

Issue: The U.S. is overly dependent on China for imports of a wide variety of vital goods. China supplies 90 percent of the raw materials used in antibiotics, 80 percent of rare earth minerals, and 72 percent of America’s smart phones. REF Excessive interference in business operations by Chinese regulators has made disruptions of critical supply chains more common in recent years, as seen in the shortages of pharmaceuticals and other goods caused by COVID-19 lockdowns in China. Furthermore, China has repeatedly shown that it is willing to weaponize economic interests to punish or coerce uncooperative countries. REF Should Chinese authorities temporarily disrupt activity in key manufacturing plants, critical U.S. supply chains could be disrupted. Additionally, prices for imported goods could skyrocket and Americans could be denied access to everyday essentials. These risks would grow exponentially in the event of armed conflict with China.

Action: To enhance U.S. national security, the U.S. government should proactively encourage businesses operating in strategically relevant fields to move operations out of China and work toward “reshoring” supply chains back to the U.S., “nearshoring” to countries in the Western Hemisphere, or “friendshoring” to allies, partners, and non-adversarial countries. To be clear: This targeted decoupling is just one tool at America’s disposal, and not an economic strategy. Decoupling is a defensive measure, not an offensive weapon. In the most sensitive sectors, these efforts must be undertaken irrespective of the short-term, medium-term, or even long-term financial costs. Decoupling actions are critical to reducing dependence on unreliable supply chains; eliminating opportunities for strategic blackmail or disruptions to the U.S. economy; disengaging with entities conducting predatory practices, human rights abuses, and other malicious actions; and ensuring reliable alternatives for strategic materials, technology, goods, and services.

Implementation: The U.S. government should provide comprehensive assessments to U.S. firms highlighting the strategic risks of doing business in and with China, both in articulating concerns and helping to develop responsible alternatives. U.S. actions must be deliberate, systematic, sustained, and sequenced. For critical industries vital to U.S. national security and economic well-being, the U.S. government must be prepared to employ punitive policy measures to enforce compliance, including sanctions and entity-list restrictions. Congress should establish authority for “specific U.S. entities or U.S. entities operating in specific sectors to divest in a timely manner.” REF

Where large, complex supply chains cannot be speedily redirected without irreparable harm, firms should receive time to complete their supply-chain restructuring. The process should mitigate costs and disruptions to U.S. firms, if possible. Fully switching the U.S. tax system to a territorial system would remove penalties present in the current U.S. tax system that can leave assets stranded in countries such as China. REF In some cases, companies may not need to cease operations in China altogether. There is no single model for executing decoupling. The U.S. must take a risk-management approach.

Impact: The U.S. must strengthen the resilience of the American economy by mitigating China’s ability to harm U.S. security and business interests through coercive measures. China will have less economic leverage to wield against the U.S. in response to bilateral tensions, while U.S. businesses will reduce vulnerability to coercive Chinese measures. Foreign countries that benefit from friendshoring and nearshoring operations will have new opportunities and incentives to do business with the U.S. and, presumably, less incentive to turn to China for economic opportunities. Strategic decoupling from China also maximizes the benefits of free, fair, and open-market practices for U.S. businesses in proven, stable, and friendly markets. China will not allow businesses to decouple easily—trade restrictions and punitive responses should be expected.

Allies: Partners are essential for any successful decoupling and friendshoring measures. Public and private U.S. entities need to proactively coordinate with foreign countries that can serve as new destinations for American financial and physical investments. A number of developing countries are uniquely positioned to secure increased investments from the U.S. in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Friendshoring will benefit partner nations by bolstering trade and investment ties, as well as their domestic economic capacity. REF

Reject Damaging Environmental, Social, and Governance Policies.

Issue: U.S. financial institutions have strong financial incentives to pursue ESG policies that strengthen China and weaken the U.S. They are incentivized to do so by progressive interest groups and “blue states” who use their status as market participants to pressure financial institutions to push ESG goals, such as “net-zero” carbon emissions. REF Net zero requires companies to phase out fossil fuels, which increases dependence on a Chinese government that controls the supply chains for key components of renewable energy. REF Thus, ESG is not simply an instrument promoting social justice, it is a political agenda with implications beyond domestic politics or the environment. ESG policies represent a framework of potentially destructive policies that undermine U.S. foreign and national security policies and America’s capacity to safeguard vital interests. Increasing dependence on China, and a Chinese climate industry rife with forced labor, is at odds with responsible corporate governance.

Action: Legislators and regulatory agencies should adopt policies that discourage ESG compliance in ways that benefit the CCP. Private-sector companies should scrutinize corporate governance and business practices and their implementation of ESG. Congress should establish legal mandates that prevent state and federal agencies from imposing regulatory requirements that make critical infrastructure or a company’s supply chain more dependent on China.

Implementation: Actions to stop the weakening of the United States through the adoption of ESG policies include enforcing existing legal duties to prevent financial services from being used to promote net zero and other ESG goals, establishing new state and federal legal obligations that discourage ESG compliance that aids China, enhancing scrutiny of ESG ratings and preventing regulators from taking actions that promote ESG scores, and encouraging states to prevent the imposition of net-zero policies.

These actions are critical because the market concentration of large financial institutions means that they can shape corporate behavior and function as quasi-regulators. Such proactive measures can be undertaken through educational briefings and partnerships with state Attorneys General, Treasurers, Governors, and state and federal legislators.

Impact: Proactive counter-ESG policies will boost U.S. economic growth and promote energy independence, both of which are vital to success in outcompeting China. Further, diminishing the influence of ESG policies will reduce dependence on China, diminish CCP manipulation of the topic, and reverse poor public policy.

Allies: ESG policies are increasingly prevalent in friendly and allied nations and can represent risks to their economic well-being, corporate governance, and energy security. The White House should direct U.S. federal agencies to educate foreign governments, the private sector, and civil society about CCP manipulation of ESG issues. Further, the U.S. government should adopt a proactive strategy to resist and combat harmful ESG activities promoted by international and multinational institutions.

Address Energy and Climate Challenges.

Issue: China has an aggressive energy consumption agenda and an abhorrent environmental record. Its energy and climate policies are designed to fuel rapid domestic economic growth, exploit the West’s obsession with the transformation to green energy, and expand China’s power and influence. China is a major investor, consumer, and producer of energy and environmental technologies at a scale that influences global markets. REF Despite being the world’s largest polluter, China also enjoys the favorable terms and flexibility afforded to developing nations under international climate and finance bodies. REF Prior U.S. governments have approached climate negotiations with China naively, allowing Beijing to block any effective verification or enforcement provisions while expanding greenhouse gas emissions and claiming credit as a responsible champion of the environment. Beijing has also sought to force the U.S. to make geopolitical concessions on trade, human rights, and transparency in order to “earn” China’s cooperation on climate change. REF Finally, Beijing has aggressively pursued traditional energy investments abroad while supporting U.S. and European mandates, regulatory standards, and subsidies that force a transition to renewable energy and electric-vehicle technologies dominated by Chinese firms. REF

Action: The U.S. government must discount the climate agenda as the organizing principle governing foreign and domestic energy policy. America must reorient its energy policy away from pursuing a “net-zero” economy and toward ensuring reliable, affordable, and abundant energy (ideally with ample domestic supplies) for the American people. Critical actions include eliminating arbitrary, self-imposed restrictions that impose competitive disadvantages for no environmental benefit; reducing domestic dependencies on China for energy and transportation technologies; eliminating the more than $250 billion of newly enacted green energy–related tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA); enacting tax reform that would lift burdens from investments that would strengthen the ability of American companies to meet global energy needs; and increasing global energy supplies to mitigate adversarial countries’ leveraging of energy markets for political ends.

Implementation: The U.S. must eliminate the special treatment of China, as well as domestic energy policies that reduce American competitiveness, while strengthening partnerships with allies and trading partners. Because many renewable energy technologies and components come from China, the executive branch and Congress must ensure compliance with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) of 2021 and strengthen its implementation. The UFLPA prevents American entities from purchasing Chinese goods produced in Xinjiang prison camps. Congress must repeal and replace policies seeking to force a costly and ineffective transition away from conventional energy to renewable energy as enshrined in the Paris Agreement. This includes the Biden Administration’s regulatory agenda restricting numerous aspects of energy exploration and production, from financing and private-sector investment to pipeline construction and operation, and consumer use. REF

Congress should also address outdated statutes and regulations that subsidize certain energy technologies, inhibit efficient distribution of energy, and block access to domestic resources. REF Finally, the U.S. should continuously highlight China’s abhorrent use of forced labor in the energy-technology sector as well as find innovative ways to highlight China’s poor environmental stewardship, as former U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman did when he directed the U.S. embassy in Beijing to publish daily data on air-quality readings in the Chinese capital. REF

Impact: Implementing dramatic changes to energy policy will support American energy security and dramatically increase U.S. capacity to influence global energy markets, as well as deliver more resources and means to address climate and other environmental concerns. At the same time, these actions will undermine Chinese efforts to exploit Western economies and end its abuse of claiming “developing nation” status to skirt its responsibilities.

Allies: The U.S. can build international consensus for actions by emphasizing how America will contribute to energy security for partners and allies, increase prosperity, and address China’s human rights abuses and its poor track record on reducing emissions, all while delivering better environmental outcomes. Strengthening partnerships with allies requires modifying protectionist policies, including eliminating tariffs and trade barriers that target allies. This includes domestic content requirements on steel, timber, minerals, semiconductors, shipping, vehicles, and biofuels. REF The U.S. should also improve energy trade across North America, permitting efficient energy-infrastructure projects (such as pipelines, export facilities, and transmission lines). Finally, the U.S. should encourage energy diversity and production of global energy resources, including nuclear energy, and extend technical, regulatory, and legal support for European nations to use hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling technologies. REF

Promote Good Corporate Governance.

Issue: U.S. businesses have for decades actively contributed to China’s rise, at times putting their own long-term economic welfare and U.S. national security at risk. REF U.S. corporations operating or investing in China face risks of espionage, IP theft, and state administrative sanctions. In many cases compensation and reporting structures incentivize companies to transfer technology to China and increase dependence on Chinese supply chains. U.S. corporations also must navigate a growing web of U.S. government sanctions on China. REF Finally, there remains significant risks that U.S.–China geopolitical tensions could escalate, which could devastate businesses exposed to the Chinese market. While U.S. business decisions should be sensitive to market forces and responsibilities to shareholders, properly balancing national security and profitability is also necessary and will ensure long-term stability for U.S. companies operating in the international market.

Action: U.S. corporations should meet their fiduciary responsibilities by adopting specific measures to create greater awareness of the threats of doing business in and with the PRC and mitigate the risks of enriching CCP-linked entities in critical strategic sectors. Shareholders should be aware that the longer U.S. corporations engage with and support such CCP-linked businesses, the more likely they are to suffer adverse consequences and risk endangering national security and American economic interests.

Implementation: U.S. companies with significant China exposure should be encouraged to select leadership and board members who understand the geopolitical context of the China challenge and recognize that incorporating national security considerations in their corporate governance practices is in the long-term interests of shareholders. Corporate boards should consider the following steps: diversifying critical supply chains by beginning to move production out of China, diversifying export markets to reduce CCP leverage over their decision-making, refusing deals that involve exposing or transferring advanced U.S. technology or trade secrets to any CCP-linked entity, rejecting ESG and DEI compliance measures that undermine U.S. competitiveness REF and advantage Chinese competitors, and applying due diligence to prospective employees and counterparties that may have connections to the CCP. Finally, given the stakes involved, corporate leaders operating or investing in sensitive industries should not wait until the government forces them to divest or take associated protective measures.

Impact: Reducing economic ties with China in critical sectors will enhance the long-term profitability, mitigate risks of espionage and IP theft, and reduce sanctions-related economic disruptions. Additionally, the U.S. will reduce strategic vulnerabilities caused by dependencies on Chinese markets and supply chains. As corporations adopt policies that safeguard their entities from CCP influence, both the entities themselves and U.S. national security will benefit from more secure investments.

Allies: U.S. corporations are uniquely positioned to lead globally, combating the CCP’s economic exploitation tactics. The substantial influence and economic power of U.S. business may encourage allies and partners that may be hesitant to implement their own economic safeguarding measures to follow America’s lead. Furthermore, as U.S. corporations look for new markets, allies and partners can benefit from U.S. nearshoring and friendshoring operations.

C. Reorient America’s Defense Posture

Recalibrate America’s Defense Posture to Meet the China Threat.

Issue: China is building the capacity to diminish and overcome U.S. means of strategic and conventional deterrence. REF If successful, China hopes to “win without fighting,” deterring the use of U.S. military force in the Indo–Pacific or, if necessary, prevailing in a conventional conflict, including in the Taiwan Strait. REF A regional conflict between China and the U.S. would be disastrous with significant human and economic costs, disrupting supply chains, the energy trade, and other critical economic activity. Deterring a regional conflict will require robust capability to operate in the maritime and air domains (subsurface, surface, and air) as well as conducting supporting operations in space and cyberspace and on land.

As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) rapidly modernizes, the U.S. Navy remains unprepared for protracted great-power conflict, with an aging fleet of fewer than 300 ships. REF The PLAN’s expanding fleet, by contrast, already exceeds 350 ships, even as the CCP enjoys an advantage over the U.S. in enlisting civilian or commercial vessels and its “maritime militia” for quasi military activities. As a result, the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific is fading. This is not a problem that can be solved only by “pivoting to Asia.” REF The preponderance of U.S. Navy assets, more than 70 percent by some estimates, are already positioned in the Indo–Pacific. However, U.S. Air Force assets, particularly fighter, bomber, and air-refueling squadrons remain in short supply in the region.

Action: China has an advantage in purchasing power parity and a robust defense industrial base. REF The U.S. must adopt a cost-imposing strategy that pairs significantly expanding asymmetric U.S. and allied naval and air capabilities with greater efforts to outcompete China economically. Preparing for regional contingencies and deterring China from taking provocative military actions will require additional warships, aircraft, and munitions, paired with an effective deterrence strategy. The U.S. will also require a more capable industrial base to enhance the U.S. naval fleet’s performance at sea, as well as increasing production of the F-35 and B-21 aircraft.

Implementation: The U.S. government must make it a priority to reduce the longest lead time for delivery, enhancing naval warfighting capacity through expanded shipbuilding. To leverage the savings inherent to making large block purchases and economies of scale, Congress should craft a Naval Act of 2023. This one-time legislation would authorize and appropriate the funds necessary for a large block purchase of naval assets for a total of $152.3 billion before anticipated savings. REF Ships covered by this purchase would only be those with approved, stable designs and that are in production today at numbers already stipulated in the current approved Future Years Defense Program that runs through 2027.

Impact: Establishing a modern Naval Act would provide industry with the predictability to make needed infrastructure investments and increase the workforce, creating a virtuous cycle of follow-on effects in improving maintenance and repair capacity. As a discrete legislative act, it would draw attention to a vital national security priority while not competing directly with other military service budget needs. A modern Naval Act, echoing the nation’s historic success in preparing for war in the Pacific during World War II, would galvanize meaningful action.

Allies: Effective deterrence with an undersized U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force necessitates allied support and combined action as the U.S. rebuilds its naval and air forces. This will include greater access to each other’s shipyards for repairs and sustainment of deployed operations. At a minimum, other key allies in Pacific warfighting scenarios include Japan, and potentially the Philippines, as well as Pacific Island nations to secure critical transpacific sea and air lines of communication.

Restore Conventional Deterrence in the Indo–Pacific.

Issue: The unquestioned military advantage that the U.S. enjoyed in the Indo–Pacific for decades following World War II has atrophied significantly. Today, it is uncertain whether the U.S. military can present a credible conventional deterrent against the PLA in the near future. Indeed, there are growing concerns among U.S. defense planners and experts that the U.S. military may prove unprepared to win a regional conflict with the PRC, including a conflict over the Taiwan Strait. The next several years—before the U.S. delivers critical military platforms to Taiwan—present an elevated risk for the U.S. and Taiwan. Preparedness acts as the strongest deterrent against Chinese aggression, yet the PLA’s modernization has left U.S. forward-deployed and rotational forces potentially overmatched in the first island chain.

Action: The United States should immediately adopt and resource a strategy of deterrence by denial against the PLA. REF This will require disciplined prioritization, advantaging improvements to U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific over competing objectives in other theaters. This strategy must also account for the possibility that attempts to deter an invasion could fail, providing adequate resources and capabilities to sustain and win a longer-term conflict if necessary.

Implementation: The Administration and Congress should prioritize providing the U.S. Indo–Pacific Command with the funding and capabilities identified as requirements in the Commander’s annual independent assessment under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Additionally, the Pentagon should prioritize the Indo–Pacific for rotational deployments necessary to backfill any capabilities removed from the region, a need highlighted recently by congressional concern over the removal of F-15 squadrons from Okinawa. REF The Pentagon and State Department should make the realization of a more distributed and resilient force posture a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy.

The Pentagon should accelerate efforts to expand basing in the Freely Associated States of the Pacific Islands, and the State Department should undertake a major effort to solidify America’s alliance with the Philippines, with the goal of regaining the ability to operate from the Philippines in a regional contingency, which will prove invaluable in any China conflict scenarios. To counter the PLA’s massive advantage in ground-based missiles, REF the U.S. government must make determined efforts to develop and regionally deploy ballistic and cruise missiles formerly prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Impact: Apart from reducing near-term risks of conflict, the decades of stability and peace in the Indo–Pacific underwritten by U.S. military strength not only served American and allied interests, but also helped China enrich to itself. Restoring conventional deterrence in the Indo–Pacific is the surest way to extend this peace dividend and avoid a PLA fait accompli over Taiwan, or any armed conflict with China, for that matter.

Allies: A more credible U.S. conventional deterrent would reassure U.S. partners and allies in the region. While allied forces cannot replace the need for the United States to implement a strategy of deterrence by denial, the U.S. should lean on allied capitals to complement and enhance this strategy, particularly through expanded access to local military and logistics facilities and through the hosting and deployment of ground-based missiles.

Enhance Nuclear Deterrence.

Issue: China is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces as part of what U.S. senior military leaders have defined as a “strategic breakout.” REF China is building hundreds of new missile silos capable of carrying its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and is projected to have at least 1,000 nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, and 1,500 by 2035, which roughly equals the number deployed by the United States. REF China is also upgrading its arsenal qualitatively, with around 900 nuclear-capable missiles in the Indo–Pacific capable of striking Guam with precision. By contrast, the United States does not base nuclear forces in the Indo–Pacific. REF China is also developing novel technologies, including a fractional orbital bombardment system armed with a hypersonic vehicle, a technology not found in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. As a result, China has rapidly become a peer nuclear competitor to both the United States and Russia. REF

Action: The United States must strengthen its nuclear forces to maintain a suitable level of nuclear deterrence amid rapid gains in China’s nuclear arsenal. Currently, U.S. nuclear forces are sized only to deter Russia—not both Russia and China at the same time. When decisions were made regarding the future of U.S. nuclear forces under the Obama Administration, policymakers were not expecting a Chinese nuclear expansion of this magnitude. REF As a result, current U.S. nuclear modernization plans will not suffice to deter two nuclear peers at once, and the United States will need to bolster its nuclear forces in response.

Implementation: First, the United States should increase the size of its nuclear arsenal by preparing to more quickly utilize its capacity to transfer additional warheads to deployed forces in crisis scenarios and by planning to procure more modernized nuclear systems than initially planned. Second, the U.S. needs to develop additional capabilities tailored specifically to deter China. Investing in the development of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) would mark an important first step. Third, the United States should seek to accelerate timelines for developing new warheads and increase production of plutonium pits for storing nuclear warheads. REF

Impact: Enhancing U.S. nuclear forces will strengthen deterrence by enabling the United States to demonstrate to the PRC that during a crisis or conflict, escalating to the nuclear level would be disastrous for Beijing. It will also help to prevent Chinese nuclear coercion. With a stronger nuclear force and posture tailored to the unique Chinese threat, the United States can disabuse China of the notion that it can continue to engage in nuclear blackmail or coercion toward the U.S.

Allies: China’s nuclear expansion threatens the credibility of U.S. commitments to extended deterrence for its regional allies. The U.S. government must continue working with allies through extended deterrence dialogues to ensure that they do not feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons of their own, an outcome that would run contrary to long-standing U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

Urgently Increase Munition Production and Arm Taiwan.

Issue: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that America’s defense industrial base is not currently capable of producing munitions at a sufficient rate or quantity. This failure is most concerning for Taiwan’s defense, as it has rendered the foreign military sales (FMS) process—the only mode of U.S. military support to Taiwan beyond training––unreliable. While successive Administrations have continued to announce high-profile sales to Taiwan, few of the capabilities that Taiwan has purchased in recent years have actually been delivered. REF Many of the most critical capabilities to defend against PLA aggression, such as Harpoon missiles, are still years away from delivery. Taiwan’s Harpoon purchase likely will not be fully delivered until at least 2029.

Action: The Administration must deliver critical munitions to Taiwan as soon as possible, as current delivery timelines stretch beyond when the PLA will reach a 2027 deadline reportedly set by General Secretary Xi to be prepared to wage a successful invasion of Taiwan. In the medium term and the long term, a whole-of-government effort will be necessary to revitalize the defense industrial base and ensure that the United States is able to produce munitions at the levels required for great-power competition.

Implementation: When the Administration sends capabilities that are backlogged for Taiwan to other places, it should be required to justify the decision to Congress with full transparency about the trade-offs to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Suggestions that future military aid to Ukraine will not impact Taiwan REF ignore the additional stresses on the defense industrial base and obscures the higher opportunity costs of arming Taiwan with depleted U.S. stocks. The executive branch should use the drawdown authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to arm Taiwan with critical munitions to fill the gap left until delayed FMS platforms are delivered.

Impact: Failure to deliver munitions that Taiwan has purchased undermines U.S. credibility as a defense partner and can heighten the threat of PLA aggression across the Taiwan Strait. Addressing the shortcomings of U.S. munitions productions with short-term and long-term solutions would help to repair the damage and enhance deterrence of the PLA.

Allies: U.S. allies and partners manufacture defense systems relevant to Taiwan’s defense that may not be available from U.S. sources. They should be encouraged to sell or otherwise transfer such capabilities to Taiwan without regard to PRC opposition. In some cases, it may be appropriate for the U.S. to purchase the defense material from third parties and sell or transfer it to Taiwan.

Foster Innovation in the U.S. Maritime and Shipping Sectors.

Issue: An uncompetitive and outdated shipbuilding and shipping sector diminishes U.S. competitiveness, undermines the resilience of the economy, constrains the nation’s ability to mobilize and sustain a wartime economy, and meet the U.S. Navy’s global responsibilities. Furthermore, it inhibits U.S. prosperity, hindering transportation-intensive strategic industries including energy and heavy manufacturing. Passed more than 100 years ago, the current legislative framework governing the commercial maritime space, the Jones Act, has severely restricted the U.S. maritime industry’s ability to modernize. REF Since 2000, the paucity of U.S. shipyard capacity and expeditionary battle-damage repair capacity has resulted in prolonged delays in warship production and sustainment. REF Several key U.S. ports have seen historic shipping backlogs REF and are hobbled with protracted labor negotiations. REF

Action: The U.S. government should create domestic commercial–military naval infrastructure that can foster a sustainable competitive advantage in American shipbuilding, shipping, and logistics. Such an initiative would have the additional benefit of jump-starting the U.S. economy. Revolutionizing American shipping and shipbuilding industries will enhance America’s ability to compete with China globally and meet urgent military logistic needs, in addition to making the U.S. an even larger global logistics hub.

Implementation: Congress should repeal and replace the antiquated Jones Act with a naval act that makes American shipping globally competitive. Doing so would ensure adequate sealift for the U.S. Navy while creating a new paradigm for domestic shipbuilders and supply-chain innovation. Greater free-market competition will offer superior results even as it accommodates national security protections. Technological developments will bring a revolution in shipping on the scale of the container shipping revolution of the 1950s. REF The U.S. must be on the cutting edge, including developing the capability to secure bulk, containerized, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargo on a competitive commercial basis. Any revolution in shipping must consider redesigning twenty-foot-equivalent unit (TEU) containers, opening new more competitive means of managing, packaging, and shipping goods.

Additive manufacturing, such as computer-aided-design hardware and software, will be a crucial enabler, supporting both defense and commercial efforts in reducing costs and delivery delays and lowering transportation capital investments. REF Novel means of distributed production must be included in future naval logistics ship designs, leveraging best practices from the commercial sector and providing incentives for American private-sector innovation. In addition, the U.S. should develop new capabilities for aerial vertical cargo lift to reduce dependence on ports and rail. Finally, new shipbuilding must be paired with expanding U.S. maritime constabulary capability, ensuring that the ability to expand the U.S. maritime economy is matched by the means to safeguard assets and interests. REF

Impact: Fostering an American revolution in shipping can energize a lethargic industrial sector and serve as a deterrent against Chinese economic coercion and military adventures abroad.

Revitalizing the U.S. maritime industry would both boost the economy and expand the defense industrial base. Positioning the U.S. at the cutting edge of shipbuilding innovations will advance U.S. security and prosperity.

Allies: Allies and partners increasingly anxious about China’s expanding naval capabilities will be reassured by a renewed U.S. shipbuilding industry capable of increasing the quality and quantity of American naval platforms and enhancing its ability to export warships and auxiliary naval vessels to allies and partners. Other nations will also be eager to leverage new technologies, platforms, and processes wrought by a revolution in American shipping and shipbuilding.

Align National Security Spending with National Security Priorities.

Issue: Successive U.S. Administrations have repeatedly identified the PRC as the United States’ top national security challenge, and the Indo–Pacific as the most important theater for countering that threat. The 2022 National Defense Strategy explicitly states: “The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo–Pacific region…. The PRC presents the most consequential and systemic challenge.” Meanwhile, the Defense Department will be “prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo–Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.” REF

Nevertheless, the U.S. government has struggled to shift diplomatic and defense spending priorities to align with these threat assessments. Across the last three presidential Administrations, the U.S. diplomatic budget, which funds all tools of American statecraft short of military force, has allocated less than 10 percent of foreign assistance to the Indo–Pacific region each year. In fiscal year (FY) 2021, both Africa and the Middle East each received roughly five times the Indo–Pacific’s share of U.S. foreign assistance spending. REF The U.S. defense budgeting process has done a better job of providing the resources necessary to assert U.S. power in the Indo–Pacific, but significant shortcomings remain.

Action: Congress should require the Administration to produce budgets that reflect the current national security threat environment, rather than repeating the inertia of past budgets. The U.S. should organize foreign assistance in a way that advances U.S. national interests in its priority theaters, counters America’s highest-priority threats, and achieves tangible and measurable outcomes.

Implementation: Congress should require the Administration to produce a plan to double the share of foreign assistance spending in the Indo–Pacific within two years, bringing the Indo–Pacific to approximately 15 percent of annual foreign assistance spending. If the Administration fails to do so, Congress should reorient foreign assistance through the appropriations process, rather than continuing to appropriate strategically deficient budget requests from the White House with only incremental changes.

As a part of this process, Congress should consider establishing an Indo–Pacific companion to the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account, which provides a dedicated line item in appropriations legislation. Furthermore, Congress must fund the Taiwan security assistance programs authorized in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which the FY 2023 omnibus bill failed to do, while renewing Compacts of Free Association with the Pacific Islands nations of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

Impact: Taxpayer funds entrusted to the government are not infinite and should be managed in a way that reflects the nation’s top priorities. The CCP seeks hegemony in the Indo–Pacific, and it is a national security imperative to sustain partnerships and alliances in the region and to promote diplomatic and economic alternatives to countries seeking alternatives to Chinese regional hegemony.

Allies: Reorienting U.S. spending for the Indo–Pacific will strengthen the American allies and partners on the front line of the CCP’s territorial aggression and hegemonic ambitions. The United States can offer the region capabilities that no other country can provide, such as the ability to significantly boost the maritime law enforcement capacity of South China Sea claimant states under duress from China’s “maritime militia.” At the same time, the United States still lacks critical capabilities that are necessary for great-power competition in the 21st century, including the ability to offer alternatives to PRC-provided infrastructure with strategic implications. Appropriately prioritizing limited resources for the Indo–Pacific will strengthen U.S. allies and partners by leveraging comparative advantages and addressing America’s diplomatic, military, and economic shortcomings in the region.

Expand Export Controls.

Issue: America should not be exporting technology to China that makes the PLA more capable; threatens the security of the U.S. or its allies and interests abroad; or contributes to the CCP’s human rights abuses. From surveillance data to hypersonic missile components, the U.S. has for too long assisted the CCP in achieving its technology-related objectives. REF Beijing’s aggressive quest to acquire U.S. technology through illicit means is a serious problem compounded by the wholly inadequate measures taken by the U.S. government to stop it.

In 2018, the U.S. Congress voted to restrict “foundational” technology exports to China REF but the executive branch still has not carried out its mandate. REF Implementing authority for export controls lies with the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which has a history of prioritizing export revenue over national security. In 2022, the BIS acknowledged that it had failed to designate a single foundational technology as controlled, despite legislation instructing BIS to do so. REF Nevertheless, in 2022, Congress announced new export controls on high-end chip technology, with promises of more to follow. REF It remains to be seen whether the BIS will implement these controls as the BIS has in the past ignored congressional oversight requests in contravention of the 2018 export-control reform law. Compounding the problem, the scarce data available shows that the BIS approves almost all transactions with malign PRC entities even when controls are in place. REF

Action: The U.S. must develop a more systemic and disciplined approach to export controls that eases barriers to sharing technology with critical allies and denies important dual-use technologies to China. Congress must apply greater scrutiny and oversight to the BIS and require the agency to be transparent about licensing decisions for PRC entities that present national security threats. Congress should require the Department of Commerce to explain, not simply assert, the legal justification for setting aside the 2018 congressional mandate on foundational technology export controls. Congress should apply the findings of this enhanced oversight to fundamentally revamp the export control system in light of the national security threat of the CCP’s military-civil fusion efforts and effective control of all economic entities in the PRC.

Implementation: Federal agencies do not have authority to overrule or ignore legislative guidance to protect the national interest from a threat like the CCP. REF The BIS should provide written justifications and public testimony to relevant congressional committees on previous and future rulings on granted licenses subject to the 2018 mandate. After a review, Congress should decide if transferring export-control authority elsewhere is warranted. Among other options, one legislative proposal introduced in Congress in 2022 would transfer export-control authority from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Defense. REF In the interim, Congress should mandate the regular release of licensing data for malign PRC entities on the Commerce Department Entity List. Congress should also authorize at least one national security agency in the export-control license decision-making process to veto license approvals to malign PRC entities.

Impact: More aggressive implementation of strategically targeted export controls against China will invariably create short-term and medium-term economic disruptions. Some firms will see deals scuttled, operations impeded, and drops in revenue or stock prices. It is worth the cost. The CCP has already turned against China’s own tech innovators REF and the party distrusts large private firms. REF Without ready access to American technology, China could face the same dilemma that confronted the Soviet Union, unable to keep pace technologically with the United States. Expanding export controls, combined with new U.S. investments in defense capabilities, promoting domestic economic growth, and cooperating more with allies could dramatically reverse the relative gains that China has made in the past decade and further tip the balance of military and economic power in America’s favor.

Allies: For U.S. export controls to be successful, American partners and allies must also limit Chinese access to advanced technology with dual-use applications. Export controls can be limited in scope: Only a few countries have products at the top of the value chain and restrictions can be narrow. But they must resist growing pressure from a Chinese state determined to gain access to their technology. In the immediate term, it should be a top foreign policy priority of the U.S. government to ensure that the controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment in other high-end producers, such as the Netherlands and Japan, align with U.S. actions.

Moving forward, the U.S. must set an example, and American firms must be willing to accept lost corporate profits, in service to the national interest. If necessary, the U.S. must also be willing to apply secondary sanctions to companies from friendly countries if they are involved in high-tech transfers to China. Such secondary sanctions will involve applying foreign direct product rules protecting U.S.-origin technology and barring transactions with firms that offer sanctioned technology to China and other countries of concern. REF Finally, the U.S. must ensure that export controls do not do active harm, such as not slowing down military joint-development projects with allies, including in the AUKUS initiative, to co-develop submarines and collaborate on other defense industrial initiatives. REF

Restrict Outbound Investment into China.

Issue: For decades, U.S. investments in China have empowered the CCP, undermined American security and prosperity by eroding its industrial base, and created profit-seeking constituencies in the U.S. that are financially incentivized to contribute to the CCP’s economic goals and are opposed to more forcefully confronting Beijing. Of greatest concern are material investments in China by U.S. actors that endanger U.S. national security. The U.S. government currently lacks adequate tools and transparency for assessing national security risks engendered by outbound American investments in China or the appropriate mechanisms to manage them.

The U.S. Treasury Department currently lacks comprehensive data on the amount of U.S. money invested in China and how those funds are being used. Thus, the U.S. government is unable to determine how much investment is supporting capabilities and companies that are detrimental to U.S. national security, let alone take decisive action to address this problem. What is known, however, is that the scale of U.S. investments is massive. In 2020, the stock of American portfolio investment in China (excluding Hong Kong) stood at $1.15 trillion. REF Not all this capital outflow is helping to strengthen Chinese military capabilities or aiding in the repression of the Chinese people—but even 10 percent of that total exceeds $100 billion. Furthermore, there are Chinese companies facing U.S. sanctions that can still freely receive American funding. REF

Action: As a moral and practical matter, the federal government should encourage state governments and private entities to divest away from China. Investments with direct implications for U.S. national security should receive first priority, but any investment that benefits a regime with an abhorrent human rights record should be heavily scrutinized. The U.S. government should insist on greater disclosure by American funders of significant investments to countries of concern, beginning with China. Existing tools, such as the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List are neither designed for, nor capable of, answering the scale of this challenge. Congress must establish a review process that focuses first on advanced technology with implications for U.S. national security.

Implementation: For large-scale investments in critical economic sectors, in accordance with guidelines established by Congress, the U.S. government should require American entities investing in China to submit information on their counterparties and anticipated use of funds for approval prior to investing, under a presumption of denial. This process must cover joint ventures with PRC entities. Penalties for circumvention, such as routing through offshore financial centers, should be severe.

Impact: These actions will impose costs on China, denying it access to critical resources and capabilities that can threaten the U.S. and harm American interests. They will dampen China’s global reputation and attractiveness as a target of foreign investment.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage partner and allied nations to implement their own outbound investment controls; however, the U.S. should take the lead. As American (and Australian) leadership against CCP-controlled 5G networks showed, it is possible to convince aligned capitals that they, too, should refrain from financing Chinese investments in sensitive technologies, such as genetics, high-end semiconductors, and other capabilities that have significant national security and economic implications.

Counter Xi’s Big Data Ambitions.

Issue: The threat of CCP-controlled apps operating in the U.S. is one part of a larger national security challenge stemming from the CCP’s ambition to dominate big data. In 2013, Xi told the Chinese Academy of Sciences: “The vast ocean of data, just like oil resources during industrialization, contains immense productive power and opportunities. Whoever controls big data technologies will control the resources for development and have the upper hand.” REF This philosophy informed the CCP’s industrial policy laid out in the Made in China 2025 initiative which prioritizes the storage, management, and accumulation of vast quantities of bulk data.

Xi and the CCP understand that in the 21st century, big data is irreplaceable fuel for critical technologies, economic competitiveness, and national security applications. Accordingly, China seeks an upper hand over this resource not only through its illicit activities, but by exploiting commercial data while walling off China’s data from reciprocal access. REF

Action: The U.S. should significantly reduce data flows from the United States and allies and partners to entities that are based in China or answer to the CCP and seek to diminish CCP efforts to block China’s data from the rest of the world. These measures should be guided by commercial reciprocity, as the PRC restricts some transactions of data that is stored in the U.S. China’s legal framework and the CCP’s leverage over economic actors in the PRC means that any sensitive data can be accessed or co-opted by the party in malign ways.

Implementation: In the immediate term, the Department of Commerce must begin robust implementation of executive orders relating to the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain, including by publishing and enforcing final ICTS supply-chain regulations. Proper implementation of the initial executive order on the ICTS supply chain, dated May 15, 2019, REF should entail the blocking and unwinding of transactions that cause large amounts of U.S. data to flow to the PRC.

CFIUS and other investment review mechanisms should prohibit the transfer of large amounts of data to PRC entities, and the U.S. government should seek to prohibit any U.S. entity from aiding the CCP’s data localization efforts. Congress should enact a personal data privacy law to protect Americans’ privacy, reform sanctions laws to ensure that relevant data flows can be blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and legislate to extend export controls over commercial transfers of data which threaten national security.

Impact: Curtailing the flow of U.S. data to PRC entities would blunt the CCP’s espionage activities, protect Americans’ privacy, counter the CCP’s predation on the United States for commercial advantage, and mitigate national security threats. Halting contributions to the CCP’s big data ambitions is consistent with American values, as AI-enabled technologies reliant on vast data sets are crucial to the CCP’s efforts to implement a draconian police state, including its genocidal programs in Xinjiang.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage its allies and partners to take similar actions to stop the nonreciprocal flow of data to CCP-controlled entities. As evidenced when several allies adopted investment review mechanisms in the years following CFIUS reform in the United States, American leadership can help to spur allies to action.

Address China’s Abuse of the World Trade Organization.

Issue: China’s violations of its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments have led to calls from U.S. Members of Congress for the United States to review the U.S.–China Relations Act of 2000 that granted China permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. REF Since its ascension to the WTO in 2001, China has routinely violated its WTO commitments, costing U.S. businesses, U.S. workers, and the U.S. economy dearly. By one estimate, the U.S. manufacturing industry has lost 2.8 million jobs to China since its WTO ascension—nearly 75 percent of the 3.7 million total jobs lost since then. REF

Despite U.S. victories against China in WTO litigation, the CCP has demonstrated a history of making cosmetic changes to ensure narrow compliance rather than reforming the underlying economic policies that violate the spirit of the WTO. REF The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) REF and Congressional–Executive Commission on China have produced more than 100 examples of lamentable Chinese economic and human rights practices. REF China’s PNTR status, however, limits the U.S. government’s ability to hold China accountable.

Action: The U.S. government should make the case that China has violated the 1999 Agreement on Market Access between the PRC and the U.S., as well as its WTO accession commitments, including its commitment not to condition approval of foreign investments on “the transfer of technology.” REF The U.S. government should consider the merits of suspending PNTR status for China.

Implementation: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) should conduct a comprehensive review of China’s compliance with its WTO commitments, as recommended by the USCC. REF Supporting evidence, such as previous USTR assessments REF and WTO rulings, should be included. REF If the USTR assesses China to be noncompliant, Congress should consider legislation to revoke PNTR status. Should legislation be signed into law, Congress could develop conditions for reconsidering China’s PNTR status. H.R. 7193, the China Trade Relations Act of 2022, REF and S. 785, the China Trade Relations Act of 2021, REF offer potential templates for action and implementation.

Impact: Action on China’s PNTR status would underscore the United States’ shift away from an engagement-first model while forcing China to re-evaluate its exploitive economic practices. China could well respond with tariff escalation and other retaliatory action on U.S. trade and investments. Before revoking PNTR status, Congress should produce a report that assesses the potential economic impact and explore ways to mitigate effects on American businesses and consumers.

Allies: Although the U.S. can unilaterally revoke PNTR, it would be advisable to consult with allies. American leadership on combating China’s economic violations should inspire other states to consider revoking their own “most favored nation” designations for China. Due to China’s global economic reach, allies may be reluctant to join the U.S. On the other hand, if revocation were executed in concert with the other economic initiatives in this plan, the cumulative effect would create more momentum for others to follow the U.S. lead and create more economic opportunities for friendly and allied nations.

Make Limited Use of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers.

Issue: In the 21st-century global economy, American consumers have benefited from low tariffs. American firms, through exporting goods to other countries and importing low-cost, high-quality industrial inputs to bolster U.S. manufacturing, have benefitted when other nations have reduced their tariffs. While that generally remains the case today, China poses a unique set of challenges. China’s 2001 entry into the WTO opened its market to foreign trade and investment, resulting in lasting disruptions to the U.S. labor market and the entanglement of supply chains. REF

At the same time, the CCP failed to implement robust reforms to its state-led economic system while taking advantage of the global free-trading system. China’s economic policies and currency-manipulation tactics have distorted markets beyond its borders. To date, tariff and non-tariff actions have failed to address the underlying problems and in some cases U.S. tariffs have needlessly increased costs for Americans and harmed relationships with friends, allies, and key trading partners. For instance, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 championed by President Biden included several measures criticized by partners and allies. REF

Action: Tariffs have long been a tool for U.S. foreign, national security, and economic policy and have acceptable applications vis-a-vis China when employed in specific, targeted ways to respond to direct national security threats or in response to egregious Chinese trading practices and non-tariff barriers. The use of punitive tariffs to combat unfair trade practices and protect U.S. national security is consistent with U.S. obligations as a member of the WTO and the principles of the international trading system routinely violated by Beijing. REF

Implementation: The U.S. government should be less risk-averse in implementing and enforcing tariffs to punish Chinese predatory behaviors and facilitate the reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring detailed earlier. Tariffs, however, are no panacea and can be a double-edged sword. To ensure continued growth and prosperity, the U.S. must equally focus on unleashing the power of America’s greatest comparative advantage against China: the ingenuity and work ethic of its people. To support American workers, the U.S. government must eliminate and lower regulatory barriers, cut taxes, carefully consider intermediate goods tariffs, and rein in government spending. These measures can restore vitality to the American economy and will mitigate the economic burdens of imposing tariffs and Chinese retaliatory countermeasures.

Impact: Tariffs can reduce China’s access to American markets and the U.S. should anticipate a symmetrical response from Beijing. The CCP is likely to respond with its own tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as measures to punish U.S. companies engaged in business with or in China. Negative impacts on the U.S. economy can be mitigated or offset with reforms in domestic economic policies, such as pro-growth tax and regulatory reforms. REF

Allies: China’s coercive economic practices are common concerns for the United States and its allies. As opposition to unfair Chinese trading practices grows, the United States must work with allies to develop pragmatic ways to impose costs on Beijing and restructure global value chains. An inability to provide substitutes will make it challenging for allies to fully support U.S. actions against China’s market distortions. The U.S. must make clear to international partners that it is narrowly focused on advancing free and fair international trade and punishing illiberal economic policies practiced by the CCP.

Hold China Accountable for Its Role in the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Issue: The coronavirus that caused global economic recession and tremendous human suffering and loss of life originated in China. While the evidence pointing to a “lab leak” from one of the Chinese facilities in Wuhan that was experimenting with novel coronaviruses has strengthened with time, there may never be definitive proof of the virus’ origins, in part due to the Chinese government’s destruction of evidence and obstruction of any impartial investigation. REF It is nevertheless clear that the Chinese government’s initial cover-up, delayed response, opacity, and stonewalling of independent investigations into the virus’s origins contributed to the spread of the disease and caused countless casualties. REF The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) response to the COVID-19 pandemic was also inexcusably poor, exposing itself as vulnerable to politicization and coercion from the CCP.

Action: The U.S. should use its influence and leverage to improve focus, effectiveness, and accountability at the WHO and support alternative frameworks to accomplish the essential mission of international cooperation for pandemic detection and response. Although conclusive evidence on the origins of COVID-19 is unlikely to appear anytime soon, recent congressional studies illustrate that there is more to be learned. REF The U.S. should continue to investigate the origins of COVID-19 through its own initiatives and advocate a truly independent, international investigation both to advance the principle of accountability and to better prepare for the future. REF A new draft pandemic treaty under consideration called “WHO CA+” fails to adequately address China’s intransigence, and the Biden Administration should reject it. REF

Until a transparent and thorough investigation is conducted with full Chinese cooperation, the U.S. should suspend funding and cooperation with Chinese laboratories on biomedical research. In addition, funding for the WHO should be conditional on continued and objective investigations into the origins of the disease. International efforts to bolster pandemic detection and response, whether by updating the International Health Regulations (IHRs) or through a new pandemic treaty, should require full transparency and cooperation with regular international assessments of facilities and, should an outbreak occur, an unbiased international inspection by experts.

Implementation: U.S. leadership is vital to ensuring that the international pandemic response framework prevents the type of non-cooperation that China practiced during COVID-19, at great cost to the world. To address global pandemics, an impartial and science-oriented international health framework is vital to protect the American people and U.S. interests. The U.S. should propose an international framework that champions new standards for pandemic detection and response while respecting U.S. sovereignty. REF Accountability is also important: China faced no consequences for its lack of transparency and cooperation on COVID-19. This creates perverse incentives for the future. The CCP’s mishandling of COVID-19 has been historically disastrous and consequential, but accountability is vital for more than just addressing past misconduct. Understanding COVID-19’s origins is necessary to mitigate future dangers. The U.S. government must pursue accountability as the basis for enhancing the IHRs that currently govern pandemic detection and response.

Impact: These steps are essential to protecting the U.S. economy and the American people from future shocks emanating from these threats. The U.S. government should also force China to incur greater reputational costs for its malpractice early in the pandemic. Unless the U.S. applies strong diplomatic and financial pressure, pushes for greater accountability, and works closely with allies to effect change, the current system will remain inadequate and unchanged when the world confronts its next global pandemic.

Allies: Every nation should have a strong interest in ensuring robust international cooperation in the ability to detect, respond to, and suppress communicable diseases. Since most decisions in international organizations are adopted by a majority or super majority, the U.S. should focus on rallying support from other governments to address these vulnerabilities. U.S. policies should emphasize proactive mitigation measures rather than intrusive measures that would undermine national sovereignty, personal liberties, or create intrusive and burdensome requirements on international travel.

Expose CCP Inf luence over U.S. Cultural Institutions.

Issue: Enterprises that shape and influence American culture—such as Hollywood studios and sports leagues like the NBA—are popular in China, earn considerable revenue for the CCP, and have courted significant investments from Chinese entities. At times, these linkages have made U.S. cultural enterprises unwitting, and sometimes witting, partners in Chinese censorship and oppression. In some cases, owners and investors have additional business interests tied to China and the CCP that influence their behavior.

Beijing manipulates these entities by coercing or enticing the leadership into censoring speech and content in ways that benefit the CCP. For example, the NBA in recent years silenced athletes and franchise owners who spoke out against Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang or in support of the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. REF For Hollywood, the size of China’s movie market and the difficulty getting a film approved for screening in a country with hypersensitive censors and a strict quota on foreign films results in self-censorship by studios, as well as expensive measures to infuse movies with narratives that will appeal to the CCP. REF

Action: The United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party should organize public hearings to shine a transparent light on the ways in which the CCP coerces U.S. firms operating in China to avoid falling afoul of the CCP’s policies and priorities. The committee should exercise its subpoena powers to force senior executives of U.S. firms and cultural enterprises to explain to the American public the ways in which they have been coerced to meet censorship demands and questioned on cases in which they engaged in blatant self-censorship. Congress should also consider legislation that would authorize corporations and businesses that are in, or that affect, interstate commerce to establish best practices so that they can publicize CCP attempts to influence their business decisions. Finally, U.S. civil society should mobilize to bring greater transparency to CCP influences over U.S. cultural institutions. REF One example of civil society mobilization is The Heritage Foundation’s China Transparency Project, a network of open-source information documenting the nefarious domestic and foreign activities of the CCP. REF

Implementation: The federal government should take the steps noted above to shed light on the problem of Chinese influence operations. Philanthropic institutions should support transparency efforts. Institutions that address, educate, and advise on corporate governance should develop and promote proposals to address Chinese malicious influence and manipulation tactics. These proposals should make clear that they are addressing activities and influence by a threatening adversarial power and are not intended to discriminate against ethnicity or any specific group of persons.

Impact: Such measures might reduce cases of censorship by Chinese authorities and cultural entities consulting with Chinese authorities on content. At a minimum, they will educate the American audience about how the CCP seeks to manipulate U.S. businesses to serve its geopolitical agenda. In addition, greater transparency of Chinese influence over U.S. cultural entities and the national security implications will help to make censorship on Beijing’s behalf reputationally harmful for businesses in these sectors.

Allies: Beijing conducts similar activities in countless countries, seeking to manipulate cultural businesses into self-censorship on matters related to the PRC. From South Korean movie studios and record companies to European soccer leagues, cultural enterprises from around the world have had their financial interests in China held hostage by the CCP for political reasons. REF The U.S. should share its best practices with others, as well as situational awareness on CCP activities and practices.

Combat Malicious CCP Activity in International Organizations.

Issue: The U.S. and other global capitals hoped that China’s integration into the international system would “liberalize” China. Instead, China has sought to reorder the international system to its benefit and manipulate the United Nations and other international organizations from within to advance CCP interests. REF Over the past two decades, China has substantially expanded its influence in international organizations in ways that have undermined U.S. interests, the global rule of law, and international norms, such as on human rights. REF These efforts are at odds with the stated principles of the U.N. and the interests and values of America and like-minded countries. Should China succeed, the United States will face an even steeper uphill battle to ensure that international institutions adhere to their founding principles and promote the norms and policies that have led to transformative developments throughout the world to advance freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity.

Action: The U.S. should launch a focused campaign, in concert with partners and allies, to counter Chinese-led policies and initiatives that infringe on U.S. interests or violate the founding principles of the U.N. and other international organizations. In general, the U.S. should oppose Beijing’s preferred candidates to lead certain international organizations. Similarly, the United States should more vigorously highlight China’s hypocrisy and regular violations of international norms by pressing for investigations into its human rights practices and seeking to expel it from bodies like the Human Rights Council.

The U.S. government should conduct a detailed assessment of China’s expanding reach in international organizations and the tactics it deploys to exert influence and advance its preferred candidates to leadership positions, sharing its findings and coordinating with partner capitals to counter those efforts. The U.S. should contest the PRC’s distortion of Resolution 2758 as a core element of its engagement with the U.N. and also advocate Taiwan’s participation in an array of appropriate international organizations. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should target international organizations whose responsibilities affect key U.S. interests and challenge Chinese nominations that will threaten U.S. interests in the respective organizations. REF The U.S. must be purposeful and judicious in applying pressure on international bodies, including withholding financial contributions, if necessary. Previous successes include opposing China’s attempt to elect Wang Binying of China as director-general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2020 REF and pressuring the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to release its report on human rights violations in Xinjiang. REF The U.S. government should also work to fracture traditional pro-Chinese voting blocs. Not all international organizations are equally important, though. The U.S. should not squander time, effort, and resources on organizations where China’s capacity for mischief is limited, such as the World Tourism Organization.

Impact: These measures will counteract China’s shrewd diplomatic and economic tactics to advance its interests, maximize its benefits, and minimize its costs in international organizations. Stronger resistance against Chinese actions will limit China’s ability to wield influence in international organizations in ways that are inimical to U.S. interests.

Allies: Since most decisions in international organizations are adopted by a majority or super majority, the U.S. needs support from other governments to achieve its goals. It should work with like-minded partners and use its influence as the top funder of many international organizations to organize opposition to Beijing’s preferred candidates to lead international organizations by coordinating support for alternative candidates. Votes in international organizations are often the product of bartering, trading, and coalition building, and the United States is one of the only countries that can muster the resources and coordination to counter malign Chinese practices and preferences in international organizations.

Highlight the CCP’s Abhorrent Human Rights Record.

Issue: The CCP has a long and established record of egregious human rights violations. Fundamental freedoms like speech, assembly, press, and religion, are undermined by CCP policies designed primarily to protect the pre-eminence of the party. The CCP has systemically targeted ethnic and religious minorities for persecution, including Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Hong Kong citizens, Chinese Christians, and others. REF Perhaps no group has faced greater depravations at the hands of the CCP more than the Uyghurs. In recent years, at least one million Uyghurs have been held in political re-education camps REF and the U.S. government determined that the CPP is committing ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs. REF In Xinjiang, the CCP is arguably committing some of the worst human rights atrocities of the 21st century. U.S. foreign policy toward China is incomplete without a plan to highlight and address the CCP’s gross human rights violations.

Action: Condemning China’s human rights record should be a core element of a broader U.S. effort to hold China accountable. REF Holding CCP officials and entities accountable for undermining human rights should be a consistent priority for U.S. foreign policy, emphasizing it in every diplomatic engagement and international forum. The U.S. should also provide support to those persecuted in China by providing access to information and resources to help them advocate for their basic human rights and individual liberties.

Implementation: The U.S. should increase the quality and quantity of unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Chinese individuals and entities responsible for undermining freedom and basic human rights. The U.S. should also prioritize the release of political prisoners like Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Christian pastor Wang Yi, and the Panchen Lama. REF In addition to sanctions, the U.S. should extend safe haven by issuing “Priority 2” refugee status to some persecuted Uyghurs and Hong Kongers. REF The U.S. should also enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and identify additional means at its disposal to shift the CCP’s risk calculus and alter its willingness to continue committing human rights violations. REF

Impact: Highlighting the CCP’s gross human rights violations will further undermine the legitimacy of China’s claim that the nation is a responsible global actor. Further, there are few more tangible ways to assist the Chinese people than to advocate freeing political prisoners and assisting legitimate political refugees and asylum seekers. Enforcing the ban on goods produced with forced labor in China makes it less likely that ordinary U.S. citizens will inadvertently aid and abet the CCP in its human rights abuses.

Allies: There is already substantial momentum building in the international community to place greater emphasis on China’s human rights violations. The U.S. should adopt proactive policies to support and lead this effort by encouraging countries to partake in joint education programs like those organized by the Victims of Communism Foundation, and collaborative parliamentarian forums, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, to draw global attention to the CCP’s draconian domestic policies.

Address the Persecution of Christians.

Issue: Estimates on the number of Christians living in China vary widely, from 30 million to more than 130 million and growing, REF divided between the state-run churches with clergy chosen by the CCP and underground churches. The CCP’s goal to diminish religion in Chinese culture and everyday life has accelerated since Xi became general secretary. Nevertheless, the Vatican has entered into an agreement in which the papacy and the CCP share authority to appoint Chinese Catholic bishops. REF The arrangement undermines religious freedom. Over the past four years, conditions for Christians have deteriorated dramatically, with churches demolished, bishops jailed, and Bibles burned. According to some media reports, the CCP is also in the process of writing its own version of the Bible. REF Along with the Uyghur genocide, the persecution of Christians is one of the most critical religious liberty violations that the U.S. must address.

Action: The U.S. should challenge the CCP assault on religious liberty, underscoring China’s animus toward freedom and human rights. A key component of this challenge must focus on the papacy. The Vatican is a state. Therefore, the U.S. government, together with partners and allies, should vigorously engage with the papacy, encouraging the pontiff to revoke the agreement with Beijing, highlight the regime’s persecution of Christians, and adopt policies and measures to support the underground church. Furthermore, the U.S. government should educate the American public on China’s draconian suppression of religion and mobilize governments and nongovernmental partners in a global information campaign. The U.S. government should also look for ways to support organizations and initiatives that advocate for Christians and religious liberty in China, such as ChinaAid. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should demonstrate to the Vatican how seriously it takes this issue, including through legislative action. Legislation has already been proposed in the U.S. Congress to “hold accountable senior officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China who are responsible for or have directly carried out, at any time, persecution of Christians or other religious minorities in China, and for other purposes.” REF Further, the U.S. should apply Global Magnitsky sanctions and other applicable sanctions to Chinese officials involved in the torture, sexual abuse, or death of prisoners who are in state custody because of their religion.

Impact: A human rights campaign targeting those responsible for abuses against Christians in China should impose reputational costs on the CCP. For help, the U.S. should look to partners in the transatlantic community, where the majority of the world’s Christians reside, including in Latin America, Europe, and North America. Ideally, in addition to imposing reputational costs on China, the pressure campaign would result in a relaxing of draconian restrictions on China’s Christian population.

Allies: Some of America’s partners and allies have already highlighted violations of religious liberty by the CCP. The European Parliament, for instance, passed a resolution criticizing the detention of Hong Kong’s Cardinal Joseph Zen, a vocal critic of the Vatican–China deal, who was convicted and fined in 2022 for his involvement with a fund to support pro-democracy protestors, and who may face additional charges under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The EU’s resolution called for dropping all charges against him, as well as demanding that the Vatican “strengthen its diplomatic efforts and its leverage on Chinese authorities to demand Cardinal Zen’s unconditional release and the end of persecution and human rights violations in China.” REF A core group of concerned parties already exists that should make this campaign a multilateral initiative rather than a unilateral U.S. effort.

Revitalize the Blue Dot Network.

Issue: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a crown jewel of Chinese foreign policy, a multibillion-dollar project to fund new infrastructure and connectivity investments across the globe. Yet, the BRI has faced substantial criticism in the U.S. and abroad for promoting low labor and environmental standards and low-quality infrastructure, lacking transparency, ensnaring countries in “debt trap diplomacy,” and advancing China’s strategic interests atop ostensibly economic projects. REF To outcompete China and offer countries quality infrastructure options with higher standards, the Trump Administration established the Blue Dot Network (BDN), a collaborative program among Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to certify infrastructure projects that meet robust international quality standards. In 2021, the Biden Administration encouraged the Group of Seven (G7) to adopt the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative. REF The Blue Dot Network was subsequently co-opted into B3W. This change was more political than substantive, shoehorning the BDN into an overly broad and politicized initiative that will complicate efforts to counter China in the global infrastructure space.

Action: The U.S. should re-focus on the BDN as a strategic priority for establishing and enforcing constructive rules for international development. The BDN can provide a high-standards certification to give potential investors confidence and begin treating infrastructure investments as an asset class that can be rated. It will also highlight the projects and investments that do not meet international standards.

Implementation: The U.S. should disaggregate the BDN from the B3W and focus on promoting better standards, greater transparency, and a new vision for regional connectivity. The U.S. must shine a light on the risks and consequences of the BRI where necessary, aid friendly countries subject to Chinese economic coercion, and assist like-minded partners and institutions in providing investment alternatives. The U.S. should also align aid and economic engagement agencies in execution of the BDN and support Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development proposals for Blue Dot certification. REF

Impact: Standardized contracts, quality certification, and quality audits could help to remove uncertainty and minimize risk for outside investors while facilitating confidence and private capital flows. Certified projects will embody transparency and openness, mitigate financing risks, and offer regional capitals better alternatives to China’s BRI. A successful BDN will create economic opportunities for U.S. and other high-standards investors, and in the long term will strengthen the resilience and prosperity of recipient nations.

Allies: The BDN already has momentum. Australia and Japan embraced the BDN program to introduce “high-quality trusted standards for global infrastructure development.” REF The three partners began working together during the Trump Administration through the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation. REF The U.S. should seek participation from other friendly capitals, including New Delhi, Seoul, and Taipei, to enlarge its scope and capabilities. The U.S. should also encourage BDN certification for reconstruction projects in Ukraine, the Three Seas Initiative, and infrastructure projects along the Middle Corridor. The U.S. should also seek buy-in for the BDN from partners in the Middle East, especially to include those countries that signed the Abraham Accords. REF

Address Illegal Fishing and Maritime Militia Activities.

Issue: Illegal fishing practices condoned or permitted by the CCP are widespread and damaging, and the U.S. should highlight them as Beijing seeks to bolster its reputation as a responsible international actor. China deploys a massive flotilla of fishing vessels and the CCP uses these vessels partly to buttress its unlawful claims in international waters, such as its claims over all the water and territory within the “Nine Dash Line” encompassing virtually the entire South China Sea. Chinese fishing vessels also engage in uncontrolled and illegal practices that violate maritime law. REF

Apart from the serious damage that illegal Chinese over-fishing has done to fishing stocks, REF Chinese fishing vessels regularly harass and clash with maritime vessels registered to other nations while fishing far beyond China’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Chinese fishing vessels are increasingly operating further abroad, including in the Western Hemisphere. In August 2022, for instance, Chinese fishing vessels clashed with a U.S. Coast Guard vessel while the latter was on a legal patrol of the high seas near Ecuador’s Galapagos Islands. REF

Action: The U.S. should take both unilateral and multilateral diplomatic action to pressure Chinese fleets to operate in compliance with relevant maritime law. The U.S. should also increase its capacity to conduct maritime constabulary activities and collaborate with other nations to increase their capacity, including through expanding the size, capabilities, and mandate of the U.S. Coast Guard. REF

Implementation: The U.S. must draft a clear declaratory policy against China’s illegal fishing practices. This policy should directly attribute the fleet’s actions to the CCP—Chinese fishermen would not operate with such blatant disregard for international laws and maritime norms without at least implicit support from Beijing. The U.S. should increase its global maritime presence, enhancing naval and Coast Guard patrols in strategically sensitive international waters and in the EEZs of U.S. partners and allies where welcomed. In particular, the U.S. should increase the Coast Guard’s capacity to operate in Arctic waters. REF The U.S. should also consider the merits of banning the import of Chinese fishing products until those products are verifiably harvested in a legal way. The U.S. should refuse to recognize so-called Chinese fishing bans in the South China Sea, which use the cover of concern for the environment to enforce Chinese claims to control the region.

Impact: Restraining China’s illegal fishing will have a modest impact on China’s economy but shining a light on its unlawful activities will diminish Beijing’s claim to be acting as a responsible global power. In addition, U.S. actions will have environmental and economic benefits, preserving fishing stocks for use by other nations, including the U.S. Finally, it will deprive the CCP of a weapon that Beijing uses to buttress its unlawful claims of sovereignty over international waters and the EEZs of other countries.

Allies: U.S. action cannot be effective on its own. Nations from Vietnam to the Philippines to Ecuador resent the aggressive approach by the Chinese fishing fleet and the theft of natural resources. The U.S. should coordinate diplomatic action as well as Coast Guard patrols with friendly nations and, where practical, impose joint restrictions on Chinese fishing products obtained through unlawful means.

Diminish China’s Threat to Taiwan.

Issue: Nowhere else in the world do the interests of China and the United States collide as directly or dangerously as they do in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the CCP has increased coercive military activities around the self-governing island, including live-fire military exercises, provocative missile testing, and encroachments into Taiwan’s EEZ. Since 2022, the PRC’s belligerence has reached new heights, conducting ballistic missile launches over Taiwan and conducting a mock blockade. If China’s stated goal of “reunification” with the island was to be realized, it would cement the PLA’s control of the Western Pacific, threaten critical interests of the U.S. and key allies, disrupt the global supply of semiconductors, and give the CCP unprecedented leverage over vital sea lines of communication and, therefore, the global economy. U.S. credibility among its regional allies and partners would be dealt a mortal blow, as would broader U.S. efforts to thwart China’s global ambitions. REF

An armed conflict over Taiwan, whether the United States is directly involved or not, would be distinct from any conflict that generations of younger Americans have experienced, as it would inflict economic harm on every American household. Deterring the CCP’s aggression toward Taiwan must be an apex priority for U.S. foreign policy.

Action: The U.S. must deter China from any attempt to take Taiwan by force by expanding U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific and by providing robust political, diplomatic, and military aid to Taipei. The U.S. must demonstrate the resolve—and above all the capability—to support Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, up to and including direct U.S. military intervention. Further, the U.S. must work in partnership with the Taiwanese government to increase its own capacity to deter Chinese military adventurism and defend its territory. Finally, it must seek to persuade and incentivize Taipei to pursue the optimal strategies and military platforms necessary to defend the island.

Implementation: The U.S. government should push back on China’s efforts to distort the United States’ one-China policy and undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While avoiding any change in U.S. policy on the diplomatic status of Taiwan, the U.S. government should have a declaratory policy that unambiguously states its commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes across the Taiwan Strait while demonstrating the capacity to support the defense of Taiwan. In addition to providing robust military support as required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. should deepen economic ties with the island, including by negotiating a free trade agreement to help Taiwan gradually to become less dependent on its trade with China and open more business opportunities for U.S. companies. REF Following the authorization of up to $10 billion of military aid to Taiwan over five years in the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. government must ensure that those funds are actually appropriated and are used to bolster Taiwan’s defense by focusing on those capabilities that are most likely to be effective.

Impact: The most effective way to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is to convince Beijing of U.S. military superiority and its strong commitment to defending Taiwan without changing Taiwan’s official status. This will secure a vital U.S. interest by denying China control of the first island chain and some of the world’s most vital sea and air lines of communication that sustain global trade and supply chains.

Allies: The more that Taiwan enjoys the diplomatic space and engagement commensurate with its economic and geopolitical clout, the more the CCP will fear the international consequences of any reckless military intervention. The United States, along with other democratic states, should therefore ensure that Taiwan’s diplomats can participate in discussions of relevant transnational issues. Taiwan should have meaningful participation at various international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the WHO, Interpol, and other entities that help to create and monitor international standards. The U.S. should also encourage other free nations to enhance their bilateral diplomatic and economic engagements with Taiwan, including establishing representative offices and free trade agreements where applicable. The Administration should set an example by accepting Taiwan’s long-standing request to update the name of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Office to the Taiwan Representative Office.

Enhance Regional Stability in Northeast Asia.

Issue: Countering China requires strong, confident, and secure regional allies in Northeast Asia, where both South Korea and Japan are critical economic partners and treaty allies hosting substantial U.S. military forces and personnel. North Korea, an ally of China, is a destabilizing threat to both these American allies. Beijing exploits its status as predominant economic trading partner to gain leverage over South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Any future policy toward North Korea must respect two important U.S. interests: First, peace and stability in Northeast Asia is a vital U.S. strategic objective. North Korea must be deterred from military aggression against Japan, South Korea, or U.S. forces in the region. Second, the U.S. cannot accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the U.S. or its allies. This interest is critical to the defense of the American homeland and the future of the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea cannot be permitted to benefit from its blatant violations of U.N. resolutions and international law and threats of nuclear blackmail.

Action: The U.S. must eschew any effort to offer China concessions in exchange for cooperation on North Korea, explicitly rejecting linkages to other bilateral issues. Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions. If the U.S. foreswears denuclearization, it will undermine the 11 U.N. resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner. REF The U.S. should continually affirm its extended deterrence guarantee to Japan and South Korea while maintaining current levels of American forces in the region until the North Korean threats have been reduced. Washington should encourage Seoul to continue to improve its own deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea with an extensive conventional force build-up, including enhanced precision-strike capabilities and new missile defense systems. The U.S. should also work to strengthen South Korean, Japanese, and American trilateral cooperation on regional economic and security matters. REF

Implementation: The U.S. government must craft an unambiguous policy to uphold U.N. resolutions and U.S. law requiring North Korean denuclearization backed by strategic and conventional deterrence. Arms control proponents mischaracterize denuclearization as requiring North Korea to abandon all its programs before receiving any benefits. In fact, denuclearization proposals call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions.

Further, calls for an alternative “new” arms control approach are not all that new. REF North Korea has violated all its prior agreements. REF The prospects for externally or internally fomented regime change are unrealistic. The U.S. must instead focus on continuing to seek a comprehensive agreement that retains denuclearization as a stated goal, implemented in verifiable incremental steps over time. This should be paired with the U.S. and allied efforts to protect their national security by augmenting and improving their deterrence and defense capabilities.

Impact: These efforts will help to deter North Korea from attacking American allies and interests in Northeast Asia and diminish Pyongyang’s ability for coercive diplomacy. Further, a stable Northeast Asia will make South Korea and Japan stronger allies in promoting a free and open Indo–Pacific and confronting threats from the CCP.

Allies: The U.S. must underscore the efficacy, viability, and practicality of a comprehensive approach to North Korea denuclearization with regional partners and allies. It must stress the importance of burden-sharing and joint economic and security cooperation to create a strong foundation for multilateral cooperation on North Korean policy.

Diminish the Value of Russia as China’s Ally.

Issue: As one of Beijing’s closest allies, Russia is a part of the China challenge. Russia has turned more decisively toward China since its 2014 invasion of Crimea, becoming one of Beijing’s most important strategic partners in the process, providing energy, raw materials, market access, arms deals, geopolitical leverage, and support in international organizations. A strengthening entente between China and Russia presents the U.S. with a powerful adversarial coalition that seeks to challenge American interests in Europe, the greater Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, as well as to diminish U.S. influence in international institutions. As permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Russia and China regularly work together to obstruct U.S. initiatives. Finally, Russian threats and actions destabilizing and weakening Europe create additional strategic challenges for the U.S. and NATO, distracting American attention and resources from focusing on diminishing the China threat.

Action: The U.S. must prioritize countering China in the Indo–Pacific while deterring further Russian aggression in Europe and diminishing Russia’s capacity for military adventurism. To do so, the U.S. government must continue to stress the importance of burden-sharing among European partners and allies. As the U.S. focuses greater resources and attention on China and the Indo–Pacific theater, European states, particularly NATO members, will need to significantly increase their defense spending and capabilities. Furthermore, Europe must enhance its energy security by diversifying imports away from Russia, further limiting Moscow’s influence over the continent.

Robust U.S. efforts to develop energy resources and increase U.S. energy export capacity will aid Europe’s transition and further isolate Russia politically and economically. Ultimately, U.S. policy should strive to diminish the value of Russia to China. A progressively weakened Russia will add strain to the China–Russia relationship, forcing Beijing to carry a greater burden to sustain the partnership, although the PRC will simultaneously seek to benefit from Russian weakness, wielding increased leverage in negotiations over energy import prices and arms contracts, among other things.

Implementation: U.S. policy should promote the robust forward defense of NATO, a strong and independent Ukraine, a more resilient Georgia and Moldova, and greater Eastern European cooperation through the Three Seas Initiative. REF The U.S. must continue to provide responsible military assistance to Ukraine with substantial transparency and accountability, push European capitals to provide more civilian and military aid, and press all parties involved to develop a responsible plan for reconstruction. REF Further, the U.S. must adopt robust energy policies that enhance European energy security. REF

Impact: Bolstering European resilience against Russian aggression, further isolating Moscow and draining Russian finances, will serve U.S. interests, diminishing Moscow’s capacity for aggression in Europe and allowing America to focus its energy and attention on China and the Indo–Pacific. Weakening and isolating Russia will make Moscow a less desirable partner for China, limit the two countries’ efforts to co-opt and influence international organizations, and weaken their ability to work jointly to diminish U.S. influence and reputation. Seizing opportunities to showcase Russian atrocities and war crimes in Ukraine can increase the reputational costs to China for continuing to support a pariah regime in Moscow.

Allies: The U.S. must remain strong and capable in both the European and Indo–Pacific theaters, but it cannot provide adequate conventional deterrence in both without allied support. The U.S. must press all NATO members to expeditiously enforce their commitments to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. REF Further, the U.S. must work with European partners to rebuild a robust and capable defense industrial base adequate to support NATO’s long-term needs. Finally, the U.S. must press European partners not just to divest from Russian energy sources, but to adopt responsible energy policies that ensure reliable, affordable, and abundant energy in the future.

Expand Economic and Security Cooperation with India.

Issue: South Asia and the Indian Ocean are crucial theaters for countering China’s expanding influence in the Indo–Pacific. India has become a vital U.S. partner in the region, a key strategic counterweight to China, and a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to advance a free and open Indo–Pacific. A foundational member of the Quad, India is a net-security provider in a region overseeing key lines of communication linking East and West across the Indian Ocean, “with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two-thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes.” REF

India is also an important emerging economic partner for the United States, with bilateral trade reaching roughly $150 billion annually. India is also a vital partner in confronting other regional challenges: The threat of transnational terrorism in the region remains acute, particularly after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. The long-standing nuclear-tinged India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions over the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability.

Action: Strengthening the India–U.S. strategic partnership is critical both to U.S. interests in the region and to India’s ability to deter China at the disputed border. The U.S. should aid India in developing the capabilities necessary to prevent continued Chinese incursions across the Line of Actual Control and the naval capacity to remain a responsible steward of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the U.S. must remain engaged with other regional powers—including Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh—which remain strategically important and have experienced buyer’s remorse after assuming billions of dollars in loans from China. Finally, U.S. policy must be attentive to the risks of terrorism in the region and clear eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ongoing and highly problematic relationships with a wide range of terrorist and Islamist extremist groups.

Implementation: The U.S. should develop a new regional strategy for South Asia that resets American priorities in the region and enhances economic engagement. REF While U.S. economic engagement with the region, and India in particular, has grown exponentially since the turn of the millennium, the countries of South Asia still account for less than 3 percent of total U.S. external trade. REF While prioritizing the strategic partnership with India, the U.S. should continue to expand trade and investment opportunities with the rest of the region, improving defense cooperation, and promoting political and economic freedom. However, the U.S. must remain cognizant of the fact that regional capitals are wary of being seen as pawns in a larger geopolitical struggle between the U.S. and China.

Finally, in order to realize stronger cooperation with India on China, Washington should engage with New Delhi in setting an agenda for the Western Indian Ocean and Middle East. Looking west, India sees threats from piracy, a hostile Pakistani navy, and a new Chinese military base in Djibouti on the east coast of Africa. It also has a large diaspora population in the Middle East and is a major importer of energy from the region. The U.S. should be attentive to these concerns and collaborative opportunities, including through the India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, U.S. (I2U2) multilateral grouping.

Impact: A strong Indian–U.S. partnership, and sustained U.S. engagement with the rest of South Asia, will deter Chinese efforts to dominate the “Indo” half of the Indo–Pacific. Enhanced U.S. economic engagement with the region will provide regional capitals alternatives to dependence on Beijing, especially in the area of much-needed infrastructure development, where unfavorable terms and sovereignty-violating provisions of several agreements have exposed China to accusations of debt-trap diplomacy.

Allies: Strengthening the Indian–U.S. partnership, developing India’s role as a cornerstone of the Quad grouping, and enhancing India’s capacity to defend itself from Chinese military encroachments must remain top priorities for U.S. policy in the region. The State Department should also develop new “Quad-Plus” engagements in the region, inviting other South Asian powers to participate in select Quad activities, potentially as observers, on issues of mutual interest. REF

Prioritize the Pacific Islands.

Issue: The Pacific Islands include Melanesia (the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji), Micronesia (Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, and Kiribati), and Polynesia (Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, and a dozen other islands, including Hawaii). The Pacific Islands are strategically significant, forming a bridge between the U.S. state of Hawaii and East Asia. Any loss of U.S. presence and influence on the islands puts at risk critical economic and security air and maritime routes linking the U.S. to the Indo–Pacific. In recent years, China has made greater political, economic, and even military inroads into several Pacific Island nations, most notably signing a new security agreement with the Solomon Islands in March 2022. REF Beijing has also signaled its interest in the Pacific Islands by dispatching senior Chinese leaders on major tours throughout the region, offering discounted deals for infrastructure projects, and pushing for new security arrangements with regional governments. REF

Action: The U.S. should prioritize renewing the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau through which the U.S. provides financial assistance in exchange for military access and responsibility for the defense of those islands. Citizens of those three islands serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. These COFA agreements are due for renewal in 2023 and 2024. REF The U.S. should also explore options to sign new COFAs with Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. REF Maintaining exclusive defense access to these territories is critical to America’s defense posture in the Indo–Pacific. REF The U.S. must also deepen diplomatic and economic engagement with all Pacific Islands partners, and demonstrate sensitivity to their own interests and needs, which include economic development, fisheries management, and climate-change mitigation.

Implementation: The U.S. should take actions that will add momentum to the COFA negotiations: It should make the U.S.–Pacific Island Country Summit an annual event, REF and the President should tour the Pacific Island states. A U.S. President has never visited a Pacific Island state; meanwhile, Xi visited Fiji in 2014 REF and Papua New Guinea in 2018. REF At a minimum, minister-level meetings must increase in frequency; Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s 2022 visit to Fiji was the first such visit by a Secretary of State since 1985, REF and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Federated States of Micronesia in 2019—despite a COFA agreement since 1986. REF

In accordance with the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. should identify resources to provide Pacific Island partners with high-quality infrastructure projects. REF It should also encourage more Coast Guard engagement and agreements with Pacific Island nations to help to combat illegal fishing and establish a new Coast Guard station on American Samoa. Finally, the Administration should encourage the National Guard to form new state partnerships with Pacific Island nations and increase embassy and defense attaché representation throughout the region.

Impact: Improved political and economic engagement with the Pacific Islands will ensure continued U.S. military access to vital military bases and logistics hubs and prevent these strategically significant nations from dependence on the PRC, which can threaten vital U.S. interest in the region.

Allies: Several Pacific Island nations are having second thoughts about engagement with the PRC: Some states have terminated, rejected, or frozen high-profile Chinese investments while Chinese state aid to the Pacific Islands has decreased in recent years amid slowing Chinese growth. REF The U.S. must seize the moment and take advantage of regional capitals’ desire for alternatives to the PRC. In addition, several U.S. partners and allies in the region have a shared interest in ensuring that the Pacific Islands remain sovereign, democratic, prosperous states free from dependence on China. The U.S. should emphasize joint action, specifically working with regional partners Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Australia has been a particularly important partner, dispatching senior officials on regional tours and providing Pacific Island capitals with more than $10 billion in official development assistance since 2009. REF

Stay Engaged in Southeast Asia.

Issue: Southeast Asia is a dynamic and important region for the U.S. and the global economy. U.S. trade with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2020 exceeded $360 billion. REF ASEAN is a diverse grouping including democratic U.S. treaty allies like Thailand and the Philippines, important economic and political partners in Indonesia and Malaysia, emerging strategic partners like Vietnam, international pariah military regimes like Burma, and close autocratic allies of the PRC like Cambodia and Laos. Singapore remains a vital U.S. partner in the region, granting the U.S. military access to its naval and air force bases. China also maintains robust economic ties to ASEAN but has conflicting territorial claims with several of its members, including the Philippines.

In recent years the PRC has raised tensions in the South China Sea, whose sea lanes carry one-third of the global shipping trade, with unlawful and expansive territorial claims, military and grey-zone coercion tactics, and the construction of several militarized artificial islands. REF The PRC has also engaged in reckless behavior toward U.S. surveillance aircraft and clashed with the U.S. over U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), wherein U.S. military vessels fly and sail through international waters and airspace to signal non-recognition of China’s unlawful claims. REF Privately, Southeast Asian leaders reaffirm their support for U.S. FONOPs and America’s ongoing military commitments in the region, even as they prefer to avoid publicly criticizing the PRC and incurring Beijing’s wrath.

Action: The U.S. must remain diplomatically, economically, and militarily engaged with ASEAN and cognizant of its members’ interests and concerns. ASEAN members are fairly consistent in their requests of the United States: Reaffirm ASEAN’s “centrality” as the central convener of the region’s various diplomatic forums, engage in these forums with senior political and military representation from the U.S., enhance trade and investment ties and join in the region’s multilateral trade and investment initiatives, do not force ASEAN countries to choose sides between China and the U.S., and maintain a robust but non-provocative defense posture in the region as a hedge against Chinese militarism.

Most of these requests are reasonable and require modest commitments from the U.S. government, with the exception of U.S. ascension to regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, which are currently politically untenable in Washington. Nevertheless, the U.S. retains a strong economic position in the region: While ASEAN trade ties with China have flourished, the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN countries was around $330 billion in 2020, roughly five times China’s stock of FDI in the region. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should take measures to deepen engagement with ASEAN, including encouraging U.S. companies decoupling from China to consider Southeast Asian alternatives. The U.S. should also use tools at its disposal to help Southeast Asian capitals to find alternatives to China’s BRI with high-quality, transparent, responsible infrastructure alternatives. The White House should make it a priority to attend or host ASEAN summits on an annual basis and ensure that other regional diplomatic forums are appropriately staffed.

The U.S. Navy should keep a robust pace of FONOPS in the South China Sea, ideally two per quarter, to both reassure regional partners of America’s enduring commitment and signal to China that the U.S. will not be intimidated into abandoning its rights to fly, sail, and operate where international law allows. The U.S. should support efforts by Southeast Asian states to bolster their military and deterrence capabilities in light of the coercive military pressure that the PRC is applying to their maritime borders. The U.S. should support efforts to de-legitimize China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s “Nine Dash Line” claims in 2016.

Impact: The U.S. is unlikely to draw Southeast Asian capitals into any robust balancing coalitions, such as the Quad or AUKUS initiatives, but it can prevent regional capitals from being pulled too far into China’s orbit by remaining economically, diplomatically, and militarily engaged in the region. ASEAN is an important center of economic and diplomatic activity for the entire Indo–Pacific, geographically linking South Asia and the Indian Ocean to East Asia and the Western Pacific. It is in America’s interest to maintain military access in the region through basing and rotational arrangements in Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, while retaining robust economic ties with ASEAN.

Allies: The U.S. should look for opportunities to complement and engage with ASEAN on its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo–Pacific REF strategy adopted in 2019. The U.S. should ensure that it has senior representation at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Finally, the U.S. should work with the Philippines to enhance and accelerate implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (ECDA), including through expanding U.S. access to new military bases in the Philippines and enhancing the U.S. presence at existing ones.

Establish and Resource an Atlantic Strategy.

Issues: Malicious activities by the CCP threaten America’s ability to defend its national interests, democracy, and free enterprise in the Atlantic area—a geopolitical and economic zone encompassing the Atlantic Ocean and the 80 littoral nations and territories from Greenland in the north to Antarctica in the south. REF China is an increasingly active player in the Atlantic space. In 2019, China, Russia, and South Africa held their first trilateral maritime exercise off Cape Town. REF In 2022, the PLAN joined other American antagonists, including Russia and Iran, in war games hosted by Venezuela. REF Chinese state-owned enterprises operate along the Panama Canal, REF a chokepoint for U.S. trade. The PRC may soon establish its first Atlantic Ocean naval base in Africa’s Equatorial Guinea. REF China also declared itself an “Arctic power,” REF prompting the United States to increase its diplomatic presence in Greenland. REF China leverages its status as the top trading partner and, in many cases, the top financial partner for many African and Latin American countries along the Atlantic Ocean rim. REF Without a coherent, integrated national response, the U.S. could face greater threats from Chinese malicious activity in the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead.

Action: The U.S. should develop a comprehensive and coordinated Atlantic Strategy that mitigates potential Chinese threats and rolls back pernicious aspects of China’s influence. The Atlantic Strategy should harness America’s military, economic, diplomatic, and global leadership capabilities to ensure a stable, prosperous, and secure Atlantic region based on common economic, political, and security interests and shared values. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should include an Atlantic Strategy as a priority in the next President’s National Security Strategy to ensure that policymakers across the U.S. government coordinate their respective responses to strategic challenges from the CCP. On the military front, the United States must enhance air, sea, undersea, space, intelligence, and cybersecurity cooperation with Atlantic partners to mitigate future threats from the CCP. Furthermore, the U.S. government must shift its foreign aid–based development model to one that promotes private sector–led wealth creation through robust commercial diplomacy, bilateral free trade agreements, and leveraging taxpayer-financed U.S. and international lenders to favor private companies over Chinese state-owned enterprises. REF The U.S. can host an Atlantic Summit of like-minded allies and designate the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to execute the strategy.

Impact: An effectively directed and resourced Atlantic Strategy should establish a comprehensive regional framework for addressing threats from the PRC in the Atlantic region. The strategy must promote greater synergy and efficiency in employing U.S. capabilities in the theater while imposing additional costs on China for working against U.S. interests in the Atlantic and Western Hemisphere. An Atlantic Strategy would signal to U.S. partners and allies America’s firm commitment to defend its interests and values in its own backyard.

Allies: The U.S. needs a core of like-minded leaders in Atlantic capitals to implement a proper Atlantic Strategy. REF Gibraltar (the U.K.), Greenland (Denmark), Honduras, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and other NATO allies offer a strong Atlantic network of bases for military cooperation. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Caribbean states remain strong hemispheric partners and targets for enhanced cooperation.

Expand Economic Partnerships in Eurasia.

Issue: China is expanding strategic and economic engagement with countries throughout Eurasia, as it increasingly challenges American global leadership. Major Chinese projects, such as the BRI, have undermined regional stability and the economic health of several participating nations. As a result, a growing number of regional capitals have soured on the BRI. REF While there is widespread recognition of the value that a modern Silk Road could bring to the region, many capitals are uncomfortable with the terms of the arrangement and Chinese control over the initiative. This discomfort creates an opportunity for the nations of North, Central, and Southern Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia to pursue alternatives to secure their futures. The U.S. is well suited to collaborate with regional capitals, even as it advances its own economic and strategic interests.

Action: The U.S. should support Eurasian development through four interrelated projects: (1) the European Three Seas Initiative (3SI); (2) the reconstruction of Ukraine; (3) an international campaign for a “free and open” Black Sea; and (4) the “Middle Corridor,” an expanse of energy production and distribution, value-added supply chains, and transport infrastructure stretching from Central Asia to the Mediterranean. Together, the four projects will serve as a new backbone of prosperity linking East and West. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should proactively support, and encourage private-sector firms to participate in, the 3SI, which invests in Eastern European physical, energy, and digital infrastructure through commercial enterprises rather than state-directed infrastructure programs. This support will offer participants a more dynamic, imaginative, responsive, and sustainable development model. The 3SI is a vehicle for attracting global private capital, investing in a responsible manner that respects the rule of law and transparency, and offering a clear alternative to the development options offered by Beijing. The U.S. should also materially contribute to a “free and open” Black Sea. REF An evolving yet critically relevant dimension to the 3SI is a trade route called the “Middle Corridor,” which encompasses linkages from Europe to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and from there, via the Black Sea, to Türkiye. The U.S. should encourage and support corridor development. REF

Impact: The 3SI can offer the United States and Europe a concrete, alternative engagement model to the BRI in Central Europe and China’s faltering “16+1” development framework. The 3SI could also strengthen dual-use infrastructure for the forward collective defense of NATO. With support, the Middle Corridor could emerge as an alternative transcontinental trade route. A high-functioning Middle Corridor would give the whole of Europe resilient and diversified supply chains, new sources for energy diversification and energy security, and new opportunities for value-added manufacturing and resource development.

Allies: Proactive U.S. economic engagement would be welcomed by regional partners as a counterbalance to China’s expanding power and influence. Regional capitals desperately want new investments, but they also want options. The postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, coordinated in part through the 3SI, will speed European integration and political stability. That effort, paired with working for a “free and open” Black Sea and a high-functioning Middle Corridor, would give the whole of Europe resilient supply chains that are diversified from China and Russia. This is a game plan for regional prosperity and stability—and an opportunity that the U.S. government should seize on.

Establish a Quad Select Initiative.

Issue: The U.S. must foster an enduring, resilient regional coalition that challenges the expansion of Chinese power and influence in the Indo–Pacific while offering alternative leadership to the region. This group of like-minded nations must protect freedom of the commons, champion human rights, and foster alternative development paths based on economic freedom and resilient physical and digital infrastructure. The Quad is a critical diplomatic initiative joining Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. All four countries are committed to promoting a free and open Indo–Pacific, encouraging responsible environmental stewardship, protecting human rights, and fostering responsible infrastructure development. These elements form a capstone diplomatic framework for U.S. engagement in Asia, a coordinating structure that sits atop a network of trilateral and bilateral consultations. REF

Action: To enhance the Quad even further, the Quad should consider expanding the network to include pursuing “Quad Plus” activities with like-minded nations. REF Where appropriate, other nations can be selectively invited to join Quad meetings, initiatives, and even military exercises, improving coordination and joint planning activities among a network of strategically aligned democracies in the Indo–Pacific. REF Separately, a new “Quad Select” initiative could add a more proactive economic dimension to the Quad. As the U.S. and other countries move toward greater decoupling from China, Washington should encourage the flow of investment, trade, and joint production toward Quad countries and select partners. At the same time, the four Quad capitals should collaboratively work to complement and enhance the Blue Dot Network and the Clean Network initiatives to promote responsible infrastructure and digital networks throughout the Indo–Pacific. REF

Implementation: Rather than being limited to the bureaucracy and mandates of complicated regional free trade agreements, a Quad Select initiative would enjoy an open architecture facilitating deal-making and development within a community of like-minded nations. This community would value the principles of economic freedom, rule of law, and human rights and would reject the CCP’s predatory economic practices. Under the direction of the White House, cabinet officials would be charged with coordinating joint action and coordination of infrastructure investments that would have strategic impact and deliver a responsible financial return on investment. These projects could serve as pilot programs and blueprints for additional private-sector initiatives and cooperation. Educating and consulting with the private sector, and building support within Congress, will be critical to success.

Impact: A Quad Select initiative would enhance the scope, agenda, and profile of the existing Quad, and accelerate U.S. efforts to provide credible, responsive, and impactful alternatives to China’s BRI and its exploitation activities. It would strengthen trust and confidence among U.S. partners while contributing to economic growth and dynamism among a community of like-minded nations in the Indo–Pacific.

Allies: A new Quad Select initiative, working alongside the BDN and Clean Network initiatives would help to encourage and channel investments toward the four Quad core member countries and select partners across the Indo–Pacific, including the Pacific Islands.

Improve U.S.–Canadian Bilateral Cooperation.

Issue: The U.S. and Canada share borders, infrastructure, supply chains, natural resources, and responsibility for the protection of North American air and maritime space. Threats from China that affect one materially affect the other. This reality necessitates greater U.S.–Canadian cooperation and shared threat assessments of China. Progress is being made. In addition to a new Indo–Pacific Strategy that frames China as a “increasingly disruptive global power,” REF Canada is also raising concerns over Chinese-linked radio deals and ordering China to divest from Canadian mining companies. REF Canadians were also alarmed by the unlawful detention of two Canadian citizens by the Chinese regime in 2018 for 1,000 days. REF But while awareness of China’s malign intentions is growing among U.S. partners and allies in the Indo–Pacific and Europe, Canada lags behind major strategic partners in appreciating the scope of the China challenge.

Action: A more proactive U.S. response to threats from the CCP will help to spark Canada’s own awakening. The U.S government, private sector, and civil society must engage more proactively with Canada at the national level, as well as with provincial and local governments, to highlight growing threats posed by the CCP and press for joint action. In particular, the U.S. must seek to build consensus and operationalize efforts to counter China’s growing role in the Arctic, screen sensitive Chinese investments in North America, and resist repressive and subversive Chinese activities, particularly in universities and other civic institutions. REF

Implementation: The U.S. should support implementation of Canada’s Indo–Pacific Strategy provisions that combat Chinese influence and nefarious practices in North America. While Canada has had policy disputes with China in recent years, the Canadian government has also attempted to improve its ties with Beijing and sought to expand trade with the CCP. REF

Impact: The U.S. should not expect immediate or dramatic shifts in Canadian policy. As in the United States, a change in Canada’s approach to China will not happen overnight. It will take patience and tenacity to build consensus and create the basis for implementing new policies. Successful efforts will further position Canada as a strong U.S. ally in securing their shared border and the Western Hemisphere from nefarious CCP influence.

Allies: Including Canada in international dialogues and multilateral decisions related to China will increase Canada’s resilience. As Canada is one of the United States’ strongest allies, U.S.–Canadian measures to combat China should be integrated and coordinated as closely as possible.

Facilitate Strategic Economic Partnerships with Deal Teams.

Issue: China engages in mercantilism, using the power of the state to achieve economic benefits for both state-owned and privately owned Chinese companies. The CCP works actively to aid and subsidize Chinese firms to win business deals, both abroad and when competing with foreign firms in China’s domestic market. China’s development deals and “packages” can take several forms, including below-cost pricing and market-rate financing, government grants in unrelated areas, military assistance, and illicit or corrupt cash transfers. Many of these deals not only put the United States at a disadvantage, but also undermine governance, prosperity, stability, and rule of law in the affected countries. The U.S. government, by contrast, does not own, control, or aid businesses in the same ways, often putting U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage. Further, traditional instruments of U.S. government economic engagement and assistance are inadequate to sustain and win a strategic competition with China. REF

Action: The U.S. should create effective government interagency coordination mechanisms, including re-energizing the Deal Team Initiative (DTI), which supports U.S. firms competing with foreign firms backed by foreign governments. REF The U.S. government has considerable resources with which to aid American businesses while upholding free-market principles. Sometimes this assistance is required to level the playing field with foreign competitors that receive assistance from their governments. Other times, the U.S. has strategic or national security interests at stake that draw government interest in business transactions. Failure to support U.S. business in sensitive transactions can allow Chinese companies to acquire unfair advantages, forcing U.S. firms to cede opportunities and market share while U.S. consumers become more reliant on Chinese products.

Implementation: Deal Teams should consider the strategic competition with China, and transactions relevant to that competition and U.S. national security, as their overwhelming priority. The Department of State’s Economic Undersecretariat and the Department of Commerce’s International Undersecretariat manage the DTI. Coordination includes representatives from 13 government agencies. REF The Administration should coordinate Deal Team activities with the National Security and Domestic Economic Councils, integrating actions with the Administration’s broader China strategy. It should ensure that Deal Teams in Washington, regionally, and at foreign embassies focus on nearshoring and friendshoring, with particular emphasis on Northern, Central, and Southern Europe, and partner countries in the Americas, the Caucuses, and South Asia. REF

Impact: Revitalizing the DTI can help to level the playing field for U.S. firms, enhance the dynamism of the U.S. economy, and strengthen America’s hand in its competition with China. It will provide a means to operationalize other nearshoring and friendshoring initiatives and counteract CCP advantages in deal-making. U.S. businesses will benefit by receiving government support in ensuring that foreign countries adhere to free-market principles and allow U.S. entities to fairly compete in the global marketplace.

Allies: Many countries across Europe and the Indo–Pacific have been targets of Chinese economic abuses and coercion. REF The U.S. should emphasize that DTI helps to promote a fairer global marketplace, leveling the playing field for non-Chinese firms. The U.S. should encourage partners—including members of the Quad and nations participating in the Abraham Accords and the 3SI—to promote their own initiatives, emphasizing that government intervention and support should be restricted to cases where domestic firms are competing with unfairly subsidized Chinese firms or to cases where there are overriding national security priorities.

Part III: Next Steps for the U.S. Government

In summary of key actions from Part II, in order to resist the malign influence of the CCP and to prepare for the threats that the regime poses, the U.S. government must:

Protect the Homeland. To protect the homeland, the U.S. must:

• Improve cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local governments to combat China’s growing influence and malicious practices in the U.S.;
• Insulate U.S. universities and research institutes from nefarious Chinese influences, close down the Confucius Institutes, and curtail access to sensitive research programs by Chinese nationals;
• Crack down on illegal Chinese police operations in the United States, including by reinstating the Justice Department’s China Initiative;
• Ban Chinese apps, including TikTok, that pose national security risks;
• Prevent Chinese entities from purchasing U.S. land with strategic value or near sensitive military and civilian installations;
• Ban CCP lobbyists and increase penalties on U.S. citizens and non-citizens for failing to disclose foreign lobbying activities;
• Increase pressure on the CCP to curb fentanyl exports to the U.S. and improve security at the lawless southern border;
• Institute federal prohibitions on federal agencies from purchasing, operating, or deploying Chinese drones and advise state and local governments against using Chinese drones; and
• Ban dual-capable life-science technology transfers to China that pose biotechnological threats.

Safeguard and Advance U.S. Prosperity. To protect U.S. prosperity, the U.S. must:

• Facilitate robust U.S. growth and protect the U.S. economy from Chinese economic coercion while promoting sustainable, responsible spending;
• Reform restrictive environmental statutes and improve business incentives to expand domestic critical mineral mining and processing;
• Restructure CFIUS to expand review jurisdiction and enforce criteria that allow the U.S. government to better risk-manage inbound investments, particularly from the PRC;
• Enforce a PRC-focused IP blockade in technologies with military applications, including biotechnology;
• Ensure reliable semiconductor supply chains by encouraging greater investments in semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the U.S. and sourcing from non-adversarial countries;
• Encourage strategic industries to shift operations out of China and back to the U.S. or non-adversarial states;
• Pursue U.S. energy security and combat counterproductive climate policies; and
• Encourage corporate boards to adopt anti-CCP measures and reject ESG policies that undermine U.S. competitiveness.

Reorient America’s Defense Posture. To reorient its defense posture, the U.S. should:

• Enhance conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence and revive the U.S. defense industrial base to support a defense posture sufficient to meet the China threat;
• Capitalize on the Taiwan Enhance Resilience Act’s authorities to prioritize the delivery of munitions and backlogged weapons systems to Taiwan;
• Repeal and replace the Jones Act, which hinders the U.S. shipbuilding and shipping industries; and
• Align national security spending with national security priorities by reallocating funds to the Indo–Pacific through the appropriations process.

Diminish the CCP’s Influence and Hold It Accountable. To diminish the CCP’s influence, the U.S. should:

• Enhance restrictions on U.S. investments in China in sensitive industries and increase penalties for non-compliance;
• Expand export controls of sensitive technology to the CCP and reform underperforming enforcement mechanisms;
• Review China’s compliance of U.S. and WTO agreements for violations that may warrant revoking “most favored nation” status;
• Employ limited tariffs and non-tariff barriers to compel the CCP to end unfair and predatory economic practices;
• Investigate the origins of, and China’s culpability in, the spread of COVID-19 and hold Beijing accountable;
• Counter China’s growing influence in international institutions, particularly where it directly infringes on U.S. interests and seeks to shape consequential laws and norms in its image;
• Emphasize China’s human rights violations , including religious persecution, and sanction complicit Chinese officials and entities;
• Reinvigorate the Blue Dot Network as a counter to China’s BRI and separate it from the Build Back Better World initiative; and
• Draw international attention to Chinese illegal fishing practices, their sovereignty violations, and their impact on regional fishing stocks.

Exercise Global Leadership. To exercise global leadership, the U.S. must:

• Deter China from using military force against Taiwan while supporting enhanced engagement between Taiwan and the international community;
• Maintain denuclearization as an explicit goal of North Korea policy and reject Chinese attempts to extract concessions for cooperation on the Korean peninsula;
• Diminish the value of the China–Russia alliance by weakening Moscow, including through the provision of arms to Ukraine;
• Prioritize the Quad grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. and look to create a new Quad Select initiative to guide infrastructure investments to Quad countries and select partners;
• Develop a new regional strategy for South Asia that prioritizes the India–U.S. strategic partnership and enhances India’s ability to serve as a net security provider and deter Chinese military adventurism along their border;
• Position the U.S. as the partner of choice for Southeast Asia and maintain a robust economic and security presence in the region;
• Produce an Atlantic Strategy that reaffirms American leadership and combats China’s expanding influence in the Western Hemisphere;
• Bolster the development of the 3SI, Ukraine’s reconstruction through the Middle Corridor, and the free and open Black Sea initiatives to counter Chinese regional influence;
• Cooperate with Canada to restrict China’s growing role in the Arctic and its subversive activities in North America;
• Revive the Deal Teams Initiative to assist U.S. firms in making strategic investments abroad; and
• Commit to a new era of U.S. engagement with the Pacific Islands and renew important defense pacts with the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

This plan describes the ends, ways, and means that, combined, will secure America’s future while confronting the greatest external threat the U.S. has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. REF To achieve success, this plan requires an offensive-defensive mix of actions, including vouchsafing Americans and their interests from Chinese actions that undermine U.S. competitiveness and prosperity. While a spectrum of actions is required, the economic component of this competition is critical. In the end, raw economic power will help to determine the outcome of this contest.

This plan requires real and sustained U.S. growth, greater political will, stronger external partnerships, synchronized economic and security policies, resilient supply chains and borders, adequate military deterrence, and American energy independence. It also requires buy-in from the whole of American society. In order to galvanize a whole-of-nation effort, the U.S. government must educate the American public and business community, from Main Street to Wall Street, about the scope of the CCP’s threats.

The President’s Domestic Policy Council and National Security Council are appropriate instruments for coordinating interagency measures. That is precisely the role these two bodies were created to play. They must take responsibility for operationalizing government strategy into action. The councils and their staff are more than clearinghouses for consolidating inputs to the President. They must serve as instruments of implementation, organization, and staffing to serve this function. Furthermore, they must share the President’s vision on the scope of the threat and the necessary responses. The President’s Cabinet and National Security Advisor must have the skills, knowledge, and attributes to oversee effective execution. REF

The PRC is confronting the U.S. with new challenges in new domains every year, seemingly one step ahead of lawmakers. Poor enforcement of existing laws is arguably as much of a problem as the lack of new legislation and authorities. Agencies and departments with key responsibilities for managing the China challenge are understaffed, undertrained, under-resourced, or suffer from poor leadership and misguided priorities.

The role of Congress is also crucial. Effective action will require more than just liaison and negotiation with congressional leaders. The Administration must be proactive in educating and engaging congressional Members on the responsibilities and realities of dealing with an assertive China. Conversely, Congress must hold the executive branch accountable and should require all federal agencies and federally funded institutions to provide annual reports on any aid, loans, and technical or monetary assistance currently that they provide to the CCP or CCP-linked individuals or entities, including in science and health.

Congress also needs to do a better job of ensuring that executive branch bureaucrats enforce legislative policy actions. Too often, the Treasury and Commerce Departments have skirted their national security responsibilities by failing to enforce legislation related to export controls and inbound investment screening. What is more, both Congress and the Administration need to do a better job of supporting U.S. companies that face intimidation and theft or eviction from the Chinese market by the CCP or that seek to offshore their operations to safer destinations.

Meeting the China challenge will require an unprecedented degree of coordination among federal, state, and local governments. At a federal level, responsibility falls not just to the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security—the scope of the China threat necessitates involvement from the Departments of Commerce, the Treasury, and Education, as well as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission will also have important roles to play, among others.

Chinese efforts to penetrate, exploit, manipulate, and influence officials and legislators at all levels of government is a persistent and obvious problem. Therefore, implementation of countermeasures must be accompanied by robust counterintelligence, law enforcement, and operational security. This implementation must address both overt lobbying and public activities as well as illegal influence peddling and would be aided by reviving the Department of Justice’s China Initiative.

The U.S. government should also redouble its efforts to communicate with the Chinese people with Mandarin-language programming, including through Radio Free Asia. During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe was an oasis for anti-Communist dissidents in a desert of Soviet censorship and propaganda. Radio Free Asia could serve a similar purpose, but Congress would have to increase its Mandarin-language budget considerably.

Proper implementation of this plan will require a vast number of coordinated actions. Leaders that try to do everything at once, without adequate preparation and prioritization, tend to accomplish little. Sequencing actions and initiatives is crucial. The decisions made on how and when to take action are often as, if not more, consequential than the actions themselves. The first priority remains getting the right leaders in place to execute the plan. It is the responsibility of the core leadership to then take ownership of the plan and make the critical decisions of sequencing action and implementation.

Finally, many initiatives in this plan recognize the need for consultation, cooperation, and action with allied and partner nations. While the U.S. State Department plays a key role in the conduct of foreign affairs, proper implementation of a plan this vital to U.S. national security requires the U.S. President to direct timely, informative, and impactful engagement with other nations, using all the instruments of national power at the government’s disposal.

The Way Forward

Michael Pillsbury, PhD

Some of the more avid readers of “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China,” may well be in Beijing. Studying the enemy is a hallmark of Chinese strategy and statecraft. Sun Tzu’s Art of War advised that the best strategy is fa qi mou , meaning to “counter the enemy’s plans.” To do that, one must first identify the enemy’s strategy.

Beijing works hard at this goal. Chinese authors—and General Secretary Xi Jinping himself—claim that America today has adopted a “Cold War mentality” toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Xi frequently warns that this alleged mentality mirrors the strategy the Americans used to overthrow the Soviet Communist Party during the Cold War with the USSR.

With this release of The Heritage Foundation’s new Special Report , the CCP now has something to attack: a transparent plan to win the New Cold War. What the Chinese leadership may not understand is that Heritage does not propose copying the Cold War ideas of George Kennan’s 1947 “X Article” or Paul Nitze’s “NSC 68” from 1950. This is a new plan tailored to a new adversary.

The authors of this Special Report hope that the U.S. government, state and local authorities, leaders in the private sector and civil society, and international allies and partners will help to implement this plan as quickly and comprehensively as possible. It would be a blow to China’s quest for global dominance.

That said, calibrating a new strategy will not come easy for Washington. The U.S. government’s weak response to the China challenge is deeply ingrained after all these years. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership will start planning new actions even before the U.S. can begin to implement any new strategy.

China has a 3,000-year history of rising powers that toppled the old hegemon to create a new dynasty. Xi Jinping often quotes ancient authors, such as Han Fei Zi, to illustrate how the greatest dynasties were established by creating complacency and confusion in the mind of the old global leader. Xi has said many times that traditional Chinese history inspires his strategy.

China’s friends in the U.S. claim that there is no threat, that China is weak and may collapse soon, and that Americans must be calm about the new global order that China plans to create. They deny that China has any ambitions to replace America as the top global power. According to books written by eyewitnesses to history, such as John Bolton, Jared Kushner, and Peter Navarro, when Xi Jinping sat down with President Donald Trump to enjoy a steak dinner at the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires in 2018, Xi said that China’s strategy was no “100-year marathon.” China, he said, had no plan to replace America as the global leader.

American strategy must never be based on an adversary’s assurances.

In the years ahead, China may seek to escalate tensions, which will require even more adjustments to U.S. strategy. After all, most Americans today believe that the U.S. China strategy failed because the U.S. government widely assumed China to be its friend, forever on the verge of major political and free-market reforms. Even Ronald Reagan, arguably America’s most anti-communist President, famously said in 1984 that he had just visited “so-called Communist China.” While I was serving as Reagan’s policy planning chief in the Pentagon, he directed the U.S. government to sell weapons and share intelligence with China. It did.

Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy, the respected conservative John Lehman, has written proudly about his transfer of high-tech Mark 46 torpedoes to Beijing for use in Chinese submarines. Chinese sources say that one American Secretary of State even offered a nuclear umbrella to China. Many Americans today cling to this obsolete strategy of aiding China. How else can one explain the assumption of friendship that motivated American funding for “gain of function” research in that Wuhan virology laboratory?

The New Cold War has begun because China has become the most capable and dangerous enemy the U.S. has faced since the end of World War II. The U.S. must acknowledge and respond to this reality. Dwight Eisenhower may have said that “no plan survives contact with the enemy,” but he also observed: “Plans are worthless, yet planning is everything.”

It is impossible to plan ahead of the enemy without a planning guide. When the U.S. entered World War II, Eisenhower (who, as a young Army officer was responsible for overseeing the original planning) knew his plan was far from the last word in determining how to beat a formidable, thinking, determined enemy. The U.S. today must be just as flexible and adept in its determination to alter its plans as needed to win the New Cold War against China.

There is bipartisan support for actions to protect the U.S. economy from China and to diminish Beijing’s capacity to harm Americans and their interests. In the years ahead, The Heritage Foundation will draft model legislation for some of the proposals in this Special Report to assist government leaders in rapid implementation of the plan. Heritage will also provide research and policy support to state and local governments, some of which have already begun to take action by banning the use of Chinese-controlled social media apps, the purchase of Chinese drones by government entities, and Chinese purchases of farmland near sensitive military installations.

These are the tactical fights that are necessary to win the next battles. However, the U.S. also needs to stop simply reacting to threats from China. The U.S. needs to be one step ahead, anticipating Chinese countermeasures and future plans.

Part of the Heritage Foundation’s work to confront the CCP will involve expanding Heritage’s China Transparency Project, working with like-minded partners around the world to highlight, through open-source (unclassified, publicly available) intelligence, what China is currently doing, what it might do next, and how U.S. actions with allies and partners are affecting its calculations.

In addition, I will lead a comprehensive project at Heritage to do something that has never been successfully accomplished in the unclassified world: building an index to assess the relative national power of the U.S. and of China. The Index of Strategic Competition will measure indicators of military might, economic wealth, and political influence in an objective, standardized manner. The intent is to improve understanding of how both Chinese and American leadership conceptualizes and employs national power. The Index will allow Heritage analysts to track the status of the competition from year to year and anticipate new measures that the U.S. must take to ensure victory in the New Cold War. Americans must understand that China has already surpassed America in many of these indicators.

In Part I of this Special Report , my colleagues did a fine job evaluating much of the contemporary analysis on the U.S.–China competition. I am proud that they included my work and analysis over the decades studying official, original Chinese strategic planning documents, many of them still little known in the West. A future Heritage Foundation goal is to provide a cogent list of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, crafting a master plan that exploits China’s weaknesses and diminishes their strengths, while protecting and enhancing American power.

“Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China” is an important first step, not a “one and done” document. This plan represents the current to-do list. Future recommendations will focus on how to adapt and operationalize U.S. strategy and how to organize and equip like-minded allies—from local communities to global partnerships. Given the goals of the CCP, much work lies ahead.

Michael Pillsbury, PhD, is Senior Fellow for China Strategy in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation.

James J. Carafano, PhD, is Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Michael Pillsbury, PhD, is Senior Fellow for China Strategy in the Davis Institute. Jeff M. Smith is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. Andrew J. Harding is Research Assistant in the Asian Studies Center.

Contributors

Ted R. Bromund, PhD, is Senior Fellow in Anglo-American Relations in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan Burack is Senior Policy Advisor for China and the Indo–Pacific in the Asian Studies Center. David R. Burton is Senior Fellow in Economic Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Dustin Carmack is Research Fellow in Cybersecurity, Intelligence, and Emerging Technologies in the Border Security and Immigration Center at The Heritage Foundation. Michael Cunningham is Research Fellow for China in the Asian Studies Center. Jake Denton is Research Associate in the Tech Policy Center at The Heritage Foundation. Carrie Filipetti is Executive Director of the Vandenberg Coalition. Patty-Jane Geller is Senior Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Center for National Defense at The Heritage Foundation. Anthony B. Kim is Research Fellow in Economic Freedom, Editor of the Index of Economic Freedom, and Manager of Global Engagement in the Thatcher Center. Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., is John, Barbara, and Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow in the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Dan Negrea is former Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Max Primorac is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Andrew F. Puzder is Visiting Fellow in Business and Economic Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. Brent D. Sadler is Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technologies in the Center for National Defense. Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Thatcher Center. Derek Scissors is Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Peter St Onge, PhD, is Research Fellow in the Roe Institute. Katie Tubb is a former Research Fellow in the Center for Energy, Climate and Environment at The Heritage Foundation. John Venable is Senior Research Fellow in Defense Policy in the Center for National Defense. Erin Walsh is Senior Research Fellow for International Affairs in the Asian Studies Center. Peter W. Wood is President of the National Association of Scholars.

Acknowledgments

The editors express their sincere gratitude to Ilan Hulkower, a former intern for The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, for his invaluable research and contributions.

Senior Counselor to the President and E.W. Richardson Fellow

Senior Fellow, International Engagement

Director, Asian Studies Center

Research Assistant, Asian Studies Center

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Celebrate President Kennedy's Birthday and Join a Lasting Legacy!

The cold war.

After World War II, the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellite states began a decades-long struggle for supremacy known as the Cold War. Soldiers of the Soviet Union and the United States did not do battle directly during the Cold War. But the two superpowers continually antagonized each other through political maneuvering, military coalitions, espionage, propaganda, arms buildups, economic aid, and proxy wars between other nations.

From Allies to Adversaries

The Soviet Union and the United States had fought as allies against Nazi Germany during World War II. But the alliance began to crumble as soon as the war in Europe ended in May 1945. Tensions were apparent in July during the Potsdam Conference, where the victorious Allies negotiated the joint occupation of Germany.

The Soviet Union was determined to have a buffer zone between its borders and Western Europe. It set up pro-communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and eventually in East Germany.

As the Soviets tightened their grip on Eastern Europe, the United States embarked on a policy of containment to prevent the spread of Soviet and communist influence in Western European nations such as France, Italy, and Greece.

During the 1940s, the United States reversed its traditional reluctance to become involved in European affairs. The Truman Doctrine (1947) pledged aid to governments threatened by communist subversion. The Marshall Plan (1947) provided billions of dollars in economic assistance to eliminate the political instability that could open the way for communist takeovers of democratically elected governments.

France, England, and the United States administered sectors of the city of Berlin, deep inside communist East Germany. When the Soviets cut off all road and rail traffic to the city in 1948, the United States and Great Britain responded with a massive airlift that supplied the besieged city for 231 days until the blockade was lifted. In 1949, the United States joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first mutual security and military alliance in American history. The establishment of NATO also spurred the Soviet Union to create an alliance with the communist governments of Eastern Europe that was formalized in 1955 by the Warsaw Pact.

The Worldwide Cold War

In Europe, the dividing line between East and West remained essentially frozen during the next decades. But conflict spread to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The struggle to overthrow colonial regimes frequently became entangled in Cold War tensions, and the superpowers competed to influence anti-colonial movements.

In 1949, the communists triumphed in the Chinese civil war, and the world's most populous nation joined the Soviet Union as a Cold War adversary. In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, and the United Nations and the United States sent troops and military aid. Communist China intervened to support North Korea, and bloody campaigns stretched on for three years until a truce was signed in 1953.

In 1954, the colonial French regime fell in Vietnam.

The United States supported a military government in South Vietnam and worked to prevent free elections that might have unified the country under the control of communist North Vietnam. In response to the threat, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 1955 to prevent communist expansion, and President Eisenhower sent some 700 military personnel as well as military and economic aid to the government of South Vietnam. The effort was foundering when John F. Kennedy took office.

Closer to home, the Cuban resistance movement led by Fidel Castro deposed the pro-American military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Castro's Cuba quickly became militarily and economically dependent on the Soviet Union. The United States' main rival in the Cold War had established a foothold just ninety miles off the coast of Florida.

Kennedy and the Cold War

Cold War rhetoric dominated the 1960 presidential campaign. Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon both pledged to strengthen American military forces and promised a tough stance against the Soviet Union and international communism. Kennedy warned of the Soviet's growing arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and pledged to revitalize American nuclear forces. He also criticized the Eisenhower administration for permitting the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Cuba.

John F. Kennedy was the first American president born in the 20th century. The Cold War and the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union were vital international issues throughout his political career. His inaugural address stressed the contest between the free world and the communist world, and he pledged that the American people would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."

The Bay of Pigs

Before his inauguration, JFK was briefed on a plan drafted during the Eisenhower administration to train Cuban exiles for an invasion of their homeland. The plan anticipated that support from the Cuban people and perhaps even elements of the Cuban military would lead to the overthrow of Castro and the establishment of a non-communist government friendly to the United States.

Kennedy approved the operation and some 1,400 exiles landed at Cuba's Bay of Pigs on April 17. The entire force was either killed or captured, and Kennedy took full responsibility for the failure of the operation.

The Arms Race

In June 1961, Kennedy met with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna, Austria. (See a memorandum below outlining the main points of conversation between President Kennedy and Khrushchev at their first lunch meeting.) Kennedy was surprised by Khrushchev's combative tone during the summit. At one point, Khrushchev threatened to cut off Allied access to Berlin. The Soviet leader pointed out the Lenin Peace Medals he was wearing, and Kennedy answered, "I hope you keep them." Just two months later, Khrushchev ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall to stop the flood of East Germans into West Germany.

As a result of these threatening developments, Kennedy ordered substantial increases in American intercontinental ballistic missile forces. He also added five new army divisions and increased the nation's air power and military reserves. The Soviets meanwhile resumed nuclear testing and President Kennedy responded by reluctantly reactivating American tests in early 1962.

JFKPOF-126-009-p0024. Memorandum relaying the main points of the conversation between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during their first lunch meeting in Vienna, on June 3, 1961.

During this meeting, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev discussed Soviet agriculture, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's space flight, the possibility of putting a man on the moon, and their hopes that their two nations would have good relations in the future.

More information

JFKPOF-126-009-p0025. Memorandum relaying the main points of the conversation between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during their first lunch meeting in Vienna, on June 3, 1961. 

JFKPOF-126-009-p0026. Memorandum relaying the main points of the conversation between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during their first lunch meeting in Vienna, on June 3, 1961. 

JFKPOF-126-009-p0027. Memorandum relaying the main points of the conversation between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during their first lunch meeting in Vienna, on June 3, 1961. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis

In the summer of 1962, Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with the Cuban government to supply nuclear missiles capable of protecting the island against another US-sponsored invasion. In mid-October, American spy planes photographed the missile sites under construction. Kennedy responded by placing a naval blockade, which he referred to as a "quarantine," around Cuba. He also demanded the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. Recognizing that the crisis could easily escalate into nuclear war, Khrushchev finally agreed to remove the missiles in return for an American pledge not to reinvade Cuba. But the end of Cuban Missile Crisis did little to ease the tensions of the Cold War. The Soviet leader decided to commit whatever resources were required for upgrading the Soviet nuclear strike force. His decision led to a major escalation of the nuclear arms race.

In June 1963, President Kennedy spoke at the American University commencement in Washington, DC. He urged Americans to critically reexamine Cold War stereotypes and myths and called for a strategy of peace that would make the world safe for diversity. In the final months of the Kennedy presidency Cold War tensions seemed to soften as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated and signed. In addition, Washington and Moscow established a direct line of communication known as the "Hotline" to help reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation.

In May 1961, JFK had authorized sending 500 Special Forces troops and military advisers to assist the government of South Vietnam. They joined 700 Americans already sent by the Eisenhower administration. In February 1962, the president sent an additional 12,000 military advisers to support the South Vietnamese army. By early November 1963, the number of US military advisers had reached 16,000.

Even as the military commitment in Vietnam grew, JFK told an interviewer, "In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam against the Communists. . . . But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . [The United States] made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia." In the final weeks of his life, JFK wrestled with the need to decide the future of the United States commitment in Vietnam—and very likely had not made a final decision before his death.

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Grade 12 - The Cold War

How did the Cold War period shape international relations after the Second World War?

After the Second World War, there was a struggle between two world powers, the US and Russia. Why was it called the ‘Cold War’ ? The reason lay in the threat of new and even deadlier weapons of nuclear technology that prevented outright open warfare. The Cold War was characterised by conflict through proxy wars, the manipulation of more vulnerable states through extensive military and financial aid, espionage, propaganda, rivalry over technology, space and nuclear races, and sport. Besides periods of tense crisis in this bi-polar world, the Cold War deeply affected the newly independent countries in Africa and the liberation struggles in southern Africa from the 1960s until the 1990s, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)  was dismantled.

Did you know?  The term “Cold War” was first used by George Orwell, author of the book satirizing Stalinism, “Animal Farm”.

The detente (friendship) that existed between the Allied powers (The US, France and Russia) after 1945 was no more. That military aid would be offered to each other when faced with Nazism fell away, and increased hostility was the order of the day. Some historians argue that it was the formulation and implementation of common policy documents by the USSR for its East European territories that heralded the beginning of different spheres of influence.  Quickly, two distinct blocs emerged.

Also see: National Senior Certificate Grd 12, History Paper 1, November 2014 and National Senior Certificate Grd 12, History Paper 2, November 2014 .

Most learners will understand that a ‘war’ involves conflict between warring parties; that a ‘war’ involves the use of weaponry amongst ‘warring parties’ BUT what is meant by a ‘COLD’ war as opposed to a ‘HOT’ one? Common reference to any war usually involves the type of war that involves weaponry, personnel, devastation, explosions, and most of the images of war. A “COLD” war would refer to a battle of ideologies where the protagonists do not face each other, or fight, each other DIRECTLY.

The Cold War was characteristics by different ideologies being imposed or sold to other countries.

It dissected the world into spheres of influence, with the United States of America (USA) as a champion of democracy (and incidentally, Capitalism, as well) pitted against the USSR (Russia), which stood as a beacon of Communism. These divisions played themselves out in the exporting of influence...and then arms and money....to countries sympathetic to either cause.

The Cold War, which occurred from 1945 until 1989/1990 had far-reaching consequences for the world in general. Much of the literature during this period focussed on the bi-polar nature of the globe. Nation-states across the world, whatever explicit or not, empathised with either Russia or the USA. These countries became the battlefields for the competing influences of Democracy/Capitalism against Communism/Centrally-planned economies.

So, learners might ask as to why this Cold War did not escalate into a ‘Hot’ war, where conventional means of warfare were employed. The reason lies in the proliferation (increase) of nuclear weapons so that if these weapons were ever used, the destruction that would follow would result in a global destruction. So, this Cold War was fought behind the threat of a nuclear war.  The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) was probably the closest that the world got to a full-blown conventional war.

The Cold War was a period of increased hostility between two blocs of power, the USA and its allies on the one hand; and the USSR and China, on the other. From the end of the Cold War until the early 1990s, world politics and events were primarily viewed through this lens the battle to exert control and influence globally. The Cold War spread outside Europe to every region of the world, and drew to a close by end of the late 1980s / early 1990s. Towards the end of the 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held conferences with USA President Ronald Reagan. The USSR introduced reform policies aimed at restructuring (perestroika) and opening the Russian economy (glasnost).

In December 1989, after more than four decades, Russian President Gorbachev and American President G. H.W Bush declared the Cold War officially over.

Timeline (Source:  “ Timeline of events in the Cold War ” [ Accesssed: 23 January 2015])

• 1945:  Cold War begins
• 1946:  Winston Churchill delivers his ‘ Iron Curtain’ speech
• 1947:  Marshall Plan is announced
• 1948 :  February, Communists take over Czechoslovakia
• 1948 :  June, The ‘Berlin Blockade’ begins
• 1949 :  July, NATO is ratified
• 1950 :  February, McCarthy begins communist witchunt
• 1954 :  KGB established.  CIA assists in overthrowing ‘unfriendly’ regimes in Iran and Guatemala
• 1961 :  Bay of Pigs invasion.  Construction of Berlin Wall begins.  US involvement in Vietnam increases ( troops were dispatched in 1965)
• 1962 :  Cuban Missile Crisis
• 1965 :  150000 troops dispatched to Vietnam
• 1970 :  US President Nixon extends the war to Cambodia.
• 1973 :  Ceasefire between the US and Vietnam.
• 1975 :  North Vietnam defeats South Vietnam.
• 1979 :  USSR invades Afghanistan
• 1983 :  Ronald Reagan proposes Star Wars
• 1989 :  Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.  Communist governments collapse in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania.  The Soviet Empire ( USSR ) ends.

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/what%20was%20the%20cold%20war.htm

http://www.amazon.com/The-Cold-War-New-History/dp/0143038273

USSR and USA and the creation of spheres of interest :

- installation of Soviet-friendly governments in satellite states;

- USA’s policy of containment: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan;

- Berlin Crises from 1949 to 1961 (broad understanding of the crises); and

- opposing military alliances: NATO and Warsaw Pact (broadly)

Containment and brinkmanship: the Cuban crisis (as an example of containment and brinkmanship)

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Essay on the Cold War: it’s Origin, Causes and Phases

After the Second World War, the USA and USSR became two Super Powers. One nation tried to reduce the power of other. Indirectly the competition between the Super Powers led to the Cold War.

Then America took the leadership of all the Capitalist Countries.

Soviet Russia took the leadership of all the Communist Countries. As a result of which both stood as rivals to each other.

Definition of the Cold War:

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In the graphic language of Hartman, “Cold War is a state of tension between countries in which each side adopts policies designed to strengthen it and weaken the other by falling short by actual war”.

Image Source: i.ytimg.com/vi/y9HjvHZfCUI/maxresdefault.jpg

Infact, Cold War is a kind of verbal war which is fought through newspapers, magazines, radio and other propaganda methods. It is a propaganda to which a great power resorts against the other power. It is a sort of diplomatic war.

Origin of Cold War:

There is no unanimity amongst scholars regarding the origin of the Cold War In 1941 when Hitler invaded Russia, Roosevelt the President of USA sent armaments to Russia. It is only because the relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin was very good. But after the defeat of Germany, when Stalin wanted to implement Communist ideology in Poland, Hungery, Bulgaria and Rumania, at that time England and America suspected Stalin.

Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of England in his ‘Fulton Speech’ on 5 March 1946 said that Soviet Russia was covered by an Iron Curtain. It led Stalin to think deeply. As a result of which suspicion became wider between Soviet Russia and western countries and thus the Cold War took birth.

Causes of the Cold War:

Various causes are responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War. At first, the difference between Soviet Russia and USA led to the Cold War. The United States of America could not tolerate the Communist ideology of Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Russia could not accept the dominance of United States of America upon the other European Countries.

Secondly, the Race of Armament between the two super powers served another cause for the Cold War. After the Second World War, Soviet Russia had increased its military strength which was a threat to the Western Countries. So America started to manufacture the Atom bomb, Hydrogen bomb and other deadly weapons. The other European Countries also participated in this race. So, the whole world was divided into two power blocs and paved the way for the Cold War.

Thirdly, the Ideological Difference was another cause for the Cold War. When Soviet Russia spread Communism, at that time America propagated Capitalism. This propaganda ultimately accelerated the Cold War.

Fourthly, Russian Declaration made another cause for the Cold War. Soviet Russia highlighted Communism in mass-media and encouraged the labour revolution. On the other hand, America helped the Capitalists against the Communism. So it helped to the growth of Cold War.

Fifthly, the Nuclear Programme of America was responsible for another cause for the Cold War. After the bombardment of America on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Soviet Russia got afraid for her existence. So, it also followed the same path to combat America. This led to the growth of Cold War.

Lastly, the Enforcement of Veto by Soviet Russia against the western countries made them to hate Russia. When the western countries put forth any view in the Security Council of the UNO, Soviet Russia immediately opposed it through veto. So western countries became annoyed in Soviet Russia which gave birth to the Cold War.

Various Phases of the Cold War:

The Cold War did not occur in a day. It passed through several phases.

First Phase (1946-1949 ):

In this phase America and Soviet Russia disbelieved each other. America always tried to control the Red Regime in Russia. Without any hesitation Soviet Russia established Communism by destroying democracy in the Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungery, Yugoslavia and other Eastern European Countries.

In order to reduce Russia’s hegemony, America helped Greece and Turkey by following Truman Doctrine which came into force on 12 March 1947. According to Marshall Plan which was declared on 5 June, 1947 America gave financial assistance to Western European Countries.

In this phase, non withdrawal of army from Iran by Soviet Russia, Berlin blaockade etc. made the cold was more furious. After the formation of NATO in 1949, the Cold War took a halt.

Second Phase (1949-1953 ):

In this phase a treaty was signed between Australia, New Zeland and America in September, 1957 which was known as ANZUS. America also signed a treaty with Japan on 8 September, 1951. At that time by taking armaments from Russia and army from China, North Korea declared war against South Korea.

Then with the help of UNO, America sent military aid to South Korea. However, both North Korea and South Korea signed peace treaty in 1953 and ended the war. In order to reduce the impact of Soviet Communism, America spent a huge amount of dollar in propaganda against Communism. On the other hand, Soviet Russia tried to be equal with America by testing atom bomb.

Third Phase (1953-1957):

Now United States of America formed SEATO in 1954 in order to reduce Soviet Russia’s influence. In 1955 America formed MEDO in Middle East. Within a short span of time, America gave military assistance to 43 countries and formed 3300 military bases around Soviet Russia. At that time, the Vietnamese War started on 1955.

To reduce the American Power, Russia signed WARSAW PACT in 1955. Russia also signed a defence pact with 12 Countries. Germany was divided into Federal Republic of Germany which was under the American control where as German Democratic Republic was under Soviet Russia. In 1957 Soviet Russia included Sphutnick in her defence programme.

In 1953 Stalin died and Khrushchev became the President of Russia. In 1956 an agreement was signed between America and Russia regarding the Suez Crisis. America agreed not to help her allies like England and France. In fact West Asia was saved from a great danger.

Fourth Phase (1957-1962):

In 1959 the Russian President Khrushchev went on a historical tour to America. Both the countries were annoyed for U-2 accident and for Berlin Crisis. In 13 August 1961, Soviet Russia made a Berlin Wall of 25 Kilometres in order to check the immigration from eastern Berlin to Western Berlin. In 1962, Cuba’s Missile Crisis contributed a lot to the cold war.

This incident created an atmosphere of conversation between American President Kenedy and Russian President Khrushchev. America assured Russia that she would not attack Cuba and Russia also withdrew missile station from Cuba.

Fifth Phase (1962-1969 ):

The Fifth Phase which began from 1962 also marked a mutual suspicion between USA and USSR. There was a worldwide concern demanding ban on nuclear weapons. In this period Hot Line was established between the White House and Kremlin. This compelled both the parties to refrain from nuclear war. Inspite of that the Vietnam problem and the Problem in Germany kept Cold War between USA and USSR in fact.

Sixth Phase (1969-1978 ):

This phase commencing from 1969 was marked by DETENTE between USA and USSR- the American President Nixon and Russian President Brezhnev played a vital role for putting an end to the Cold War. The SALT of 1972, the summit Conference on Security’ of 1975 in Helsinki and Belgrade Conference of 1978 brought America and Russia closer.

In 1971, American Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger paid a secret visit to China to explore the possibilities of reapproachment with China. The American move to convert Diego Garcia into a military base was primarily designed to check the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. During the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 and the Egypt-Israel War of 1973 the two super powers extended support to the opposite sides.

Last Phase (1979-1987 ):

In this phase certain changes were noticed in the Cold War. That is why historians call this phase as New Cold War. In 1979, the American President Carter and Russian President Brezhnev signed SALT II. But in 1979 the prospects of mitigating Cold War were marred by sudden development in Afghanistan.

Vietnam (1975), Angola (1976), Ethiopia (1972) and Afghanistan (1979) issues brought success to Russia which was unbearable for America. American President Carter’s Human Rights and Open Diplomacy were criticised by Russia. The SALT II was not ratified by the US Senate. In 1980 America boycotted the Olympic held at Moscow.

In 1983, Russia withdrew from a talk on missile with America. In 1984 Russia boycotted the Olympic game held at Los-Angeles. The Star War of the American President Ronald Regan annoyed Russia. In this way the ‘New Cold War’ between America and Russia continued till 1987.

Result of the Cold War:

The Cold War had far-reaching implications in the international affairs. At first, it gave rise to a fear psychosis which resulted in a mad race for the manufacture of more sophisticated armaments. Various alliances like NATO, SEATO, WARSAW PACT, CENTO, ANZUS etc. were formed only to increase world tension.

Secondly, Cold War rendered the UNO ineffective because both super powers tried to oppose the actions proposed by the opponent. The Korean Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War etc. were the bright examples in this direction.

Thirdly, due to the Cold War, a Third World was created. A large number of nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America decided to keep away from the military alliances of the two super powers. They liked to remain neutral. So, Non-Alignments Movement became the direct outcome of the Cold War.

Fourthly, Cold War was designed against mankind. The unnecessary expenditure in the armament production created a barrier against the progress of the world and adversely affected a country and prevented improvement in the living standards of the people.

Fifthly, the principle ‘Whole World as a Family’, was shattered on the rock of frustration due to the Cold War. It divided the world into two groups which was not a healthy sign for mankind.

Sixthly, The Cold War created an atmosphere of disbelief among the countries. They questioned among themselves how unsafe were they under Russia or America.

Finally, The Cold War disturbed the World Peace. The alliances and counter-alliances created a disturbing atmosphere. It was a curse for the world. Though Russia and America, being super powers, came forward to solve the international crisis, yet they could not be able to establish a perpetual peace in the world.

Related Articles:

• Essay on the Cold War, 1945
• Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO): Structure, Principles and Other Details
• History of The Cold War: Origin, Reasons and Other Details
• Truman Doctrine: A Policy Statement Made by US during the Cold War

At The Brink

An Introduction: It’s Time to Protest Nuclear War Again

Kathleen Kingsbury, Opinion Editor

The threat of nuclear war has dangled over humankind for much too long. We have survived so far through luck and brinkmanship. But the old, limited safeguards that kept the Cold War cold are long gone. Nuclear powers are getting more numerous and less cautious. We’ve condemned another generation to live on a planet that is one grave act of hubris or human error away from destruction without demanding any action from our leaders. That must change.

In New York Times Opinion’s latest series, At the Brink, we’re looking at the reality of nuclear weapons today. It’s the culmination of nearly a year of reporting and research. We plan to explore where the present dangers lie in the next arms race and what can be done to make the world safer again.

W.J. Hennigan, the project's lead writer, begins that discussion today by laying out what’s at stake if a single nuclear weapon were used, as well as revealing for the first time details about how close U.S. officials thought the world came to breaking the decades-long nuclear taboo.

Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, threatened in his 2024 annual speech that more direct Western intervention in Ukraine could lead to nuclear conflict. Yet an American intelligence assessment suggests the world may have wandered far closer to the brink of a nuclear launch more than a year earlier, during the first year of Mr. Putin's invasion.

This is the first telling of the Biden administration’s efforts to avoid that fate, and had they failed, how they hoped to contain the catastrophic aftermath. Mr. Hennigan explores what happened during that tense time, what officials were thinking, what they did and how they’re approaching a volatile future.

In the first essay of the series, W.J. Hennigan lays out the risks of the new nuclear era and how we got here. You can listen to an adaptation of the piece here .

Within two years, the last major remaining arms treaty between the United States and Russia is to expire. Yet amid mounting global instability and shifting geopolitics, world leaders aren’t turning to diplomacy. Instead, they have responded by building more technologically advanced weapons. The recent intelligence on Russia’s development of a space-based nuclear weapon is the latest reminder of the enormous power these weapons continue to wield over our lives.

There is no precedent for the complexity of today’s nuclear era. The bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a great-power competition with far more emerging players. With the possibility of Donald Trump returning as president, Iran advancing its nuclear development and China on track to stock its arsenal with 1,000 warheads by 2030, German and South Korean officials have wondered aloud if they should have their own nuclear weapons, as have important voices in Poland, Japan and Saudi Arabia.

The latest generation of nuclear technology can still inflict unspeakable devastation. Artificial intelligence could someday automate war without human intervention. No one can confidently predict how and if deterrence will work under these dynamics or even what strategic stability will look like. A new commitment to what could be years of diplomatic talks will be needed to establish new terms of engagement.

Over the past several months, I’ve been asked, including by colleagues, why I want to raise awareness on nuclear arms control when the world faces so many other challenges — climate change, rising authoritarianism and economic inequality, as well as the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Part of the answer is that both of those active conflicts would be far more catastrophic if nuclear weapons were introduced into them. Consider Mr. Putin’s threat at the end of February: “We also have weapons that can strike targets on their territory,” the Russian leader said during his annual address. “Do they not understand this?”

The other answer lies in our recent history. When people around the world in the 1960s, ’70s, ’80s and early ’90s began to understand the nuclear peril of that era, a vocal constituency demanded — and achieved — change.

Fear of mutual annihilation last century spurred governments to work together to create a set of global agreements to lower the risk. Their efforts helped to end atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which, in certain cases, had poisoned people and the environment. Adversarial nations started talking to each other and, by doing so, helped avoid accidental use. Stockpiles were reduced. A vast majority of nations agreed to never build these weapons in the first place if the nations that had them worked in good faith toward their abolishment. That promise was not kept.

In 1982 as many as a million people descended on Central Park calling for the elimination of nuclear arms in the world. More recently, some isolated voices have tried to raise the alarm — Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, said last year that “the most serious thing facing mankind is nuclear proliferation” — but mostly such activism is inconceivable now. The once again growing threat of nuclear weapons is simply not part of the public conversation. And the world is less secure.

Today the nuclear safety net is threadbare. The good news is that it can be restitched. American leadership requires that Washington marshal international support for this mission — but it also requires leading by example. There are several actions that the U.S. president could take without buy-in from a Congress unlikely to cooperate.

As a first step, the United States could push to reinvigorate and establish with Russia and China, respectively, joint information and crisis control centers to ensure that misunderstandings and escalation don’t spiral. Such hotlines have all but gone dormant. The United States could also renounce the strategy of launching its nuclear weapons based only on a warning of an adversary’s launch, reducing the chance America could begin a nuclear war because of an accident, a human or mechanical failure or a simple misunderstanding. The United States could insist on robust controls for artificial intelligence in the launch processes of nuclear weapons.

Democracy rarely prevents war, but it can eventually serve as a check on it. Nuclear use has always been the exception: No scenario offers enough time for voters to weigh in on whether to deploy a nuclear weapon. Citizens, therefore, need to exert their influence well before the country finds itself in such a situation.

We should not allow the next generation to inherit a world more dangerous than the one we were given.

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The Phenomenon of McCarthyism during the Cold War

This essay is about McCarthyism, a political and social phenomenon during the early Cold War, named after Senator Joseph McCarthy. It details the period of intense fear and suspicion of communist infiltration in the United States, marked by aggressive investigations and accusations. McCarthy’s tactics, including public accusations and guilt by association, led to numerous careers being destroyed. The essay covers the broader context of the Cold War, key events like the Army-McCarthy hearings, and the impact on civil liberties and free expression. It also highlights the eventual downfall of McCarthy and the lasting legacy of this period as a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked political power and fearmongering.

How it works

McCarthyism, christened in homage to Senator Joseph McCarthy, emerged as a momentous political and societal phenomenon during the nascent stages of the Cold War. This era, spanning from the latter part of the 1940s to the concluding years of the 1950s, was ensconced in profound trepidation and distrust regarding communist infiltration within the United States. McCarthyism epitomizes the pinnacle of the anti-communist fervor, characterized by zealous investigations, indictments, and encroachments upon civil liberties.

The genesis of McCarthyism is enmeshed within the broader tapestry of the Cold War milieu, a period during which the United States and the Soviet Union grappled in a global ideological, political, and military struggle.

Post-World War II, revelations of Soviet espionage endeavors on American soil, exemplified by the Alger Hiss affair and the Rosenberg case, nurtured public paranoia concerning the existence of communist sympathizers embedded within American institutions. This apprehension was compounded by the Korean War and the Soviet Union’s advancements in nuclear armaments, which heightened the perceived specter of communism.

Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Republican luminary hailing from Wisconsin, adeptly capitalized on these anxieties. In a pivotal address delivered in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1950, McCarthy purported possession of a registry of communists entrenched within the State Department, albeit without substantiating evidence. This pronouncement thrust him into the national limelight and inaugurated a series of probes and hearings aimed at ferreting out purported communist subversion. Chairing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, McCarthy leveraged his authority to orchestrate rigorous inquiries into sundry governmental entities and associations.

McCarthy’s stratagems encompassed public indictments, guilt by association, and reliance upon dubious testimonies. A myriad of individuals were summoned to testify before Congress, often subjected to hostile interrogation and coerced into divulging information regarding other suspected communists. The climate of trepidation and intimidation precipitated the ruination of numerous careers predicated upon uncorroborated accusations. Individuals entrenched within the entertainment sphere, academia, and governmental apparatus were particularly susceptible to allegations of communist sympathies.

The repercussions of McCarthyism transcended the immediate casualties of the witch hunts. It engendered an atmosphere of trepidation that stifled political dissent and the free exchange of ideas. The loyalty of multitudes of Americans was impugned, resulting in widespread blacklisting and unemployment. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) played a pivotal role in these investigations, particularly targeting the Hollywood milieu, where actors, writers, and directors underwent scrutiny for their ideological proclivities.

One of the most emblematic cases was that of the Hollywood Ten, a cadre of scriptwriters and directors who declined to testify before HUAC, invoking their First Amendment privileges. Subsequently, they were ostracized and served penitentiary terms for contempt of Congress. Fearing further retribution, the entertainment industry frequently acquiesced to HUAC’s demands, fostering a climate of self-censorship and marginalizing numerous gifted individuals.

Despite the widespread endorsement of McCarthy’s anti-communist crusade, substantial detractors contested his methodologies. Journalists of the caliber of Edward R. Murrow and political figures such as Senator Margaret Chase Smith vociferously opposed the excesses of McCarthyism. Murrow’s seminal broadcast, “See It Now,” in 1954, castigated McCarthy’s tactics and played a pivotal role in swaying public opinion against him.

The decline of Joseph McCarthy commenced with the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954. These televised hearings laid bare McCarthy’s reckless accusations and coercive methods before the American populace. His altercations with the U.S. Army and his inability to substantiate his claims precipitated a marked erosion of support. Later that same year, the Senate officially censured McCarthy, effectively curtailing his influence and bringing an end to the epoch that bore his appellation.

The legacy of McCarthyism is multifaceted. While it unquestionably inflicted harm upon countless individuals and eroded civil liberties, it also serves as a sobering cautionary narrative regarding the perils of unchecked political authority and the imperative of due process and adherence to the rule of law. The sobriquet “McCarthyism” has since become synonymous with demagogic practices, fearmongering, and the unjust persecution of individuals based on ideological pretexts.

In retrospect, McCarthyism underscores the vulnerability of democratic institutions during periods of crisis and the facile manipulation of fear for political expediency. The era serves as a poignant reminder of the necessity for unwavering vigilance in safeguarding civil liberties, even amidst considerations of national security. The lessons gleaned from McCarthyism endure, underscoring the significance of striking a delicate balance between security imperatives and the preservation of individual rights and freedoms.

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The U.S. and China are in a 'new Cold War' — with chips at the center

F or five years, the United States has wielded its trade and sanctioning powers to curb China’s advanced chipmaking efforts — and the situation has become a Cold War between the two nations, arguesthe first national security analyst to predict the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

In his new book World on the Brink , Department of Homeland Security adviser Dmitri Alperovitch argues that China is readying to invade Taiwan by the end of the decade, and the U.S. and its allies face dire consequences if the takeover is not stopped. “The estimates are that an invasion scenario over Taiwan would bring down the world economy to global depression, potentially wiping out as much as $10 trillion worth of economic value,” he tells Quartz. “[W]e should do whatever is possible to avoid it.”

Alperovitch was one of the first analysts to predict that Russian president Vladimir Putin would invade Ukraine three months before the war began — and says it’s just one stop in a modern day Cold War between the U.S. and China. He also sees an analogue further east: The causes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s possible invasion of Taiwan “are very similar,” Alperovitch said.

And the very fate of the semiconductor industry could rest on the tiny island. Taiwan is home to the world’s largest semiconductor foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which is estimated to produce 90% of the world’s advanced chips. A Chinese invasion risks China taking control of TSMC — securing it unbridled access to the valuable chips, and therefore the upper hand in the technology war developing between the country and the United States .

Alperovitch spoke with Quartz about China’s chip ambitions amid what he calls Cold War II, and offered his insight into what the U.S. should do to prepare ahead.

Why has China struggled to make its own advanced chips?

Technically no country in the world can make its own advanced chips alone, since no one country houses the entire semiconductor supply chain. Chip production includes a design process in the U.S., “printing” the chips with extreme-ultraviolet lithography machines made only in the Netherlands, integrating chemicals largely manufactured in Japan, and making use of chip fabrication sites (known as fabs)in Taiwan and South Korea, Alperovitch explained. Plus, advanced chips require putting tiny transistors on a silicon wafer, which is difficult enough.

“For China to reproduce that entire supply chain in-country is extraordinarily difficult, and will take many, many years — well over a decade, if not more,” Alperovitch said.

China, like other countries in the supply chain, are dependent on imports and technology from those countries to be able to produce chips, he added. “The United States woke up to this problem a couple of years ago, and it has started export controls — particularly on equipment — and convinced the allies to do the same, to deny China the ability to import the equipment they need to make chips. They’re trying to build their own equipment, but it is literally the most sophisticated equipment that man has ever built. Will they get there one day? Probably. Will it be anytime soon? No,” he said.

If China invades Taiwan, how would U.S. sanctions work?

Alperovitch says the U.S. needs a “four-pronged approach to China” in the event it invades Taiwan. First, the U.S. needs to deny China the ability to produce chips, which it can do for the foreseeable future by denying China the ability to purchase, maintain, and operate equipment from the U.S., along with Japan and the Netherlands.

Second, Alperovitch says the U.S. should tell China that in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, China would not be able to take control of TSMC’s fabs — whether or not the U.S. decides to become involved. “There are numerous ways in which you can do that,” Alperovitch said, including sabotaging TSMC’s equipment, or stopping the maintenance and future sales of equipment and chemicals to those fabs if they are taken over.

The third step is diversifying chip supply and reducing overall reliance on Taiwan — but not eliminating it. Alperovitch said this is already happening with the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, and other similar acts around the world.

Finally, the United States would have to convey to China that in the event of an invasion, it will not be able to buy chips from anywhere in the world. That also comes with a precedent: The United States has used a similar export control, the Foreign-Direct Product Rule , on Russia. That rule denies the export of any good to any country if it is manufactured with a certain percentage of U.S. intellectual property components. “Because every single semiconductor is produced in part with U.S. equipment, U.S. designs, and so forth, every U.S. chip in the world falls under the foreign direct product rule,” Alperovitch explained.

How does the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act play into all of this?

According to Alperovitch, the Biden administration’s U.S. CHIPS and Science Act is accomplishing its key goal to bring advanced chipmaking stateside. But it’s fomented unintended benefits, too: The act “stirred up a chips race all over the world,” he said. Once the United States began giving grants and incentives to chip development, nations like Japan, South Korea, and others in the European Union followed suit to stay competitive.

That’s ushered in a lot of money to the U.S.’s cause. This leg of the chips race has generated an estimated $1.2 trillion of public and private-sector commitments to chipmaking outside of China, Alperovitch said.

“The more capacity we build outside of China, and frankly, outside of Taiwan, the better off we’ll be in reducing China’s ability to threaten us, and reduce our dependence on China,” Alperovitch said. “It doesn’t all have to be here. If it’s in Europe, if it’s in Japan, if it’s in [South] Korea, if it’s in Singapore, that’s just fine. And that is producing more benefits than many people realize.”

What do you want readers to take away from On the Brink?

Alperovitch says his work attempts to define a strategy for the U.S. amid the new Cold War with China, emphasizing that technology is an essential U.S. security interest. While it starts with deterring an invasion of Taiwan, Alperovitch says the United States’ strategy needs to look ahead to an ongoing relationship with China — not a war, and not a stalemate. The tech race, he says, continues on from chips and AI to space technology, biotech, green energy, and critical minerals.

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