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Development of self-concept in childhood and adolescence: How neuroscience can inform theory and vice versa

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Eveline A. Crone , Lina van Drunen; Development of self-concept in childhood and adolescence: How neuroscience can inform theory and vice versa. Human Development 2024; https://doi.org/10.1159/000539844

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How do we develop a stable and coherent self-concept in contemporary times? Susan Harter’s original work The Construction of Self (1999; 2012) argues that cognitive and social processes are building blocks for developing a coherent sense of self, resulting in self-concept clarity across various domains in life (e.g., (pro-)social, academic, and physical). Here, we show how this framework guides and can benefit from recent findings on (1) the prolonged and non-linear structural brain development during childhood and adolescence, (2) insights from developmental neuroimaging studies using self-concept appraisal paradigms, (3) genetic and environmental influences on behavioral and neural correlates of self-concept development, and (4) youth’s perspectives on self-concept development in the context of 21st century global challenges. We examine how neuroscience can inform theory by testing several compelling questions related to stability versus change of neural, behavioral, and self-report measures and we reflect on the meaning of variability and change/growth.

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Self-Concept: Determinants and Consequences of Academic Self-Concept in School Contexts

• First Online: 02 April 2016

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• Ulrich Trautwein 6 &
• Jens Möller 7  

Part of the book series: The Springer Series on Human Exceptionality ((SSHE))

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Self-concepts are subjective beliefs about the qualities that characterize us, with academic self-concepts describing our self-beliefs about our intellectual strengths and weaknesses. The chapter attempts to answer some of the most pressing questions about the role of academic self-concept as a central construct in educational theory and practice: What is self-concept? What are the consequences of high or low self-concept? What are the determinants of high or low self-concept? What can be done to positively influence self-concept? The chapter starts by explaining the multidimensional and hierarchical nature of academic self-concept. It then identifies academic self-concepts as one of the most powerful predictors of academic behavior and academic outcomes and, thus, as highly relevant for researchers and practitioners. At the same time, the chapter highlights that the development of academic self-concept is influenced by many sources, and it describes how educational interventions have to deal with these different determinants of academic self-concept. The chapter concludes with a number of suggestions for educational practice and further research.

Lipnevich, A., Preckel, F., & Roberts, R. (Eds.), Psychosocial skills and school systems in the twenty-first century: Theory, research, and applications . Berlin: Springer.

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Some parts of this chapter were informed by the authors’ chapter on self-concept in a German language textbook (Möller & Trautwein, 2015).

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Trautwein, U., Möller, J. (2016). Self-Concept: Determinants and Consequences of Academic Self-Concept in School Contexts. In: Lipnevich, A., Preckel, F., Roberts, R. (eds) Psychosocial Skills and School Systems in the 21st Century. The Springer Series on Human Exceptionality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28606-8_8

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Article contents

Self and identity.

• Sanaz Talaifar Sanaz Talaifar Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin
•  and  William Swann William Swann Department of Psychology, University of Texas
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.242
• Published online: 28 March 2018

Active and stored mental representations of the self include both global and specific qualities as well as conscious and nonconscious qualities. Semantic and episodic memory both contribute to a self that is not a unitary construct comprising only the individual as he or she is now, but also past and possible selves. Self-knowledge may overlap more or less with others’ views of the self. Furthermore, mental representations of the self vary whether they are positive or negative, important, certain, and stable. The origins of the self are also manifold and can be considered from developmental, biological, intrapsychic, and interpersonal perspectives. The self is connected to core motives (e.g., coherence, agency, and communion) and is manifested in the form of both personal identities and social identities. Finally, just as the self is a product of proximal and distal social forces, it is also an agent that actively shapes its environment.

• self-concept
• self-representation
• self-knowledge
• self-perception
• self-esteem
• personal identity
• social identity

Introduction

The concept of the self has beguiled—and frustrated—psychologists and philosophers alike for generations. One of the greatest challenges has been coming to terms with the nature of the self. Every individual has a self, yet no two selves are the same. Some aspects of the self create a sense of commonality with others whereas other aspects of the self set it apart. The self usually provides a sense of consistency, a sense that there is some connection between who a person was yesterday and who they are today. And yet, the self is continually changing both as an individual ages and he or she traverses different social situations. A further conundrum is that the self acts as both subject and object; it does the knowing about itself. With so many complexities, coupled with the fact that people can neither see nor touch the self, the construct may take on an air of mysticism akin to the concept of the soul (Epstein, 1973 ).

Perhaps the most pressing, and basic, question psychologists must answer regarding the self is “What is it?” For the man whom many regard as the father of modern psychology, William James, the self was a source of continuity that gave individuals a sense of “connectedness” and “unbrokenness” ( 1890 , p. 335). James distinguished between two components of the self: the “I” and the “me” ( 1910 ). The “I” is the self as agent, thinker, and knower, the executive function that experiences and reacts to the world, constructing mental representations and memories as it does so (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012 ). James was skeptical that the “I” was amenable to scientific study, which has been borne out by the fact that far more attention has been accorded to the “me.” The “me” is the individual one recognizes as the self, which for James included a material, social, and spiritual self. The material self refers to one’s physical body and one’s physical possessions. The social self refers to the various selves one may express and others may recognize depending on the social setting. The spiritual self refers to the enduring core of one’s being, including one’s values, personality, beliefs about the self, etc.

This article focuses on the “me” that will be referred to interchangeably as either the “self” or “identity.” We define the self as a multifaceted, dynamic, and temporally continuous set of mental self-representations. These representations are multifaceted in the sense that different situations may evoke different aspects of the self at different times. They are dynamic in that they are subject to change in the form of elaborations, corrections, and reevaluations (Diehl, Youngblade, Hay, & Chui, 2011 ). This is true when researchers think of the self as a sort of scientific theory in which new evidence about the self from the environment leads to adjustments to one’s self-theory (Epstein, 1973 ; Gopnick, 2003 ). It is also true when researchers consider the self as a narrative that can be rewritten and revised (McAdams, 1996 ). Finally, self-representations are temporally continuous because even though they change, most people have a sense of being the same person over time. Further, these self-representations, whether conscious or not, are essential to psychological functioning, as they organize people’s perceptions of their traits, preferences, memories, experiences, and group memberships. Importantly, representations of the self also guide an individual’s behavior.

Some psychologists (e.g., behaviorists and more recently Brubaker & Cooper, 2000 ) have questioned the need to implicate a construct as nebulous as the self to explain behavior. Certainly an individual can perform many complex actions without invoking his or her self-representations. Nevertheless, psychologists increasingly regard the self as one of the most important constructs in all of psychology. For example, the percentage of self-related studies published in the field’s leading journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , increased fivefold between 1972 and 2002 (Swann & Seyle, 2005 ) and has continued to grow to this day. The importance of the self becomes evident when one considers the consequences of a sense of self that is interrupted, damaged, or absent. Epstein ( 1973 ) offers a case in point with an example of a schizophrenic girl meeting her psychiatrist:

Ruth, a five year old, approached the psychiatrist with “Are you the bogey man? Are you going to fight my mother? Are you the same mother? Are you the same father? Are you going to be another mother?” and finally screaming in terror, “I am afraid I am going to be someone else.” [Bender, 1950 , p. 135]

To provide a more commonplace example, children do not display several emotions we consider uniquely human, such as empathy and embarrassment, until after they have developed a sense of self-awareness (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989 ). As Darwin has argued ( 1872 / 1965 ), emotions like embarrassment exist only after one has a developed a sense of self that can be the object of others’ attention.

The self’s importance also is evident when one considers that it is a pancultural phenomenon; all individuals have a sense of self regardless of where they are born. Though the content of self-representations may vary by cultural context, the existence of the self is universal. So too is the structure of the self. One of the most basic structural dimensions of the self involves whether the knowledge is active or stored.

Forms of Self-Knowledge

Active and stored self-knowledge.

Although i ndividuals accumulate immeasurable amounts of knowledge over their lifespans, at any given moment they can access only a portion of that knowledge. The aspects of self-knowledge held in consciousness make up “active self-knowledge.” Other terms for active self-knowledge are the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986 ), the spontaneous self-concept (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978 ), and the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967 ). On the other hand, “stored self-knowledge” is information held in memory that one can access and retrieve but is not currently held in consciousness. Because different features of the self are active versus stored at different times depending on the demands of the situation, the self can be quite malleable without eliciting feelings of inconsistency or inauthenticity (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002 ).

Semantic and Episodic Representations of Self-Knowledge

People possess both episodic and semantic representations of themselves (Klein & Loftus, 1993 ; Tulving, 1983 ). Episodic self-representations refer to “behavioral exemplars” or relatively brief “cartoons in the head” involving one’s past life and experiences. For philosopher John Locke, the self was built of episodic memory. For some researchers interested in memory and identity, episodic memory has been of particular interest because it is thought to involve re-experiencing events from one’s past, providing a person with content through which to construct a personal narrative (see, e.g., Eakin, 2008 ; Fivush & Haden, 2003 ; Klein, 2001 ; Klein & Gangi, 2010 ). Recall of these episodic instances happens together with the conscious awareness that the events actually occurred in one’s life (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 ).

Episodic self-knowledge may shed light on the individual’s traits or preferences and how he or she will or should act in the future, but some aspects of self-knowledge do not require recalling any specific experiences. Semantic self-knowledge involves memories at a higher level abstraction. These self-related memories are based on either facts (e.g., I am 39 years old) or traits and do not necessitate remembering a specific event or experience (Klein & Lax, 2010 ; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008 ). Thus, one may consider oneself intelligent (semantic self-knowledge) without recalling that he or she achieved stellar grades the previous term (episodic self-knowledge). In fact, Tulving ( 1972 ) suggested that the two types of knowledge may be structurally and functionally independent of each other. In support of this, case studies show that damage to the episodic self-knowledge system does not necessarily result in impairment of the semantic self-knowledge system. Evaluating semantic traits for self-descriptiveness is associated with activation in brain regions implicated in semantic, but not episodic, memory. In addition, priming a trait stored in semantic memory does not facilitate recall of corresponding episodic memories that exemplify the semantic self-knowledge (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992 ). The tenuous relationship between episodic and semantic self-knowledge suggests that only a portion of semantic self-knowledge arises inductively from episodic self-knowledge (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002 ).

Recently some researchers have questioned the importance of memory’s role in creating a sense of identity. For example, at least when it comes to perceptions of others, people perceive a person’s identity to remain more intact after a neurodegenerative disease that affects their memory than one that affects their morality (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015 ).

Conscious and Nonconscious Self-Knowledge (Sometimes Confused With Explicit Versus Implicit)

Individuals may be conscious, or aware, of aspects of the self to varying degrees in different situations. Indeed sometimes it is adaptive to have self-awareness (Mandler, 1975 ) and other times it is not (Wegner, 2009 ). Nonconscious self-representations can influence behavior in that individuals may be unaware of the ways in which their self-representations affect their behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 ). Some researchers have even suggested that individuals can be unconscious of the contents of their self-representations (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2003 ). It is important to remember that consciousness refers primarily to the level of awareness of a self-representation, rather than the automaticity of a given representation (i.e., whether the representation is retrieved in an unaware, unintentional, efficient, and uncontrolled manner) (Bargh, 1994 ).

A key ambiguity in recent work on implicit self-esteem is defining its criterial attributes. One view contends that the nonconscious and conscious self reflect fundamentally distinct knowledge systems that arise from different learning experiences and have independent effects on thought, emotion, and behavior (Epstein, 1994 ). Another perspective views the self as a singular construct that may nevertheless show diverging responses on direct and indirect measures of self due to factors such as the opportunity and motivation to control behavioral responses (Fazio & Twoles-Schwen, 1999 ). While indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test do not require introspection and as a result may tap nonconscious representations, this is an assumption that should be supported with empirical evidence (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006 ).

Issues of direct and indirect measurement are a key consideration in research on the implicit and explicit self. Indirect measures of self allow researchers to infer an individual’s judgment about the self as a result of the speed or nature of their responses to stimuli that may be more or less self-related (De Houwer & Moors, 2010 ). Some researchers have argued that indirect measures of self-esteem are advantageous because they circumvent self-presentational issues (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999 ), but other researchers have questioned such claims (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007 ) because self-presentational strivings can be automatized (Paulhus, 1993 ).

Recent findings have raised additional questions regarding the validity of some key assumptions regarding research inspired by interest in implicit self-esteem (for a more optimistic take on implicit self-esteem, see Dehart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006 ). Although near-zero correlations between individuals’ scores on direct and indirect measures of self (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000 ) are often taken to mean that nonconscious and conscious self-representations are distinct, other factors, such as measurement error and lack of conceptual correspondence, can cause these low correlations (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Some researchers have also taken evidence of negligible associations between measures of implicit self-esteem and theoretically related outcomes to mean that such measures may not measure self-esteem at all (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011 ). A prudent strategy is thus to consider that indirect measures reflect an activation of associations between the self and other stimuli in memory and that these associations do not require conscious validation of the association as accurate or inaccurate (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Direct measures, on the other hand, do require validation processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004 ; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ).

Global and Specific Self-Knowledge

Self-views vary in scope (Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1987 ). Global self-representations are generalized beliefs about the self (e.g., I am a worthwhile person) while specific self-representations pertain to a narrow domain (e.g., I am a nimble tennis player). Self-views can fall anywhere on a continuum between these two extremes. Generalized self-esteem may be thought of as a global self-representation at the top of a hierarchy with individual self-concepts nested underneath in specific domains such as academic, physical, and social (Marsh, 1986 ). Individual self-concepts, measured separately, combine statistically to form a superordinate global self-esteem factor (Marsh & Hattie, 1996 ). When trying to predict behavior it is important not to use a specific self-representation to predict a global behavior or a global self-representation to predict a specific behavior (e.g., Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005 ; Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007 ; Trzesniewski et al., 2006 ).

Actual, Possible, Ideal, and Ought Selves

The self does not just include who a person is in the present but also includes past and future iterations of the self. In addition, people tend to hold “ought” or “ideal” beliefs about the self. The former includes one’s beliefs about who they should be according to their own and others’ standards while the latter includes beliefs about who they would like to be (Higgins, 1987 ). In a related vein, possible selves are the future-oriented positive or negative aspects of the self-concept, selves that one hopes to become or fears becoming (Markus & Nurius, 1986 ). Some research has even shown that distance between one’s feared self and actual self is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than proximity between one’s ideal self and actual self (Ogilvie, 1987 ). Possible selves vary in how far in the future they are, how detailed they are, and how likely they are to become an actual self (Oyserman & James, 2008 ). Many researchers have studied the content of possible selves, which can be as idiosyncratic as a person’s imagination is. The method used to measure possible selves (close-ended versus open-ended questions) will affect which possible selves are revealed (Lee & Oyserman, 2009 ). The content of possible selves is also socially and contextually grounded. For example, as a person ages, career-focused possible selves become less important while health-related possible selves become increasingly important (Cross & Markus, 1991 ; Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000 ).

Researchers have been interested in not just the content but the function of possible selves. Thinking about successful possible selves is mood enhancing (King, 2001 ) because it is a reminder that the current self can be improved. In addition, possible selves may play a role in self-regulation. By linking present and future selves, they may promote desired possible selves and avoid feared possible selves. Possible selves may be in competition with each other and with a person’s actual self. For example, someone may envision one possible self as an artist and another possible self as an airline pilot, and each of these possible selves might require the person to take different actions in the present moment. Goal striving requires employing limited resources and attention, so working toward one possible self may require shifting attention and resources away from another possible self (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006 ). Possible selves may have other implications as well. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara ( 2005 ) show how expected future income affects a person’s preferences for economic redistribution in the present.

Accuracy of Self-Knowledge and Feelings of Authenticity

Most individuals have had at least one encounter with an individual whose self-perception seemed at odds with “reality.” Perhaps it is a friend who believes himself to be a skilled singer but cannot understand why everyone within earshot grimaces when he starts singing. Or the boss who believes herself to be an inspiring leader but cannot motivate her workers. One potential explanation for inaccurate self-views is a disjunction between episodic and semantic memories; the image of grimacing listeners (episodic memory) may be quite independent of the conviction that one is a skilled singer (semantic memory). Of course, if self-knowledge is too disjunctive with reality it ceases to be adaptive; self-views must be moderately accurate to be useful in allowing people to predict and navigate their worlds. That said, some researchers have questioned the desirability of accurate self-views. For example, Taylor and Brown ( 1988 ) have argued that positive illusions about the self promote mental health. Similarly, Von Hippel and Trivers ( 2011 ) have argued that certain kinds of optimistic biases about the self are adaptive because they allow people to display more confidence than is warranted, consequently allowing them to reap the social rewards of that confidence.

Studying the accuracy of self-knowledge is challenging because objective criteria are often scarce. Put another way, there are only two vantage points from which to assess a person: self-perception and the other’s perception of the self. This is true even of supposedly “objective” measures of the self. An IQ test is still a measure of intelligence from the vantage point of the people who developed the test. Both vantage points can be subject to error. For example, self-perceptions may be biased to protect one’s self-image or due to self-comparison to an inappropriate referent. Others’ perceptions may be biased because of a lack of cross-situational information about the person in question or lack of insight into that person’s motives. Because of the advantages and disadvantages of each vantage point, self-reports may be better for assessing some traits (e.g., those low in observability, like neuroticism) while informant reports may be better for others (such as traits high in observability, like extraversion) (Vazire, 2010 ).

Furthermore, self-perceptions and others’ perceptions of the self may overlap to varying degrees. The “Johari window” provides a useful way of thinking about this (Luft & Ingham, 1955 ). The window’s first quadrant consists of things one knows about oneself that others also know about the self (arena). The second quadrant includes knowledge one has about the self that others do not have (façade). The third quadrant consists of knowledge one does not have about the self but others do have (blindspot). The fourth quadrant consists of information about the self that is not known to oneself or to others (unknown).

Which of these quadrants contains the “true self”? If I believe myself to be kind, but others do not, who is right? Which is a reflection of the “real me”? One set of attempts to answer this question has focused on perceptions of authenticity. The authentic self (Johnson & Boyd, 1995 ) is alternatively termed the “true self” (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 ), “real self” (Rogers, 1961 ), “intrinsic self” (Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001 ), “essential self” (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014 ), or “deep self” (Sripada, 2010 ). Recent research has addressed both what aspects of the self other people describe as belonging to a person’s true self and how individuals judge their own authenticity.

Though authenticity has long been the subject of philosophical thought, only recently have researchers begun addressing the topic empirically, and definitional ambiguities abound (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schroeder-Abe, 2015 ). Some studies use unidimensional measures that equate authenticity to feeling close to one’s true self (e.g., Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997 ). A more elaborate and philosophically grounded approach proposes four necessary factors for trait authenticity: awareness (the extent of one’s self-knowledge, motivation to expand it, and ability to trust in it), unbiased processing (the relative absence of interpretative distortions in processing self-relevant information), behavior (acting consistently with one’s needs, preferences, and values), and relational orientation (valuing and achieving openness in close relationships) (Kernis, 2003 ). Authenticity is related to feelings of self-alienation (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010 ). Being authentic is also sometimes thought to be equivalent to low self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982 )— someone who does not alter his or her behavior to accommodate changing social situations (Grant, 2016 ). Authenticity and self-monitoring, however, are orthogonal constructs; being sensitive to environmental cues can be compatible with acting in line with one’s true self.

Although some have argued that the ability to behave in a way that contradicts one’s feelings and mental states is a developmental accomplishment (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996 ), feelings of authenticity have been associated with many positive outcomes such as positive self-esteem, positive affect, and well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002 ; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008 ). One interesting line of research examines the interaction of authenticity, power, and well-being. Power can increase feelings of authenticity in social interactions (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011 ), and that increased authenticity in turn can result in higher well-being (Kifer, Heller, Peruvonic, & Galinsky, 2013 ). Another line of research examines the relationship between beliefs about authenticity (at least in the West) and morality. Gino, Kouchaki, and Galinsky ( 2015 ) suggest that dishonesty and inauthenticity share a similar source: dishonesty involves being untrue to others while inauthenticity involves being untrue to the self.

Metacognitive Aspects of Self

Valence and importance of self-views.

Self-knowledge may be positively or negatively valenced. Having more positive self-views and fewer negative ones are associated with having higher self-esteem (Brown, 1986 ). Both bottom-up and top-down theories have been used to explain this association. The bottom-up approach posits that the valence of specific self-knowledge drives the valence of one’s global self-views (e.g., Marsh, 1990 ). In this view, someone who has more positive self-views in specific domains (e.g., I am intelligent and attractive) should be more likely to develop high self-esteem overall (e.g., I am worthwhile). In contrast, the top-down perspective holds that the valence of global self-views drive the valence of specific self-views such that someone who thinks they are a worthwhile person is more likely to view him or herself as attractive and intelligent (e.g., Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001 ). The reasoning is grounded in the view that global self-esteem develops quite early in life and thus determines the later development of domain-specific self-views.

A domain-specific self-view can vary not only in its valence but also in its importance. Domain-specific self-views that one believes are important are more likely to affect global self-esteem than those self-views that one considers unimportant (Pelham, 1995 ; Pelham & Swann, 1989 ). As James wrote, “I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 310). Of course not all self-views matter to the same extent for all people. A professor of Greek studies is likely to place a great deal of importance on his knowledge of Greek. Furthermore, changes to features that are perceived to be more causally central than others are believed to be more disruptive to identity (Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016 ). Individuals try to protect their important self-views by, for example, surrounding themselves with people and environments who confirm those important self-views (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ) or distancing themselves from close friends who outperform them in these areas (Tesser, 1988 ).

Certainty and Clarity of Self-Views

Individuals may feel more or less certain about some self-views as compared to others. And just as they are motivated to protect important self-views, people are also motivated to protect the self-views of which they are certain. People are more likely to seek (Pelham, 1991 ) and receive (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ) feedback consistent with self-views that are highly certain than those about which they feel less certain. They also actively resist challenges to highly certain self-views (Swann & Ely, 1984 ).

Another construct related to certainty is self-concept clarity. Not only are people with high self-concept clarity confident and certain of their self-views, they also are clear, internally consistent, and stable in their convictions about who they are (Campbell et al., 1996 ). The causes of low self-concept clarity have been theorized to be due to a discrepancy between one’s current self-views and the social feedback one has received in childhood (Streamer & Seery, 2015 ). Both high self-concept certainty and self-concept clarity are associated with higher self-esteem (Campbell, 1990 ).

Stability of Self-Views

The self is constantly accommodating, assimilating, and immunizing itself against new self-relevant information (Diehl et al., 2011 ). In the end, the self may remain stable (i.e., spatio-temporally continuous; Parfit, 1971 ) in at least two ways. First, the self may be stable in one’s absolute position on a scale. Second, there may be stability in one’s rank ordering within a group of related others (Hampson & Goldberg, 2006 ).

The question of the self’s stability can only be answered in the context of a specified time horizon. For example, like personality traits, self-views may not be particularly good predictors of behavior at a given time slice (perhaps an indication of the self’s instability) but are good predictors of behavior over the long term (Epstein, 1979 ). Similarly, more than others, some people experience frequent, transient changes in state self-esteem (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993 ). Furthermore, there is a difference between how people perceive the stability of their self-views and the actual stability of their self-knowledge. Though previous research has explored the benefits of perceived self-esteem stability (e.g., Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000 ; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989 ), a recent program of research on fixed versus growth mindsets explores the benefits of the malleability of self-views in a variety of domains (Dweck, 1999 , 2006 ). For example, teaching adolescents to have a more malleable (i.e., incremental) theory of personality that “people change” led them to react less negatively to an immediate experience of social adversity, have lower overall stress and physical illness eight months later, and better academic performance over the school year (Yeager et al., 2014 ). Thus, believing that the self can be unstable can have positive effects in that one negative social interaction, or an instance of poor performance is not an indication that the self will always be that way, and this may, in turn, increase effort and persistence.

Organization of Self-Views

Though we have already touched on some aspects of the organization of self (e.g., specific self-views nested within global self-views), it is important to consider other aspects of organization including the fact that some self-views may be more assimilated within each other. Integration refers to the tendency to store both positive and negative self-views together, and is thought to promote resilience in the face of stress or adversity (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007 ). Compartmentalization refers to the tendency to store positive and negative self-views separately. But both integration and compartmentalization can have positive and negative consequences and can interact with other metacognitive aspects of the self, like importance. For example, compartmentalization has been associated with higher self-esteem and less depression among people for whom positive components of the self are important (Showers, 1992 ). On the other hand, for those whose negative self-views are important, compartmentalization has been associated with lower self-esteem and higher depression.

Origins and Development of the Self

Developmental approaches.

Psychologists have long been interested in when and how infants develop a sense of self. One very basic question is whether selfhood in infancy is comparable to selfhood in adulthood. The answer depends on definitions of selfhood. For example, some researchers have measured and defined selfhood in infants as the ability to self-regulate and self-organize, which even animals can do. This definition bears little resemblance to selfhood in adulthood. Nativist and constructivist debates within developmental psychology (and language development in particular) that grapple with the problem of the origins of knowledge also have implications for understanding origins of the self. A nativist account (e.g., Chomsky, 1975 ) that considers the human mind to be innately constrained to formulate a very small set of representations would suggest that the mind is designed to develop a self. Information from the environment may form specific self-representations, but a nativist account would posit that the structure of the self is intrinsic. A constructivist account would reject the notion that there are not enough environmental stimuli to explain the development of a construct like the self unless one invokes a specific innate cognitive structure. Rather, constructivists might suggest that a child develops a theory of self in the same way scientific theories are developed (Gopnik, 2003 ).

Because infants and children cannot self-report their mental states as adults can, psychologists must use other methods to study the self in childhood. One method involves studying the development of children’s use of the personal pronouns “me,” “mine,” and “I” (Harter, 1983 ; Hobson, 1990 ). Another method that is used cross-culturally, mirror self-recognition (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979 ; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004 ), has been associated with brain maturation (Lewis, 2003 ) and myelination of the left temporal region (Carmody & Lewis, 2006 , 2010 ; Lewis & Carmody, 2008 ). Pretend play, which occurs between 15 and 24 months, is an indication that the self is developing because it requires the toddler’s ability to understand its own and others’ mental states (Lewis, 2011 ). The development of self-esteem has also historically been difficult to study due to a lack of self-esteem measures that can be used across the lifespan. Recently, psychologists have developed a lifespan self-esteem scale (Harris, Donnellan, & Trzesniewski, 2017 ) suitable for measuring global self-esteem from ages 5 to 93.

The development of theory of mind, the understanding that others have minds separate from one’s own, is also closely related to the development of the self. For example, people cannot make social comparisons until they have developed the required cognitive abilities, usually by middle childhood (Harter, 1999 ; Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980 ). Finally, developmental psychology is also useful in understanding the self beyond childhood and into adolescence and beyond. Adolescence is a time where goals of autonomy from parents and other adults become particularly salient (Bryan et al., 2016 ), adolescents experiment with different identities to see which fit best, and many long-term goals and personal aspirations are established (Crone & Dahl, 2012 ).

Biological Approaches

Biological approaches to understanding the origins of the self consider neurological, genetic, and hormonal underpinnings. These biological underpinnings are likely evolutionarily driven (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007 ). Neuroscientists have debated the extent to which self-knowledge is “special,” or processed differently than other kinds of knowledge. What is clear is that no brain region by itself is responsible for our sense of self, but different aspects of the self-knowledge may be associated with different brain regions. Furthermore, the same region that is implicated in self-related processing can also be implicated in other types of processing (Ochsner et al., 2005 ; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006 ). Specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) have been associated with self-related processing (Northoff Heinzel, De Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & Panksepp, 2006 ). But meta-analyses have found that the mPFC and PCC are recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli more generally (e.g., familiar others) (Qin & Northoff, 2011 ).

Twin studies of personality traits can shed light on the genetic bases of self. For example, genes account for about 40% to 60% of the population variance in self-reports of the Big Five personality factors (for a review, see Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001 ). Self-esteem levels also seem to be heritable, with 30–50% of population variance accounted for by genes (Kamakura, Ando, & Ono, 2007 ; Kendler, Gardner, & Prescott, 1998 ).

Finally, hormones are unlikely to be a cause of the self but may affect the expression of the self. For example, testosterone and cortisol levels interact with personality traits to predict different levels of aggression (Tackett et al., 2015 ). Differences in levels of and in utero exposure to certain hormones also affect gender identity (Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011 ; Reiner & Gearhart, 2004 ).

Intrapsychic Approaches

Internal processes, including self-perception and introspection, also influence the development of the self. One of the most obvious ways to develop knowledge about the self (especially when existing self-knowledge is weak) is to observe one’s own behavior across different situations and then make inferences about the aspects of the self that may have caused those behaviors (Bem, 1972 ). And just as judgments about others’ attributes are less certain when multiple possible causes exist for a given behavior, the same is true of one’s own behaviors and the amount of information they yield about the self (Kelley, 1971 ).

Conversely, introspection involves understanding the self from the inside outward rather than from the outside in. Though surprisingly little thought (only 8%) is expended on self-reflection (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982 ), people buttress self-knowledge through introspection. For example, contemporary psychoanalysis can increase self-knowledge, even though an increase in self-knowledge on its own is unlikely to have therapeutic effects (Reppen, 2013 ). Writing is one form of introspection that does have psychological and physical therapeutic benefits (Pennebaker, 1997 ). Research shows that brief writing exercises can result in fewer physician visits (e.g., Francis & Pennebaker, 1992 ), and depressive episodes (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988 ), better immune function (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, & Glaser, 1994 ), and higher grade point average (e.g., Cameron & Nicholls, 1998 ) and many other positive outcomes.

Experiencing the “subjective self” is yet another way that individuals gain self-knowledge. Unlike introspection, experiencing the subjective self involves outward engagement, a full engagement in the moment that draws attention away from the self (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 ). Being attentive to one’s emotions and thoughts in the moment can reveal much about one’s preferences and values. Apparently, people rely more on their subjective experiences than on their overt behaviors when constructing self-knowledge (Andersen, 1984 ; Andersen & Ross, 1984 ).

Interpersonal Approaches

At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are social animals and thus the self is rarely cut off from others. In fact, many individuals would rather give themselves a mild electric shock than be alone with their thoughts (Wilson et al., 2014 ). The myth of finding oneself by eschewing society is dubious, and one of the most famous proponents of this tradition, transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau, actually regularly entertained visitors during his supposed seclusion at Walden (Schulz, 2015 ). As early as infancy, the reactions of others can lay the foundation for one’s self-views. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969 ; Hazan & Shaver, 1994 ) holds that children’s earliest interactions with their caregivers lead them to formulate schemas about their lovability and worth. This occurs outside of the infant’s awareness, and the schemas are based on the consistency and responsiveness of the care they receive. Highly consistent responsiveness to the infant’s needs provide the basis for the infant to develop feelings of self-worth (i.e., high global self-esteem) later in life. Though the mechanisms by which this occur are still being investigated, it may be that self-schemas developed during infancy provide the lens through which people interpret others’ reactions to them (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987 ). Note, however, that early attachment relationships are in no way deterministic: 30–45% of people change their attachment style (i.e., their pattern of relating to others) across time (e.g., Cozzarelli, Karafa, Collins, & Tagler, 2003 ).

Early attachment relationships provide a working model for how an individual expects to be treated, which is associated with perceptions of self-worth. But others’ appraisals of the self are also a more direct source of self-knowledge. An extremely influential line of thought from sociology, symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902 ; Mead, 1934 ), emphasized the component of the self that James referred to as the social self. He wrote, “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 294). The symbolic interactionists proposed that people come to know themselves not through introspection but rather through others’ reactions and perceptions of them. This “looking glass self” sees itself as others do (Yeung & Martin, 2003 ). People’s inferences about how others view them become internalized and guide their behavior. Thus the self is created socially and is sustained cyclically.

Research shows, however, that reflected appraisals may not tell the whole story. While it is clear that people’s self-views correlate strongly with how they believe others see them, self-views are not necessarily perfectly correlated with how people actually view them (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979 ). Further, people’s self-views may inform how they believe others see them rather than the other way around (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993 ). Lastly, individuals are better at knowing how people see them in general rather than knowing how specific others view them (Kenny & Albright, 1987 ).

Though others’ perceptions of the self are not an individual’s only source of self-knowledge, they are an important source, and in more than one way. For example, others’ provide a reference point for “social comparison.” According to Festinger’s social comparison theory ( 1954 ), people compare their own traits, preferences, abilities, and emotions to those of similar others, making both upward and downward comparisons. These comparisons tend to happen spontaneously and effortlessly. The direction of the comparison influences how one views and feels about the self. For example, comparing the self to someone worse off boosts self-esteem (e.g., Helgeson & Mickelson, 1995 ; Marsh & Parker, 1984 ). In addition to increasing self-knowledge, social comparisons are also motivating. For instance, those undergoing difficult or painful life events can cope better when they make downward comparisons (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985 ). When motivated to improve the self in a given domain, however, people may make upward comparisons to idealized others (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999 ). Sometimes individuals make comparisons to inappropriate others, but they have the ability (with mental effort) to undo the changes made to the self-concept as a result of this comparison (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995 ).

Others can influence the self not only through interactions and comparisons but also when an individual becomes very close to a significant other. In this case, according to self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1996 ), as intimacy increases, people experience cognitive overlap between the self and the significant other. People can acquire novel self-knowledge as they subsume attributes of the close other into the self.

Finally, the origins and development of the self are interpersonally influenced to the extent that our identities are dependent on the social roles we occupy (e.g., as mother, student, friend, professional, etc.). This will be covered in greater detail in the section on “The Social Self.” Here it is important simply to recognize that as the social roles of an individual inevitably change over time, so too does their identity.

Cultural Approaches

Markus and Kitayama’s seminal paper ( 1991 ) on differences in expression of the self in Eastern and Western cultures spawned an incredible amount of work investigating the importance of culture on self-construals. Building on the foundational work of Triandis ( 1989 ) and others, this work proposed that people in Western cultures see themselves as autonomous individuals who value independence and uniqueness more so than connectedness and harmony with others. In contrast to this individualism, people in the East were thought to be more collectivist, valuing interdependence and fitting in. However, the theoretical relationship between self-construals and the continuous individualism-collectivism variable have been treated in several different ways in the literature. Some have described individualism and collectivism as the origins of differences in self-construals (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996 ; Kim, Aune, Hunter, Kim, & Kim, 2001 ; Singelis & Brown, 1995 ). Others have considered self-construals as synonymous with individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002 ; Taras et al., 2014 ) or have used individualism-collectivism at the individual level as an analog of the variable at the cultural level (Smith, 2011 ).

However, in contrast to perspectives that treat individualism and collectivism as a unidimensional variable (e.g., Singelis, 1994 ), individualism and collectivism have also been theorized to be multifaceted “cultural syndromes” that include normative beliefs, values, and practices, as well as self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007 ; Triandis, 1993 ). In this view, there are many ways of being independent or collectivistic depending on the domain of functioning under consideration. For example, a person may be independent or interdependent when defining the self, experiencing the self, making decisions, looking after the self, moving between contexts, communicating with others, or dealing with conflicting interests (Vignoles et al., 2016 ). These domains of functioning are orthogonal such that being interdependent in one domain does not require being interdependent in another. This multidimensional picture of individual differences in individualism and collectivism is actually more similar to Markus and Kitayama’s ( 1991 ) initial treatment aiming to emphasize cultural diversity and contradicts the prevalent unidimensional approach to cultural differences that followed.

Recent research has pointed out other shortcomings of this dichotomous approach. There is a great deal of heterogeneity among the world’s cultures, so simplifying all culture to “Eastern” and “Western” or collectivistic versus individualistic types may be invalid. Vignoles and colleagues’ ( 2016 ) study of 16 nations supports this. They found that neither a contrast between Western and non-Western, nor between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, sufficiently captured the complexity of cross-cultural differences in selfhood. They conclude that “it is not useful to characterize any culture as ‘independent’ or ‘interdependent’ in a general sense” and rather advocate for research that identifies what kinds of independence and interdependence may be present in different contexts ( 2016 , p. 991). In addition, there is a great deal of within culture heterogeneity in self-construals For example, even within an individualistic, Western culture like the United States, working-class people and ethnic minorities tend to be more interdependent (Markus, 2017 ), tempering the geographically based generalizations one might draw about self-construals.

Another line of recent research on the self in cultural context that has explored self-construals beyond the East-West dichotomy is the study of multiculturalism and individuals who are a member of multiple cultural groups (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014 ). People may relate to each of the cultures to which they belong in different ways, and this may in turn have important effects. For example, categorization, which involves viewing one cultural identity as dominant over the others, is associated positively with well-being but negatively with personal growth (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2013 ). Integration involves cohesively connecting multiple cultures within the self while compartmentalization requires keeping one’s various cultures isolated because they are seen to be in opposition. Each of these strategies has different consequences.

Finally, the influence of religion remains significant in many parts of the world (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004 ; Inglehart & Baker, 2000 ), and so religion is also an important source of differences in self-construal. These religious traditions provide answers to the question of how the self should relate to others. For example, Buddhism emphasizes the interdependence of all things and thus agency does not necessarily reside in individual actors. Moreover, for Buddhists the boundaries between the self and the other are insignificant, and in fact the self is thought to be impermanent (see Garfield, Nichols, Rai, Nichols, & Strohminger, 2015 ).

Motivational Properties of the Self

Need for communion, agency, and coherence.

Understanding what motivates people is one of social psychology’s core questions, and a variety of motives have been proposed. Three motives that are particularly important to self-processes are the need for communion (belonging and interpersonal connectedness), the need for agency (autonomy and competence), and the need for coherence (patterns and regularities). The needs for communion and agency are the foundations of many aspects of social behavior (Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ; Wiggins & Broughton, 1991 ). Among attitude researchers, constructs similar to communion and agency (i.e., warmth and competence) represent the two basic dimensions of attitudes (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007 ; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 ; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005 ). Of even more relevance to the self, communion and agency correspond with the dual forms of self-esteem (e.g., Franks & Marolla, 1976 ; Gecas, 1971 ). That is, self-esteem can be broken down into two components: self-liking and self-competence (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001 ). Self-competence is an evaluation of one’s ability to bring about a desired outcome while the need for communion is an evaluation of one’s goodness, worth, and lovability. Each of these dimensions of self-esteem predicts unique outcomes (e.g., Bosson & Swann, 1999 ; Tafarodi & Vu, 1997 ).

Those who do not fulfill their communion needs have poorer physical outcomes such as relatively poor physical health, weakened immune functioning, and higher mortality rates (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988 ; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996 ). As far as psychological outcomes, people who lack positive connections with others also experience greater loneliness (Archibald, Bartholomew, & Marx, 1995 ; Newcomb & Bentler, 1986 ), while those with rich social networks report higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999 ). People’s sense of autonomy also contributes to psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989 ) and encourages people to strive for high performance in domains they care about. Autonomy strivings can also be beneficial in that they contribute to people’s need for self-growth (e.g., Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001 ; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995 ).

Finally, a great deal of support exists for the notion that people have a fundamental need for psychological coherence or the need for regularity, predictability, meaning, and control (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006 ). Coherence is a distinct from consistency because it refers specifically to the consistency between a person’s enduring self-views and the other aspects of their psychological universe (English, Chen, & Swann, 2008 ). The coherence motive may be even more basic than the needs for communion and agency (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Popper, 1963 ). That is, self-views serve as the lenses through which people perceive reality, and incoherence degrades the vision of reality that these lenses offer.

When people feel that their self-knowledge base is incoherent, they may not know how to act, and guiding action is thought to be the primary purpose of thinking in the first place (James, 1890 / 1950 ).

Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification Motives

Drawing on Prescott Lecky’s ( 1945 ) proposition that chronic self-views give people a strong sense of coherence, self-verification theory posits that people desire to be seen as they see themselves, even if their self-views are negative. Self-views can guide at least three stages of information processing: attention, recall, and interpretation. In addition, people act on the preference for self-confirmatory evaluations ensuring that their experiences reinforce their self-views. For example, just as those who see themselves as likable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them positively, so too do people who see themselves as dislikable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them negatively (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989 ). The theory suggests that people both enter and leave relationships that fail to satisfy their self-verification strivings (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994 ), even divorcing people who they believe have overly positive appraisals of them (for a review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010 ). People may also communicate their identities visually through “identity cues” that enable others to understand and react accordingly to that identity (Gosling, 2008 ). People seek verification of their specific as well as global (self-views). They are especially inclined to seek self-verifying evaluations for self-views that are certain or important (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ).

For the 70% of individuals with globally positive self-views (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995 ), self-verification may look like self-enhancement strivings (Brown, 1986 ) in that it will compel people to seek and prefer positive feedback about the self. In fact, even people with negative self-views tend to self-enhance when they do not have the cognitive resources available to reflect on their self-views and compare it to the feedback available (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ). In addition, people have a tendency to self-enhance before they self-verify (Swann et al., 1990 ). Other evidence for self-enhancement includes the tendency for people to view themselves as better than average, though this may be most likely for ambiguous traits that can describe a wide variety of behaviors because the evidence that people use to make self-evaluations is idiosyncratic (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989 ).

It is important to remember in discussions of self-verification and self-enhancement that people do not seek to see themselves as they actually are but rather as they see themselves . As mentioned in the section on accuracy, this self-view may overlap to varying degrees with “reality” or others’ perceptions of the self.

The Social Self

Identity negotiation.

People’s self-views influence the kinds of relationships they will engage in, and people can take on numerous identities depending on the situation and relationship. Identity negotiation theory (Swann & Bosson, 2008 ) suggests that relationship partners establish “who is who” via ongoing, mutual, and reciprocal interactions. Once people establish a “working consensus” for what roles each person will take in the relationship (e.g., Swann & Bosson, 2008 ), their agreed-upon expectations help disconnected individuals collaborate toward common obligations and goals, with some commitment to each other. Identity negotiation processes help define relationships and serve as a foundation for organized social activity. The identities that people negotiate tend to align with their chronic self-views. People follow these identity-negotiating processes, albeit largely unintentionally, during each of several successive stages of social interaction. Identities only survive to the extent that they are nourished and confirmed by the social environment, so negotiating identities in relationships is one way an individual ensures the survival of their self-views.

Personal and Social Self-Knowledge

Researchers have historically distinguished between two types of identity: personal and social. Personal identity refers to those features of the self that distinguish us from others while social identity refers to features of the self that are a source of commonality with others, such as group memberships. Once formed, social identities have a powerful influence on thought and behavior (Tajfel, 1981 ; Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ). Social category memberships can influence a person’s self-definition as much or more than idiosyncratic personal attributes (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008 ). One version of social identity theory posits that people enter groups that they view as both positive and distinctive to bolster their self-views (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988 ). Evidence shows that people display a strong ingroup bias, or tendency to favor their own group relative to outgroups (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985 ; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 ). This bias, along with the outgroup homogeneity effect whereby people see outgroup members as more similar than ingroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980 ) facilitates people’s ability to dehumanize members of outgroups. Dehumanization, perceiving a person as lacking in human qualities, then allows for the justification and maintenance of intergroup prejudice and conflict (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005 ; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003 ).

Self-categorization theory, in contrast to emphasizing motivation as in social identity theory, stresses the perceptual processes that lead humans to categorize the world into “us” and “them” (Turner, 1985 ; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 ). Other approaches argue that social identities reduce uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007 , 2012 ), make the world more coherent (e.g., Ellemers & Van Knippenberg, 1997 ), or protect people from the fear of death (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002 ). Though these approaches emphasize cognitive aspects of group membership, group-related emotions are also an important component of social identity. For instance, intergroup emotions theory proposes that a person’s emotional reactions toward other social groups can change in response to situationally induced shifts in self-categorization (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009 ).

Whatever the nature of the motive that causes people to identify with groups, although group memberships are critical for survival, they can also place people in grave danger when they motivate extreme action on behalf of the group. Research on identity fusion, which occurs when the boundaries between one’s personal and social identities become porous, shows how strong alignment with a group can lead to fighting and dying for that group at great personal cost (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014 ). This occurs when people come to view members of their social group as family (Swann et al., 2014 ).

Some research has investigated how personal and social identities are cognitively structured (Reid & Deaux, 1996 ). The segregation model of identity assumes that social and personal attributes are distinct (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991 ) while the integration model suggests that identities and attributes coexist in a limited set of cognitive structures. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting ( 1999 ) suggest that what constitutes social versus personal identity should not be determined by the attribute itself but rather the function it is serving (i.e., connecting the self to other people or distinguishing the self from other people). Similarly, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991 ) argues that individuals have an inherent drive to identity with groups but an equally important drive to maintain their individuality. To cope, they strive to find a balance between these opposing forces by finding an identity that supports both the individual’s need for autonomy and affiliation.

For most people, gender and ethnicity are important social identities, and there is variation in the strength of people’s identification with these groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992 ). In terms of how gender affects the expression of the self, girls are often socialized to prioritize the qualities that align them to others, while boys are taught to prioritize the qualities that distinguish and differentiate them from others (e.g., Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985 ). Moreover, women’s self-esteem tends to be connected more to their relational qualities, while men’s self-esteem is linked to their independent qualities (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992 ).

Though society has made great strides in allowing men and women to embrace identities of their own choosing (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2004 ), traditional social expectations about what it means to be a man or a women persist. For example, gender stereotypes have remained constant over the past thirty years even as women have made significant professional and political gains (Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016 ). These stereotypes remain entrenched for men as well. England ( 2010 ) argues that for the gender revolution to be complete, not only should traditionally male professions and domains be open to women but traditionally female domains should be increasingly occupied by men. This would help move society closer to attaining gender equality while signaling that traditionally female-dominated roles are equally valued.

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What Is Self-Concept and Why Does It Matter?

Learn about your self-concept and how it affects well-being..

Posted September 1, 2021 | Reviewed by Gary Drevitch

Our self-concept is the image we have of our bodies, capabilities, impressions, etc. (Bailey, 2003). It includes:

• The material self. Our body, possessions, and other things in our lives.
• The interpersonal self. The views others hold about us.
• The intrapersonal self. Our emotions, desires, needs, values, etc. (Epstein, 1973)

Research psychologists noticed that the way we see ourselves is often similar to the way others see us. This finding is referred to as the looking-glass self (Epstein, 1973). This research taught us that much of our self-concept emerges from the social interactions we have with others. Our 'self' emerges based on the information others tell us about who we are.

Our self-concept also includes the self-awareness that we are part of categories based on our age, gender , race, etc. Some people theorize that self-concept is like the glue that holds all the pieces of our personality together. And, at its most basic, self-concept is the answer we give when asked the question "Who am I?"

Why Does the Self-Concept Matter?

Each of us has parts of ourselves that we believe are the most important (Epstein, 1973). For example, an athlete might view their athleticism to be of central importance to their self-concept, even though they also enjoy cooking and are part of a big family. Some have even suggested that the self is arranged hierarchically, with relatively important parts above less important parts. But each of us decides which parts are important to us.

​As we experience new things and gain additional information from others, the self-concept may determine which new aspects of personality are acceptable. If new parts don't jibe with the old parts, they may not be allowed, thus ensuring that our sense of self remains reliable and intact (Epstein, 1973). As we grow older, contradictory evidence may have less impact on our self-concept. So it can become harder to integrate external information, particularly if it disrupts important aspects of the self-concept.

How Does Self-Concept Relate to Well-Being?

Several aspects of the self-concept also play a role in well-being . These include:

• Self-image: The way you see yourself.
• Self-esteem (or self-worth): The extent to which you value yourself or believe you have worth.
• Ideal self: The vision you have of your best self.

Self-image ​

The terms self-image and self-concept are sometimes used interchangeably, but more often, self-image is defined as how you see yourself. This may be literal, like when looking in the mirror. But it can also involve mental representations of yourself. These may or may not be consistent with what one actually sees in the mirror.

Self-esteem (or self-worth)

Self-esteem is broadly defined as the extent to which we like or value ourselves. This generally includes evaluating two parts of ourselves (Tafarodi & Swann Jr, 2001):

• Intrinsic value. This refers to our belief that we are a good (or not-so-good) person. If we have intrinsic value, then we value ourselves just for being who we are. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we like ourselves.
• Instrumental value. This refers to our belief that we can do good things. If we have instrumental value, then we value ourselves because of the things we do. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we respect ourselves.

The ideal self is defined as the self we would like to be—our best self. It appears to originate from the ideal selves that our parents hold for us and communicate to us through childhood (Zentner & Renaud, 2007).

​In positive psychology, the ideal self is thought to include three parts (Boyatzis, & Akrivou, 2006):

• The image of our desired future. This may include dreams , aspirations, and goals .
• Hope. This includes self-efficacy and optimism (beliefs that we can indeed achieve our goals).
• A clear self-concept. This includes an understanding of our core identity and enduring traits. Our ideal self needs to fit with our values, beliefs, and who we are.

Our ideal self is a vision of what we could be or do. That's why the ideal self is thought to be a helpful motivator—it inspires us to progress toward goals and improve our lives in beneficial ways. It may also include aspirations, passions, dreams, and purpose—all things that tend to be good for our well-being.

Our self-concept is an important guiding principle that helps us navigate the world and understand our role in it. Parts of our self-concept may be good or not-so-good for our well-being. That's why learning more about our own self-concept can be beneficial.

Adapted from an article published by The Berkeley Well-Being Institute .

​Bailey 2nd, J. A. (2003). Self-image, self-concept, and self-identity revisited. Journal of the National Medical Association, 95(5), 383.

​Boyatzis, R. E., & Akrivou, K. (2006). The ideal self as the driver of intentional change. Journal of management development.

Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American psychologist, 28(5), 404.

​Tafarodi, R. W., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2001). Two-dimensional self-esteem: Theory and measurement. Personality and individual Differences, 31(5), 653-673.

​Zentner, M., & Renaud, O. (2007). Origins of adolescents' ideal self: An intergenerational perspective. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(3), 557​

Tchiki Davis, Ph.D. , is a consultant, writer, and expert on well-being technology.

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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Academic achievement, self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence in primary education. analysis by gender and cultural group.

• 1 Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Granada, Melilla, Spain
• 2 Early Childhood and Primary Education School “Pedro de Estopiñán”, Melilla, Spain

A review of the scientific literature shows that many studies have analyzed the relationship between academic achievement and different psychological constructs, such as self-concept, personality, and emotional intelligence. The present work has two main objectives. First, to analyze the academic achievement, as well as the self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence, according to gender and cultural origin of the participants (European vs. Amazigh). Secondly, to identify what dimensions of self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence predict academic achievement. For this, a final sample consisting of 407 students enrolled in the last 2 years of Primary Education were utilized for the study. By gender, 192 were boys (47.2%) and 215 girls (52.8%), with an average age of 10.74 years old. By cultural group, 142 were of European origin (34.9%) and 265 of Amazigh origin (65.1%). The academic achievements were evaluated from the grades obtained in three school subjects: Natural Sciences, Spanish Language and Literature, and Mathematics, and the instruments used for data collection of the psychological constructs analyzed were the Self-Concept Test-Form 5, the Short-Form Big Five Questionnaire for Children, and the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version-Short. Based on the objectives set, first, the grades in the subject of Spanish Language and Literature varied depending on the gender of the students. Likewise, differences were found in self-concept, personality, and emotional intelligence according to gender. Also, the physical self-concept varied according to the cultural group. Regarding the second objective, in the predictive analysis for each of the subjects of the curriculum of Primary Education, the academic self-concept showed a greater predictive value. However, so did other dimensions of self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence. The need to carry out a comprehensive education in schools that addresses the promotion of not only academic but also personal and social competences is discussed. Also, that the study of the variables that affect gender differences must be deepened.

Introduction

A review of the scientific literature has shown that many studies have analyzed the relationship between academic achievement and different psychological constructs such as self-concept ( Susperreguy et al., 2018 ; Wolff et al., 2018 ; Sewasew and Schroeders, 2019 ), personality ( Janošević and Petrović, 2019 ; Perret et al., 2019 ; Smith-Woolley et al., 2019 ), and emotional intelligence ( Corcoran et al., 2018 ; Deighton et al., 2019 ; Piqueras et al., 2019 ). In this work, these psychological constructs are analyzed together with primary school children by gender and cultural group. Gender has been a highly studied variable since there are differences between boys and girls in academic performance as well as in the psychological constructs mentioned above ( Chrisler and McCreary, 2010 ; Voyer and Voyer, 2014 ; Carvalho, 2016 ; Herrera et al., 2017 ; Janošević and Petrović, 2019 ). There are also studies that analyze the possible differences that may exist in the school context between children from different cultures ( Schmitt et al., 2007 ; Strayhorn, 2010 ; Cvencek et al., 2018 ; Min et al., 2018 ). In this sense, there is a disadvantage in the school context for children of minority culture. The present study has been developed in Melilla, a Spanish city located in North Africa, close to Morocco. In their schools, children of European culture and children of Amazigh culture (also known as Berber) have been together from early childhood education. In addition, the predictive value of each of the dimensions that integrate self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence regarding the grades in three subjects of the Primary Education curriculum are analyzed. The psychological constructs analyzed in the present study are described below.

Self-Concept

Many research studies have highlighted that the psychological construction of a positive self-concept by the students, during their academic stage, leads to success in educational environments and social and emotional situations ( Eccles, 2009 ; Harter, 2012 ; Nasir and Lin, 2012 ; Chen et al., 2013 ). Therefore, the positive self-concept acquired in the formative years could help in the development of the strategies and skills needed for confronting life challenges ( Huang, 2011 ). It has also been found that self-concept is positively associated with different factors such as the individual experiencing greater happiness ( Hunagund and Hangal, 2014 ); a greater and better academic performance ( Salami and Ogundokun, 2009 ); greater and more pro-social behaviors ( Schwarzer and Fuchs, 2009 ); and lastly, an overall greater well-being ( Mamata and Sharma, 2013 ).

Among the different models that link self-concept and academic performance, we found the Reciprocal Effects Model (REM), with a theoretical, methodological and empirical review conducted by Marsh and Martin (2011) . This model argues that academic self-concept and performance mutually re-enforce themselves, with one producing advances in the other.

Starting with the evolution perspective, the Developmental Equilibrium Hypothesis has also been highlighted. The objective of this hypothesis is centered on achieving equilibrium between two factors that are directly related: self-concept and academic performance ( Marsh et al., 2016a , b ). Hence, achieving a state of equilibrium has important implications for the development of the individual, but it cannot be ignored that each individual’s development of self-concept is different depending on the personal, emotional, and social characteristics surrounding them ( Eccles, 2009 ; Murayama et al., 2013 ; Paramanik et al., 2014 ).

The studies that relate self-concept with school or academic performance are exhaustive in the first educational stages as well as higher education ( Guay et al., 2010 ; Möller et al., 2011 ; Skaalvik and Skjaalvik, 2013 ). The student’s self-concept, and the academic self-concept within it, has a strong influence on student self-efficacy ( Ferla et al., 2009 ). Additionally, academic self-concept significantly correlates with school adjustment in Primary Education ( Wosu, 2013 ; Mensah, 2014 ) and predicts academic achievement ( Marsh and Martin, 2011 ; Guo et al., 2016 ). Therefore, in this research it is expected to find such predictive value.

The results from cross-cultural studies have shown that a negative self-concept had detrimental effects on the academic performance of the students from the different samples and countries ( Marsh and Hau, 2003 ; Seaton et al., 2010 ; Nagengast and Marsh, 2012 ). Cvencek et al. (2018) , when analyzing primary school students from a minority group and a majority group in North America, found that the academic performance, as well as the academic self-concept of the children from the minority group, were lower as compared to those from majority group. Similar results that show the disadvantage of minority groups in schools are found in other studies ( Strayhorn, 2010 ). According to these results, it would be expected that in the present study children of Amazigh cultural origin obtained lower scores than those of European cultural origin in their academic performance and academic self-concept.

Another variable that has been analyzed along with self-concept and academic performance has been gender ( Chrisler and McCreary, 2010 ; DiPrete and Jennings, 2012 ). Thus, in the meta-analysis study by Voyer and Voyer (2014) , it was shown that a certain advantage in school performance existed in women, with their results showing differences in favor of the women for the Language subject. Differences according to gender were also found in self-concept ( Nagy et al., 2010 ). Huang (2013) , in a meta-analysis study, identified that the women had a greater self-concept in the subject matter or courses related to language, as well as the arts as compared to the men. Therefore, in this study we expect to find that girls obtain higher grades than boys in Spanish Language and Literature as well as academic self-concept.

Personality

In general terms, personality and self-concept predict satisfaction with life ( Parker et al., 2008 ). Also, personality moderates the effects of the frame of reference that are central for the shaping of self-concept ( Jonkmann et al., 2012 ).

Within the models of personality, the Five Factor Model ( McCrae and Costa, 1997 ) has been the most developed ( Herrera et al., 2018 ), and it represents the dominant conceptualization of the structure of personality in current literature. It postulates that the five great factors of personality (emotional instability, extraversion, intellect/imagination, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) are found at the highest level in the hierarchy of personality.

Among the strongest arguments utilized to show that the measurements of personality, based on the Big-Five Factor Structure ( Goldberg, 1990 , 1992 ), correlate with academic performance, we find the evidence that supports the importance of the personality factors to predict behaviors that are socially valued and the recognition of personality as a component of the individual’s will ( Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006 ). In this respect, the scientific literature shows studies that relate personality, through the five-factor model, with academic performance. Thus, agreeableness, and intellect/imagination (also known as openness) are related to academic performance ( Poropat, 2009 ; Smith-Woolley et al., 2019 ). Specifically, conscientiousness predicts academic achievement ( O′Connor and Paunonen, 2007 ), which is expected to be found in the present study.

Personality has been analyzed in different cultures ( Allik et al., 2012 ). A good example of a broad study, which included 56 countries, is the one conducted by Schmitt et al. (2007) . Among the main results, it was found that the five-factor structure of personality was robust among the main regions of the world. Also, the inhabitants from South America and East Asia were significantly different in their intellect/imagination characteristics as compared to the rest of the world regions. Thus, while the South American and European countries tended to occupy a higher position in openness, the cultures from East Asia were found in lower positions. This is attributed, among other factors, in that the Asian cultures are more collective, so that the openness dimension could be difficult to clearly identify, as proposed in the starting theoretical model. Based on these results, differences in personality dimensions are expected to be found among children of European and Amazigh cultural origin.

As for gender, differences have also been found. For example, the academic achievement in Primary Education is related to a higher conscientiousness in girls than in boys ( Janošević and Petrović, 2019 ).

Emotional Intelligence

Another factor that should be taken into account, as related to the academic achievements and school adjustment, is the emotional intelligence (EI). The models or theoretical approaches of EI are different ( Cherniss, 2010 ; Herrera et al., 2017 ). On the one hand, models have been identified that are based on the processing of emotional information, which are focused on basic emotional abilities ( Brackett et al., 2011 ). On the other hand, mixed models of EI have also been identified, which involve both intellectual and personality factors. The socio-emotional competence model by Bar-On (2006) forms part of the second group. In it, different dimensions are identified: intrapersonal, interpersonal, stress management, adaptability, and general mood.

Numerous research studies have examined the relationship between EI and academic performance ( Pulido and Herrera, 2017 ). They have also analyzed their relationship with other variables such as adjustment and permanence in the school context ( Hogan et al., 2010 ; Szczygieł and Mikolajczak, 2017 ), coping styles ( MacCann et al., 2011 ), the degree of social competence ( Franco et al., 2017 ), and school motivation ( Usán and Salavera, 2018 ).

Emotional intelligence has also been analyzed in groups with different ethnic or cultural origins ( Dewi et al., 2017 ; Min et al., 2018 ), and according to gender, differences were found in EI as well. Thus, for example, Herrera et al. (2017) obtained results that showed that girls in primary schools in Colombia exceeded the boys in the interpersonal dimension, while the boys stood out in the adaptability dimension. Similarly, Ferrándiz et al. (2012) identified that Spanish girls had higher scores in the interpersonal dimensions and the boys had higher scores in adaptability and general mood. Accordingly, we expect to find differences in emotional intelligence based on the cultural origin and gender of primary school children in this study.

As a function of what has been described until now, the present work has two main objectives. Firstly, to analyze the academic performance, as well as self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence, as a function of gender and cultural origin (European vs. Amazigh) of the participants. It is important to mention that the research study took place in the autonomous city of Melilla, a Spanish city that neighbors Morocco, with unique social, cultural and economic characteristics. In it, people from different cultures co-habit: European, Amazigh (also known as Berber, and who come from the Moroccan Rif), Sephardic and Hindu, although the majority of the population is of European and Amazigh descent and culture. The children with an Amazigh culture origin cohabit live and grow between their maternal culture, which counts with the Tamazight (a dialect that is orally transmitted) as a means of communication, and the European culture, with Spanish being the language employed at school and administrative environments of the city ( Herrera et al., 2011 ).

Secondly, to identify which dimensions of self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence predict academic performance.

In addition, different hypotheses are raised based on the results found in the scientific literature that addresses the research topics described above.

Hypothesis 1 . Academic grades differ depending on the gender and cultural origin of students. Thus, for example, as indicated by Voyer and Voyer (2014) , girls will achieve higher grades than boys in the subject of Spanish Language and Literature. Likewise, children of cultural origin different from the school (i.e., children of Amazigh culture) will obtain lower grades than Spanish children ( Strayhorn, 2010 ).

Hypothesis 2 . The psychology constructs evaluated (self-concept, personality and emotional intelligence) differ according to gender and cultural origin. Among other issues, it is expected to find that girls have a higher academic self-concept than boys ( Chrisler and McCreary, 2010 ), higher scores in the personality dimension of conscientiousness ( Janošević and Petrović, 2019 ) as well as in the interpersonal EI dimension ( Ferrándiz et al., 2012 ; Herrera et al., 2017 ). Likewise, children of European cultural origin are expected to obtain higher scores than those of Amazigh cultural origin in academic self-concept ( Cvencek et al., 2018 ), intellect/imagination ( Schmitt et al., 2007 ) and in the intrapersonal and interpersonal EI dimensions ( Dewi et al., 2017 ; Min et al., 2018 ).

Hypothesis 3 . Academic self-concept ( Marsh and Martin, 2011 ; Guo et al., 2016 ), conscientiousness ( O′Connor and Paunonen, 2007 ) and adaptability ( Hogan et al., 2010 ) predict academic achievement.

Materials and Methods

Participants.

A non-probabilistic sampling was used. Initially, 422 Primary school students were included in the research study. Nevertheless, once the non-valid cases were eliminated, defined as those who did not complete the evaluation instruments, or whose scores did not comply to what was set, the final sample was comprised of 407 students. These students were enrolled in eight of the twelve public early childhood and primary education centers in the autonomous city of Melilla, Spain (see Table 1 ), with a minimum age of 10 and a maximum of 12 years old. The description of the participants according to cultural origin, gender, grade and age is presented in Table 2 .

Table 1. Distribution of participants according to the center of early childhood and primary education.

Table 2. Distribution of participants according to cultural origin, gender, grade, and age.

The children of European cultural origin are mainly of Spanish nationality and Catholic religion. They were born in the autonomous city of Melilla or elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula. Their parents were born in Melilla or have changed their residence to this city for professional reasons (mainly to work in public administration or in the army). Children of Amazigh cultural origin were born in the autonomous city of Melilla, so their nationality is Spanish, or they reside in that city. Many of them are Muslims and have family in Morocco so, given the short distance away, they usually travel at weekends or holidays to Moroccan cities close to Melilla. Rearing practices of children in families of each cultural group developed, among other things, based on cultural values and identities that define them. Thus, for example, the raising of children of Amazigh cultural origin is similar to that of children in the Rif region of Morocco. However, these same children socialize not only with children of their own cultural group but also with children of European cultural origin in a Spanish city, that is, the autonomous city of Melilla. The same can be indicated for children of European cultural origin.

Instruments

Academic achievement.

The final grades of the students of the school subjects Natural Sciences, Spanish Language and Literature, and Mathematics were obtained through a registry, provided by the student’s teachers. These were classified as insufficient (0–4.9 points), sufficient (5–5.9 points), good (6–6.9 points), notable (7–8.9 points) and outstanding (9–10 points).

A Self-Concept Test-Form 5 (AF-5, García and Musitu, 2001 ) was utilized. It is composed of 30 items that evaluate the self-concept of an individual in academic (e.g., “I do my homework well”), social (e.g., “I make friends easily”), emotional (e.g., “I am afraid of some things”), family (e.g., “I feel that my parents love me”) and physical (e.g., “I take good care of my physical health”) contexts. This form has to be answered according to an attributive scale ranging from 1 to 99, according to how the item adjusts to what the individual evaluated thinks of it. For example, if a phrase indicates “music helps human well-being” and the student strongly agrees, he/she would answer with a high number, such as 94. But if the student disagreed, he/she would choose a low number, for example 9. Esnaola et al. (2011) , when analyzing the psychometric properties of this test in the Spanish population from 12 to 84 years old, indicated that its total reliability was α = 0.74. The index of internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha , calculated for the present work, had a value of α = 0.795. Also, its factorial or construct validity was corroborated in other research works ( Elosua and Muñiz, 2010 ; Malo et al., 2011 ).

For the evaluation of personality, the Short-Form Big Five Questionnaire for Children (S-BFQ-C, Beatton and Frijters, 2012 ) was utilized. It is based on the model of personality structured by five factors (Big-Five Factor Structure), formulated by Goldberg (1990 , 1992) . These factors are denominated as emotional instability (e.g., “I am often sad”), extraversion (e.g., “I make friends easily”), intellect/imagination (e.g., “When the teacher explains something, I understand immediately”), agreeableness (e.g., “I share my things with other people”) and conscientiousness (e.g., “During class I concentrate on the things I do”), creating the Big Five Questionnaire-Children (BFQ-C). This questionnaire, is directed at children aged between 9 to 15 years old, and was designed and validated by Barbaranelli et al. (2003) . In its initial version, its psychometric properties were analyzed with Italian children, although there are studies that have analyzed them in other populations such as for example the German ( Muris et al., 2005 ), Spanish ( Carrasco et al., 2005 ) or Argentinian ( Cupani and Ruarte, 2008 ) populations. Nevertheless, one of the problems of this instrument is its length, given that is composed by 65 items, 13 for each scale. This is the reason why Beatton and Frijters (2012) , in a broader study that sought to measure the effects of personality and satisfaction with life on the happiness of Australian youth aged from 9 to 14 years old, reduced the BFQ-C to a shorter version. This shorter version, named S-BFQ-C, is composed by 30 items, so that each of the scales is composed by 6 items. In this version, the questions have to be answered using a Likert -type scale with 5 response options (1 = Almost never; 5 = Almost always). The reliability, measured with Cronbach’s Alpha , was found to be between 0.60 and 0.80 for each of the five scales. For the present study, the total reliability found was α = 0.783.

The BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version-Short (EQ-i: YV-S, Bar-On and Parker, 2000 ) was used. It is directed at children aged from 7 to 18 years old, and is composed of 30 items which have to be answered with a Likert scale with four possible responses (1 = Very seldom or Not true of me, 4 = Very often or True of me). Six items shape each of the following scales: intrapersonal (e.g., “It is easy to tell people how I feel”), interpersonal (e.g., “I care what happens to other people”), adaptability (e.g., “I can come up with good answers to hard questions”), stress management (e.g., “I can stay calm when I am upset”), and positive impression (e.g., “I like everyone I meet”). This last scale is useful for eliminating the cases of high social desirability. The sum of the first four scales provides the total EQ.

The reliability or internal consistency of the EQ-i YV-S scale oscillates between 0.65 and 0.87 ( Bar-On and Parker, 2000 ). For this study, the total reliability was α = 0.745. Its internal structure was confirmed in Spanish ( Esnaola et al., 2016 ), Hungarian ( Kun et al., 2012 ), Mexican ( Esnaola et al., 2018b ), English ( Davis and Wigelsworth, 2018 ) and Chinese ( Esnaola et al., 2018a ) populations.

Information Collection

In the first place, the participation of the management teams of the 12 early childhood and primary school education centers in Melilla was solicited. Of these, eight centers answered affirmatively. Afterward, within each center, the professor-tutor from each class or classes interested were contacted. A group meeting was conducted with the parents from each group-class, where information was provided about the objectives of the research study. The authorization of the children’s parents for the exclusive use of the results obtained, for educational and scientific purposes, was requested.

Once this process was finished, a document was provided to the teachers-tutors of each participating class which explained how to access the web program utilized for the management of the student’s grades in order to download this information in pdf format. Once this information was downloaded, they were asked to write down, in a double-entry table provided for each student, the final grades obtained in the subjects of Natural Sciences, Spanish Language and Literature, and Mathematics, using the scoring system of insufficient, sufficient, good, notable or outstanding. Teachers provided students’ grades to researchers at the end of the academic year.

The AF-5, the S-BFQ-C and the EQ-i: YV-S questionnaires were administered in the first school term to the students in fifth and sixth grade of Primary Education, collectively according to group-class. The maximum time provided for this was 55 min. Previously, the students were told that there were no right or wrong answers, and that they should answer with total sincerity, given that the test was anonymous. Also, that they should not write their name; and that what they were about to answer did not have any relation with the school grades; and lastly, that they should read the questions, and if they had any doubts (for example, not understanding a term), they should raise their hand so that the question could be resolved.

In order to be able to relate the results of the evaluation of the different psychological constructs and the academic grades, the teacher of each class assigned a number to each student. This number was recorded both in the grades provided by him/her and on the first page of each of the questionnaires administered.

Statistical Analysis of the Data

Before proceeding with the statistical analysis, from the 422 students who participated, it was determined if there were students who had not completed the three evaluation tests, and also if they obtained high scores in the positive impression scale of the EQ-i: YV-S. This resulted in the elimination of 15 individuals, resulting in a final sample of 407 students.

The statistical program IBM SPSS Statistics 23 was used to carry out the statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics were utilized to describe the data (frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation). In other words, to answer the first research objective and the first two hypotheses, two Analysis of variance (ANOVA) were performed in which the Academic achievement was used as the dependent variable in one case, and self-concept, personality and EI as dependent variables in the other. In both cases, the independent variables were gender (boy or girl) and cultural group (European vs. Amazigh). The effect size was calculated with the partial eta-squared as the post hoc test, through the use of the Bonferroni test.

To address the second objective and the third hypothesis, three multiple linear regression analysis (with the enter method) were conducted, in which each subject was introduced as the dependent variable, with the predictive variables being the different dimensions which comprised the self-concept, personality and EI constructs. To justify the method used, the non-autocorrelation of the data was determined, using the Durbin Watson test, and the non-existence of multicollinearity, through the Variance Inflation Factor.

Academic Achievement by Gender and Cultural Group

All the subjects had a maximum of five points, and were scored as: 1 = Insufficient, 2 = Sufficient, 3 = Good, 4 = Notable, 5 = Outstanding. The mean grade in Natural Sciences was 3.26 ( SD = 1.33), for Spanish Language and Literature it was 3.33 ( SD = 1.24) and in Mathematics, it was 3.19 ( SD = 1.25).

Academic achievement as a function of the student’s gender and cultural group is presented in Table 3 . The analysis of variance performed as a function of gender and cultural group showed that there were differences according to gender for the subject Spanish Language and Literature, F = 5.812, p = 0.016, Eta2p = 0.014, so that the girls obtained higher grades than the boys, t = 0.313, p = 0.016. No differences were found neither in Nature Sciences, F = 0.763, p = 0.383, Eta2p = 0.002, nor Mathematics, F = 1.692, p = 0.194, Eta2p = 0.004. On their part, no differences were found as a function of the cultural group, F Natural Sciences = 0.376, p = 0.540, Eta2p = 0.001; F Language and Literature = 0.565, p = 0.453, Eta2p = 0.001; F Mathematics = 0.576, p = 0.448, Eta2p = 0.001.

Table 3. Academic achievement by gender and cultural group.

Self-Concept, Personality and EI by Gender and Cultural Group

The analysis of variance results (see Supplementary Table S1 ) showed that there were significant differences as a function of gender for self-concept, more specifically in academic self-concept, with the girls achieving higher grades in post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test, t = 0.667, p = 0.007, and self-esteem, t = 1.139, p < 0.001, where the boys stood out. Likewise, differences were found in personality in favor of the girls within the conscientiousness, t = 1.136, p = 0.018, and agreeableness dimensions, t = 1.641, p = 0.001. Also, with respect to the EI, the girls had a higher score in the interpersonal scale, t = 1.016, p = 0.007, while the boys had a higher score in the stress management, t = 1.513, p < 0.001, and adaptability, t = 1.110, p = 0.008. Lastly, with respect to the analysis according to cultural group, there were only significant differences in the physical self-concept, with higher scores reached by the children of Amazigh cultural origin, t = 0.420, p = 0.036.

Predictive Value of the Different Dimensions Evaluated With Respect to Academic Achievement

In first place, a linear regression analysis was conducted, where the dependent variable was the subject Natural Sciences and the predictive variables were the five dimensions of the self-concept, the five dimensions from personality and the four dimensions from EI (see Table 4 ). The model was significant with values F = 11.003, p < 0.001. Likewise, the coefficient of determination was R 2 = 0.311 (adjusted R 2 = 0.282). Durbin–Watson’s d test showed that there was no auto-correlation in the data ( d = 1.583). Values of the Durbin Watson test between 1.5 and 2.5 indicate that the data are not correlated ( Durbin and Watson, 1951 ). Also, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) obtained values lower than 5, so multicollinearity was not present ( Berry and Feldman, 1985 ; Belsley, 1991 ).

Table 4. Regression analysis of the different dimensions analyzed with respect to the natural sciences subject.

In the order from greater to lesser predictive value, the dimensions were: academic self-concept, physical self-concept, intrapersonal, intellect/imagination, and family self-concept. The physical self-concept, as well as intrapersonal intelligence, negatively predicted the grades in Natural Sciences.

In second place, as related to the subject Spanish Language and Literature (see Table 5 ), the model was significant with values of F = 10.442, p < 0.001 and with a coefficient of determination of R 2 = 0.299, adjusted R 2 = 0.271. The data was not correlated ( d = 1.672) and no multicollinearity was found.

Table 5. Regression analysis of the different dimensions analyzed with respect to the Spanish language and literature subject.

Once again, the academic self-concept dimension had the greatest predictive value, followed by the physical self-concept, intrapersonal intelligence, and intellect/imagination dimensions. The negative predictions remained the same.

In third and last place, for the subject of Mathematics (see Table 6 ), the model had a statistical significance, as shown by F = 10.790, p < 0.001. The coefficient of determination obtained was R 2 = 0.306, adjusted R 2 = 0.278. The data was not correlated ( d = 1.600) and multicollinearity was not present.

Table 6. Regression analysis of the different dimensions analyzed with respect to the mathematics subject.

The predictive dimensions were academic self-concept, physical self-concept (in a negative manner), adaptability, intellect/imagination, and conscientiousness.

Based on the hypotheses set, first, the grades of the Spanish Language and Literature school subject varied depending on the gender of the students, which coincided with the results from other studies, which highlighted the girls’ higher grades ( Huang, 2013 ; Voyer and Voyer, 2014 ). In this regard, it could be argued that academic and social expectations are different depending on gender ( Voyer and Voyer, 2014 ). Likewise, the influence of socialization on the formation of gender behaviors must be taken into account in accordance with the cultural norms of masculinity and femininity ( Gibb et al., 2008 ). Gender differences in academic achievement remain between different countries, regardless of their political, economic or social equality ( Stoet and Geary, 2015 ). However, it is noteworthy that in adulthood women occupy fewer representations of political, economic and academic leadership than men.

Contrary to expectations ( Strayhorn, 2010 ; Whaley and Noël, 2012 ), children of Amazigh origin did not obtain lower grades than those of European origin. These results may be due to the fact that in the city of Melilla children of both cultures are educated from early childhood education in schools where the language used is Spanish. Thus, the academic performance at the end of Primary Education does not differ depending on the cultural origin of the students. However, it is necessary to show that early childhood teachers dedicate great efforts so that children of Amazigh cultural origin develop the linguistic skills necessary for the correct learning and use of the Spanish language ( Herrera et al., 2011 ). Therefore, hypothesis 1 is partially confirmed. That is, the results found indicate that academic achievement varies according to gender but not the cultural origin of the students.

Likewise, differences were found according to gender in self-concept, specifically in the academic self-concept and self-esteem; for personality, within the factors of conscientiousness and agreeableness; in addition to emotional intelligence, particularly in the interpersonal, stress management and adaptability scales. As for the differences found for self-concept according to gender ( Nagy et al., 2010 ), the results found for academic self-concept showed differences in favor of the girls ( Malo et al., 2011 ). Nevertheless, other factors should be taken into account, such as the academic responsibilities associated to school success and failure, given that, for example, the boys in Compulsory Secondary Education attribute their academic success to their skills, while the girls attribute them to their effort ( Inglés et al., 2012 ). As for emotional self-concept or self-esteem, the boys exceeded the girls ( Xie et al., 2019 ). Cross-cultural studies show that differences in self-esteem according to gender are maintained in different countries, although their magnitude differ according to the cultural differences found in the socioeconomic, sociodemographic, gender equality and cultural value indicators ( Bleidorn et al., 2016 ). In this respect, the emotion literacy programs, based on the development of emotional intelligence, could be a useful tool for the development of self-esteem ( Cheung et al., 2014 ).

As for the differences in the personality dimensions conscientiousness and agreeableness in favor of the girls, the results were in agreement with previous studies ( Rahafar et al., 2017 ; Janošević and Petrović, 2019 ). Within the differences in EI according to gender, the girls scored higher in the interpersonal scale, while the boys did so in stress management and adaptability ( Ferrándiz et al., 2012 ; Herrera et al., 2017 ). In this way, the girls showed competencies and skills that were higher than the boys in empathy, social responsibility, and interpersonal relationships. On the contrary, the boys stood out in stress tolerance and impulse control (stress management), as well as in reality-testing, flexibility, and problem-solving (adaptability). These differences, as a function of gender, could be due to cultural factors and family rearing practices differentiated as a function of gender ( Joseph and Newman, 2010 ).

Also, the physical self-concept varied according to the cultural origin, where children from the Amazigh culture obtained higher scores than children of European culture origin. This may be due to the influence of cultural values (their own, meaning Amazigh, as well as the context in which they live in, given that the children are socialized in a European context), with respect to body image and physical self-concept ( Marsh et al., 2007 ).

Based on the results found, the second hypothesis is partially confirmed. The three psychological constructs evaluated differ according to gender in the expected direction but only in the self-concept are differences found according to the cultural origin. Although it was expected to find differences in favor of children of European cultural origin in academic self-concept ( Cvencek et al., 2018 ), they have been found in physical self-concept in favor of children of Amazigh cultural origin. As previously indicated, children of European and Amazigh culture develop in the same school contexts from the early educational stages. Thus, educational policies developed in schools may have contributed to eliminating the possible socio-cultural disadvantages of children of Amazigh cultural origin. This implies, therefore, that there are no differences depending on the cultural group in the academic self-concept.

In the predictive analysis developed for each of the school subjects of the curriculum of Primary Education, with the aim of answering the second objective and the third hypothesis of the study, the academic self-concept showed a greater predictive value ( Marsh and Martin, 2011 ; Jansen et al., 2015 ; Guo et al., 2016 ; Lösch et al., 2017 ; Susperreguy et al., 2018 ). This result confirms the third hypothesis. That is, the relevance of academic self-concept in school performance. However, so did other dimensions of self-concept. More specifically, the physical self-concept negatively predicted the academic results in the three subjects evaluated ( Lohbeck et al., 2016 ). Children who participated in the study are in the process of transition from childhood to adolescence. Biological changes in their bodies due to this stage of evolutionary development as well as greater attention to appearance and physical abilities may interfere at the end of Primary Education in their academic performance. Furthermore, the family self-concept predicted the grades of the Natural Sciences school subject. This last result points to the influence of the family on self-concept as well as academic results ( Corrás et al., 2017 ; Mortimer et al., 2017 ; Häfner et al., 2018 ).

Personality also predicted the academic results in the three school subjects from the Primary Education curriculum analyzed ( O′Connor and Paunonen, 2007 ; Spengler et al., 2016 ; Bergold and Steinmayr, 2018 ), i.e., the intellect/imagination dimension for the three subjects and conscientiousness for Mathematics. In the first case, it may be because intellect/imagination or openness is a personality dimension that reflects cognitive exploration ( DeYoung, 2015 ). It refers to the ability and tendency to find, understand and use complex patterns of both sensory and abstract information. Therefore, those children who score higher in intellect/imagination will get better academic results than those with lower scores. In the second case, conscientiousness relates to responsibility, persistence, trustworthiness, and being purposeful ( Conrad and Patry, 2012 ). Children with high conscientiousness can develop a variety of effective learning strategies, which may be associated with higher academic performance in Mathematics.

Likewise, EI predicted academic achievement in every case ( Salami and Ogundokun, 2009 ; Hogan et al., 2010 ; Brackett et al., 2011 ; MacCann et al., 2011 ). More specifically, the intrapersonal scale predicted it for the subjects of Natural Sciences and Spanish Language and Literature. Intrapersonal intelligence involves the knowledge and labeling of one’s own feelings. This ability may contribute to achieving better grades in both subjects of the curriculum. For example, in the subject of Spanish Language and Literature it can facilitate the communicative skills related to the reading of different kinds of texts, their reflection and their understanding. On the other hand, in the subject of Nature Sciences it can contribute to interpret reality in order to address the solution to the different problems that arise, as well as to explain and predict natural phenomena and to face the need to develop critical attitudes before the consequences that result from scientific advances. In the case of the Mathematics subject, the adaptability scale predicted the academic achievement. Adaptability implies abilities such as being able to adjust one’s emotions and behaviors to changing situations or conditions, which is closely related to mathematical thinking.

In general, scientific literature shows that academic achievement is related to self-concept ( Susperreguy et al., 2018 ; Wolff et al., 2018 ; Sewasew and Schroeders, 2019 ), personality ( Perret et al., 2019 ; Smith-Woolley et al., 2019 ), and EI ( Corcoran et al., 2018 ; Deighton et al., 2019 ; Piqueras et al., 2019 ). Also, that within these construct, academic self-concept ( Ferla et al., 2009 ; Guay et al., 2010 ; Chen et al., 2013 ; Marsh et al., 2014 ), intellect/imagination ( Poropat, 2009 ; Smith-Woolley et al., 2019 ), and adaptability ( MacCann et al., 2011 ; Szczygieł and Mikolajczak, 2017 ) correlate significantly with academic achievement. In this research the predictive value of the dimensions of self-concept, personality and EI regarding the academic grades obtained in three subjects of the Primary Education curriculum has been established. One of its strengths is that it analyzes the predictive value of these psychological constructs together, not separately as in other studies.

In addition, the study has been developed in a multicultural context where children of European and Amazigh cultural origin coexist. Children of Amazigh cultural origin usually have access to early childhood education centers with a lower knowledge of the Spanish language than children of European cultural origin ( Herrera et al., 2011 ). Although studies carried out with groups of cultural minorities show differences in their school performance ( Strayhorn, 2010 ; Whaley and Noël, 2012 ), in the present study they are not at the end of Primary Education. This fact may be due to the linguistic policy developed in Melilla educational centers, which means that the mother language of children of Amazigh origin does not represent a disadvantage for academic achievement.

Further, gender differences found in the study seem to be more relevant than cultural differences. In fact, they are only in the physical self-concept in the latter case. Personality can mediate in adapting to school demands, so that girls are more conscientiousness than boys and follow norms in a more adaptive way ( Carvalho, 2016 ). Moreover, since girls excel in their academic self-concept, their self-efficacy may also be superior to that of boys, which contributes to a better school adjustment ( Ferla et al., 2009 ). Girls also have greater interpersonal intelligence, indicating better empathy, social responsibility and interpersonal relationships ( Ferrándiz et al., 2012 ). Such non-cognitive abilities can stimulate the development of positive interpersonal relationships in the classroom with both the teachers and their peers. These individual differences may be due to family and social influences where, for example, girls are expected to be more emotionally expressive than boys ( Meshkat and Nejati, 2017 ). In this same direction it could explain why children have greater self-esteem and stress management that girls.

Practical Implications for Education

In light of the results obtained in the present research study, the need to carry out a comprehensive education in schools that addresses the promotion of not only academic but also personal, social and emotional competences, are underlined ( Cherniss, 2010 ; Hunagund and Hangal, 2014 ; Herrera et al., 2017 ; Szczygieł and Mikolajczak, 2017 ; Corcoran et al., 2018 ; Cvencek et al., 2018 ). For this, the application of the principles derived from Positive Psychology in the education field would be an adequate strategy ( Suldo et al., 2015 ; Chodkiewicz and Boyle, 2017 ; Domitrovich et al., 2017 ; Shoshani and Slone, 2017 ). Thus, intellectual, procedural and emotional aspects have to be worked on in learning, the latter being clear drivers of learning. The pleasant emotions experienced by children in educational settings will allow greater happiness and emotional well-being in them ( Gil and Martínez, 2016 ). For it, teachers must be trained in good teaching practices that allow the interest of students to learn as well as guide them in the emotional domain ( Castillo et al., 2013 ; Oberle et al., 2016 ; Conners-Burrow et al., 2017 ).

Likewise, schools must respond to the gender and cultural differences of students ( Chrisler and McCreary, 2010 ; DiPrete and Jennings, 2012 ), particularly the first based on the results of this study. Thus, for example, the development of greater self-esteem in girls ( Bleidorn et al., 2016 ; Xie et al., 2019 ) should be encouraged. As indicated by Cheung et al. (2014) , emotional literacy programs that are based on emotional intelligence are an appropriate strategy for promoting self-esteem. Similarly, gender differences must be taken into account in response to other factors such as cultural group, family beliefs and parenting practices ( Chrisler and McCreary, 2010 ; Joseph and Newman, 2010 ; Nagy et al., 2010 ; Allik et al., 2012 ; Marsh et al., 2015 ).

Study Limitations and Proposal for Future Research

The present study has been developed taking into account only the last two school years of the education stage of Primary Education, just before the transition to Compulsory Secondary Education. Given that the scientific literature shows evolutionary changes in the development of the constructs analyzed ( Huang, 2011 ; Murayama et al., 2013 ; Marsh et al., 2015 ; Bleidorn et al., 2016 ), longitudinal studies could be conducted in future research studies from Primary Education to Compulsory Secondary Education in order to determine the magnitude and direction of these changes.

On the other hand, all the instruments for data collection used to evaluate the psychological constructs analyzed in the present study are based on self-report measures. Different types of measuring instruments (self-report measures and performance measures) should be combined in future studies ( Petrides et al., 2010 ; Mayer et al., 2012 ).

Gender differences in academic achievement as well as the psychological constructs analyzed have been revealed. However, it has to deepen the analysis of personal variables, family, social and cultural factors that contribute to that, even though women get better scores on their school performance across the different educational stages, at adulthood that reach fewer representations than men in leadership positions ( Stoet and Geary, 2015 ).

Finally, given the cultural diversity in schools it is necessary to develop studies that analyze academic achievement as well as its relationship with different psychological variables in students of different cultural groups. Cross-cultural studies comparing different countries are necessary ( Marsh and Hau, 2003 ; Nagengast and Marsh, 2012 ; Bleidorn et al., 2016 ; Min et al., 2018 ) but teachers have to know how to deal with coexistence and cultural diversity within the classrooms.

Data Availability Statement

The datasets generated for this study are available on request to the corresponding author.

Ethics Statement

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by the Research Commission, Faculty of Educational Sciences and Sports, University of Granada, Melilla, Spain. Written informed consent to participate in this study was provided by the participants’ legal guardian/next of kin.

Author Contributions

LH, MA-L, and LM shared conception, design, and the final version of the work, were jointly accountable for the content of the work, ensured that all aspects related to accuracy or integrity of the study were investigated and resolved in an appropriate way, and shared the internal consistency of the manuscript. MA-L and LM contributions were mainly in the theoretical part and in revising it critically. LH contribution was mainly in methodological question and data analysis.

This research was co-financed by the Research Group Development, Education, Diversity, and Culture: Interdisciplinary Analysis (HUM-742).

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Supplementary Material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.03075/full#supplementary-material

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Keywords : academic achievement, self-concept, personality, emotional intelligence, gender, cultural group

Citation: Herrera L, Al-Lal M and Mohamed L (2020) Academic Achievement, Self-Concept, Personality and Emotional Intelligence in Primary Education. Analysis by Gender and Cultural Group. Front. Psychol. 10:3075. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.03075

Received: 12 September 2019; Accepted: 28 December 2019; Published: 22 January 2020.

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Copyright © 2020 Herrera, Al-Lal and Mohamed. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Lucía Herrera, [email protected]

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Self-Concept in Psychology: Definition & Examples

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

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Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

The self-concept is a general term for how someone thinks about, evaluates, or perceives themselves. To be aware of oneself is to have a concept of oneself.

It’s formed through experiences, interactions, and reflections, and plays a pivotal role in influencing behavior, emotions, and interpersonal relationships. A healthy self-concept promotes well-being, while a negative one can lead to emotional and social challenges.

Baumeister (1999) provides the following self-concept definition: “The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

The self-concept is an important term for both social and humanistic psychology . Lewis (1990) suggests that the development of a concept of self has two aspects:

(1) The Existential Self

This is “the most basic part of the self-scheme or self-concept; the sense of being separate and distinct from others and the awareness of the constancy of the self” (Bee, 1992).

The existential self is a concept within developmental psychology, particularly in the study of infant development. It refers to the basic and most fundamental understanding that an individual exists as a separate and distinct entity from others.

This realization typically begins in infancy, as early as a few months old, when a baby recognizes its existence apart from the external world.

The child realizes that they exist as a separate entity from others and continue to exist over time and space.

The existential self is the foundation upon which more complex aspects of self-concept, like the categorical self (understanding oneself in terms of categorical memberships like gender, skills, and age), are built.

According to Lewis (1990), awareness of the existential self begins as young as two to three months old and arises in part due to the child’s relationship with the world. For example, the child smiles, and someone smiles back, or the child touches a mobile and sees it move.

(2) The Categorical Self

Having realized that he or she exists as a separate experiencing being, the child becomes aware that he or she is also an object in the world.

The categorical self involves the understanding that one can be categorized into various groups based on traits, roles, and attributes.

Just as other objects, including people, have properties that can be experienced (big, small, red, smooth, and so on), so the child is becoming aware of himself or herself as an object which can be experienced and which has properties.

The self, too, can be put into categories such as age, gender, size, or skill. Two of the first categories to be applied are age (“I am 3”) and gender (“I am a girl”).

In early childhood, the categories children apply to themselves are very concrete (e.g., hair color, height, and favorite things). Later, self-description also begins to include reference to internal psychological traits, comparative evaluations, and how others see them.

For instance, a child might identify as being a “big boy” or “big girl,” differentiate themselves by saying they have “brown hair,” or later recognize they are “good at drawing.” The categorical self lays the foundation for more intricate self-identifications as one matures.

Self-image refers to the mental representation or picture that individuals have of themselves, encompassing both physical appearance and personal traits.

It’s how people perceive themselves and believe others perceive them. Personal experiences, interactions with others, societal standards, and media influences, can shape this perception.

This does not necessarily have to reflect reality. Indeed, a person with anorexia who is thin may have a self-image in which the person believes they are fat.

A person’s self-image is affected by many factors, such as parental influences, friends, the media, etc.

Self-image is a significant component of one’s overall self-concept and is crucial to self-esteem and confidence. It can influence behavior, choices, relationships, and overall mental well-being. Over time, a person’s self-image can change based on experiences, feedback, achievements, and personal reflections.

The Twenty Statements Test

Kuhn (1960) investigated the self-image by using The Twenty Statements Test .

He asked people to answer “Who am I?” in 20 different ways.

He found that the responses could be divided into two major groups. These were social roles (external or objective aspects of oneself such as son, teacher, friend) and personality traits (internal or affective aspects of oneself such as gregarious, impatient, humorous).

The list of answers to the question “Who Am I?” probably includes examples of each of the following four types of responses:

• Physical Description : I’m tall, have blue eyes…etc.
• Social Roles : We are all social beings whose behavior is shaped to some extent by the roles we play. Such roles as student, housewife, or member of the football team not only help others to recognize us but also help us to know what is expected of us in various situations.
• Personal Traits : These are the third dimension of our self-descriptions. “I’m impulsive…I’m generous…I tend to worry a lot,”…etc.
• Existential Statements (abstract ones): These can range from “I’m a child of the universe” to “I’m a human being” to “I’m a spiritual being, “…etc.

Typically, young people describe themselves more in terms of personal traits, whereas older people feel defined to a greater extent by their social roles.

Actual Self

The actual self is how individuals currently see themselves based on their self-awareness and introspection. It represents the attributes, roles, competencies, and characteristics that a person believes they genuinely possess at the present moment.

While “actual self” and “self-image” are closely related and often used interchangeably in casual discussions, they are distinct concepts within the realm of psychology. Here’s a breakdown of the differences:

• Represents an individual’s current perception of themselves based on attributes, roles, and abilities they believe they genuinely possess.
• Serves as a baseline for comparison with other self-representations, like the ideal self or ought self.
• Refers to the mental representation or picture an individual has of themselves.
• It encompasses both physical appearance and perceived personal traits.
• Self-image is about how people perceive themselves and how they believe they are seen by others.

In essence, the “actual self” is a broader construct that might include one’s self-image as a component.

The actual self covers the entirety of an individual’s current self-perception, while the self-image focuses more on the visual or representational aspect and perceived traits.

Both, however, are integral parts of an individual’s overall self-concept.

Self-Esteem

Self-esteem (also known as self-worth) refers to the extent to which we like, accept, or approve of ourselves or how much we value ourselves.

Self-esteem always involves a degree of evaluation, and we may have either a positive or a negative view of ourselves.

Factors influencing self-esteem include:

• Childhood experiences
• Feedback from others
• Comparisons with peers
• Societal standards and cultural influences
• Personal achievements or failures

High Self-Esteem : Individuals with high self-esteem generally believe that they have good qualities and value themselves positively. They often handle life challenges better, are more resilient, and have a positive outlook on life.

• Confidence in our own abilities
• Self-acceptance
• Not worrying about what others think

Low Self-Esteem: Those with low self-esteem tend to view themselves negatively, doubt their abilities, and are more critical of themselves. They are more susceptible to experiencing feelings of worthlessness, depression, and anxiety.

• Lack of confidence
• Want to be/look like someone else
• Always worrying about what others might think

Having a balanced self-esteem is crucial for mental well-being. While high self-esteem is generally beneficial, overly inflated self-esteem can lead to narcissism . On the other hand, chronically low self-esteem can contribute to a host of psychological issues, including depression and anxiety.

Measurement

There are several ways of measuring self-esteem. For example, Harrill Self-Esteem Inventory is a questionnaire comprising 15 statements about a range of interests.

Another example is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is a neutral cartoon given to the participant, who then has to devise a story about what’s going on.

Argyle (2008) believes 4 major factors influence self-esteem.

1. The Reaction of Others

If people admire us, flatter us, seek out our company, listen attentively and agree with us, we tend to develop a positive self-image.

If they avoid, neglect, and tell us things about ourselves that we don’t want to hear, we develop a negative self-image.

2. Comparison with Others

If the people we compare ourselves with (our reference group) appear to be more successful, happier, richer, and better looking than ourselves, we tend to develop a negative self-image, BUT if they are less successful than us, our image will be positive.

3. Social Roles

Some social roles carry prestige, e.g., doctor, airline pilot, TV presenter, and premiership footballer, and this promotes self-esteem.

Other roles carry a stigma. E.g., a prisoner, mental hospital patient, refuse collector, or unemployed person.

4. Identification

Roles aren’t just “out there.” They also become part of our personality, i.e., we identify with the positions we occupy, the roles we play, and the groups we belong to.

But just as important as all these factors are the influence of our parents! (See Coopersmith’s research.)

Experiments

Morse and Gergen (1970) showed that our self-esteem might change rapidly in uncertain or anxiety-arousing situations.

Participants were waiting for a job interview in a waiting room. They sat with another candidate (a confederate of the experimenter) in one of two conditions:

A) Mr. Clean – dressed in a smart suit, carrying a briefcase opened to reveal a slide rule and books.

B) Mr. Dirty – dressed in an old T-shirt and jeans, slouched over a cheap sex novel.

The self-esteem of participants with Mr. Dirty increased whilst those with Mr. Clean decreased! No mention was made of how this affected the subjects’ performance in the interview.

Self-esteem affects performance at numerous tasks, though (Coopersmith, 1967), so one could expect Mr. Dirty’s subjects to perform better than Mr. Clean.

Even though self-esteem might fluctuate, there are times when we continue to believe good things about ourselves, even when evidence to the contrary exists. This is known as the perseverance effect.

Miller and Ross (1975) showed that people who believed they had socially desirable characteristics continued in this belief even when the experimenters tried to get them to believe the opposite.

Does the same thing happen with bad things if we have low self-esteem?  Maybe not. Perhaps with very low self-esteem, all we believe about ourselves might be bad.

The ideal self refers to the person an individual aspires to become. It embodies one’s goals, ambitions, and dreams, encompassing attributes, behaviors, and traits a person values and wishes to possess. This concept is pivotal in understanding personal development and self-concept.

Key points about the ideal self:

• Comparison with Real Self: The ideal self stands in contrast to the “real self,” which represents how a person currently sees themselves. The gap between these two concepts can influence self-esteem. A smaller gap can lead to higher self-esteem, while a larger gap can result in feelings of dissatisfaction or inadequacy.
• Dynamic Nature: The ideal self is not static; it evolves based on life experiences, societal influences, personal aspirations, and changing values.
• Motivation: The ideal self can serve as a motivational force, pushing individuals to pursue personal growth, learn new skills, and strive for self-improvement.
• Potential Pitfalls: While the ideal self can be a source of inspiration, an unattainable or overly perfectionistic ideal self can lead to disappointment, low self-esteem, and mental distress.

Carl Rogers, a humanistic psychologist, emphasized the importance of achieving congruence between the real self and the ideal self for overall psychological well-being.

If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (e.g., your self-image) and what you’d like to be (e.g., your ideal self), this will likely affect how much you value yourself.

Therefore, there is an intimate relationship between self-image, ego-ideal, and self-esteem. Humanistic psychologists study this using the Q-Sort Method .

A person’s ideal self may not be consistent with what actually happens in the life and experiences of the person. Hence, a difference may exist between a person’s ideal self and actual experience. This is called incongruence.

Where a person’s ideal self and actual experience are consistent or very similar, a state of congruence exists. Rarely, if ever, does a total state of congruence exist; all people experience a certain amount of incongruence.

The development of congruence is dependent on unconditional positive regard . Rogers believed that for a person to achieve self-actualization , they must be in a state of congruence.

Michael Argyle (2008) says there are four major factors that influence its development:

• The ways in which others (particularly significant others) react to us.
• How we think we compare to others
• Our social roles
• The extent to which we identify with other people

Argyle, M. (2008). Social encounters: Contributions to social interaction . Aldine Transaction

Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.) (1999). The self in social psychology . Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis).

Bee, H. L. (1992). The developing child . London: HarperCollins.

Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self-esteem . San Francisco: Freeman.

Kuhn, M. H. (1960). Self-attitudes by age, sex and professional training. Sociological Quarterly , 1, 39-56.

Lewis, M. (1990). Self-knowledge and social development in early life. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality (pp. 277-300). New York: Guilford.

Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213–225

Morse, S. J. & Gergen, K. J. (1970). Social comparison, self-consistency and the concept of self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 16, 148-156.

Rogers, C. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships as developed in the client-centered framework. In (ed.) S. Koch, Psychology: A study of a science. Vol. 3: Formulations of the person and the social context . New York: McGraw Hill.

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What is Self-Concept Theory? A Psychologist Explains

You might answer with “ I’m a mother ,” or, “ I’m a therapist, ” or maybe, “ I’m a believer, ” “ I’m a good friend, ” “ I’m a brother. ”

Maybe you answer with, “ I am excellent at my job, ” “ I’m an accomplished musician, ” or “ I’m a successful athlete. ”

Other responses might fall into the category of traits: “ I’m a kind-hearted person, ” “ I’m intelligent and hard-working, ” or “ I’m laid-back and easy-going. ”

These responses come from your internal sense of who you are. This sense is developed early in life, but it goes through constant evaluation and adjustment throughout the lifespan.

In psychology, this sense of self has a specific term: self-concept.

Before you read on, we thought you might like to download our three Self-Compassion Exercises for free . These detailed, science-based exercises will not only help you understand and show more compassion and kindness to yourself but will also give you the tools to help your clients, students or employees improve their self-compassion.

This Article Contains:

What is self-concept a definition, self-concept theory, the components and elements of the self-concept model, the development stages of self-concept, 10 examples of self-concept, research on self-concept, measuring self-concept with scales, tests, and inventories, self-concept activities and lesson plans for preschoolers and older students (pdf), self-concept worksheets (pdf), 8 quotes on self-concept, a take-home message.

Self-concept is an overarching idea we have about who we are—physically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and in terms of any other aspects that make up who we are (Neill, 2005). We form and regulate our self-concept as we grow, based on the knowledge we have about ourselves. It is multidimensional, and can be broken down into these individual aspects.

For example, you may have a very different idea of who you are in terms of your physical body, and who you are in terms of your spirit or soul.

The influential self-efficacy researcher Roy Baumeister (1999) defines self-concept as follows:

“The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

A similar definition comes from Rosenberg’s 1979 book on the topic; he says self-concept is:

“…the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.”

Self-concept is related to several other “self” constructs, such as self-esteem, self-image, self-efficacy, and self-awareness. In the following section, we will explain these slight—yet important—differences.

Self-Concept vs. Self-Esteem

Self-concept is not self-esteem, although self-esteem may be a part of self-concept. Self-concept is the perception that we have of ourselves, our answer when we ask ourselves the question “Who am I?”

It is knowing about one’s own tendencies, thoughts, preferences and habits, hobbies, skills, and areas of weakness. According to Carl Rogers, founder of client-centered therapy , self-concept is an overarching construct that self-esteem is one of the components of it (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Image

Self-image is related to self-concept but is less broad. Self-image is how an individual sees themselves, and it does not have to align with reality.

A person’s self-image is based on how they see themselves, while self-concept is a more comprehensive evaluation of the self, largely based on how a person sees themselves, values themselves, thinks about themselves, and feels about themselves.

Carl Rogers posited that self-image is a component of self-concept, along with self-esteem or self-worth and one’s “ideal self” (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Efficacy

Self-concept is a more complex construct than self-efficacy. While self-efficacy refers to an individual’s judgments of their own abilities, self-concept is more general and includes both cognitive (thoughts about) and affective (feelings about) judgments about oneself (Bong & Clark, 1999).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Awareness

Self-awareness also influences self-concept. It is the quality or trait that involves conscious awareness of one’s own thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and traits (Cherry, 2018A). To have a fully developed self-concept (and one that is based in reality), a person must have at least some level of self-awareness .

We explore this further in The Science of Self-Acceptance Masterclass© .

Generally, theorists agree on the following points:

• On the broadest level, self-concept is the overall idea we have about who we are and includes cognitive and affective judgments about ourselves;
• Self-concept is multi-dimensional, incorporating our views of ourselves in terms of several different aspects (e.g., social, religious, spiritual, physical, emotional);
• It is learned, not inherent;
• It is influenced by biological and environmental factors, but social interaction plays a big role as well;
• Self-concept develops through childhood and early adulthood when it is more easily changed or updated;
• It can be changed in later years, but it is more of an uphill battle since people have established ideas about who they are;
• Self-concept does not always align with reality. When it does, our self-concept is “congruent.” When it doesn’t, our self-concept is “incongruent.”

Identity and Self-Concept Theory in Psychology vs. Self-Concept in Sociology

Both psychology and sociology share an interest in self-concept, but they use slightly different ways to explore it. Individual researchers vary, of course, but generally, the divide can be thought of in these terms:

• Sociology/social psychology focuses on how self-concept develops, specifically within the context of the individual’s social environment.
• Psychology focuses on how self-concept impacts people (Gecas, 1982).

There are other differences between the two, including psychology’s general focus on the individual versus sociology’s focus on the group, community, or society; however, this difference in focus has led to two diverse research streams. Both have resulted in great insights and interesting findings, and they sometimes overlap, but this divide can still be seen in the literature today.

Carl Rogers and the Self-Concept Theory of Personality

Famed psychologist, theorist, and clinician Carl Rogers posited a theory of how self-concept influences and, indeed, acts as the framework for, one’s personality.

The image we have of who we are contributes to our personality, and our actions—combined with our personality —create a feedback loop into our image of ourselves. Rogers believed that our personality is driven by our desire for self-actualization . This is the condition that emerges when we reach our full potential and our self-concept, self-worth, and ideal self all overlap (Journal Psyche, n.d.).

How we develop our personalities and self-concepts varies, thus creating the unique individuals we are. According to Rogers, we always strive for self-actualization, some with more success than others.

How do people go about striving for self-actualization and congruence? This relates to the idea of how anyone “maintains” their idea of themselves. We explore that next.

Self-Concept Maintenance Theory

Self-concept maintenance refers to how people maintain or enhance their sense of self. It is relatively fixed after a person reaches adulthood, but it can—and does—change based on the person’s experiences.

The theory of self-concept maintenance states that we do not simply sit and wait for our self-concept to develop: we take an active role in shaping our self-concept at all ages (whether we are aware of this or not).

Although there are different theories about the processes of self-concept maintenance, it generally concerns:

• Our evaluations of ourselves
• Our comparison of our actual selves with our ideal selves
• Our actions taken to move closer to our ideal selves (Munoz, 2012).

This may seem like a pretty logical and straightforward process, but we tend to give ourselves room for moral ambiguity. For example, a study by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2007) showed that people will generally engage in beneficial dishonesty when given the opportunity. However, these same people might not revise their self-concept to incorporate this dishonesty.

When participants in the study were prompted to be more aware of their internal standards for honesty , they were less likely to engage in beneficial dishonesty; on the other hand, when given a “degrees of freedom” (greater separation between their actions and the rewards they would receive for dishonesty), they were more likely to engage in dishonesty—with no impact to their self-concept.

This is one example of the work on self-concept maintenance, as humans constantly assess themselves and their moral code since it influences their identity and actions.

Self-Concept Clarity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Self-concept clarity is different from self-concept.

Self-concept clarity (SCC) refers to how clear, confident, and consistent an individual’s definitions of themselves are (Diehl & Hay, 2011). Self-concept differentiation (SCD) refers to how an individual’s self-representation may vary across contexts or social roles (e.g., self as a spouse, self as a parent, self as a student).

SCC and SCD are hot topics in psychology since they influence thought patterns and behavior.

Higher SCC indicates a firmer and more stable self-concept, while low SCC indicates that an individual is unclear or vague about who they really are. Those with low SCC may struggle with low self-esteem, self-consciousness, and neuroticism.

SCD is not as clear-cut. Having a high SCD may be viewed as a bad thing, but it can also be an effective coping mechanism for succeeding in the modern world where individuals have many different roles. If SCD is very high, it might mean that the individual does not have a stable self-concept and “wears a different mask” for each of their roles.

A very low level of SCD may indicate that the individual is authentically “them” across all of their roles—although it may also indicate that he cannot effectively switch from one role to another (Diehl & Hay, 2011).

Essentially, people who differentiate their roles slightly, yet maintain a clear image of themselves, may succeed most at finding balance in their identity and image.

There are different ideas about what self-concept consists of, and how it should be defined; however, there are some characteristics and dimensions that apply to the basic, agreed-upon conceptualization of self-concept.

Characteristics of Self-Concept

As a brief review, self-concept is the perspective we have on who we are. Each of us has a unique self-concept, different from the self-concept of others and from their concept of us.

However, there are some characteristics that all of our self-concepts have in common.

Self-concept:

• Displays uniquely with each person.
• Vary from very positive to very negative.
• Carries emotional, intellectual, and functional dimensions.
• Changes with the context.
• Changes over time.
• Influence the individual’s life (Delmar Learning, n.d.)

Dimensions of Self-Concept

Different dimensions may constitute different kinds of self-concept; for example, the dimensions that create “academic self-efficacy” will not have as much overlap with “social self-efficacy.”

There are some overarching dimensions that researchers understand with the self-concept puzzle. These dimensions include:

• Self-esteem
• Self-image (physical)
• Identities or roles (social)
• Personal traits and qualities (Elliot, 1984; Gecas, 1982)

Early childhood is a ripe time for young humans to perceive themselves in the world.

The Formation of Self-Concept During Early Childhood

There are three general stages of self-concept development during early childhood:

• Stage 1 : 0 to 2 years-old a. Babies need consistent, loving relationships to develop a positive sense of self. b. Babies form preferences that align with their innate sense of self. c. Toddlers feel secure with gentle but firm limits d. At age two, language skill develops and toddlers have a sense of “me.”
• Stage 2 : 3 to 4 years-old a. Three and four-year-olds begin to see themselves as separate and unique individuals. b. Their self-images tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive or judgmental. c. Preschoolers are increasingly independent and curious about what they can do.
• Stage 3 : 5 to 6 years-old a. They are transitioning from the “me” stage to the “us” stage, where they are more aware of the needs and interests of the larger group. b. Kindergarteners can use their words to communicate their wants, needs, and feelings. c. Five and six-year-olds can use even more advanced language to help define themselves within the context of the group (Miller, Church, & Poole, n.d.).

Self-Concept in Middle Childhood

During middle childhood (about 7 to 11 years old), children are beginning to develop a sense of their social selves and figuring out how they fit in with everyone else. They reference social groups and make social comparisons more often, and begin to think about how others see them.

Other characteristics of their self-concept at this stage include:

• More balanced, less all-or-none descriptions
• Development of the ideal and real self
• Descriptions of the self by competencies instead of specific behaviors
• Development of a personal sense of self (Berk, 2004)

Culture begins to play a big role at this stage, but we’ll talk more about that later.

The Development of Self-Concept in Adolescence

Adolescence is where the development of one’s self-concept really explodes.

This is the stage in which individuals (about age 12-18) play with their sense of self, including a time when they experiment with their identity, compare themselves with others, and develop the basis of a self-concept that may stay with them the rest of their life.

During this period, adolescents are prone to greater self-consciousness and susceptibility to the influence of their peers and chemical changes happening in the brain (Sebastian, Burnett, & Blakemore, 2008).

They enjoy greater freedom and independence, engage in increasingly competitive activities, compare themselves with their peers, and can value (even over-value) the perspective of others (Manning, 2007).

In adolescence, there are two important factors that influence self-concept and self-worth:

• Success in areas in which the adolescent desires success
• Approval from significant people in the adolescent’s life (Manning, 2007).

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You may have a good handle on what self-concept is but these examples can help explain it more.

Self-concepts are rarely all positive or all negative; someone may have both positive and some negative self-concepts in different domains (e.g., a husband who thinks of himself as a good father but sees his physical self as out-of-shape and unhealthy or a student who think so themselves as a great athlete who struggles academically).

Some examples of positive self-concepts include:

• A person sees herself as an intelligent person;
• A man perceives himself as an important member of his community;
• A woman sees herself as an excellent spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a nurturing and caring person;
• A person views herself as a hard-working and competent employee.

On the flip side, these people could have negative self-concepts like:

• A person sees herself as stupid and slow;
• A man perceives himself as expendable and a burden on his community;
• A woman sees herself as a terrible spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a cold and unapproachable person;
• A person views herself as a lazy and incompetent employee.

We all have many of these mini or domain-specific self-concepts that encompass our self-concept. Some may be more positive or negative than others, and each is an important piece of what makes us who we are.

Self concept, self identity and social identity – Khan Academy

Given the marked interest in this topic within sociology and psychology, there is quite a bit of research out there on the subject. Here are a few of the most interesting and impactful findings on self-concept.

Self-Concept in Marketing and How it Influences Consumer Behavior

It probably won’t shock you that the idea of self-concept has made its way into marketing—after all, brands and companies can profit from targeting certain desirable identities. In fact, it is the basis of fashion and consumerism.

Our self-concept influences our wants and needs, and can also shape our behavior. Whether it is true or not, we tend to believe that our purchases will help establish our identity. There is a reason why people buy certain clothing, cars, etc.

And this idea has a name: self-concept attachment.

Self-Concept Attachment

Self-concept attachment refers to the attachment we form to a product as it influences identity. For example, someone who loves their Patagonia jacket may also consider it as a status symbol that also represents their “outdoorsy” side.

Thus, this jacket has a strong self-concept attachment, in addition to its purpose of providing warmth.

Surprisingly, consumers become more attached to a brand when the brands match their “actual selves” rather than their ideal selves (Malär, Krohmer, Hoyer, & Nyffenegger, 2011). We tend to identify more with brands that “meet us where we are” rather than trying to connect with our higher, ideal selves.

Companies understand this and work to (1) get to know their target consumers better, and (2) mold their brand identity to match the self-concept of their consumers. The more they can get consumers to identify with their brand, the more they will buy that brand.

How Does Self-Concept Affect Interpersonal Communication?

Think about a cycle in which we develop, maintain, and revise our self-concept: we have an idea of who we are, and we act in accordance with that self-concept. Consequently, others form an idea about who we are, and they react in accordance with their idea of who we are, thus impacting our idea of who we are.

This feedback loop continues to shape us, and interpersonal communication plays a big role here.

Our self-concept drives our motivations, methods, and experiences with communicating with others. For example, if you see yourself as someone who is always right (or who must always be right), you may struggle in communicating with others when disagreements arise.

If that need is accompanied by an acceptance of aggression, you may use hostility, assertiveness , and argumentativeness to attack the self-concepts of the people you are debating instead of discussing their positions (Infante & Wigley, 1986).

Communication on social media is also a determinant and an outcome of an individual’s self-concept.

Sponcil and Gitimu (2012) suggested that, in general, the more friends an individual has on social networking sites, the more positively they feel about themselves as a whole. Conversely, the anxiety of social media and maintaining one’s image poses separate issues.

Self-Concept and Academic Achievement

Self-concept and academic achievement is also a positive feedback loop, as actions beget similar actions and identity to match.

In a longitudinal study, Marsh (1990) found that students with more positive academic self-concept achieved greater academic success the following year. Later studies confirmed the relationship between the two but indicated that achievement affects self-concept more than self-concept inherently influences achievement success (Muijs, 2011).

Research by Byrne (1986) offered instead that self-concept and academic self-concept can be considered two separate constructs; academic achievement may impact one’s overall self-concept, but it is most directly related to academic self-concept.

Self-Concept and Career Development

Self-concept develops throughout the lifespan and during any career.

According to researcher Donald Super, there are five life and career development stages:

• Growth (Ages 0 to 14)
• Exploration (Ages 15 to 24)
• Establishment (Age 25 to 44)
• Maintenance (Age 45 to 64)
• Decline (Age 65+)

The first stage is marked by the development of one’s basic self-concept. In the second stage, able individuals experiment and try out new classes, experiences, and jobs. Stage 3 sees individuals establishing their career and building their skills, likely starting in an entry-level position.

In the fourth stage, individuals engage in a continuous management and adjustment process to both their self-concept and their career. Finally, the fifth stage is characterized by reduced output and preparations for retirement, activities which can have a huge impact on one’s self-concept (Super, Starishevsky, Matlin, & Jordaan, 1963).

Of course, this model assumes equal access and privilege upon entering the workforce, which is not truthful to reality. Not all humans, for example, have the opportunity to explore and establish themselves as easily as others.

Nevertheless, Super posited that self-concept drives career development and can act as a general framework and inspiration for future research in this area, including a social and racial unearthing of Rogers’ theory on self-actualization.

The research could also be conducted on Bandura’s work on self-efficacy, on role salience, and on the idea of multiple identities in career development (Betz, 1994).

Culture and Self-Concept

Unsurprisingly, culture can have a big impact on self-concept. For example, how children are treated in early childhood influences how their sense of self develops.

Many parents might be more concerned with emotions and satisfying the wants of their children, while others may be more firm and controlling of their child’s behavior, worrying about their needs rather than fulfilling their desires. This is a generalization, but one that holds under scrutiny: culture influence self-concept.

Research suggests that those from more collectivist cultures produced more group self-descriptions and fewer idiocentric self-descriptions than those from individualistic cultures (Bochner, 1994).

Further research also indicated that East Asian cultures are more accepting of contradictory beliefs about the self; this indicates that one’s self-concept in these cultures may be more flexible than, say, American culture (Choi & Choi, 2002).

Findings like these are fascinating, but they also reveal how and why it is difficult to measure self-concept. The next section summarizes those attempts.

One’s self-concept does not always align with “reality” or with how others view a person. However, there are still some tools that can measure self-concept.

If you are interested in using a self-concept measure for research purposes, look first at the development of the instrument, the definition it is based on, and the dimensions or components it measures. It’s important that you choose a tool that aligns with the idea of self-concept that your research uses.

Some of the most prominent tools to measure self-concept include:

• The Robson Self-Concept Questionnaire (SCQ; Robson, 1989)
• The Social Self-Concept Questionnaire (SSC; Fernández-Zabala, Rodríguez-Fernández, & Goñi, 2016)
• The Academic Self-Concept Questionnaire (ASCQ; Liu & Wang, 2005)

Self-Concept Questionnaire by Dr. Saraswat

The Self-Concept Questionnaire from Dr. Saraswat (1984) has become a popular choice for measuring self-concept. It consists of 48 items measuring self-concept across six dimensions:

• Temperamental;
• Educational;
• Intellectual.

For each item, the respondent rates how well each item describes their ideas about themselves on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate high self-concept, while low scores indicate low self-concept.

This self-concept questionnaire is generally thought of as reliable by researchers, but it is dated.

If you’re looking for a great resource with 10 simple but effective activities for cultivating self-concept in young children, Glori Chaika’s article “Ten Activities to Improve Students’ Self-Concepts” can be adapted to fit the context for several age ranges.

We summarize the 10 activities she suggests here:

1 – The Interview

This activity is great for the beginning of the year as students to get to know their peers.

Break the group into pairs, and make sure each student is paired with someone they don’t very well. Give them 10 minutes to interview each other (5 minutes per interview) with fun questions like “would you rather live on a boat or on an island?” or “what is your favorite subject at this school?”.

When all of the interviews have been completed, have each pair come to the front of the class and introduce their partner to the other children.

2 – The Journal

Journals can be beneficial in many ways, as  keeping a journal  allows you to self-examine. Help your students develop their sense of self by assigning journal entries that they keep in one notebook all year.

Tell your students that they can put whatever they want in their journal—they can write a poem, describe a dream they had, write about what they hope for, something they are happy about, something they are sad about, etc.—and that they must make at least three entries (or however many you decide is appropriate) per week.

Make sure to tell them that you will only read the entry if they give you permission, but that you will check to ensure they have at least three dated entries per week.

3 – Designing Self-Collages

Self-collages are a great activity from young children to high-schoolers. Tell the students they need to create a collage that represents who they are by using pictures, words, and/or symbols. They can cut things from magazines, print them out from the internet, or draw pictures themselves.

You may want to guide them by suggesting to focus on things they enjoy or are good at, places they’ve been or would like to go, and people they admire.

When everyone’s collage is complete, you can do an extra activity where students present their collage to the classroom, or maybe everyone tries to guess which collage belongs to which student.

4 – Ranking Traits

This activity is best for older students with writing skills. Have the students rip a piece of paper into ten strips and write a word or phrase on each strip that they feel describes them. Tell them that no one will see the things they write down, so they can be completely honest.

Once the students have written down their ten traits, have them arrange them in order from those they most like about themselves to those they least like about themselves.

Encourage them to reflect on their traits by asking questions like:

• Do you like what you see?
• Do you want to keep it?
• Now give up one trait. How does the lack of that affect you?
• Now give up another. Give up three. Now what kind of person are you?

After the students have reduced their traits to six, have them add the traits back, one by one. For an extra boost to this activity, you can have the students journal about their experience at the end, and how they want to use their strengths.

5 – Accentuate the Positive

Accentuating the positive is all about noticing and sharing the positive things about others (and themselves).

To try this activity, break the students up into groups of four to six. Instruct the groups to pick one person (to start with) and tell that person all the positive things about them. Encourage the students to focus on traits and skills that can be altered (e.g., work ethic, skill in soccer), rather than permanent features (e.g., eyes, skin).

One student in each group will act as a recorder, writing down all the positive things that are said about someone. Each member of the group takes a turn, and the recorder gives the individual the list of all the positive things said about them at the end of the activity.

This exercise can also make a great focus for a journal entry.

6 – Thumbprints

This activity requires an ink pad and the willingness to get a bit messy!

Have each of your students place his or her thumb on the inkpad and then on a piece of paper to get a thumbprint. Show them the five major fingerprint patterns and have them identify their print type. Explain how fingerprints are unique—both across their own fingers and from person to person.

Next, have each student create an animal out of their thumbprint. Bonus points if the animal is one the student feels represents him or her! Encourage them to write about this in their journal, or to add the thumbprint drawing to their journal.

7 – Create a “Me” Commercial

This activity can be especially fun for the drama-loving students. Tell them that they are each going to make a two or three-minute commercial on why you should hire them.

The commercial should focus on their special skills, talents, and positive qualities. It should highlight what is great about them and what they would bring to the fictional position they are auditioning for.

Give the students some time to write their commercial, then have them present their commercials to the class. An alternative method for this activity is to have small groups create commercials for each group member.

8 – Shared Learning

This is a simple activity if you’ve been having your students write in their journal for the whole term.

Tell the students to look through their journal entries and reflect. Have them choose one thing they have learned about themselves during this term.

When each student has chosen something they would like to share, sit in a circle and have each student share out on what they learned over the past three months (or four months, or six months, etc.).

9 – Write Yourself a Letter

This is another activity that is appropriate for older children since it requires somewhat advanced writing skills.

Tell the students that they will be writing a letter to themselves, and to be totally honest since no one else will be able to read it. They can write whatever they’d like in this letter to their future selves, but they may want to add in things that describe them today (e.g., height and weight, current friends, favorite music and movies, special things that happened to them this year).

On another piece of paper or on the back of this letter, tell students to write down ten goals they would like to accomplish by this time next year. Have your students seal the letter and their goals in an envelope, address the envelope to themselves, and give it to you. In one year, mail the letters out to the students.

This is a far-reaching activity that will encourage your students to think about how they change over time, and how they stay the same.

10 – Drawing Self Portraits

Make sure that each student has access to a mirror for this activity. If there isn’t one handy in your classroom, bring some small mirrors in for the students to use.

Tell your students to use the mirror to draw a picture of themselves. It doesn’t have to look exactly like them, but it should be a good representation of them. This simple activity can promote self-reflection in students (beyond the kind that involves a mirror).

To take this activity a bit further, have them divide the drawing in half—on the left side, each student should draw herself as she sees herself, and on the right side, she should draw herself as she thinks others see her. Along with this drawing, the students can make an entry in their journal on the differences between how they see themselves and how they think others see them.

Self-Concept Activities for Preschoolers

For example, a few of the activities that can help preschoolers develop a self-concept include:

• Record each child’s voice during an activity period. Have the children listen to the voices and guess which voice goes with each child.
• Have several children stand in a line in front of the class. Name the child who is first, second, third and so on. Ask the children to change positions. Then have each child in line name his or her new position. To vary the activity, have the children at their seats name each child in line and describe his or her position.
• Make a friendship quilt. Cut several squares of brightly colored construction paper. Give each child one of the squares. Have them decorate the square or even glue a picture of himself, glitter, beads, sequins, or yarn to the square. Staple the squares, side by side, to the bulletin board. If extra squares are needed to fill in empty spaces, print the school’s name or teacher’s name on additional squares and intermingle them with the student’s squares.
• Have the children think of some things they can’t do now, but can do when they grow older. What are some things they can do now that they couldn’t do when they were younger?
• Role-play the growth process from baby to father or mother to grandparent. The child can interpret the process as he or she goes along. Children can also develop a short play about the family.

Any of these activities can be adapted to fit your children’s context, whether that is a classroom, at home, in a playgroup, in a therapy session, etc.

Lesson Plan on Self-Concept

If you’re looking for a good lesson plan on teaching self-concept, this plan from the Utah Education Network is a great choice.

It starts with a description of self-concept as “the person I think I am” and contrasts it with “the person others think I am” and “the person others think I think I am.”

A diagram on the first page shows a cycle with four “stops:”

• As I see myself
• As others see me
• Other’s reactions to me

This diagram shows how each stop on the cycle feeds into the next, influencing each aspect and eventually coming back to the original stop. For example, how we see ourselves influences our actions. Our actions drive how others see us, and their image of us drives their reactions or behavior toward us.

Feedback on ourselves contributes to our overall image of ourselves, and the cycle continues.

Next, it describes several case studies to help drive the point home. There is the case of a 45-year old father who looks in the mirror and thinks about the wrinkle he just found, the weight he would like to lose, his desire to be a stay-at-home dad, his messy and unorganized house, and a commitment he made that has overextended him.

There is also a case of a middle-aged mother thinking about her miserable day at work, the last decade or so of overtime, her struggles to pay the bills and have a little money left for herself, and all the things she has on her to-do list.

A third case focuses on a teenage girl who is concerned about her skin, her haircut, whether her friends truly care about her, and an upcoming chemistry test that she has not studied for.

The final case concerns a teenage guy who was struggling to understand calculus and thinking back to the counselor that encouraged him to take it. He is also comparing himself to his straight-A brother and thinking about how he wished he could be the athlete his father wanted him to be. He is worrying about tryouts and doubting his ability to even make the team.

For each of these cases, the questions are:

• How will the individual see himself or herself?
• How will the individual act toward others?
• How will the individual think others see him or her?
• How will others act toward the individual?
• What effect does this have on how the individual sees him- or herself?
• Where is the spiral headed and how can its motion be reversed?

This is a great lesson for children to learn, whether you introduce it in elementary school (with some extra time and patience set aside!) or in high school.

Follow this link and click on “Self Concept Transparency” to see the example lesson plan for yourself, and feel free to invent examples most relevant to your class or client.

Three of the most useful worksheets on self-concept are described below.

All About Me

This worksheet from the Utah Education Network is a good option for children of all ages.

It is only one page with 15 prompts to complete. These prompts are:

• I feel good about…
• I feel successful when…
• My favorite person is…
• My favorite activity is…
• I wish I could…
• If I could have three wishes, they would be: a. b. c.
• I feel depressed when…
• A character trait I need to improve is…
• I am good at…
• I wish I did not…
• My family is…
• I would like to be…
• The most important thing to me is…
• The thing I like best about myself…

You can find this worksheet and other worksheets and lesson plans on the Utah Education Network’s website here .

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Learning about how others perceive a construct can be helpful in furthering our own understanding of that construct.

Use the quotes below to see how your idea of self-concept compares to the ideas of others.

What others think of us would of little moment did it not, when known, so deeply tinge what we think of ourselves.

Paul Valéry

Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly.

Seek out that particular mental attribute which makes you feel most deeply and vitally alive, along with which comes the inner voice which says, ‘This is the real me’, and when you have found that attitude, follow it.

William James

Today you are You, that is truer than true. There is no one alive who is Youer than You.

Act as if you are the person you want to be.

Bernie Siegel

The self is not something that one finds. It is something that one creates.

Thomas Szasz

There is but one cause of human failure. And that is man’s lack of faith in his true Self.

An individual’s self-concept is the core of his personality. It affects every aspect of human behavior: the ability to learn, the capacity to grow and change. A strong, positive self-image is the best possible preparation for success in life.

Joyce Brothers

In this piece, we learned about what self-concept is (an overarching idea about who we are), how it comes about (it develops throughout the lifespan, and is most flexible in the early years), what it is related to and affected by (just about everything, but namely consumer behavior, academic achievement, career development, and culture), and whether you can do anything to change it—you can.

Our self-concept is affected by how we feel about ourselves and how we judge our abilities, competencies, and worth as a person. When we put some effort into boosting these self-evaluations, our self-concept will adjust to accommodate these changes.

We have the ability to change how we think about ourselves by working to become more like our ideal selves.

It might seem daunting to put in the effort required to revise your self-esteem and self-image, but like most tasks, getting started is the hardest part. Refer to some of the quotes above to get a dose of inspiration, or find some quotes on the subject that inspire you and keep them nearby whenever you’re in need of some motivation.

What do you think about self-concept? Do you have any other good quotes about self-concept? Do you have a developed self-concept or is it vaguer? Do you think it’s good or bad to have self-concept differentiation?

Let us know in the comments, and thanks for reading.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Self Compassion Exercises for free .

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• Liu, W. C., & Wang, C. K. J. (2005). Academic self-concept: A cross-sectional study of grade and gender differences in a Singapore Secondary School. Asia Pacific Education Review, 6, 20-27.
• Malär, L., Krohmer, H., Hoyer, W. D., & Nyffenegger, B. (2011). Emotional brand attachment and brand personality: The relative importance of the actual and the ideal self. Journal of Marketing, 75, 35-52.
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Help me to make preparations for grade5 class about positive self concept.

Here is an idea: – Brief Introduction: Explain self-concept in simple terms—how we see ourselves, including our abilities, personality, and place in the world. Activities: – Positive Affirmation Cards: Students create and decorate cards with positive statements about themselves. Self-Portrait: Draw or paint self-portraits that express individual personalities and strengths. – Growth Mindset Chat: Discuss how effort and perseverance can improve abilities, showing that self-concept can grow and change. – Role-Playing: Practice scenarios that involve giving compliments, asking for help, and overcoming obstacles to understand how actions affect self-concept. – Reflection: Encourage journaling about personal growth, challenges, and successes to help students see their progress. – Parent Guide: Send home tips on reinforcing positive self-concept, including praise, open discussions, and setting a positive example.

I hope this helps!

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What Is Self-Concept?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Rachel Goldman, PhD FTOS, is a licensed psychologist, clinical assistant professor, speaker, wellness expert specializing in eating behaviors, stress management, and health behavior change.

Verywell / Cindy Chung 

• Development
• Can It Be Changed?
• Self-Concept Theories

Frequently Asked Questions

Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves. It is influenced by many forces, including our interaction with important people in our lives. It is how we perceive our behaviors, abilities, and unique characteristics. For example, beliefs such as "I am a good friend" or "I am a kind person" are part of an overall self-concept.

Other examples of self-concept include:

• How you view your personality traits, such as whether you are an extrovert or introvert
• How you see your roles in life, such as whether you feel that being a parent, sibling, friend, and partner are important parts of your identity
• The hobbies or passions that are important to your sense of identity, such as being a sports enthusiast or belonging to a certain political party
• How you feel about your interactions with the world, such as whether you feel that you are contributing to society

Our self-perception is important because it affects our motivations , attitudes, and behaviors . It also affects how we feel about the person we think we are, including whether we are competent or have self-worth.

Self-concept tends to be more malleable when we're younger and still going through self-discovery and identity formation . As we age and learn who we are and what's important to us, these self-perceptions become much more detailed and organized.

At its most basic, self-concept is a collection of beliefs one holds about oneself and the responses of others. It embodies the answer to the question: " Who am I? " If you want to find your self-concept, list things that describe you as an individual. What are your traits? What do you like? How do you feel about yourself?

Rogers' Three Parts of Self-Concept

Humanist psychologist  Carl Rogers believed that self-concept is made up of three different parts:

• Ideal self : The ideal self is the person you want to be. This person has the attributes or qualities you are either working toward or want to possess. It's who you envision yourself to be if you were exactly as you wanted.
• Self-image : Self-image refers to how you see yourself at this moment in time. Attributes like physical characteristics, personality traits , and social roles all play a role in your self-image.
• Self-esteem : How much you like, accept, and value yourself all contribute to your self-concept. Self-esteem can be affected by a number of factors—including how others see you, how you think you compare to others, and your role in society.

Incongruence and Congruence

Self-concept is not always aligned with reality. When it is aligned, your self-concept is said to be congruent . If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and who you wish you were (your ideal self), your self-concept is incongruent . This incongruence can negatively affect self-esteem .

Rogers believed that incongruence has its earliest roots in childhood. When parents place conditions on their affection for their children (only expressing love if children "earn it" through certain behaviors and living up to the parents' expectations), children begin to distort the memories of experiences that leave them feeling unworthy of their parents' love.

Unconditional love, on the other hand, helps to foster congruence. Children who experience such love—also referred to as family love —feel no need to continually distort their memories in order to believe that other people will love and accept them as they are.

How Self-Concept Develops

Self-concept develops, in part, through our interaction with others. In addition to family members and close friends, other people in our lives can contribute to our self-identity.

For instance, one study found that the more a teacher believes in a high-performing student's abilities, the higher that student's self-concept. (Interestingly, no such association was found with lower-performing students.)

Self-concept can also be developed through the stories we hear. As an example, one study found that female readers who were "deeply transported" into a story about a leading character with a traditional gender role had a more feminist self-concept than those who weren't as moved by the story.

The media plays a role in self-concept development as well—both mass media and social media . When these media promote certain ideals, we're more likely to make those ideals our own. And the more often these ideals are presented, the more they affect our self-identity and self-perception.

Can Self-Concept Be Changed?

Self-concept is not static, meaning that it can change. Our environment plays a role in this process. Places that hold a lot of meaning to us actively contribute to our future self-concept through both the way we relate these environments to ourselves and how society relates to them.

Self-concept can also change based on the people with whom we interact. This is particularly true with regard to individuals in our lives who are in leadership roles. They can impact the collective self (the self in social groups) and the relational self (the self in relationships).

In some cases, a medical diagnosis can change self-concept by helping people understand why they feel the way they do—such as someone receiving an autism diagnosis later in life, finally providing clarity as to why they feel different.

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Other Self-Concept Theories

As with many topics within psychology , a number of other theorists have proposed different ways of thinking about self-concept.

Social Identity

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel developed social identity theory, which states that self-concept is composed of two key parts:

• Personal identity : The traits and other characteristics that make you unique
• Social identity : Who you are based on your membership in social groups, such as sports teams, religions, political parties, or social class

This theory states that our social identity influences our self-concept, thus affecting our emotions and behaviors. If we're playing sports, for instance, and our team loses a game, we might feel sad for the team (emotion) or act out against the winning team (behavior).

Multiple Dimensions

Psychologist Bruce A. Bracken had a slightly different theory and believed that self-concept was multidimensional, consisting of six independent traits:

• Academic : Success or failure in school
• Affect : Awareness of emotional states
• Competence : Ability to meet basic needs
• Family : How well you work in your family unit
• Physical : How you feel about your looks, health, physical condition, and overall appearance
• Social : Ability to interact with others

In 1992, Bracken developed the Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale, a comprehensive assessment that evaluates each of these six elements of self-concept in children and adolescents.

Self-concept development is never finished. Though one's self-identity is thought to be primarily formed in childhood, your experiences as an adult can also change how you feel about yourself. If your self-esteem increases later in life, for instance, it can improve your self-concept.

Our self-concept can affect the method by which we communicate. If you feel you are a good writer, for instance, you may prefer to communicate in writing versus speaking with others.

It can also affect the way we communicate. If your social group communicates a certain way, you would likely choose to communicate that way as well. Studies on teens have connected high self-concept clarity with more open communication with parents.

Self-concept refers to a broad description of ourselves ("I am a good writer") while self-esteem includes any judgments or opinions we have of ourselves ("I feel proud to be a good writer"). Put another way, self-concept answers the question: Who am I? Self-esteem answers the question: How do I feel about who I am?

Our self-concept impacts how we respond to life, so a well-developed self-concept helps us respond in ways that are more positive and beneficial for us. One of the ways it does this is by enabling us to recognize our worth. A well-developed self-concept also helps keep us from internalizing negative feedback from others.

Different cultures have different beliefs. They have different ideas of how dependent or independent one should be, different religious beliefs, and differing views of socioeconomic development.

All of these cultural norms influence self-concept by providing the structure of what is expected within that society and how one sees oneself in relation to others.

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By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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4.1 The Cognitive Self: The Self-Concept

Learning objectives.

• Define and describe the self-concept and its influence on information processing.
• Describe the concept of self-complexity, and explain how it influences social cognition and behavior.
• Review the measures that are used to assess the self-concept.
• Differentiate the different types of self-awareness and self-consciousness.

Some nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and perhaps dolphins, have at least a primitive sense of self (Boysen & Himes, 1999). We know this because of some interesting experiments that have been done with animals. In one study (Gallup, 1970), researchers painted a red dot on the forehead of anesthetized chimpanzees and then placed the animals in a cage with a mirror. When the chimps woke up and looked in the mirror, they touched the dot on their faces, not the dot on the faces in the mirror. This action suggests that the chimps understood that they were looking at themselves and not at other animals, and thus we can assume that they are able to realize that they exist as individuals. Most other animals, including dogs, cats, and monkeys, never realize that it is themselves they see in a mirror.

A simple test of self-awareness is the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror. Humans and chimpanzees can pass the test; dogs never do.

Allen Skyy – Mirror – CC BY 2.0; 6SN7 – Reflecting Bullmatian – CC BY 2.0; Mor – There’s a monkey in my mirror – CC BY-NC 2.0.

Infants who have similar red dots painted on their foreheads recognize themselves in a mirror in the same way that the chimps do, and they do this by about 18 months of age (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996; Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). The child’s knowledge about the self continues to develop as the child grows. By age 2, the infant becomes aware of his or her gender as a boy or a girl. At age 4, self-descriptions are likely to be based on physical features, such as one’s hair color, and by about age 6, the child is able to understand basic emotions and the concepts of traits, being able to make statements such as “I am a nice person” (Harter, 1998).

By the time they are in grade school, children have learned that they are unique individuals, and they can think about and analyze their own behavior. They also begin to show awareness of the social situation—they understand that other people are looking at and judging them the same way that they are looking at and judging others (Doherty, 2009).

Development and Characteristics of the Self-Concept

Part of what is developing in children as they grow is the fundamental cognitive part of the self, known as the self-concept . The self-concept is a knowledge representation that contains knowledge about us, including our beliefs about our personality traits, physical characteristics, abilities, values, goals, and roles, as well as the knowledge that we exist as individuals . Throughout childhood and adolescence, the self-concept becomes more abstract and complex and is organized into a variety of different cognitive aspects , known as self-schemas . Children have self-schemas about their progress in school, their appearance, their skills at sports and other activities, and many other aspects, and these self-schemas direct and inform their processing of self-relevant information (Harter, 1999).

By the time we are adults, our sense of self has grown dramatically. In addition to possessing a wide variety of self-schemas, we can analyze our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and we can see that other people may have different thoughts than we do. We become aware of our own mortality. We plan for the future and consider the potential outcomes of our actions. At times, having a sense of self may seem unpleasant—when we are not proud of our appearance, actions, or relationships with others, or when we think about and become afraid of the possibility of our own death. On the other hand, the ability to think about the self is very useful. Being aware of our past and able to speculate about the future is adaptive—it allows us to modify our behavior on the basis of our mistakes and to plan for future activities. When we do poorly on an exam, for instance, we may study harder for the next one or even consider changing our major if we continue to have problems in the major we have chosen.

One way to learn about a person’s self-concept and the many self-schemas that it contains is by using self-report measures. One of these is a deceptively simple fill-in-the-blank measure that has been used by many scientists to get a picture of the self-concept (Rees & Nicholson, 1994). All of the 20 items in the measure are exactly the same, but the person is asked to fill in a different response for each statement. This self-report measure, known as the Twenty Statements Test, can reveal a lot about a person because it is designed to measure the most accessible—and thus the most important—parts of one’s self-concept. Try it for yourself, at least five times:

• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________

Although each person has a unique self-concept, we can identify some characteristics that are common across the responses given by different people on the measure. Physical characteristics are an important component of the self-concept, and they are mentioned by many people when they describe themselves. If you’ve been concerned lately that you’ve been gaining weight, you might write, “I am overweight. ” If you think you’re particularly good looking (“I am attractive ”), or if you think you’re too short (“I am too short ”), those things might have been reflected in your responses. Our physical characteristics are important to our self-concept because we realize that other people use them to judge us. People often list the physical characteristics that make them different from others in either positive or negative ways (“I am blond ,” “I am short ”), in part because they understand that these characteristics are salient and thus likely to be used by others when judging them (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978).

A second characteristic of the self-concept reflects our memberships in the social groups that we belong to and care about. Common responses in this regard include such ones as “I am an artist ,” “I am Jewish ,” and “I am a student at Augsburg College. ” As we will see later in this chapter, our group memberships form an important part of the self-concept because they provide us with our social identity —the sense of our self that involves our memberships in social groups.

The remainder of the self-concept is normally made up of personality traits —the specific and stable personality characteristics that describe an individual (“I am friendly, ” “I am shy, ” “I am persistent ”). These individual differences (the person part of the person-situation interaction) are important determinants of our behavior, and this aspect of the self-concept reflects this variation across people.

Self-Complexity Provides a Buffer Against Negative Emotions

The self-concept is a rich and complex social representation. In addition to our thoughts about who we are right now, the self-concept includes thoughts about our past self—our experiences, accomplishments, and failures—and about our future self—our hopes, plans, goals, and possibilities (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004). The self-concept also includes thoughts about our relationships with others. You no doubt have thoughts about your family and close friends that have become part of yourself. Indeed, if you don’t see the people you really care about for a while, or if you should lose them in one way or another, you will naturally feel sad because you are in essence missing part of yourself.

Although every human being has a complex self-concept, there are nevertheless individual differences in self-complexity , the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves (Linville, 1987; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Some selves are more complex than others, and these individual differences can be important in determining psychological outcomes. Having a complex self means that we have a lot of different ways of thinking about ourselves. For example, imagine a woman whose self-concept contains the social identities of student, girlfriend, daughter, psychology major , and tennis player and who has encountered a wide variety of life experiences. Social psychologists would say that she has high self-complexity. On the other hand, a man who perceives himself solely as a student or solely as a member of the hockey team and who has had a relatively narrow range of life experiences would be said to have low self-complexity. For those with high self-complexity, the various self-aspects of the self are separate, such that the positive and negative thoughts about a particular self-aspect do not spill over into thoughts about other aspects.

Research has found that compared with people low in self-complexity, those higher in self-complexity experience more positive outcomes. People with more complex self-concepts have been found to have lower levels of stress and illness (Kalthoff & Neimeyer, 1993), a greater tolerance for frustration (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000), and more positive and less negative reactions to events that they experience (Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992).

The benefits of self-complexity occur because the various domains of the self help to buffer us against negative events and help us to enjoy the positive events that we experience. For people low in self-complexity, negative outcomes on one aspect of the self tend to have a big impact on their self-esteem. If the only thing that Maria cares about is getting into medical school, she may be devastated if she fails to make it. On the other hand, Marty, who is also passionate about medical school but who has a more complex self-concept, may be better able to adjust to such a blow by turning to other interests. People with high self-complexity can also take advantage of the positive outcomes that occur on any of the dimensions that are important to them.

Although having high self-complexity seems useful overall, it does not seem to help everyone equally and also does not seem to help us respond to all events equally (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). The benefits of self-complexity seem to be particularly strong on reactions to positive events. People with high self-complexity seem to react more positively to the good things that happen to them but not necessarily less negatively to the bad things. And the positive effects of self-complexity are stronger for people who have other positive aspects of the self as well. This buffering effect is stronger for people with high self-esteem, whose self-complexity involves positive rather than negative characteristics (Koch & Shepperd, 2004), and for people who feel that they have control over their outcomes (McConnell et al., 2005).

Studying the Self-Concept

Because the self-concept is a schema, it can be studied using the methods that we would use to study any other schema. As we have seen, one approach is to use self-report—for instance, by asking people to list the things that come to mind when they think about themselves. Another approach is to use neuroimaging to directly study the self in the brain. As you can see in Figure 4.1 , neuroimaging studies have shown that information about the self is stored in the prefrontal cortex, the same place that other information about people is stored (Barrios et al., 2008). This finding suggests that we store information about ourselves as people the same way we store information about others.

This figure shows the areas of the human brain that are known to be important in processing information about the self. They include primarily areas of the prefrontal cortex (areas 1, 2, 4, and 5). Data are from Lieberman (2010).

Still another approach to studying the self is to investigate how we attend to and remember things that relate to the self. Indeed, because the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, it has extraordinary influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Have you ever been at a party where there was a lot of noise and bustle, and yet you were surprised to discover that you could easily hear your own name being mentioned in the background? Because our own name is such an important part of our self-concept, and because we value it highly, it is highly accessible. We are very alert for, and react quickly to, the mention of our own name.

Other research has found that information that is related to the self-schema is better remembered than information that is unrelated to it, and that information related to the self can also be processed very quickly (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). In one classic study that demonstrated the importance of the self-schema, Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) conducted an experiment to assess how college students recalled information that they had learned under different processing conditions. All the participants were presented with the same list of 40 adjectives to process, but through the use of random assignment, the participants were given one of four different sets of instructions about how to process the adjectives.

Participants assigned to the structural task condition were asked to judge whether the word was printed in uppercase or lowercase letters. Participants in the phonemic task condition were asked whether or not the word rhymed with another given word. In the semantic task condition , the participants were asked if the word was a synonym of another word. And in the self-reference task condition , participants indicated whether or not the given adjective was or was not true of themselves. After completing the specified task, each participant was asked to recall as many adjectives as he or she could remember.

Figure 4.2 The Self-Reference Effect

The chart shows the proportion of adjectives that students were able to recall under each of four learning conditions. The same words were recalled significantly better when they were processed in relation to the self than when they were processed in other ways. Data from Rogers et al. (1977).

Rogers and his colleagues hypothesized that different types of processing would have different effects on memory. As you can see in Figure 4.2 “The Self-Reference Effect” , the students in the self-reference task condition recalled significantly more adjectives than did students in any other condition. The finding that information that is processed in relationship to the self is particularly well remembered , known as the self-reference effect , is powerful evidence that the self-concept helps us organize and remember information. The next time you are studying for an exam, you might try relating the material to your own experiences—the self-reference effect suggests that doing so will help you better remember the information.

Self-Awareness

Like any other schema, the self-concept can vary in its current cognitive accessibility. Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept . When the self-concept becomes highly accessible because of our concerns about being observed and potentially judged by others, we experience the publicly induced self-awareness known as self-consciousness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Rochat, 2009).

I am sure that you can remember times when your self-awareness was increased and you became self-conscious—for instance, when you were giving a class presentation and you were perhaps painfully aware that everyone was looking at you, or when you did something in public that embarrassed you. Emotions such as anxiety and embarrassment occur in large part because the self-concept becomes highly accessible, and they serve as a signal to monitor and perhaps change our behavior.

Not all aspects of our self-concepts are equally accessible at all times, and these long-term differences in the accessibility of the different self-schemas help create individual differences, for instance, in terms of our current concerns and interests. You may know some people for whom the physical appearance component of the self-concept is highly accessible. They check their hair every time they see a mirror, worry whether their clothes are making them look good, and do a lot of shopping—for themselves, of course. Other people are more focused on their social group memberships—they tend to think about things in terms of their role as Christians or as members of the tennis team. Think back for a moment to the opener of this chapter and consider Dancing Matt Harding. What do you think are his most highly accessible self-schemas?

In addition to variation in long-term accessibility, the self and its various components may also be made temporarily more accessible through priming. We become more self-aware when we are in front of a mirror, when a TV camera is focused on us, when we are speaking in front of an audience, or when we are listening to our own tape-recorded voice (Kernis & Grannemann, 1988). When the knowledge contained in the self-schema becomes more accessible, it also becomes more likely to be used in information processing and more likely to influence our behavior.

Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979) conducted a field experiment to see if self-awareness would influence children’s honesty. The researchers expected that most children viewed stealing as wrong but that they would be more likely to act on this belief when they were more self-aware. They conducted this experiment on Halloween evening in homes within the city of Seattle. When children who were trick-or-treating came to particular houses, they were greeted by one of the experimenters, shown a large bowl of candy, and were told to take only one piece each. The researchers unobtrusively watched each child to see how many pieces he or she actually took.

Behind the candy bowl in some of the houses was a large mirror. In the other houses, there was no mirror. Out of the 363 children who were observed in the study, 19% disobeyed instructions and took more than one piece of candy. However, the children who were in front of a mirror were significantly less likely to steal (14.4%) than were those who did not see a mirror (28.5%). These results suggest that the mirror activated the children’s self-awareness, which reminded them of their belief about the importance of being honest. Other research has shown that being self-aware has a powerful influence on other behaviors as well. For instance, people are more likely to stay on their diets, eat better foods, and act more morally overall when they are self-aware (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007; Heatherton, Polivy, Herman, & Baumeister, 1993). What this means is that when you are trying to stick to a diet, study harder, or engage in other difficult behaviors, you should try to focus on yourself and the importance of the goals you have set.

Social psychologists are interested in studying self-awareness because it has such an important influence on behavior. People lose their self-awareness and become more likely to violate acceptable social norms when, for example, they put on a Halloween mask or engage in other behaviors that hide their identities. The members of the militant White supremacist organization the Ku Klux Klan wear white robes and hats when they meet and when they engage in their racist behavior. And when people are in large crowds, such as in a mass demonstration or a riot, they may become so much a part of the group that they lose their individual self-awareness and experience deindividuation — the loss of self-awareness and individual accountability in groups (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969).

Examples of situations that may create deindividuation include wearing uniforms that hide the self and alcohol intoxication.

Craig ONeal – KKK Rally in Georgia – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0; Bart Everson – Nazis – CC BY 2.0; John Penny – Snuggie Keg Stand – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Two particular types of individual differences in self-awareness have been found to be important, and they relate to self-concern and other-concern, respectively (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings . People who are high in private self-consciousness tend to think about themselves a lot and agree with statements such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I am generally attentive to my inner feelings.” People who are high on private self-consciousness are likely to base their behavior on their own inner beliefs and values—they let their inner thoughts and feelings guide their actions—and they may be particularly likely to strive to succeed on dimensions that allow them to demonstrate their own personal accomplishments (Lalwani, Shrum & Chiu, 2009).

Public self-consciousness , in contrast, refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and to be particularly aware of the extent to which we are meeting the standards set by others . Those high in public self-consciousness agree with statements such as “I’m concerned about what other people think of me,” “Before I leave my house, I check how I look,” and “I care a lot about how I present myself to others.” These are the people who check their hair in a mirror they pass and spend a lot of time getting ready in the morning; they are more likely to let the opinions of others (rather than their own opinions) guide their behaviors and are particularly concerned with making good impressions on others.

Research has found cultural differences in public self-consciousness, such that people from East Asian collectivistic cultures have higher public self-consciousness than do people from Western individualistic cultures. Steve Heine and his colleagues (Heine, Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, & Henrich, 2008) found that when college students from Canada (a Western culture) completed questionnaires in front of a large mirror, they subsequently became more self-critical and were less likely to cheat (much like the trick-or-treaters we discussed earlier) than were Canadian students who were not in front of a mirror. However, the presence of the mirror had no effect on college students from Japan. This person-situation interaction is consistent with the idea that people from East Asian cultures are normally already high in public self-consciousness, in comparison with people from Western cultures, and thus manipulations designed to increase public self-consciousness are less influential for them.

Overestimating How Others View Us

Although the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, and although people (particularly those high in self-consciousness) are aware of their self and how they are seen by others, this does not mean that people are always thinking about themselves. In fact, people do not generally focus on their self-concept any more than they focus on the other things and other people in their environments (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982).

On the other hand, self-awareness is more powerful for the person experiencing it than it is for others who are looking on, and the fact that self-concept is so highly accessible frequently leads people to overestimate the extent to which other people are focusing on them (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Although you may be highly self-conscious about of something you’ve done in a particular situation, that does not mean that others are necessarily paying all that much attention to you. Research by Thomas Gilovich and his colleagues (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) found that people who were interacting with others thought that other people were paying much more attention to them than those other people reported actually doing.

Teenagers are particularly likely to be highly self-conscious, often believing that others are constantly watching them (Goossens, Beyers, Emmen, & van Aken, 2002). Because teens think so much about themselves, they are particularly likely to believe that others must be thinking about them, too (Rycek, Stuhr, McDermott, Benker, & Swartz, 1998). It is no wonder that everything a teen’s parents do suddenly feels embarrassing to them when they are in public.

People also often mistakenly believe that their internal states show to others more than they really do. Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) asked groups of five students to work together on a “lie detection” task. One at a time, each student stood up in front of the others and answered a question that the researcher had written on a card (e.g., “I have met David Letterman”). On each round, one person’s card indicated that they were to give a false answer, whereas the other four were told to tell the truth.

Figure 4.3 The Illusion of Transparency

After each round, the students who had not been asked to lie indicated which of the students they thought had actually lied in that round, and the liar was asked to estimate the number of other students who would correctly guess who had been the liar. As you can see in Figure 4.3 “The Illusion of Transparency” , the liars overestimated the detectability of their lies: On average, they predicted that over 44% of their fellow players had known that they were the liar, but in fact only about 25% were able to accurately identify them. Gilovitch and his colleagues called this effect the “illusion of transparency.”

Key Takeaways

• The self-concept is a schema that contains knowledge about us. It is primarily made up of physical characteristics, group memberships, and traits.
• Because the self-concept is so complex, it has extraordinary influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior, and we can remember information that is related to it well.
• Self-complexity, the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves, helps people respond more positively to events that they experience.
• Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept. Differences in the accessibility of different self-schemas help create individual differences, for instance, in terms of our current concerns and interests.
• When people lose their self-awareness, they experience deindividuation, and this may lead them to act in violation of their personal norms.
• Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings; public self-consciousness refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and the standards set by others.
• There are cultural differences in self-consciousness, such that public self-consciousness may normally be higher in Eastern than in Western cultures.
• People frequently overestimate the extent to which others are paying attention to them and accurately understand their true intentions in public situations.

Exercises and Critical Thinking

• What are the most important aspects of your self-concept, and how do they influence your behavior?
• Consider people you know in terms of their self-complexity. What effects do these differences seem to have on their feelings and behavior?
• Can you think of ways that you have been influenced by your private and public self-consciousness?
• Do you think you have ever overestimated the extent to which people are paying attention to you in public?

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• > The Self in Understanding and Treating Psychological Disorders
• > The self-concept: theory and research

Book contents

• The Self in Understanding and Treating Psychological Disorders
• Copyright page
• Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Section 1 Introduction and concepts
• 1 The self in psychological disorders: an introduction
• 2 The self-concept: theory and research
• 3 Adult attachment and self-related processes
• Section 2 The self in treatment frameworks
• Section 3 The self in specific psychological disorders
• Section 4 Conclusions and future directions

2 - The self-concept: theory and research

from Section 1 - Introduction and concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2016

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• The self-concept: theory and research
• By Sunil S. Bhar , Michael Kyrios
• Edited by Michael Kyrios , Australian National University, Canberra , Richard Moulding , Deakin University, Victoria , Guy Doron , Sunil S. Bhar , Swinburne University of Technology, Victoria , Maja Nedeljkovic , Swinburne University of Technology, Victoria , Mario Mikulincer
• Foreword by Aaron T. Beck
• Book: The Self in Understanding and Treating Psychological Disorders
• Online publication: 05 February 2016
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139941297.003

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Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Differentiation – What Have We Been Measuring for the Past 30 Years?

Aleksandra pilarska.

Department of Personality Psychology, Institute of Psychology, Adam Mickiewicz University, Szamarzewskiego 89, 60-568 Poznań, Poland

Anna Suchańska

Research on the relation between the structure of the self-concept and psychological well-being has yielded seemingly inconsistent and even conflicting results. This article presents studies that examined the validity of often-used measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation and tested their ability to predict personal identity and active cognitive processing. The findings revealed several conceptual and methodological problems that continue to plague self-structure research, including the conflating of self-concept content and self-concept structure. In short, our data indicated that the commonly used indices of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation cannot be considered pure measures of the underlying dimensions of self-structure. In addition, only weak correlations of the self-structure variables with measures of personal identity and thinking dispositions have been found. Moreover, once the theoretically irrelevant sources of variance were controlled, the effects of the included structural features of the self-concept on the outcomes of interest either did not occur or were less pronounced. Given the above, it seems reasonable to suggest that at least some of the conclusions regarding the adaptive value of self-structural variables drawn from previous research in this field need revision.

Introduction

The majority of contemporary theorists and researchers in personality psychology agree that self-concept is a dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon (e.g., Greenwald and Pratkanis 1988 ; Markus and Wurf 1987 ; Roberts 2007 ; Suszek 2007 ; Swann and Bosson 2010 ). The notion of the self as plural allows distinguishing between its content (i.e., what one thinks one is like) and structural features (i.e., how the contents are organized). After nearly 3 decades of research it has been shown that there are individual differences in the self-concept structure. However, the functionality of various structural features of the self-concept appeared to be different depending on their operationalization and measurement.

This article presents the results of a series of studies carried out by the authors, sharing a common focus on the validity of operationalization and adaptive value of two, broadly discussed in the psychological literature, structural aspects of self, namely self-complexity (Linville 1985 , 1987 ) and self-concept differentiation (Donahue et al. 1993 ).

Self-Complexity

Among the various models of self-complexity (e.g., Anderson 1992 ; Evans 1994 ; Stein 1994 ; Woolfolk et al. 1995 ), Linville’s social-cognitive model of self-complexity ( 1985 , 1987 ) is by far the most widely studied and cited (Rafaeli and Hiller 2010 ). According to Linville, self-complexity reflects the number and diversity of self-aspects developed for meaningful aspects of one’s life. So, theoretically, it is considered as two-dimensional, capturing both differentiation and integration. To measure self-complexity, Linville adopted the dimensionality statistic (H), a measure of nominal scale dispersion utilized in exact sciences. This index is obtained in a trait-sorting task in which participants ascribe a predefined set of traits to a variable (self-generated) set of self-aspects. High self-complexity results from trait sorts composed of a high number of self-aspects with low redundancy between them (i.e., low repetition of trait adjectives). The basic assumption of Linville’s model ( 1985 , 1987 ) is that greater self-complexity moderates the negative effects of stressful situations. With a more complex self-concept, the impact of a stress-inducing event is less likely to spill over from one self-aspect to another.

Research examining the stress-buffering role of self-complexity has been vigorously pursued since Linville’s model was introduced. Over the decades, it has been used to address various adjustment outcomes, ranging from depression (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007 ; Linville 1987 ) to narcissism (Rhodewalt and Morf 1995 ). These studies, however, have yielded mixed results. Specifically, some research has shown a positive link between self-complexity and psychological adjustment (e.g., Cohen et al. 1997 ; Dixon and Baumeister 1991 ; Linville 1987 ; Niedenthal et al. 1992 ), some studies have found a negative link (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007 ; Jordan and Cole 1996 ), and some findings implied no relationship (e.g., Assanand 2003 ; Campbell et al. 2003 ; Gramzow et al. 2000 ). Such results have called into question both the validity of Linville’s measure and the model itself (see, for review, Koch and Shepperd 2004 ; Rafaeli and Hiller 2010 ; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg 2002 ). Several researchers argue that different types of content could be organized differently and that such factors as the valence of self-descriptors should be taken into account (Morgan and Janoff-Bulman 1994 ; Woolfolk et al. 1995 ). Other studies suggest, though, that what is problematic is not the model, but its measurement, namely the H statistic (Locke 2003 ; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ). As a result, distinguishing two components of self-complexity – the number of self-aspects and the degree of overlap in their content – has been advocated as a more appropriate approach (Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ). Based on these two measures, a new composite measure of self-complexity has then been proposed (SC, Sakaki 2004 ).

Self-Concept Differentiation

The second component of self-complexity, overlap, can be conceptually tied to the concept of self-concept differentiation (self-incoherence). 1 Self-concept differentiation refers to an individual’s tendency to view oneself as possessing different personality characteristics across different social roles or contexts (Donahue et al. 1993 ). To assess self-concept differentiation, Donahue et al. ( 1993 ) developed the procedure in which participants rate how well a fixed set of traits describe them in experimenter-provided social roles. The self-concept differentiation index (SCD) can be expressed as the unshared variance, the mean intercorrelation, or the absolute differences among the role identities (Campbell et al. 2003 ; Donahue et al. 1993 ; Styła et al. 2010 ). Various linear transformations of the above indices are also used, although less frequently (e.g., Sheldon et al. 1997 ; Suh 2002 ).

Prior research on self-concept differentiation has pointed to the adaptive value of self-concept consistency and argued that high self-concept differentiation is indicative of an incoherent and fragmented self-concept (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003 ; Diehl and Hay 2010 ; Diehl et al. 2001 ; Donahue et al. 1993 ; McReynolds et al. 2000 ; Sheldon et al. 1997 ; Styła et al. 2010 ). This concurs with Block’s ( 1961 ) description of an individual who lacks a coherent self as “an interpersonal chameleon, with no inner core of identity, fitfully reacting in all ways to all people” (p. 392). Although the association of self-concept differentiation with psychological maladjustment has been repeatedly demonstrated, it might appear contrary to both everyday and clinical experience. After all, rigidity and inflexibility of behavior is considered as an essential diagnostic criterion for personality disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association 1994 ; ICD-10, World Health Organization 1992 ). Additional concerns were raised by findings that the SCD index, while in theory a measure of the self-concept structure, was influenced by its content (Locke 2006 ). Moreover, the indices based on correlation coefficients do present some calculation problems, since they are also dependent upon variance in how traits are rated in a given situation (Baird et al. 2006 ; Locke 2006 ). In fact, the SCD index will not be identified if there is no within situation variance whatsoever. Finally, methodological concerns have been raised with regard to the SCD index based on an average standard deviation. Specifically, Baird et al. ( 2006 ) argued that this measure of self-concept differentiation conflates trait mean-level information and information concerning within-person variability, and that the previously identified associations between psychological adjustment and self-concept differentiation may be, at least to some degree, a statistical artifact (see also La Guardia and Ryan 2007 ).

Self-Complexity Versus Self-Concept Differentiation

Since both self-complexity – overlap in particular – and self-concept differentiation theoretically refer to the same idea of contextualized self-views, how they relate to each other has received some attention. Donahue et al. ( 1993 ) argued that these aspects of self-concept structure are different in two respects: first, self-complexity includes not only the distinctiveness, but also the numerousness of self-aspects; and second, the original Linville’s self-complexity hypothesis does not postulate a direct link between self-complexity and adjustment. Campbell et al. ( 1991 ) contributed to this issue by pointing out that there is a crucial, though slightly ambiguous, difference between a complex self-concept and an uncertain one. In a similar way, Koch and Shepperd ( 2004 ) emphasized the distinction between self-complexity and cohesion within the self.

The empirical evidence supports the above reasoning by indicating that self-complexity and self-concept differentiation have dissimilar relationships with indices of well-being. Specifically, measures of self-concept differentiation have consistently been found to be positively related to depression, negative affectivity, and low self-esteem, whereas self-complexity measure has been shown to buffer against the harmful effects of stress on mental health outcomes such as depression (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003 ; Constantino et al. 2006 ; Dixon and Baumeister 1991 ; Lutz and Ross 2003 ; Niedenthal et al. 1992 ). Perhaps more puzzling is the lack of convergence of indices that purport to measure only the distinctiveness component of self-concept structure (also referred to as self-concept unity), namely overlap and self-concept differentiation (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006 ; Diehl et al. 2001 ). Such findings are, however, consistent with the suggestion that measures of SCD tap the negative experience of a fragmented self, whereas measures of self-complexity tap the positive experience of specialization of role identities. This difference supposedly is due to the way the two constructs are assessed – self-complexity scores are derived from self-generated roles that are idiosyncratic in content, whereas self-concept differentiation task uses participants’ self-ratings for personality attributes across experimenter-provided roles (e.g., Donahue et al. 1993 ; Koch and Shepperd 1991, Lutz and Ross 2003 ).

Summary and Aim

There is a vast body of literature – theoretically, empirically, and clinically anchored – that suggests the importance of considering self-structure variables when attempting to understand the nature and function of the self-concept. Yet, empirical work in this area has produced inconsistent findings and is clearly hampered by measurement problems. This article aims to address these issues. Specifically, the purposes of the studies were to:

• examine different measures of self-complexity, obtained from the same trait-sort task: the quantity of self-aspects and the overlap among them, each reflecting one of the self-complexity components (Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ), and the H statistic (Linville 1987 ) and the SC statistic (Sakaki 2004 ), each representing a singular measure of self-complexity;
• examine different indices of self-concept differentiation: one representing the absolute differences among the identities (i.e., the mean standard deviation across attributes; Donahue et al. 1993 ; Styła et al. 2010 ), one expressed as the mean intercorrelation among the role identities (Campbell et al. 2003 ), and one representing the proportion of variance in the role-identity ratings that was not shared across the roles (Block 1961 ; Donahue et al. 1993 );
• investigate the mutual relationships between various measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation;
• test the assumption of independence of self-concept structure and self-concept content, specifically the sensitivity of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation indices to affective valence of self-descriptions used to measure them; and
• establish the relationship between self-complexity, self-concept differentiation, and well-being outcomes, particularly those relating to personal identity and thinking dispositions.

Our focus on personal identity stems from the notion, well grounded in theoretical and empirical research, that regards a sense of personal identity as an indication of effective adaptation and mental health, the cornerstone of the capacity to do well (e.g., Crawford et al. 2004 ; Erikson 1980 ; for review, see also Bosma and Kunnen 2001 ; Schwartz 2001 ). In addition to the identity variables, we also chose to focus on three cognitive variables that are known to promote meaning and integration of self-knowledge: need for cognition (Cacioppo et al. 1996 ), reflection (Trapnell and Campbell 1999 ), and integrative self-knowledge (Ghorbani et al. 2008 ). Each of these variables has displayed positive associations with psychological adjustment (e.g., Cacioppo et al. 1996 ; Fleischhauer et al. 2010 ; Ghorbani et al. 2010 , 2008 ; Trapnell and Campbell 1999 ), contributing to a growing consensus that self-awareness and self-understanding play a key role in self-regulation. This examination becomes even more important, since structural features of the self-concept themselves reflect the ways that people cognitively organize knowledge about the self (e.g., Linville 1985 ; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg 2002 ).

It should be noted that, despite the fact that self-complexity and self-concept differentiation have been extensively researched, their relationships with personal identity and thinking dispositions have received little attention. To the extent that the existing literature allows conclusions, it appears that the greater the differentiation and the lower the integration among one’s self-aspects, the weaker one’s sense of identity (e.g., Block 1961 ; Donahue et al. 1993 ; Goldman 2004 ). However, that postulation still needs to be explored empirically. As for thinking dispositions in question, we are not aware of any empirical evidence regarding the relationships of these factors to self-complexity and self-concept differentiation.

Overview and Procedure

The data reported in this paper were drawn from three studies carried out as part of a research project aimed at identifying relationships between self-concept structure and characteristics of personal identity. The studies were conducted in a collaborative mode, ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. The participants were informed about the purpose of the research project. The consent of each individual was the condition of participation in the research. Participants completed measures of self-complexity, self-differentiation, identity, and thinking dispositions as well as several questionnaires assessing constructs not relevant to the subject of this article.

Participants

The samples were pooled based on age and education. We utilized data collected from university students and young adults with a college degree. In Study 1a there were 336 participants, whose ages ranged from 18 to 35 ( M =21.65 yrs, SD =3.20 yrs). Women comprised 65.8 % of the participants. Study 1b included 544 participants between the ages of 18 and 32 ( M =21.26 yrs, SD =1.46 yrs). Of this sample, 59.4 % were female. The sample in Study 1c consisted of 131 participants whose ages ranged from 20 to 34 ( M =24.66 yrs, SD =3.13 yrs); 54.3 % were female.

Because the three studies differed in the content of the test batteries administered, we note below which studies contained each measure.

To obtain measures of self-complexity, we used the Self-Complexity Questionnaire by Barczak et al. ( 2007 ). This instrument is based on self-descriptive trait-sorting task used by Linville ( 1987 ), but contains several minor adaptations.

First, the trait adjectives were listed in a sheet given to each participant, instead of being printed on cards. Second, a longer and more balanced list of traits was used. Sixty traits, divided equally between those with positive and negative valence, were used in place of the original list of 33 (mostly positively valenced) traits. The stimulus words were compiled by having psychology students ( N  = 186) provide adjectives that described eight people: a teacher they like, a politician they wouldn’t vote for, their best friend, a sibling, a person they don’t like, their ideal person and the opposite of that ideal. This resulted in a list of 493 unique adjectives. The final list was composed of 30 positively valenced adjectives (e.g., outgoing, trustworthy, kind, ambitious) and 30 negatively valenced adjectives (e.g., mean, selfish, lazy, withdrawn) most commonly mentioned by the students.

The participants were provided with a list of adjectives and a recording sheet with blank columns. They were first prompted to read the list and then think of the different roles they play in their lives. After that the participants were asked to form groups of traits, so that each group was descriptive of an aspect of their life. The descriptive groups were recorded in the blank columns of the recording sheet and labeled by the participants. No limit was placed on the number of groups or on the number of adjectives within each group. The participants were informed that each adjective may be used in more than one group or not at all.

Each participant’s trait sort was then used to calculate four measures of self-complexity. Two of them indicated the two components of self-complexity as suggested by Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ). One was the number of self-aspects formed by the participants (NSA). The other was the degree of overlap between self-aspects (OL), which reflects the average communality between all pairs of self-aspects. Another two measures represented self-complexity as a whole. One was the H statistic endorsed by Linville ( 1987 ), which represents the number of independent or nonredundant dimensions underlying each grouping. The other was the SC statistic proposed by Sakaki ( 2004 ), which is a single composite measure of self-complexity, alternative to the one of Linville ( 1987 ). As argued by Sakaki ( 2006 ), the SC statistic provides a direct index of self-complexity, and serves as a better indicator of self-complexity than the H statistic. The corresponding formulas are presented in Table ​ Table1. 1 . A remark should be made regarding Sakaki’s SC formula, which uses overlap as a divisor. If the overlap score is zero then the result would be a divide by zero error. Unfortunately, Sakaki ( 2004 ) did not comment on this or propose an alternative approach to avoid the divide-by-zero situation.

Formulas for calculating self-complexity

The Self-Complexity Questionnaire was included in test batteries administered in Studies 1b and 1c.

The participants completed the Self-Incoherence Scale by Styła et al. ( 2010 ). This tool is a self-concept integration measure based on Block’s ( 1961 ) and Donahue et al.’s ( 1993 ) scales. The participants were instructed to rate how descriptive 7 personality traits are of them in each of five different social roles (student, romantic partner, son or daughter, friend, and worker), using a 7-point Likert scale.

The 7 attributes (i.e., active, open-minded, loyal, self-confident, resourceful, independent, direct) were selected after a series of pilot studies. First, a group of psychology students ( N  = 24) was asked to read the list of 68 trait adjectives and mark those which describe them. An initial pool of attributes was derived from the Questionnaire of Social Perception (Jarymowicz 2008 ). They were broad personal characteristics and adjective markers that represent the Big Five traits (e.g., creative, outgoing, hardworking, helpful, sensitive). The pilot version of the Self-Incoherence Scale included 27 adjectives most commonly chosen by the students. In succeeding studies, a total of 317 participants completed the pilot version. Then, all items were factor-analyzed to obtain factor scores for each of them. Fourteen items with the greatest factor loadings were selected and split into two parallel versions of the scale. A final study ( N  = 94) showed that one of these versions produced better validity coefficients then the other, and was suggested as preferable for scientific research (Styła et al. 2010 ).

Three different indices of self-concept differentiation were computed for each participant from the data generated by this task. The first one was suggested by Styła et al. ( 2010 ), but previously used also by others (e.g., Donahue et al. 1993 ; Goldman 2004 ). This index represents the absolute differences among the roles. In particular, we computed the standard deviation of each of the participant’s personality trait ratings across each role (7 standard deviations in all), and then averaged them. The resulting score (SCD SD ) represents the extent that participants’ personality trait ratings had deviated from one another when describing themselves across their different roles. As the second index of self-concept differentiation we used the average correlation among the roles (SCD R ), as proposed by Campbell et al. ( 2003 ). Correlations between each participant’s five roles (10 correlations in all) were computed on the basis of the adjectives ratings made in each role. This measure provides an inverse measure of self-concept differentiation. The third index was computed by factor-analyzing the correlation matrix, and subtracting the percent of variance accounted for by the first principal component from 100 percent. The resulting score represents the proportion of unshared variance among the roles (SCD VAR ). That is, higher scores on this measure reflect greater differentiation of self. This index was proposed by Block ( 1961 ), and then used by Donahue et al. ( 1993 ). 2

The Self-Incoherence Scale was used in Studies 1a and 1b.

Sense of Identity

To measure a sense of personal identity, understood as a recurring mode of experiencing oneself-as-subject, extended form of the Multidimensional Questionnaire of Identity (MQI; Pilarska 2012 , 2014a ) was employed. The questionnaire consists of six subscales measuring the degree of accessibility, specificity, separateness, coherence, stability, and valuation of identity content (referred to, respectively, as sense of having inner contents, sense of uniqueness, sense of one’s own boundaries, sense of coherence, sense of continuity over time, and sense of self-worth), including a total of 43 items (e.g., I feel that I was once a very different person than I am now; It happens that I perceive my close one as an important part of my self). All items are evaluated on a four-level scale ranging from “strongly disagree/never” to “strongly agree/always”. In addition, a single composite score for a global sense of identity (GSI) was computed by averaging scores across all identity dimensions. 3 In earlier studies, reliability coefficients for the identity dimensions varied from 0.62 to 0.86, with an average Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 (e.g., Pilarska 2014a ; Suchańska and Worach 2013 ). For our sample, the standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the overall scale was 0.90, and ranged from 0.62 to 0.79 (average, 0.72) for the individual subscales.

We included the Multidimensional Questionnaire of Identity in all three studies.

Identity Processes

The Identity and Experience Scale (IES) by Whitbourne and collegues ( 2002 ) in its Polish version by Suchańska and Jawłowska (2010, as cited in Jawłowska 2010 ) was used for measuring the identity processes. This tool consists of 33 statements, 11 for each scale: assimilation (e.g., When it comes to understanding myself, I’d rather not look too deeply), accommodation (e.g., Very influenced by what others think), and balance (e.g., Often take stock of what I have or have not accomplished). The participants respond on a seven-point scale from “definitely no” to “definitely yes”. The three subscales demonstrated reasonable internal consistency, with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69 for assimilation, 0.83 for accommodation, and 0.83 for balance.

The Identity and Experience Scale was employed in Study 1c.

The Study lb battery contained the following scales measuring selected thinking dispositions.

Need for Cognition

Need for cognition was assessed via an adapted version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo and Petty 1982 ; Matusz et al. 2011 ). The scale includes 36 items that focus on engagement in and enjoyment of intellectual activities (e.g., I try to avoid situations that require intensive thinking from me; I enjoy broadening my knowledge about things); each evaluated on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Psychometric properties of the Polish version of the NCS are comparable to those of the original version: the reliability and stability indices are α = 0.91 and r  = 0.86, respectively (Matusz et al. 2011 ). In the present sample, the internal consistency of this NCS, as measured by Cronbach’s standardized reliability coefficient, was α = 0.88.

Reflection, an openness-related form of self-focused attention, was measured with the 8-item Reflection subscale taken from the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire – Shortform (RRQ Shortforms) by Trapnell ( 1997 ). Every item (e.g., I love exploring my “inner” self) is presented on a five-point scale, allowing for a range of responses from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The Cronbach’s standardized reliability coefficient for the translated version of this scale was 0.80.

Integrative Self-Knowledge

The Integrative Self-Knowledge Scale (ISK; Ghorbani et al. 2008 ; Polish adaptation by Pilarska 2014b ) assesses a temporally integrated understanding of processes within the self. The scale includes 12 items referring to an individual’s efforts (1) to understand past experience (e.g., If I need to, I can reflect about myself and clearly understand the feelings and attitudes behind my past behaviors), (2) to maintain awareness of the self in the present (e.g., Most of the time, I get so involved in what is going on that I really can’t see how I am responding to a situation), and (3) to move toward desired goals in the future (e.g., By thinking deeply about myself, I can discover what I really want in life and how I might get it). Each item is rated on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “largely untrue” to “largely true”. The Polish version of the ISK scale has good construct validity, and satisfactory internal consistency (Pilarska 2014b ). In our sample, internal reliability in terms of Cronbach’s standardized alpha was found to be 0.79.

For clarity of presentation, the results with brief comments are presented in five major sections, followed by a more general discussion of the results and their implications. It should be noted that parts of the analyses were performed in the individual samples, while other parts were conducted using the combined data (for the sake of increasing statistical power). In each of the following sections, we state which data set was used.

Measures of Self-Complexity

We started with examining psychometric properties of alternative measures of self-complexity: the dimensionality statistic (H), quantity of self-aspects (NSA) and overlap among them (OL), and a composite index of these two components of self-complexity (SC). The subsequent analyses were based on combined samples for which the appropriate scores were available (i.e., Study 1b and Study 1c samples).

To test the internal consistency of each of the self-complexity measure, split-half reliability coefficients were calculated, following the procedure of Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ). Instead of using a participant’s full trait sorting, the relevant measures (NSA, OL, H, and SC) were computed separately on two subsets of traits: the 30 odd-numbered traits and the 30 even-numbered traits. Scores on each measure within one subset of traits were then correlated with the respective scores within the other half of the traits. The resulting split-half correlations were corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula to obtain split-half reliability estimates. The split-half reliability estimate of NSA was the highest ( r  = 0.93), followed by Linville’s H statistic ( r  = 0.85), OL ( r  = 0.69), and Sakaki’s SC statistic ( r  = 0.57). Overall, the split-half reliability coefficients were moderate or satisfactory, with the number of self-aspects and the H statistic showing greater reliability. The reliability estimates for Linville’s H measure and NSA matched the values found by Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ) in the semi-random splitting. The reliability coefficient for OL was higher than that reported by Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ) for the valenced split, but remained below the coefficients that were computed in the semi-random splitting.

The participants used an average of 15.44 ( SD =6.53) trait adjectives in their self-descriptions. The number of self-aspects (NSA) in the present study ranged from 1 to 12, with a mean of 4.90 ( SD =1.93), overlap (OL) ranged from 0.00 to 1.00 with a mean of 0.17 ( SD =0.15), 4 the H statistic ranged from 0.12 to 3.77 with a mean of 1.51 ( SD =0.61), and the SC statistic ranged from 3.08 to 1200.00 with a mean of 45.31 ( SD =71.17). All data were checked for normality. The skewness of the variables ranged from 0.61 to 9.56, and their kurtosis ranged from 0.61 to 136.09. Only the SC scores showed a severe departure from normality based on Kline’s ( 1998 ) rule (i.e., skew index absolute value <3; kurtosis index absolute values <10). There were significant gender differences in the number of traits used, the number of self-aspects, overlap, and Linville’s H statistic. Women (1) used more traits to describe themselves ( M women =16.61 [ SD =6.01] vs. M men =13.78 [ SD =6.89]), U =36987.00, Z  = −6.14, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.24, (2) identified more self-aspects ( M women =5.13 [ SD =1.81] vs. M men =4.58 [ SD =2.06]), U =41133.50, Z  = −4.47, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.17, (3) had more interrelated self-aspects ( M women =0.19 [ SD =0.15] vs. M men =0.15 [ SD =0.16]), U =40603.00, Z  = −4.25, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.17, and (4) had higher H scores ( M women =1.62 [ SD =0.57] vs. M men =1.34 [ SD =0.63]), U =36271.50, Z  = −6.44, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.25, than did men.

The simple correlation analysis revealed that the H statistic had a positive association with the number of self-aspects ( r  = 0.59, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.35), and thus appeared to reflect this element of self-complexity quite well. This is consistent with the findings of Linville ( 1987 ) and others (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007 ; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ). However, contrary to Linville’s expectation that the H statistic will reflect high distinctiveness among roles, the H statistic and overlap were positively related in this sample ( r  = 0.27, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.08). Similar result was previously reported by Constantino et al. ( 2006 ), Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ), and Luo et al. ( 2009 ). We examined the scatterplot of the two variables and used regression analysis to test the significance of a quadratic effect for overlap. The analysis indicated that both linear and nonlinear effects were significant (β =0.15 and β = −0.13, p  < 0.001, respectively), suggesting a concave down quadratic trend in the relationship between overlap and the H scores. This observation was even more important since the mean level of overlap in our sample was very low (as was in Rafaeli-Mor et al.’s study, M =0.13, Constantino et al.’s study, M =0.17, and Luo and Watkins’ study, M =0.18) and lied in the 1st theoretical quartile. A high percentage of 96 % of the participants had overlap below, and merely 4 %, above, the theoretical midpoint of 0.50. We used the theoretical midpoint of 0.50 to separate high-OL and low-OL groups, and then performed regression analysis for each group (controlling for the effect of the number of self-aspects and the number of attributes). As predicted, the H statistic was positively predicted by overlap in the low-OL group (β =0.10, p  < 0.001), but negatively predicted by overlap in the high-OL group (β = −0.24, p  < 0.001). These findings suggest that there were certain circumstances in which greater overlap increased the value of H and other circumstances in which greater overlap reduced its value. More precisely, the relationship between Linville’s H measure and overlap followed an inverted U-shaped function, but because most overlap values were relatively small, the general relationship between them was positive.

Consistent with the findings of Linville ( 1987 ), the SC statistic was found to be positively related to the number of self-aspects ( r  = 0.36, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.13) and negatively associated with overlap ( r  = −0.41, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.17). In agreement with Brown and Rafaeli ( 2007 ), the two component measures of self-complexity (the number of roles and overlap) were unrelated ( r  = 0.04, ns ). But controversy emerged as the H statistic and the SC statistic turned out to be unrelated ( r  = 0.05, ns ). Since both measures theoretically capture the same construct, this can be only explained by the difference in calculation formula.

Additional analysis showed that the H statistic is problematic for another reason. It was found to be strongly and positively linked to the number of trait adjectives used in the person’s sort ( r  = 0.97, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.94). And this is not without importance, since participants used positive self-descriptors much more frequently than negative ones ( χ 2 (1) =6.25, p  = 0.012). This tendency reflects a form of self-enhancement (e.g., Sedikides 1993 ). Expectedly, the H statistic showed a stronger correlation with the number of positive trait adjectives ( r  = 0.90, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.81) than with the number of negative trait adjectives ( r  = 0.56, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.32). The difference between the correlation coefficients was significant ( z  = 14.88, p  < 0.001). This turned out to be true for NSA ( r  = 0.44 and r  = 0.25, z  = 3.96, p  < 0.001) and OL ( r  = 0.25 and r  = 0.05, z  = 3.71, p  < 0.001) as well. On the other hand, the same correlation analysis performed for the SC statistic revealed that neither the total number of chosen adjectives nor the number of positive or negative adjectives were related to the SC statistic ( r  = 0.04, r  = 0.02, and r  = 0.05, ns , respectively). 5

To ascertain these relations and determine the most important predictors of both Linville’s H and Sakaki’s SC statistic, simultaneous multiple regression analyses were conducted with the number of self-aspects, overlap, and the number of chosen adjectives as predictors and either the H statistic or the SC statistic as the dependent variable. Squared semipartial correlations were calculated to estimate the unique contribution of each predictor to the variance in self-complexity scores. We also tested for multicollinearity using a rule of thumb associated with the variance inflation factor (VIF <5).

As can be seen in Table ​ Table2, 2 , NAS, OL, and NAT were significant unique predictors of self-complexity, regardless the measure that was used. The number of chosen adjectives emerged as the strongest (and positive) predictor of Linville’s H statistic (β = 0.87, p  < 0.001). Positive associations between the H statistic and both number of roles and overlap held even when controlling for all the other predictor variables (β = 0.19, p  < 0.001 and β = 0.06, p  < 0.001, respectively). The number of self-aspects was the strongest (and positive) predictor (β = 0.42, p  < 0.001) of Sakaki’s SC statistic, closely followed by overlap (β = −0.40, p  < 0.001), which remained negatively associated with the SC statistic. The regression model ( F (3, 642) =5765.86, p  < 0.001) accounted for 96 % of the variance in the H score, with NAT explaining 57.5 % of the variance, NSA approximately 3 %, and OL an additional 0.3 %, as reflected by the squared semipartial correlation. Thus both NSA and OL played only a minor role in self-complexity indicated by the H statistic. For Sakaki’s SC statistic, the regression model accounted for 31 % of the variance ( F (3, 530) =77.80, p  < 0.001), with OL and NSA explaining 15.5 % and 13 % of the variance, respectively. The remaining 1.6 % was attributable to NTA. 6

Summary of multiple regression analysis with either the H or SC statistic as the dependent variable

N  = 652

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, NAT number of trait adjectives

*** p <0.001

The above results suggest that the SC statistic serves as a more adequate measure of the self-complexity as conceptualized by Linville ( 1987 ). However, since the equation for computing the SC statistic may cause a divide by zero error, using the two-component approach and analyzing NSA and OL separately seems to be most suitable. It is also worth noting that Linville’s H statistic, reflecting predominantly the quantity of self-descriptions, constitutes the measure of differentiation, and not self-complexity, according to Zajonc’s ( 1960 ) original taxonomy.

Measures of Self-Concept Differentiation

The following analyses aimed at providing validity information on the Self-Incoherence Scale and exploring the convergence among different measures designed to assess self-concept differentiation: the average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles (SCD SD ),the average correlation among the roles (SCD R ), and the proportion of unshared variance among the roles (SCD VAR ). The analyses in this section were based on combined samples for which the appropriate scores were available (i.e., Study 1a and Study 1b samples).

Internal consistency reliability of the scale was examined. The standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the composite index, based on the intercorrelations among trait-specific standard deviations, was 0.83. The mean corrected item-total correlation for the 7 traits was r  = 0.57, indicating that those participants who were variable on one trait tended to be variable on the others. Although the reliability coefficient was slightly lower than that of the original study of Styła et al. ( 2010 , α =0.90), it was nevertheless acceptable.

The self-differentiation scores calculated from an average standard deviation (SCD SD ) in the present study ranged from 0.00 to 3.03, with a mean of 0.98 ( SD =0.36), the index based on an average correlation (SCD R ) ranged from 0.10 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.42 ( SD =0.13), and the index derived from factor analysis (SCD VAR ) ranged from 0.00 to 67.92, with a mean of 45.77 ( SD =11.07). 7 For all three variables, skewness and kurtosis were within acceptable limits (skewness: −0.77 to 1.18; kurtosis: 0.75 to 3.67). No significant gender differences were observed.

The zero-order correlation revealed that the SCD index based on an average standard deviation was only weakly correlated with Campbell et al.’s ( 2003 ) index ( r  = −0.27, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.07) and Block’s ( 1961 ) index ( r  = 0.27, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.07). These findings are contrary to those by Donahue et al. ( 1993 ) who reported high degree of convergence between alternative indexes. In accordance with expectations, Campbell et al.’s ( 2003 ) and Block’s ( 1961 ) indexes were strongly associated ( r  = −0.95, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.90).

Additional concerns raised with respect to the fact that all personality traits included in the Self-Incoherence Scale were positively valenced. Thus, it is possible that the SCD score represents the consistency of endorsing desirable traits rather than self-concept differentiation, as conceptualized in the literature (Donahue et al. 1993 ). To test this hypothesis, we compared the SCD scores in two groups: participants who rated themselves highly on the 7 positive traits and those, who claimed they lacked them. For each participant, we averaged their ratings on each trait across the five roles. The compared groups were composed of participants who obtained extremely low and extremely high scores on a given trait. A standard deviation criterion was used as cut-off point. The Mann–Whitney U tests showed there were significant differences in trait variability scores between the two groups on every personality trait analyzed (effect size range r  = 0.47 to 0.78, average r  = 0.58). Specifically, participants who rated a positive personality trait as highly descriptive of themselves received lower standard deviation scores for that trait , indicating a more stable self-concept (see Table ​ Table3). 3 ). Similar results were obtained in correlation analysis of mean trait rating with cross-role standard deviation for the respective trait. The correlation coefficients ranged from r  = −0.32 to r  = −0.54, with the average coefficient being approximately −0.39 ( p  < 0.001, range of r 2  = 0.10 to 0.29, average r 2  = 0.16).

Trait variability in individuals with high and low ratings on traits included in the Self-Incoherence Scale

N  = 868

*** p  < 0.001

We also performed Mann–Whitney U tests to compare all three SCD indexes between participants who generally viewed themselves positively and those who evaluated themselves more negatively. The two groups were obtained simply by averaging participants’ ratings for all 7 personality traits. A standard deviation criterion was used as cut-off point. Once again, as shown in Table ​ Table4, 4 , self-differentiation index based on an average standard deviation was found to be associated with a tendency to ascribe desirable traits to the self ( U =3025.50, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.57). 8 The Pearson correlation coefficient of these two variables was r  = −0.40 and was statistically significant ( p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0,16). This effect, however, was not observed for the other two SCD indexes.

Self-concept differentiation difference between individuals with high and low mean ratings

SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, SCD R average correlation among the roles, SCD VAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles

The above results suggest that there is varying correspondence between alternative ways of measuring self-concept differentiation, and, more importantly, that self-concept differentiation – operationalized as the average standard deviation – may not be independent of the contents of the self-concept (see also Locke 2006 ).

Relationship Between Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Differentiation

We examined whether measures of self-concept structure, reflecting differentiation and integration (unity), were related to one another. These analyses were based on Study 1b sample data.

Correlation analysis (see Table ​ Table5) 5 ) between self-complexity, its components and self-concept differentiation revealed a weak, negative association between overlap and SCD index based on an average standard deviation ( r  = −0.13, p  = 0.004, r 2  = 0.02). Considering the dependence of SCD SD on mean trait rating (cf. Tables  3 and ​ and4), 4 ), we decided to examine this result further. The zero-order correlation showed that along with OL and SCD SD being correlated to each other, both were significantly correlated to the mean trait rating ( r  = 0.12, p  = 0.005 and r  = −0.40, p  < 0.001, respectively). To test for the possible confounding effect of the mean trait rating, a hierarchical regression was used in which the SCD SD score was regressed on overlap (Step 1), and participants’ mean rating for personality traits (Step 2). After entering the mean trait rating in Step 2, the model explained 16.5 % of the variance in the SCD SD score (Δ R 2  = 0.15, F (1, 515) =92.23, p  < 0.001). The mean trait rating emerged as a significant predictor (β = −0.39, p  < 0.001), whereas the effect of overlap was no longer significant (β = −0.08, ns ). 9

Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity and self concept differentiation

N  = 521

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, SCD R average correlation among the roles, SCD VAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles

*** p  < 0.001, ** p  < 0.01, * p  < 0.05

No further associations between measures of self-complexity and measures of self concept differentiation were found, suggesting that they are, to a large extent, independent constructs. A similar conclusion was drawn by Campbell et al. ( 2003 ), and Lutz and Ross ( 2003 ).

Identity Correlates of Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Traditionally, a stable and coherent personal identity is considered to be essential for psychological health and adaptive functioning. According to Erikson ( 1980 ), the subjective experience of personal identity actually gives rise to a preconscious sense of personal well-being. We examined the self structure–identity relationship, operationalizing identity through measures of identity processes and identity senses.

Basic statistical description of identity variables in combined sample is presented in Table ​ Table6. 6 . The levels of skewness and kurtosis exhibited by our data were below those that Kline ( 1998 ) specifies as problematic (skewness: −0.40 to 0.25; kurtosis: −0.25 to 0.26). An analysis of gender differences by means of Mann–Whitney U test indicated that men had a higher sense of inner contents ( U =107833.50, Z  = −2.47, p  = 0.013, r =0.08), uniqueness ( U =100746.00, Z  = −4.00, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.13), their own boundaries ( U =96659.00, Z  = −4.96, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.16), and self-worth ( U =94079.00, Z  = −4.76, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.15), than women. Moreover, men, as compared to women, had higher scores on overall sense of identity ( U =99912.50, Z  = −4.27, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.14). With respect to identity processes, women endorsed identity accommodation more than men ( U =1098.00, Z  = −4.30, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.03), and men scored higher on identity balance than women ( U =1496.00, Z  = −2.23, p  = 0.026, r  = 0.02).

Descriptive statistics and gender differences for identity senses and identity processes

Descriptive statistics for identity senses are based on 1001 participants; descriptive statistics for identity processes are based on 127 participants

SIC sense of having inner contents, SU sense of uniqueness, SOB sense of one’s own boundaries, SC sense of coherence, SCT sense of continuity over time, SSW sense of self-worth, GSI global sense of identity, IAS assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance

*** p  < 0.001, * p  < 0.05

Table ​ Table7 7 contains the zero-order correlations between self-complexity, self concept differentiation, and identity measures. All observed correlations were rather weak ( r ≤0.34) and seemingly inconsistent. Of all self-complexity measures, relatively the strongest correlation emerged between the H statistic and identity balance (Study 1c: r  = 0.31, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.10). Linville’s measure was also related to most of the identity senses (average r  = 0.11, average r 2  = 0.02) and global sense of identity (average r  = 0.16, average r 2  = 0.03). These correlations were all positive with the exception of the one with sense of one’s own boundaries. Overlap showed significant associations with some of the identity senses (average r  = 0.02, average r 2  = 0.01) and global sense of identity (average r  = 0.02, average r 2  = 0.01). Though the direction and significance of these associations was not consistent across the two studies. The only significant correlation of the number of self-aspects was a negative one with sense of one’s own boundaries (Study 1b: r  = −0.12, r 2  = 0.01), and the only significant correlation of Sakaki’s SC statistic was a negative one with identity accommodation (Study 1c: r  = −0.21, r 2  = 0.05). Negative associations emerged between SCD SD and most of the identity senses (average r  = −0.18, average r 2  = 0.05) and global sense of identity (average r  = −0.24, average r 2  = 0.07). Clearly weaker correlations were found between identity senses and SCD R (average r  = 0.03, average r 2  = 0.004) and SCD VAR (average r  = −0.04, average r 2  = 0.005). Both of these self-concept differentiation indices were uncorrelated with the global sense of identity score (on average, r  = 0.04, r 2  = 0.002 and r  = −0.06, r 2  = 0.004, respectively).

Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity, self-concept differentiation, and identity

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, SCD R average correlation among the roles, SCD VAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles, SIC sense of having inner contents, SU sense of uniqueness, SOB sense of one’s own boundaries, SC sense of coherence, SCT sense of continuity over time, SSW sense of self-worth, GSI global sense of identity, IAS assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance

*** p  ≤ 0.001, ** p  ≤ 0.01* p  ≤ 0.05

To ascertain the extent to which each of the self complexity and self-concept differentiation measures exhibited associations with identity variables that were independent of their associations with other variables, regression analyses were conducted. Identity scores were regressed on self-structure variables that were available in the data set. Due to the fact that specific identity senses were correlated with one another (average r  = 0.41, p  < 0.001), we only used the global sense of identity scores. Also, there were a number of cases for which the SC scores and scores on the two SCD indices based on the cross-role correlation matrix could not be obtained because of calculation problems (i.e., a division by zero error and an undefined correlation with zero variance). Since the missing cases may have caused the samples to be biased, we excluded these measures from the regression analyses described below. 10 Lastly, since some of the self-structural measures have been shown to be sensitive to variations in self-contents variables (e.g., the proportion of positive traits adjectives used in the sort and the mean trait rating), we performed regressions including them as predictors to control for their respective effects.

In all models, multicollinearity was examined to determine if any of the independent or control variables were a significant function of each other. As expected, since the H score and the number of traits were very highly correlated, the tolerances for these variables were very low and the VIFs exceed the value of 10. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem, only the number of traits has been included in the analysis. The tolerance and the variance inflation factors in the final regression analyses were well within the acceptable range (tolerance >0.20, VIF <5).

In general, control variables (i.e., related to richness and favorability of self-depiction) were more consistent predictors of personal identity than variables related to self-concept structure (see Table ​ Table8 8 ). 11 Individuals with a strong sense of identity and who were identity balanced were more likely to have very rich self-defining aspects and to describe themselves with more positive attributes.

Summary of beta weights for regression analyses with identity measures as the dependent variable

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, NAT number of trait adjectives, PPAT proportion of positive trait adjectives, MTR mean trait rating, GSI global sense of identity, IAS assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance

*** p  ≤ 0.001,** p  < 0.01, * p  < 0.05

With this in mind, it is possible to interpret psychologically the obtained results. The global sense of identity was negatively predicted by SCD SD (Study 1a: β = −0.22, p  < 0.001), showing that a differentiated self-concept was associated with a weakening of a sense of identity. Approximately 4 % of the GSI variance was explained by SCD SD . OL emerged as a significant predictor of IAS (Study 1c: β = −0.19, p  = 0.046), suggesting that a unified self-structure was related to lesser use of assimilation, probably since there was hardly any discrepancy that needed to be resolved. About 3.5 % of the variance in the IAS scores was attributable to OL.

Overall, these correlation and regression findings would support the assumption that a sense of identity is related to coherence across self-aspects rather than their complexity and diversity. At the same time, they suggest that certain relationships of structural variables with well-being outcomes could be explained by content-based variables.

Cognitive Correlates of Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Drawing on the ideas of positive psychology, we posit that psychological well-being includes the development of various reflective and self-reflective capacities. Therefore, in this section, we address the issue of adaptive significance of structural aspects of self by exploring their relationships with need for cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge. The following analyses were based on Study 1b sample data.

In our sample, the scores on need for cognition ranged from 56.00 to 175.00 ( M =127.39, SD =17.92), on reflection ranged from 1.00 to 5.00 ( M =3.26, SD =0.77), and for integrative self-knowledge ranged from 0.00 to 4.00 ( M =2.36, SD =0.63). For the current data set, the skewness of the variables ranged from −0.18 to 0.09, and the kurtosis ranged from −0.16 to 0.38. These estimates did not identify any serious violations of normality. To examine gender differences, for each variable, an independent Mann–Whitney U test was computed comparing the male and female scores. Women ( M =3.21, SD =0.76) scored significantly lower than men ( M =3.34, SD =0.77) on reflection ( U =31578.00, Z  = −2.12, p  = 0.034, r  = 0.09). In terms of other variables, no significant gender differences were observed.

The observed correlations between measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation, and thinking dispositions are given in Table ​ Table9. 9 . Need for cognition correlated with all three indices of self-concept differentiation. The strongest association was observed between NCS and SCD SD ( r  = −0.29, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.09). Reflection correlated with the number of self-aspects, Linville’s H statistic, and self-concept differentiation index calculated from an average standard deviation. The latter association was the strongest ( r  = −0.18, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.03). Finally, integrative self-knowledge correlated with overlap, the H and the SC statistics, and self-concept differentiation index based on an average standard deviation. The association of greatest magnitude was between ISK and OL ( r  = 0.21, p  < 0.001, r 2  = 0.04). It should be pointed out that all of the correlation coefficients were rather small, even when statistically significant; the largest explained about 9 % of the variance.

Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity, self-concept differentiation, and thinking dispositions

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, SCD R average correlation among the roles, SCD VAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles, NCS need for cognition, RQ reflection, ISK integrative self-knowledge

*** p  ≤ 0.001, ** p  < 0.01* p  < 0.05

Although the zero-order correlations are instructive, they may be misleading. Therefore, a subsequent series of regression analyses was performed to examine the independent effects of measure of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation on each cognitive variable. The rationale guiding inclusion of the predictor variables was similar to the analyses in the previous section. Sakaki’s SC measure, the SCD VAR index, and the SCD R index were excluded to avoid bias in the sample and to retain sample size. 12 Linville’s H measure was excluded to avoid multicollinearity. Three variables related to richness and favorability of self-concept were included in the models to control for their potential effects. The beta weights (standardized regression coefficients) are reported in Table ​ Table10 10 .

Summary of beta weights for regression analyses with thinking dispositions as the dependent variable

NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, SCD SD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, NAT number of trait adjectives, PPAT proportion of positive trait adjectives, MTR mean trait rating, NCS need for cognition, RQ reflection, ISK integrative self-knowledge

The obtained results indicated, again, that the control variables were more strongly related to thinking dispositions than were the main predictors. Individuals who gave more elaborated self-descriptions and expressed more favorable self-evaluations used adaptive cognitive thinking to a greater degree. Of the included structural features of the self-concept, self-concept differentiation emerged as a significant predictor of need for cognition (β = −0.19, p  < 0.001) as well as reflection (β = −0.16, p ≤0.001), and integrative self-knowledge (β = −0.11, p  = 0.016), accounting for, respectively, 3 %, 2 %, and 1 % of the criterion variance. These effects suggested that active cognitive processing accompanied less differentiated self-structure. Overlap was independently associated with integrative self-knowledge (β =0.16, p  < 0.001), showing that a tendency to integrate past, present, and desired future self-experience into a meaningful whole was directly linked to a unified self-structure. The predictive value of overlap for integrative self-knowledge was approximately 2.4 %. 13

Altogether, the obtained results indicated that the thinking dispositions of interest were not substantially predicted from the included structural features of the self-concept. Although relatively small in magnitude, these effects suggested that engaging in functionally adaptive cognitive processing was associated with a more coherent self-concept.

General Discussion

Individual differences in the self-concept structure have been a topic of considerable interest for at least three decades and have been debated as to their validity and adaptive significance. Thus, in this paper, we tackled issues related to the validity of operationalization and adaptive value of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation. The results of the present investigation can be summed up as follows:

• The obtained results suggest that both singular indices of self-complexity – Linville’s H statistic and Sakaki’s SC statistic – are lacking, although for different reasons.

Correlation and regression analyses showed that the H score was positively associated with the number of self-aspects as well as with the overlap among them. Thus, in contrast to Linville’s ( 1985 , 1987 ) prediction, not only numerous self-aspects but also more role overlap strengthen one’s H score. The effect of overlap proved particularly inconsistent across different studies, ranging from positive (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006 ; Luo and Watkins 2009 ; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ) to even nonsignificant (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007 ; Engįn 2004 ; Heath 2011 ; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg 2002 ), with no consensus on its association to Linville’s H measure. These potentially conflicting findings could all be correct. Inspection of our data indicated that the relationship between the H statistic and overlap was, in fact, inverted U-shaped (see also Luo and Watkins 2008 , 2009 ; Luo et al. 2009 ). That is, an increase in overlap initially increases the H score, but when overlap exceeds a certain threshold, the H score decreases. Thus, depending on range of overlap values observed, the H statistic function takes on a different shape. The most possible explanation for our overall positive result is that the range of overlap in our data was sufficiently low, so that we did not observe the decrease in the H score – only the increase. The same explanation could account for previous failures (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006 ; Luo and Watkins 2009 ; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ) to identify the theoretically assumed negative effect of overlap on Linville’s H measure.

Moreover, the H statistic turned out to be influenced by the number of traits used in self-definition. In fact, the total number of traits used in the trait-sort task appeared to be the most important predictive factor for the H score, and a significant mediator in the NSA–H and OL–H relationships. Taken together, these data indicate that Linville’s H statistic, at best, could be considered an indirect measure of role quantity or simply a measure of the number of traits endorsed (see also Zajonc 1960 ). Corresponding conclusions were drawn by Locke ( 2003 ), Rafaeli-Mor et al. ( 1999 ), and Solomon and Haaga ( 2003 ). In addition, since the H statistic is highly sensitive to the number of traits, and people tend to ascribe far more positive traits than negative traits to the self, the H statistic will somewhat reflect self-esteem. This was previously recognized by Woolfolk et al. ( 1995 ) and Campbell et al. ( 2003 ), who found that self-complexity was influenced by the evaluative composition of the attributes sorted (i.e., the ratio of positive to negative attributes). Our analyses revealed that both component measures of self-complexity were also affected by the number of traits used, although to a much lesser extent than the H statistic. In addition, overlap was also found to be dependent on the favorability of the self-concept. This agrees with the results reported by Campbell et al. ( 2003 ) for the average correlation among self-aspects. One important question which we should address at this point is, whether we should interpret the obtained results as an indication of a positive self-complexity–self-esteem relationship or as a result of the method of calculation. While not entirely conclusive, our data, and those cited above, point to the second conclusion.

As for Sakaki’s SC statistic, it was found to be related positively to the number of self-aspects utilized and negatively to the overlap among these self-aspects, as Linville argued that it should. The amount of the SC statistic variance captured by the number of traits used in the sort was so small as to suggest that it probably was not meaningful. However, the mathematical formula of the SC statistic can potentially require division by zero and thus may yield uninterpretable results. Surprising as it may seem, neither Sakaki ( 2004 , 2006 ) nor other authors that used this index (e.g., Borawski 2011 ) commented on this issue. 14

Given the above and in agreement with Rafaeli-Mor and colleagues ( 1999 ), the two component measures of self-complexity, rather than singular measures, emerge as a more reasonable alternative in self-complexity assessment. Results showed that the component measures of self-complexity were uncorrelated with each other, thus providing support for their functional independence and for the two-dimensional nature of self-complexity, comprising both differentiation and a form of integration.

• 2. The results found that measures of self-concept differentiation based on an average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles and derived from correlations between role identities were not convergent. Moreover, each of them share certain limitations.

Although Campbell et al.’s ( 2003 ) and Block’s ( 1961 ) indices of self-concept differentiation were strongly intercorrelated, contrary to Donahue et al.’s ( 1993 ) finding, they had a weaker correlation with the measure recommended by Styła et al. ( 2010 ). We also found evidence for the non-convergence of these indices through an examination of their patterns of relationships with identity and cognitive variables. In particular, associations between indices derived from cross-role correlations and these other variables were considerably weaker and less consistent.

Furthermore, the SCD SD index turned out to be biased, since participants rating positive traits as highly descriptive of themselves obtained considerably lower self-concept differentiation scores. Hence, it could be argued that the SCD SD index reflects self-esteem (or self-esteem enhancement) in addition to self-concept differentiation. Similar concerns have been raised previously by Baird et al. ( 2006 ). Their studies provided evidence that the cross-role standard deviation conflate mean-level information with variability in trait expression. Baird et al. ( 2006 ) strongly suggested that this association is attributable to the constraints on the bivariate distribution and not to any underlying psychological process. They also pointed out that the relation of mean level and variability of traits will be more evident if the distribution of means is skewed. Because the Self-Incoherence Scale is restricted to positively valenced traits, and people generally view themselves positively, the means distribution in our data was skewed toward higher values ( Sk  = −0.49, SES =0.08). Thus, in regression analyses we controlled for trait mean levels and examined whether variability per se predicted well-being outcomes.

As to indices based on cross-role correlation matrix, they can only reflect the covariance rather than consistency between role-based personalities, meaning that they do not exactly reflect the theoretically defined construct of self-concept differentiation (Donahue et al. 1993 ). Moreover, as such they are sensitive to the within role variance, and thence any role identity that has no within variation has to be dropped from calculations or the indices remain undefined in such circumstances (see also Baird et al. 2006 ; Locke 2006 ). The chance of this occurring is lower when the number of self-descriptive traits is greater. However, with only seven self-descriptors, as in the Self-Incoherence Scale, this became an important issue. Regardless, this source of variance is not even relevant to what Donahue and colleagues ( 1993 ) have conceptualized as self-concept differentiation.

• 3. The examination of relationships between measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation did not reveal any evident links between those seemingly similar constructs.

Our overall results were comparable to those previously reported (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003 ; Constantino et al. 2006 ; Lutz and Ross 2003 ), as we found no unique associations between measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation. Correlation and regression analyses of self-complexity, its components, and self-concept differentiation on identity and cognitive variables yielded rather inconclusive results (see later in the text). Still, it seems safe to say that the patterns of associations for different structural features were neither similar, nor opposite. These findings support the postulate that complexity of the self-concept and self-concept differentiation are not the same phenomena. Moreover, since the two integration measures, namely overlap and self-concept differentiation, also appeared not to be uniquely related to one another, we might need to assume that they reflect different forms of integration. The above observations can also be understood in terms of the nature of the technique used. As noted in the introduction, the self-complexity task allows individuals to define their self-aspects in idiosyncratic ways, whereas in the self-concept differentiation task participants are constrained by limited and predefined roles. As pointed out by some authors (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006 ; Koch and Shepperd 2004 ; Lutz and Ross 2003 ), this distinction is important in that the former task may draw participants’ attention to more pleasant feelings of social specialization (a flexibility–rigidity dimension), whereas the latter task may promote focusing attention on rather unpleasant feelings of wearing many masks (an integration–fragmentation dimension).

• 4. There were some direct associations of measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation with measures of identity and active cognitive processing. However, these associations were more limited than expected, and were influenced by the self-contents related variables.

The focus of the current paper was to consider the relations between structural characteristics of the self-concept and two broad aspects of psychological adjustment: personal identity and thinking dispositions. The former was operationalized in terms of identity senses (Pilarska 2012 , 2014a ) and identity processes (Whitbourne et al. 2002 ). The latter were operationalized as individual differences in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al. 1996 ), reflection (Trapnell and Campbell 1999 ), and integrative self-knowledge (Ghorbani et al. 2008 ); all of which can be considered indicative of adaptive cognitive thinking.

As previously reported, several structural features of the self-concept appeared to be a function of the quantity and positivity of the self-descriptions. Not surprisingly, our results concerning the relationships of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation with adaptive outcomes were affected by self-contents related variables. Participants’ mean ratings of personality traits mediated the effects of self-concept differentiation on global sense of identity, need for cognition, and integrative self-knowledge. Also, the number of traits used in the sort mediated the effects of overlap on integrative self-knowledge. With this in mind, below we discuss the results after controlling for these variables.

Among the set of self-structure variables, self-concept differentiation showed negative association with global sense of personal identity, suggesting that describing oneself differently across social contexts was indicative of a weakened sense of identity. These results are in line with other reports suggesting that self-concept differentiation serves as a sign of psychological maladjustment (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003 ; Diehl and Hay 2010 ; Diehl et al. 2001 ; Donahue et al. 1993 ; Lutz and Ross 2003 ; McReynolds et al. 2000 ) and identity struggle (e.g., Block 1961 ; Goldman 2004 ; Sheldon et al. 1997 ). Note, however, that self-concept differentiation did not share unique variance with global sense of identity when it was entered simultaneously with other self-structure variables (see Table ​ Table8, 8 , Study 1b). Overlap emerged as a negative predictor for assimilation, thus indicating that greater unity in the self-concept structure was associated with less reliance on identity assimilation. It would seem that the identity processes of assimilation in itself does not serve any purpose, unless there is a dissonance within the self-concept, motivating an individual to reduce existing discrepancies. This is consistent with Whitbourne et al. ( 2002 ) descriptions of identity processes as different approaches to processing identity-discrepant experiences, different modes in dealing with changes in one’s life.

It is worth noting, that the obtained results could also be helpful for clarifying the relation between the two concepts – self and identity. From the literature review (e.g., Baumeister and Muraven 1996 ; Swann and Bosson 2010 ), one can note that the distinction between self and identity is not consistently well-established and the two concepts are sometimes used interchangeably. Since, in the present studies, the associations between self-structural indices and measures of personal identity had little predictive ability, it is tempting to assume that the way we describe ourselves in different situations or contexts, and the way we experience our selves are different phenomena. This conclusion is in line with authors who argue that the distinction between self and identity should be made and maintained (e.g., Berzonsky 2005 ; Katzko 2003 ; Oleś 2008 ). It should also be noticed that corresponding results, essentially no correlation between self-complexity and identity, were obtained by Suchańska and Ligocka ( 2011 ), whose study used different measures of identity, namely identity status and identity style approaches.

The results concerning the relationships of various measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation with thinking dispositions indicated self-concept differentiation to be the most important variable in predicting adaptive cognitive endeavors. It showed unique associations with need for cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge. The direction of these effects was by no means constant and suggested that a strong, curiosity-driven, desire to engage in effortful thinking was associated with greater unity in the self-concept. In line with the above results, integrative self-knowledge appeared also to be positively related to overlap. Once again, this result indicated that an adaptive capacity to understand and integrate self-experience across time was associated with a more unified self-structure. Our results can also be interpreted as providing evidence that active cognitive processing serves as a means of uniting self-experience and reducing discrepancies within the self. As such, they support theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature (e.g., Berzonsky 2008 ; Campbell et al. 1996 ; Ghorbani et al. 2008 ; Njus and Johnson 2008 ; Trapnell and Campbell 1999 ).

We will sum up with two concluding remarks: (1) measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation do not necessary measure what they have been purported to measure, (2) results concerning the relationships of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation with adaptive outcomes are generally affected by self-contents related variables; when the confounding factors were taken into account, the true effects of structural features of the self-concept, while suggesting that psychological well-being is associated with a stable and coherent self-concept, were of minor significance.

Though the present paper is unique in its consideration of various measures of self-structure and exploring areas that had not previously been investigated (e.g., examining the impact of self-concept structure on cognitive processing), our findings are not the first to indicate that the commonly used indices of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation may lack validity (e.g., Baird et al. 2006 ; Locke 2003 , 2006 ; Luo et al. 2009 ; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999 ; Solomon and Haaga 2003 ). Indeed, the reasonable degree of consensus reflected in the studies cited above argues for the invalidity, rather than the validity, of the measures employed here. Yet, these measures have been and are still being used as indices of the constructs they supposedly tap, thereby introducing potential artifacts. As it stands, there seems to be a gap between the available research evidence and using this evidence to change the measurement practice. Until this gap is filled, it would be premature to draw any definite conclusions about the relationship between the structure of the self-concept and important outcomes.

Limitations

The current investigation has a few limitations that merit discussion. First, the present studies included Polish participants only. On the one hand, the relative homogeneity of the samples studied here was a strength, as there were likely to be fewer confounding variables. On the other hand, it raises questions regarding the generalizability of the findings, for example, whether the results would hold for individuals with different cultural backgrounds. A number of cultural psychologists have pointed out that people in collectivistic cultures (or those with a predominantly interdependent self-construal) are expected to show less cross-situational consistency in their behavior (e.g., Choi and Choi 2002 ; Church et al. 2008 ; English and Chen 2007 ; Markus and Kitayama 1991 ). Moreover, self-consistency is believed to be central to optimal functioning in individualistic cultures, but not in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Cross et al. 2003 ; Pilarska 2014a ; Suh 2002 ). It should be noted that, with regard to cultural dimensions, Poland is one of the countries which Hofstede ( 1984 ) identified as an exception – while it is considered as an individualistic society, it also has high scores on both power distance and uncertainty avoidance (see also Minkov 2013 ; Murdoch 2009 ). As argued by Reykowski ( 1994 , 1998 ), despite popular belief that there has been a major change toward individualism in Poland, strong collectivistic elements have persisted.

There was also another limitation in relation to the samples. Given the developmental changes taking place during emerging adulthood (i.e., ages 18–25; Arnett 2000 ), the inclusion criteria could have been stricter or age could have been introduced as an additional independent variable. Since identity exploration – an active experimentation with different social roles – is thought to be an important feature of emerging adulthood (e.g., Arnett 2000 ; Schwartz et al. 2005 ), there may be a theoretical reason to expect age-related differences in the structure of self-concept among our participants. Diehl et al. ( 2001 ) obtained some evidence that self-concept differentiation was related to age, and that the association between self-concept differentiation and psychological well-being was moderated by age. More precisely, the negative effect of self-concept differentiation on psychological well-being was more pronounced in older adults than in younger adults.

Finally, an additional limitation of our studies could be the use of the Self-Incoherence Scale. This measure is similar to the one used by Donahue et al. ( 1993 ), but with considerably fewer adjectives, all of which are positively valenced. Since the indices of self-concept differentiation are sensitive to the within-role variation and the mean trait rating, perhaps using a longer and more balanced list of traits could reduce (but by no means eliminate) their limitations.

Recommendations

The conflation of self-concept structure and self-concept content evidenced by our results not only presents a problem for research, but also challenges the underlying theoretical models themselves. Both Linville’s ( 1987 ) and Donahue et al.’s ( 1993 ) models assume that structure and content are independent and, more specifically, that the valence of self-content is unrelated to structure. While various authors have reported on the inability to distinguish between structure and content (valence) by the applied measures, the possibility that the assumptions behind these models may themselves be the problem has been given less attention. Yet, research by Woolfolk and colleagues ( 1995 , 2004 ) demonstrated that evaluative valence may affect self-complexity, and identified two partially independent dimensions of self-complexity, namely positive self-complexity and negative self-complexity. In a similar vein, Locke ( 2006 ) provided support for the relative independence of positive and negative self-concept differentiation. The possible effects of features of the self-knowledge, other than valence, on the structure of the self-concept seem to deserve further investigation. Meanwhile, whether it is just that the currently available self-structural measures are vulnerable to self-enhancement and social desirability biases (e.g., the over-endorsement of positive traits) or the contents of the self-concept have an influence on the way they are organized, the inclusion of a measure of self-esteem should be considered standard practice in future studies utilizing measures of self-structure.

Moreover, the search for potential moderators of the effects of self-concept structure should continue. Only a few previous studies (besides those mentioned earlier) have examined whether the relationship between the structure of the self-concept and psychological well-being was conditional on other variables. McConnell et al. ( 2005 ) found support for a moderating role of self-aspects control, meaning that the positive relation between self-complexity and poor well-being was evident among those with low perceived control over their self-aspects. In another study, McConnell et al. ( 2006 ) found interactions between self-complexity and three of the Big Five major personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness) in accounting for differences in well-being. The findings of Diehl and Hay ( 2011 ) revealed that the relationship of self-concept differentiation and well-being was qualified by self-concept clarity. Other relevant factors that might moderate the effects of self-concept structure could include, for example, importance (centrality) of one’s self-aspects and internalization of one’s self-aspects (Ryan and Deci 2003 ).

Future research should also examine potential antecedents of different dimensions of self-structure. There is very little empirical evidence on what factors actually lead to individual differences in the self-concept structure. To our knowledge, except for cross-cultural studies, there have been only few investigations on this topic. Using a developmental perspective, Evans and Seaman ( 2000 ) proposed that individual differences in self-complexity could be explained by differences in maturity of defense mechanisms. Also encouraging are the findings by Lutz and Ross ( 2003 ) that link self-concept differentiation to aspects of parental bonding. Moreover, conclusions drawn from the longitudinal study of Donahue et al. ( 1993 ) support the view that psychological adjustment may be a causal antecedent to self-concept differentiation.

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by an internal grant for young scientists at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Adam Mickiewicz.

1 We used Styła et al.’s ( 2010 ) tool called Self-Incoherence Scale to assess self-concept differentiation. Therefore, the terms self-concept differentiation and self-incoherence will be used interchangeable throughout this paper.

2 In computing the SCD SD score, we allowed for up to seven non-responses (20 %), with no more than one omission on each trait adjective. When calculating SCD indices based on correlation coefficients, we allowed for one role (20 %) to be excluded from the correlation matrix, either because of the zero within variance or because of non-responses on all seven trait adjectives. The remaining six correlations were then averaged or processed by factor analysis to obtain the SCD R and the SCD VAR scores, respectively.

3 We allowed for up to 20 % of non-responses in each subscale and then used a single imputation procedure (person mean substitution). Missing values were replaced with the intraindividual mean of the other items on that subscale. Missing responses to the other multi-item measures used in this study were treated in the same manner unless otherwise specified.

4 A total of 17.3 % of the sample received a zero score on OL thereby causing a divide by zero in further computation of the SC statistic.

5 We performed additional regression analyses to examine the potential confounding of quantity with evaluation. Both the number of chosen adjectives and the proportion of positive traits chosen (PPAT) were entered to assess whether they uniquely contributed to the prediction of the dependent variables. The results showed that the number of attributes uniquely contributed to the prediction of NSA (β = 0.47, p  < 0.001), OL (β = 0.25, p  < 0.001), and the H score (β = 0.97, p  < 0.001), and the proportion of positive attributes uniquely predicted OL (β = 0.11, p  < 0.01) and the H score (β = 0.03, p  < 0.05). Sakaki’s SC statistic was unrelated to any of these two variables (β = 0.03 and β = −0.04, ns , respectively). It is worth noting that the richness of self-depiction and its favorability were not exactly independent of each other, as demonstrated by a significant correlation between them ( r  = −0.18, p  < 0.001). Moreover, in the model of the H score, the interaction term of NAT and PPAT appeared to be significant ( F (1, 648) =8.63, p  < 0.01). The effect of the number of traits on the H score was consistently positive and increased with increasing proportion of positive traits.

6 We also employed Hayes ( 2012 ) bootstrapping PROCESS tool for SPSS to assess the direct and indirect effects of NSA and OL on either the H or SC scores, with NAT as a mediating variable. The remaining component of self-complexity was used as a covariate and partialed out of all paths in the respective model. A total of 1000 re-samples of the data were executed using Hayes’ SPSS macro. The confidence intervals for the indirect effects of NSA and OL on the H scores via NAT did not include zero (estimate =0.12, 95 % CI =0.09, 0.14 and estimate =0.73, 95 % CI =0.40, 1.02 for NSA and OL, respectively). Thus, the number of traits mediated the relationships of the number of self-aspects and overlap with the H score. The indirect effect of NSA on the SC score was found to be significant (estimate = −2.89, 95 % CI = −6.70, −0.87). However, there was no indication of a significant indirect effect of overlap on the SC scores through the number of traits (estimate = −4.07, 95 % CI = −18.78, 1.56).

7 For a total of 7.2 % of the sample, the SCD R and SCD VAR scores could not be calculated because of zero within variation for more than one role.

8 The comparison of all three groups (low, medium, and high mean trait ratings) led to the same conclusions. According to Kruskal-Wallis tests, there was a significant effect of the mean self-rating classification on the SCD SD score (χ2(2) =129.62, p  < 0.001, E R 2  = 0.15). Subsequent pairwise comparisons, performed using the Mann–Whitney U test, showed that all three groups were significantly different from each other with respect to the SCD SD scores ( p  < 0.01).

9 Bootstrapping analysis (Hayes 2012 ) was used to test the mediating role of the mean trait rating. A total of 1000 re-samples of the data were executed using Hayes’ macro. As zero was not in the 95 % confidence interval for the indirect effect, we can conclude that it was indeed significant (estimate = −0.12, 95 % CI = −0.24, −0.03).

10 In each of the samples, we made a series of comparisons between participants for whom we had data and those for whom we did not, to assess whether there was any notable difference between them on any of the outcome measure. Comparisons were performed using the Mann–Whitney U-test. Significant differences were found between those for whom we obtained the SCD VAR and SCD R scores and those for whom we did not in relation to global sense of identity (Study 1a: U =1784.00, p  < 0.01, r  = 0.15); and between those for whom we obtained the SC scores and those for whom we did not in relation to accommodation (Study 1c: U =436.50, p  < 0.05, r  = 0.19) and balance (Study 1c: U =299.50, p  < 0.001, r  = 0.30).

11 The PROCESS macro (Hayes 2012 ) was used to test for mediation and moderation effects. We found evidence for mediation of the relationship between self-concept differentiation and global sense of identity, through the mean trait ratings (estimate = −0.11, 95 % CI = −0.17, −0.06 and estimate = −0.10, 95 % CI = −0.14, −0.06 for the indirect effects of SCD SD in Study 1a and Study 1b, respectively).

12 There were significant differences with regard to the cognitive variables among participants for whom we had complete data and those for whom we did not, suggesting that a bias would be present. Those for whom we did not obtain the SCD VAR and SCD R scores had lower levels of integrative self-knowledge than did those for whom we could calculate both scores ( U =9722.50, p  < 0.05, r  = 0.11). The same was true in case of the SC scores ( U =16487.00, p  < 0.01, r  = 0.13).

13 Using PROCESS bootstrapping macro (Hayes 2012 ), we found that the effect of self-concept differentiation on need for cognition as well as on integrative self-knowledge was mediated by the mean trait ratings (estimate = −3.89, 95 % CI = −5.79, −2.42 and estimate = −0.09, 95 % CI = −0.15, −0.04 for the indirect effect of SCD SD on NCS and ISK, respectively). Also, the number of traits used in the sort served as a significant mediator between overlap and integrative self-knowledge (estimate =0.13, 95 % CI =0.03, 0.28 for the indirect effect of OL).

14 In a private correspondence, Michiko Sakaki herself has suggested the use of overlap and the number of aspects participants reported as alternative measures of self-complexity. One strategy, that we felt might be useful for overcoming division by zero would be adding a small constant (for example, 0.001) to the divisor. The majority of previous findings were replicated when this correction was used, except that the correlation between accommodation and the SC score was lost (Study 1c, r  = 0.18, ns ), whereas the correlation between balance and the SC score was significant (Study 1c, r  = −0.27, p  < 0.01). However, in the simultaneous regression, the SC score was unrelated to either accommodation or balance (β = 0.14 and β = −0.10, ns , respectively). Full results are available on request.

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Healthy Narcissism: How Breakthrough Research Contradicts This Concept

Does healthy narcissism exist? In recent years, the notion of “healthy narcissism” has gained traction in popular culture and self-help circles. Proponents of this concept argue that a certain degree of self-interest and self-focus is necessary for personal growth and success. However, this idea is not only misleading but also potentially harmful, as it contradicts established neuropsychological research findings.

Instead of embracing the myth of “healthy narcissism,” it is more beneficial to cultivate self-realization, a concept rooted in Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory.

Let’s dive in…

Understanding Narcissism: A Malignant, Dark Personality – Not a Healthy Trait

Narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) is not a mere personality quirk or a continuum of self-absorption. Recent neuroimaging studies have revealed striking similarities between the brains of narcissists and psychopaths, suggesting that NPD is a more malignant condition than previously believed.

Brain scans of individuals with NPD show structural and functional abnormalities in regions associated with empathy, emotional regulation, and social cognition, mirroring the neural deficits observed in psychopaths. Specifically, narcissists exhibit reduced gray matter volume in the insular cortex and prefrontal areas, which are crucial for empathy and emotional processing.

Moreover, research has found that narcissists, like psychopaths, have an overactive striatum, a brain region involved in reward processing and decision-making. This striatal hyperactivity is linked to the impulsive, reward-seeking behavior and lack of consideration for consequences exhibited by both narcissists and psychopaths.

Contrary to the belief that narcissists struggle with self-loathing or shame, neuroimaging studies suggest that narcissists lack the capacity for genuine remorse or empathy. Their brain abnormalities, particularly in the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, impair their ability to experience and process emotions like guilt, shame, or remorse.

Furthermore, the deceptive nature of narcissists, often characterized by grandiose lies and manipulation, is reflected in their brain activity patterns. Functional MRI studies have shown that when narcissists lie or engage in deception, they exhibit reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex, a region associated with moral reasoning and decision-making.

These neurobiological findings challenge the notion of a “healthy narcissism” continuum. Instead, they suggest that narcissism is a distinct and severe personality disorder with profound neurological underpinnings, akin to the brain abnormalities observed in psychopathy.

Rather than experiencing self-loathing or remorse, narcissists lack the neurological capacity for genuine empathy, guilt, or shame. Their brain abnormalities facilitate a persistent pattern of grandiosity, exploitation, and a lack of concern for others, making NPD a more malignant condition than previously believed.

It is important to note that narcissism is not a personality trait that exists on a continuum, with “healthy” levels at one end and “unhealthy” levels at the other. Rather, it is a distinct personality disorder that can have significant negative impacts on those closely involved with these individuals.

More On the Supposed “Narcissistic Continuum”

While some highly-esteemed psychologists propose the idea of narcissism existing on a continuum, neuroimaging studies do not support this notion. Brain scans of individuals with narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) reveal distinct structural and functional abnormalities that differentiate them from those without the disorder. There is no evidence of a gradual continuum of brain changes corresponding to varying levels of narcissistic traits.  Specifically, individuals diagnosed with NPD exhibit reduced gray matter volume in key brain regions like the insular cortex and prefrontal areas involved in empathy, emotional regulation, and social cognition. These structural deficits are not observed in a milder form among those without a clinical diagnosis, suggesting a clear neurobiological distinction between narcissists and non-narcissists.

Furthermore, the concept of a “narcissistic continuum” is difficult to validate due to the inherent lack of transparency and honesty in narcissistic individuals. Narcissists are known to be deceptive and manipulative, often presenting an inflated or distorted view of themselves on self-report assessments. This tendency to lie and exaggerate their positive qualities makes it challenging to accurately measure and quantify narcissistic traits, undermining attempts to place individuals on a continuum based on such measures.

Therefore, while the idea of a narcissistic continuum may be theoretically proposed, it lacks empirical support from neuroimaging studies and is confounded by the deceptive nature of narcissists themselves. Brain scans indicate a clear neurobiological distinction between those with NPD and those without, suggesting that narcissism is a categorical disorder rather than a spectrum of traits.

The Flawed Logic of “Healthy Narcissism”

The concept of “healthy narcissism” is an oxymoron that contradicts the very definition and diagnostic criteria of narcissistic personality disorder. It suggests that a certain degree of self-absorption and self-centeredness can be beneficial, which is not supported by empirical evidence or scientific research. Proponents of “healthy narcissism” often conflate self-love and self-confidence with narcissistic traits. However, these are distinct concepts. Self-love and self-confidence are positive qualities that involve self-acceptance, self-respect, and a realistic assessment of one’s strengths and weaknesses.

Narcissism, on the other hand, is characterized by an inflated and distorted sense of self-importance, a lack of empathy, and a tendency to exploit others. Furthermore, the notion of “healthy narcissism” lacks empirical support and has not been extensively researched or validated by scientific studies. It is a theoretical construct proposed by some psychoanalysts, but it does not have a strong foundation in neuropsychology.

Embracing Self-Realization: Maslow’s Perspective on Healthy Self-Development

Instead of embracing the myth of “healthy narcissism,” it is more beneficial to cultivate self-realization, a concept rooted in Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory. Self-realization, also known as self-actualization, refers to the process of realizing one’s full potential and becoming the best version of oneself. According to Maslow, self-realization is the highest level of human motivation and personal growth. It involves the pursuit of meaningful goals, the development of positive qualities such as creativity and spontaneity, and a concern for the well-being of others.

Unlike narcissism, which is characterized by self-absorption and a lack of empathy, self-realization emphasizes self-awareness, personal growth, and the development of positive qualities that contribute to the greater good. Maslow’s theory of self-realization is supported by extensive research and has been widely accepted and incorporated into various fields of psychology, including humanistic psychology, positive psychology, and personal growth theories.

Unmasking the Seductive Lie of “Healthy Narcissism”

In our image-obsessed world, the idea of “healthy narcissism” has seduced many into believing that a little self-love and self-promotion is not only acceptable but necessary for success. But what if this widely embraced concept is nothing more than a dangerous delusion, a wolf in sheep’s clothing that threatens to devour our very souls?

The narcissistic mindset is a seductive siren’s call, luring us with the promise of unwavering confidence, unshakable self-belief, and the ability to unapologetically pursue our desires. Yet, beneath this alluring facade lies a sinister truth – narcissism, even in its supposed “healthy” form, is a toxic force that erodes our humanity, corroding empathy, authenticity, and genuine connection.

Proponents of “healthy narcissism” would have us believe that a touch of self-absorption is harmless, even beneficial. But this is a lie, a carefully crafted illusion designed to justify and normalize a deeply destructive mindset. For narcissism, in any guise, is a malignant force that breeds emotional detachment, exploitation, and a callous disregard for the needs and feelings of others.

The path to true self-worth and fulfillment lies not in the empty promises of “healthy narcissism” but in the transformative power of self-realization. This journey requires us to shed the masks we wear, to confront our deepest vulnerabilities, and to embrace our authentic selves – flaws and all.

Does Healthy Narcissism Exist? – Conclusion

The concept of “healthy narcissism” is a flawed and potentially harmful notion that contradicts established neuropsychological theories and research findings.

Instead of embracing self-absorption and self-centeredness, it is more beneficial to cultivate self-realization, a concept rooted in Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory.  Self-realization emphasizes personal growth, self-awareness, and the development of positive qualities that contribute to the greater good. It involves the pursuit of meaningful goals, the cultivation of empathy and compassion, and a commitment to continuous self-improvement.

By rejecting the myth of “healthy narcissism” and embracing self-realization, individuals can embark on a journey of personal growth, self-acceptance, and positive impact on the world around them. It is a path that leads to a more fulfilling and meaningful life, grounded in self-awareness, empathy, and a genuine concern for the well-being of others.

Kim Saeed is a leading voice in the field of narcissistic abuse recovery. Drawing from her 13+ years of extensive expertise, she guides survivors to reclaim their power and rebuild their lives after enduring the trauma of psychological abuse and manipulation.  If you’d like to work with Kim, visit the Schedule a Session Page.

Psychological Medicine, Volume 41 , Issue 8 , August 2011 , pp. 1641 – 1650

nature.com/articles/s41598-021-94920-z

Do Psychopaths Have Emotions?

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239521124_Gray_matter_abnormalities_in_patients_with_narcissistic_personality_disorder

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10605183/

https://scitechdaily.com/scientists-have-established-a-key-biological-difference-between-psychopaths-and-normal-people/

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N.C. PSI Advances AI for Agriculture

At NC State University, the N.C. Plant Sciences Initiative is leading efforts aimed at helping producers put artificial intelligence to work for increased yields, efficiency and sustainability.

Two new tools will propel its work in AI for agriculture forward: A robot named BenchBot 3.0 has taken its place on an empty field adjacent to the Plant Sciences Building on NC State’s Centennial Campus. It’s just one of the data-gathering devices that will be tied into the power of N.C. PSI’s newly acquired supercomputer, the NVIDIA Grace Hopper 200, to create AI for agricultural applications.

One of the Grace Hopper’s first tasks will be to begin making sense of the half million plant photos that BenchBot will take as it passes repeatedly over 500 pots of different plant species.

Those photos, along with ones taken by earlier versions of the BenchBot, will help feed what N.C. PSI Platform Director for Resilient Agriculture Chris Reberg-Horton says will be the world’s largest open-source agricultural image repository.

Reberg-Horton and his colleagues in the Precision Sustainable Agriculture network will use the collected photos to develop software and tools that can help farmers make all kinds of decisions about their crops: when and where to harvest, spray for weeds or insects, fertilize and more.

Getting from photos to those applications will take powerful AI, and the NVIDIA Grace Hopper, with its ability to handle five terabytes of data per second, is just the right tool, says Jevon Smith , N.C. PSI’s research computing manager.

The most powerful computer of its kind on NC State’s campus, the machine enables teams working on interdisciplinary plant sciences research to take on large datasets, like the image repository, to make more complex models and come up with solutions faster than ever.

Step One: Telling Apples From Oranges

Getting computers to recognize plants, weeds and other stressors is the first step toward getting machines to detect problems or map performance, says Reberg-Horton, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina Foundation/W.K. Kellogg Distinguished Professor in Sustainable Community-Based Food Systems in the Department of Crop and Soil Sciences .

He likens what he and his colleagues are doing to build the image repository and create grower decision tools to what car companies have done to make self-driving cars a reality.

“If you’ve got a company that is trying out some new technology for self-driving cars, the first thing they have got to do is to train computers to understand and recognize the things a car sees, and so if you’ve ever done the CAPTCHA stuff — identify the bicycles, identify the pedestrians — you’re basically helping train AI because you’re labeling images so that computers can learn to recognize, ‘That’s a person. Don’t hit the gas now,’” he says.

And it’s not just self-driving cars that use such image-based AI.

“In a lot of economic sectors, we have literally millions of images labeled so that we can train computers on tasks like driving around a city,” he says. “We don’t have that in agriculture.”

The agricultural image repository is designed to help technology developers fill that gap. Ag technology companies large and small will have access, as will anyone who uses the internet.

Already, with earlier versions of the BenchBot, Reberg-Horton says the team “has tackled about 30 of the most common weed species in North America. For cash crops, we have imaged corn, soybeans, cotton, wheat, rye, barley and oats.”

“In theory we can do about 1,000 plant pots per day, but we will test logistics slowly before going that big,” Reberg-Horton adds. “This summer will be just weeds. From October to March, we will image winter cover crop species.”

Meanwhile, two other BenchBots are being deployed to add images from different locations. One is at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Center in Beltsville, Maryland, while a  third will be deployed soon at College Station, home of Texas A&M University.

Achieving Precision Agriculture’s Promises

The images the BenchBots collect will help overcome a bottleneck in fully realizing the concept of precision farming, Reberg-Horton notes.

In precision farming, producers deliver exactly what a plant needs, precisely when and where and in what amounts it’s needed. For example, rather than spraying an entire field for insects, which would be expensive, they could spray just the areas where they are a problem. That would protect crops, limit chemical use and safeguard the environment from excess application.

Thanks to information technology, the concept of precision farming, forged in the 1980s, has taken off since the 2000s.

Smith says that while AI has become controversial, its rapid development is pushing precision farming technology ahead faster than ever.

“You can’t turn on the TV without hearing two letters — AI,” Smith says. “There are so many bad stories about AI out there, but the applications in the agriculture sector include increasing yields, reducing waste, helping reduce carbon emissions, and more. It can be used for great good.”

And it already is.

There are self-driving tractors and combines, and some are equipped with variable rate equipment that can sense where to apply chemicals and where to plant seeds — and do those tasks. Artificial intelligence is also used in farming for water management, crop rotation, harvest timing, optimal planting and more.

“We’ve been talking about precision agriculture for decades,” Reberg-Horton says. “It’s really been aspirational for the most part because we have to have lots of knowledge about a field to be able to manage each piece of the field optimally. The smart equipment is available now to apply most of our inputs variably. But we have been stuck on creating enough intelligence to tell that equipment what to do.

“Computer vision is the technology that can do it, and we will start seeing cameras on all of our agricultural machinery.”

What’s Happening With AI at the N.C. PSI

The N.C. PSI has made significant headway in applying AI in agriculture. For example, to allow growers to know precisely when to plant soybeans and how to manage soybeans in counties across the state, Rachel Vann — has worked alongside computer engineering experts to lead a team developing an AI-powered web application that will be released this fall. Vann is an NC State Extension soybean specialist, assistant professor in the Department of crop and Soil Sciences and N.C. PSI platform director for extension outreach and engagement.

Her colleague, Cranos Williams — N.C. PSI’s platform director for data analytics and Goodnight Distinguished Professor of Agricultural Analytics in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering — is among the leaders of N.C. PSI’s Sweet-APPS team. The team is working to reduce labor in the post-harvest handling of sweetpotatoes by helping producers use sensors and machines to sort and grade the vegetables by size, shape and other characteristics.

And to increase soybean resilience to climate change, N.C. PSI’s Ross Sozzani , professor in the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology and platform director for plant improvement, is working with U.S. Department of Agriculture scientist Anna Locke , as well as colleagues at the VIB, a life sciences institute in Belgium. The team is marrying machine learning, crop physiology and phosphoproteomics to evaluate the plant’s temperature stress regulators and develop a test to rapidly screen soybean genetics for temperature tolerance. The data they generate will allow the breeders to identify temperature-tolerant soybean varieties more efficiently.

More Tools From Reberg-Horton

Meanwhile, crop scientist Reberg-Horton is making progress with several AI-powered tools, some that rely on images in the repository he’s helping build. One tool uses cameras and AI-trained software to allow growers to map where they have herbicide-resistant weeds, such as the notoriously noxious palmer amaranth.

He calls the weed “sticky” because it tends to come back to the same area where it’s grown the previous year. Having a map of where palmer amaranth grew one year would help the farmer know where to use pesticides or rotate crops in the following year.

“It may sound trivial, but you’ve got to remember that the farmers that I deal with — big row crop farmers — might have 5,000 acres spread over multiple counties,” he says. “Given the growth that’s occurred in the size of farms, thinking they know where everything is at and where the bad spots are is just not true anymore.”

Another tool Reberg-Horton’s working on is designed for those who grow cover crops, which are planted in the off-season on land where cash crops are grown. They help manage soil quality, fertility, erosion and pests such as weeds and insects. Because cover crops have environmental benefits, the federal government offers incentives for planting them.

“Increasingly the Natural Resources Conservation Service is encouraging mixtures of species. So you might have a legume and a grass in a mix. Sometimes we even see complicated mixes where you might have five or six species,” he says.

“Applying the right amount of the fertilizer nitrogen onto crops like corn is already tricky because soils are not uniform across a field,” he explains. “Cover crop mixtures can amplify that variation because legumes in the mix will supply nitrogen to the corn, while other cover crops in the mix will not. We have to map the growth of each species to account for that. In essence, we are asking AI to recognize plant species.”

Using that information to reduce the need for nitrogen fertilizer saves money for farmers and reduces the environmental impact: Nitrates are lead contaminants of groundwater, where they can cause drinking water problems, and can run into surface water, where they can cause algal blooms. 

Putting More Power in the Interdisciplinary Mix

In supporting the development of smart tools for agriculture, the Grace Hopper will give the N.C. PSI an advantage. The computer is named for a computer programming pioneer who began her U.S. Navy career during World War II.

To secure and deploy the Grace Hopper, N.C. PSI has partnered with Cambridge Computing, an NVIDIA reseller that specializes in consulting with universities and research institutions. N.C. PSI secured one of 50 university seed grants to get the supercomputer.

“We already have two machine learning systems, and the Grace Hopper is a new tool on a level we haven’t had before,” Smith says. “It gives us the capability to train even larger-scale models to become more accurate and more predictive in nature and come up with solutions to more complicated challenges.”

One of the top challenges has meaning for farmers and consumers alike. “Growers are faced with needing to meet a growing population’s need for more food at the same time that climate change is altering growing conditions,” Smith says.

U.S. farmers are also facing serious labor shortages. While one of the fears surrounding AI is that it’ll take away jobs, supporters say it may hold promise for easing agricultural worker shortages, especially with the labor-intensive crops that North Carolina is known for — sweetpotatoes and tobacco, for starters.

As Reberg-Horton notes, “We’ve been talking about precision agriculture for decades. We know what we want, but it’s hard to get there. The AI revolution has been a missing piece that’ll help us get there.”

This post was originally published in Plant Sciences Initiative.

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Our future lives and livelihoods: Sustainable and inclusive and growing

As the world economy starts to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis, the time will soon come for leaders to look beyond safeguarding lives and livelihoods  and to set their sights on a more profound challenge: bettering them. This societal challenge might be ten times as big as the pandemic and last ten times as long. The three goals we have in mind—growth, sustainability, and inclusion—buttress one another yet don’t always pull in the same direction; we see powerful reinforcing as well as counteracting loops among them (exhibit). And so, while many might broadly agree on the aspiration, there’s a very tough question lurking in the background: How do we go about building a future that delivers growth and sustainability and inclusion?

Full disclosure: we’re not going to offer an answer. Instead, we propose a way for changemakers in business, government, and society to explore the problem, a mental model that might offer the best chance to reach the answer. It starts with this: we believe the ands are crucial and that they are in fact the means to the end . The three elements of growth, sustainability, and inclusion are deeply connected and cannot be viewed as trade-offs. Consider this: without growth, how could we achieve prosperity and well-being or pay for the transitions needed to make the economy more sustainable and inclusive? Without sustainability, how could we fashion growth for the current generation and the ones to follow? Without inclusion—an opportunity for productive work and a satisfying life for all citizens—how could we ensure the demand needed to propel growth? Indeed, getting to and —moving to a world in which growth and sustainability and inclusion form a powerful dynamic—is the imperative for the next era of business.

But before we get to the challenge of and , let’s face facts: hastening growth, sustainability, and inclusion are incredibly difficult challenges in their own right. Fortunately, thinkers, strategists, activists, and many others around the world—dreamers and doers—are working on it. We are too. In our view, the world will need to confront three problems simultaneously:

• Growth is elusive. In the mature G-7 economies, GDP growth has halved to 1 percent per year on average since the 2008 global financial crisis. 1 World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021, International Monetary Fund, imf.org. It’s the same story in emerging economies: despite some exceptions, such as China and India, growth in emerging economies overall has been lower recently than in the early 2000s.
• Poverty is still endemic, despite the progress made. More than 600 million people still lived in extreme poverty as of 2017. And in 2020, another 100 million or so people joined them as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. This will persist unless today’s leaders create sufficient jobs with decent wages, as well as a robust social contract that ensures access to affordable housing, healthcare, and energy for the bottom one to three quintiles of the population, depending on the country. Meanwhile, a new threat to personal income is mounting: the rise of technology-driven changes in the ways we work, which the pandemic has accelerated. We estimate that more than 100 million people will need to make occupational transitions  by 2030 in a set of eight advanced and emerging economies.
• Ensuring a sustainable future will require massive investment. For example, the International Energy Agency estimates that net-zero emissions might require investments of almost $5 trillion each year by 2030, and $4.5 trillion per year by 2050. 2 Net Zero by 2050 , International Energy Agency, July 2021, iea.org. The annual bill equates to about half of global corporate profits in 2019, or about one and a half times the annual increase in public debt over the preceding 15 years. Additional investments needed for decarbonization in agriculture, transportation, and other sectors could nearly double the bill. While many of these investments would produce a return, their financing or pricing is not yet set up.

And that’s just the start: as we explain in this article, even if the global economy were to get these three goals notionally right, there are contingencies among them that, if left unresolved, could wreck any progress made.

Here, we seek to frame the debate about achieving sustainable, inclusive growth in a clear-eyed way, laying out the aspiration but also the toughest problems that need to be solved to achieve this growth, with some illustrations as to their size. Good strategy should always start with asking the right questions. For today’s leaders, the questions are vast and profound— and soluble.

Good strategy should always start with asking the right questions. For today’s leaders, the questions are vast, profound— and soluble.

The virtuous cycle starts with growth

What do we mean by sustainable, inclusive growth? There are many ideas associated with these words. We aim for broad rather than narrow interpretations:

• In growth, we include the ambition of increased prosperity and well-being, including economic-profit growth for companies, GDP growth for nations—as well as measures such as life satisfaction for citizens—derived in part from dignity of work (while recognizing that measurable definitions of well-being are still evolving).
• In inclusion, we consider equality of opportunity and broad-based progress of outcomes for all—especially sufficiency of living standards—and the narrowing of inequalities among genders, ages, ethnicities, family backgrounds, and places of residence.
• In sustainability, we aim for environmental resilience, which starts with reducing climate risk but also includes much broader preservation of natural capital as well as intergenerational fairness, all considered in terms of economic and societal costs and benefits.

These three goals are daunting. Fortunately, they can strengthen and reinforce one another:

• Growth supports inclusion, part 1: Creating meaningful jobs and lifting incomes. High-growth emerging economies  have delivered powerful proof that growth supports inclusion, by reducing the global share of those living in extreme poverty by two-thirds—to less than 10 percent of the world’s population—and by welcoming hundreds of millions to the middle class. This applies in advanced economies too: from the early 1990s to 2005, before the global financial crisis, GDP per capita rose by 2 to 4 percent per year and real median household market incomes also rose.
• Growth supports inclusion, part 2: Correcting labor-market inadequacies. In growing economies, government transfers and tax policies can help support incomes for large swaths of the population. Research from the McKinsey Global Institute found that real market incomes were flat or fell  for just 20 to 25 percent of households, after taxes and transfers; before these transfers, some 60 to 70 percent of households saw incomes decline. During the pandemic, while US median household income dropped 2.9 percent in 2020, the share of people living in poverty declined , after accounting for government aid. 3 Income, poverty and health insurance coverage in the United States: 2020, US Census Bureau, September 14, 2021, census.gov.
• Growth enables sustainability by encouraging investment. Economic growth strengthens consumer confidence , spending, and demand, all vital elements of a healthy investment climate—which the energy transition is going to need. And as our research on outperforming emerging economies  has shown, the capital deepening that results from greater investment spurs productivity and, with it, wages and growth.
• Greater inclusion and sustainability promote growth through new demand and investment opportunities. Sustainability drives new business opportunities in domains such as clean technologies. India, for example, could more than quadruple its renewable-energy capacity by 2030 ; we estimate that this could generate some $90 billion in GDP and support about two million jobs in 2030. And inclusion has similarly powerful effects on growth. We estimate that more inclusive access to healthcare could add 0.4 percent to the world’s GDP  growth by 2040. More broadly, inclusion spurs demand, as a burgeoning middle class is a key driver of consumption. Africa has about 200 million young people of working age and will have close to a billion by 2050. Youth training and development, especially of digital skills, can vault this group into the middle class—and help close skill gaps in the rest of the world.
• Sustainability reinforces both inclusion and growth through the ‘energy prize.’ The energy transition will yield a prize of two cross-cutting benefits: lower costs that make energy more accessible, and more productive lives. Over the past ten years, the cost of electricity from renewables fell about 50 to 85 percent . 4 “Majority of new renewables undercut cheapest fossil fuel on cost,” International Renewable Energy Agency, June 22, 2021, irena.org. Renewables are now gaining ground in developing economies. In sub-Saharan Africa, a region with the lowest energy-access rate in the world, decentralized renewable solutions such as rooftop solar are taking root. 5 Jan Corfee-Morlot et al., Achieving clean energy access in sub-Saharan Africa , Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 31, 2019, oecd.org. Lower emissions and reduced air pollution can improve health and allow more people to participate productively in the economy. History has some instructive lessons: after passage of the Clean Air Act in the United States, in 1970, reduced pollution increased the labor-force participation rate for affected individuals and had a positive long-run impact on wages . 6 Adam Isen, Maya Rossin-Slater, and Reed Walker, “Every breath you take, every dollar you’ll make: The long-term consequences of the Clean Air Act of 1970,” VoxEU, February 19, 2014, voxeu.org.

These three goals—sustainability, inclusion, growth—are daunting. Fortunately they can strengthen and reinforce each other.

Squaring the circle

If only each element of the circle of sustainable, inclusive growth created purely positive reinforcements to the others, the way forward would be clear. But the reality is that sustainability, inclusion, and growth also counteract. Squaring this circle means combating three sets of potential counterforces, which could be just as powerful as the reinforcing loops.

A McKinsey Live event on 'Charting a sustainable, inclusive, and growing future'

Growth’s counteractions

Growth imposes two major challenges. First is the persistent rise in inequality, which could worsen with growth. Already, 70 percent of the global population live in countries where inequality is mounting. Second is rising resource consumption and emissions.

• Growth affects inclusion through skill-biased inequality—and its magnitude is set to rise with trends accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Growth in the knowledge-based economy has stoked demand for higher-level cognitive, technological, and socioemotional skills — a demand not matched by the supply of workers with such skills. As a result, a skill-biased inequality in many countries has sprung up. In the United States, for example, wages for middle-income jobs grew by 1.1 percent between 2000 and 2018, whereas wages for high-pay and low-pay workers grew much faster , at 7.3 and 5.3 percent, respectively. As the pandemic accelerates digitization and automation, almost all growth in labor demand could occur in high-wage occupations . The number of workers who would need to make occupational transitions by 2030 in order to stay employed would increase by up to 25 percent , including—for the first time—many low-wage workers.
• Growth counteracts sustainability through greater resource consumption. The global “material footprint” —that is, the raw materials used to make the goods that we consume—rises in correlation with GDP growth. 7 The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2019 , United Nations, 2019, unstats.un.org. As growth expands in emerging countries, the problem of an increasing global material footprint could get worse. According to the World Bank , about 10 percent of the world’s people still have no access to electricity, and 2.6 billion people lack access to clean cooking solutions. 8 “Report: Universal access to sustainable energy will remain elusive without addressing inequalities,” World Bank press release, June 7, 2021, worldbank.org. If increased demand from a globally expanding consuming class is not accompanied by improvements in resource efficiency, this will put an even heavier burden on the planet.

Sustainability’s counteractions

Trillions in capital are needed for energy investment to achieve the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. If consumers and businesses shoulder the burden, near-term growth and inclusion could suffer, even though the longer-term benefits are clear. If costs are passed on to consumers, energy prices could rise well before the gains are eventually reaped, and if costs are passed on to businesses, the profitability of whole sectors could suffer.

This dynamic sets up the potential for two counteractions: uneven distribution of impact and a challenge to the goal of inclusion.

• The energy transition could affect some countries and sectors severely. Oil- and natural-gas-producing economies could see their annual per capita income from these products fall by about 75 percent by the 2030s , according to the International Energy Agency. 9 Net Zero by 2050 , International Energy Agency, July 2021, iea.org. Lower-income countries will be disproportionately exposed because they have a higher share of emissions-intensive sectors and will also need to make higher investments relative to their GDP. Those sectors include power, automotive, construction, and others, all of which will be intensely affected, as will supply chains.
• Lower-income households are disproportionately vulnerable. In Europe, recent rises in energy prices—the vanguard of the energy transition—are falling heavily on low-income households, prompting some governments, including in Spain, to provide subsidies . 10 “Spain targets energy firms as European bills surge,” BCC, September 14, 2021, bbc.com. And while the transition could lead to some 18 million more jobs in the green economy , according to International Labour Organization estimates, many people, especially lower-income workers, will need to retrain to qualify for these new jobs. 11 Greening with jobs—World Employment and Social Outlook 2018 , International Labour Organization, May 14, 2018, ilo.org.

Inclusion’s potential counteractions

The positive spillovers of inclusion are indisputable and well documented: greater workforce participation, higher creativity, more capital allocated to children’s needs. However, poorly conceived measures to boost inclusion can have unintended negative consequences that can include distorted product markets, reduced investment, or faster environmental depletion. For example, in developing economies, free or highly subsidized nonvolumetric pricing of electricity used to pump water can lead to groundwater depletion . 12 Bekele Shifraw, “Addressing groundwater depletion: Lessons from India, the world’s largest user of groundwater,” World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, August 23, 2021, ieg.worldbankgroup.org. Efforts to achieve equality can also backfire if they become a box-ticking exercise, or a quota-driven program, which may fail to address the root causes of inequality. As a result, the goal of achieving a fairer workplace or society may not be achieved, and outcomes may even worsen for certain groups.

As in the pandemic, we will need multiple experiments, unprecedented speed in scaling successful ones, and broad participation across actors.

Starting here, starting now: A proposal

Achieving a future that is sustainable and inclusive and growing is so compelling an idea that today’s leaders owe it to future generations to act immediately. Such a feat cannot be left to enlightened self-interest: if it were that easy, the problem would already have been solved. We see six key challenges that will need to be tackled—with success or failure hinging on how effectively these challenges are met.

• How to unlock growth supported by higher productivity of an additional 1.0 to 1.5 percentage points of GDP per year, at a global scale with the same urgency that we have seen during the COVID-19 pandemic?
• How to reduce the transition costs of decarbonization by, say, $500 billion to $1 trillion of the $5 trillion in required spending per year through technological innovation and smart-portfolio choices?
• How to finance and smooth the cost of the energy transition , country by country and sector by sector, in a way that won’t stifle growth?
• How to reskill and re-employ more than 100 million workers who are in stagnating or shrinking occupations as a result of technological change, including the many millions who will likely be displaced by energy transitions?
• How to strengthen the social contract by achieving basic needs for median households , including affordable housing, healthcare, and energy—needs that are unmet for many of these families in both advanced and developing countries—in a way that attracts private-sector innovation and supply?
• How to support the most vulnerable population segments —for example, the poorest one-fifth of the global population—that struggle with access and affordability in areas such as nutrition, water, energy, education, and financial capital?

Answering these six questions would negate the counterforces mentioned earlier and allow the virtuous cycle to flow unimpeded. But important obstacles, linked to incentives, stand in the way. First is what Mark Carney has called “the tragedy of horizons” : today’s leaders collectively need to take action today for returns that will accrue only over time. 13 “Breaking the tragedy of the horizon—climate change and financial stability—speech by Mark Carney,” Bank of England, September 29, 2015, bankofengland.co.uk. Second is the tragedy of the commons: for collective action, especially on environmental sustainability, all invested parties must look past their parochial interests and fight for the common good.

No stakeholder can solve all these problems on their own. A clear road map, with buy-in from others, is paramount, as is a framework of incentives that balance short- and long-term horizons and interests across value-chain elements, economic sectors, countries, and regions. As in the case of the pandemic, tackling these challenges successfully will require multiple experiments, unprecedented speed in scaling successful ones, and broad participation across actors.

Governments will need to orchestrate a resilient transition—to manage risks, smooth costs, and avoid cascading crises in response to actions taken. On the business side, more companies and CEOs will need to enter the arena, to engage deeply in the design of policies, and to contribute their market knowledge. They will need to be open and realistic about the challenges, while also setting ambitious goals to create positive impact for their customers, workforces, societies, and the environment. Their capacity for innovation can and must be harnessed to shift the frontier of what’s possible and to help achieve what may seem unachievable. If companies don’t engage well and honestly, younger generations of workers will hold them accountable.

When it comes to achieving sustainable, inclusive growth, it is crucial first to fully recognize both the reinforcing as well as the counteracting loops. Then the conversation must move from agreeing on the targets—for who would not agree to such a tantalizing vision—to understanding how to solve the tough problems that stand in the way.

For our part, we have put our hypotheses on those problems at the top of our research agenda and look to learn even more from the leaders of the global organizations we work with who are “making a dent in the universe” through sustainable, inclusive growth. We hope that the ways in which we’ve sketched out the forces and counterforces here contributes to our collective understanding. With that, it may be possible to start to move toward a sustainable and inclusive and growing global economy.

If we don’t focus on the and , we won’t achieve the end.

The authors wish to thank Peter Gumbel and Daniel Pacthod for their contributions to this article. This is the first in a series of articles devoted to sustainable and inclusive growth.

This article was edited by Mark Staples, an executive editor in the New York office.

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Understanding the visual knowledge of language models

LLMs trained primarily on text can generate complex visual concepts through code. Researchers used illustrations to train an image-free computer vision system to recognize real photos.

You’ve likely heard that a picture is worth a thousand words, but can a large language model (LLM) get the picture if it’s never seen images before?

As it turns out, language models that are trained purely on text have a solid understanding of the visual world. They can write image-rendering code to generate complex scenes with intriguing objects and compositions — and even when that knowledge is not used properly, LLMs can refine their images. Researchers from MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) observed this when prompting language models to self-correct their code for different images, where the systems improved on their simple clipart drawings with each query.

The visual knowledge of these language models is gained from how concepts like shapes and colors are described across the internet, whether in language or code. When given a direction like “draw a parrot in the jungle,” users jog the LLM to consider what it’s read in descriptions before. To assess how much visual knowledge LLMs have, the CSAIL team constructed a “vision checkup” for LLMs: using their “Visual Aptitude Dataset,” they tested the models’ abilities to draw, recognize, and self-correct these concepts. Collecting each final draft of these illustrations, the researchers trained a computer vision system that identifies the content of real photos.

“We essentially train a vision system without directly using any visual data,” says Tamar Rott Shaham, co-lead author of the study and an MIT electrical engineering and computer science (EECS) postdoc at CSAIL. “Our team queried language models to write image-rendering codes to generate data for us and then trained the vision system to evaluate natural images. We were inspired by the question of how visual concepts are represented through other mediums, like text. To express their visual knowledge, LLMs can use code as a common ground between text and vision.”

To build this dataset, the researchers first queried the models to generate code for different shapes, objects, and scenes. Then, they compiled that code to render simple digital illustrations, like a row of bicycles, showing that LLMs understand spatial relations well enough to draw the two-wheelers in a horizontal row. As another example, the model generated a car-shaped cake, combining two random concepts. The language model also produced a glowing light bulb, indicating its ability to create visual effects.

“Our work shows that when you query an LLM (without multimodal pre-training) to create an image, it knows much more than it seems,” says co-lead author, EECS PhD student, and CSAIL member Pratyusha Sharma. “Let’s say you asked it to draw a chair. The model knows other things about this piece of furniture that it may not have immediately rendered, so users can query the model to improve the visual it produces with each iteration. Surprisingly, the model can iteratively enrich the drawing by improving the rendering code to a significant extent.”

The researchers gathered these illustrations, which were then used to train a computer vision system that can recognize objects within real photos (despite never having seen one before). With this synthetic, text-generated data as its only reference point, the system outperforms other procedurally generated image datasets that were trained with authentic photos.

The CSAIL team believes that combining the hidden visual knowledge of LLMs with the artistic capabilities of other AI tools like diffusion models could also be beneficial. Systems like Midjourney sometimes lack the know-how to consistently tweak the finer details in an image, making it difficult for them to handle requests like reducing how many cars are pictured, or placing an object behind another. If an LLM sketched out the requested change for the diffusion model beforehand, the resulting edit could be more satisfactory.

The irony, as Rott Shaham and Sharma acknowledge, is that LLMs sometimes fail to recognize the same concepts that they can draw. This became clear when the models incorrectly identified human re-creations of images within the dataset. Such diverse representations of the visual world likely triggered the language models’ misconceptions.

While the models struggled to perceive these abstract depictions, they demonstrated the creativity to draw the same concepts differently each time. When the researchers queried LLMs to draw concepts like strawberries and arcades multiple times, they produced pictures from diverse angles with varying shapes and colors, hinting that the models might have actual mental imagery of visual concepts (rather than reciting examples they saw before).

The CSAIL team believes this procedure could be a baseline for evaluating how well a generative AI model can train a computer vision system. Additionally, the researchers look to expand the tasks they challenge language models on. As for their recent study, the MIT group notes that they don’t have access to the training set of the LLMs they used, making it challenging to further investigate the origin of their visual knowledge. In the future, they intend to explore training an even better vision model by letting the LLM work directly with it.

Sharma and Rott Shaham are joined on the paper by former CSAIL affiliate Stephanie Fu ’22, MNG ’23 and EECS PhD students Manel Baradad, Adrián Rodríguez-Muñoz ’22, and Shivam Duggal, who are all CSAIL affiliates; as well as MIT Associate Professor Phillip Isola and Professor Antonio Torralba. Their work was supported, in part, by a grant from the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, a LaCaixa Fellowship, the Zuckerman STEM Leadership Program, and the Viterbi Fellowship. They present their paper this week at the IEEE/CVF Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Conference.

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