essay on preventing terrorism

• Advisory Board
• Guest Authors
• NEW: Podcast
• Artificial Intelligence
• Climate Change
• Congressional Oversight
• Counterterrorism
• Cybersecurity
• Disinformation
• Human Rights
• Immigration
• Intelligence activities
• International Criminal Law
• Israel-Hamas War
• January 6th Attack on US Capitol
• Law of Armed Conflict
• Local Voices
• Racial Justice
• Social Media Platforms
• United Nations
• Use of Force
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Trump Trials

Featured Articles

• Write for Just Security
• Signups for A.M. and P.M. emails

Adopting a Whole-of-Society Approach to Terrorism and Counterterrorism

by Nicholas Rasmussen

September 10, 2021

Share this:

• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to print (Opens in new window)

Filed under:

9/11 Twentieth Anniversary , Counterterrorism , Domestic Terrorism

(Editor’s note: This essay is part of a  Symposium  published for the twentieth anniversary of September 11th; co-organized by Just Security and the Reiss Center on Law and Security.)

On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, there is a genuine responsibility to assess anew the terrorism and extremism environment within which we in the United States currently find ourselves. Beyond that, we need also to consider with an open mind whether the strategy and policy approaches we have been relying on in the past two decades are well-suited to the evolving challenges we face.

As we approach that 20-year anniversary, my answer to the latter question is a clear “no.” Particularly with the growing threat to public safety and security posed by domestic violent extremism, it is essential that we move beyond the post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy paradigm that placed government at the center of most counterterrorism work. Viewed from the perspective of a private citizen and former senior government official responsible for counterterrorism matters, there is a clear imperative to mature and evolve our counterterrorism strategies from a focus on integrating a “whole-of-government” effort to a much wider, more expansive and inclusive “whole-of-society” approach to addressing our terrorism and violent extremism challenges.

That wider circle must not only include state and local governments, but also the private sector (to include technology companies), civil society in the form of both individual voices and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia. A whole-of-society approach promises to be in many ways more messy, more complicated, and more frustrating in terms of delivering outcomes. All that said, adopting this broader perspective offers the best chance of managing or mitigating the diverse, constantly changing threat we face from terrorism, particularly inside the United States.

Evolution of the Threat

In recent years, the most efficient way to track the federal government’s evolving view of the terrorist threat to Americans has been to review the Annual Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community . Publication of that document, and the ensuing public testimony before U.S. congressional committees by senior intelligence officials, represents the best chance for our Intelligence Community (IC) to speak publicly about its assessment of the full range of threats to U.S. national security. As in prior years, this year’s assessment catalogues and updates the threat picture tied to Sunni terrorist groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their various affiliates and networks around the world. Two decades after 9/11, that is largely familiar stuff, and that aspect of the threat promises to be persistent over time given security challenges in key conflict zones around the world.

Where this year’s assessment breaks new ground for the IC is with its focused treatment of what the Community calls Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs). The IC this year assesses that DVEs “motivated by a range of ideologies not connected to or inspired by jihadi terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS pose an elevated threat to the United States.” The assessment further notes that this “diverse set of extremists reflects an increasingly complex threat landscape, including racially or ethnically motivated threats and antigovernment or antiauthority threats.”

Beyond the abbreviated treatment of the domestic extremism threat in its annual comprehensive assessment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) went on to publish a more focused threat assessment of the DVE problem in March of this year. The IC’s effort to elevate analysis and discussion of the threat posed by DVEs is important because it puts the federal government on record and helps signal heightened priority focus across the CT and homeland security enterprise, which ultimately will help drive resource allocation.

But this year’s assessment hardly comes as any surprise given the increased prevalence of domestic terrorist attacks or events we’ve seen in recent years. Indeed, if most Americans were asked if they felt more at risk from a homeland terrorist attack linked to a domestic group/actor or to an overseas group/actor, I suspect the large majority would cite the DVE threat as feeling more imminent and more acutely dangerous to the average person living in the United States. And statistically, it is, indeed, the greater threat . As the Washington Post has noted, nearly every state has catalogued at least one domestic extremist incident or plot in recent years, suggesting that there the reach and potential impact of the DVE problem has eclipsed other forms of terrorism here inside the United States.

The net result of this evolving threat landscape is that domestic terror concerns now sit alongside homeland threats linked to overseas terrorist groups or ideologies, on roughly equal footing in terms of the level of urgency, political salience, and policy prioritization. Perhaps the best evidence that this transformation of the threat picture had taken place was the early effort by the incoming Biden administration to prioritize the development of fresh approaches to address domestic extremism and terrorism. This was almost certainly intended to be an early priority for President Biden’s team even before the events of Jan. 6 at the U.S. Capitol, but the attack on the Capitol certainly added impetus to the effort.

The announcement on Jan. 22, 2021 of a domestic terrorism policy review led by the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the fast-track development of a National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism signaled early urgency and immediate focus at the highest levels of the Biden team. These moves also suggested that the new administration did not feel adequately postured to address this particular threat landscape in terms of the strategy, programs, and resource framework that it inherited from the Trump administration.

What Does the Changing Threat Landscape Mean for CT Strategy?  

This evolution in the threat landscape should cause us to reexamine with a critical eye the set of tools, strategies, and structures that we are using to respond. For the entire post-9/11 period, senior officials under the Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations have touted their development of “whole-of-government” approaches to addressing the CT challenges we faced, mostly from abroad. In so doing, we aimed to reassure the American people that the federal government was taking an expansive, creative approach to keeping them safe. We were not simply relying on one set of tools tied to our law enforcement community or another set of tools operated by either our military or our intelligence community. That whole-of-government mindset was also driven by the painful self-examination and lessons learned exercise that followed the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission recommendations certainly pointed to a need for a more coherent and coordinated federal response to terrorism, but even without that roadmap, counterterrorism professionals knew instinctively that new ways of doing business across government were required to respond to the al-Qaeda threat.

A whole-of-government approach meant that whenever we confronted a particular terrorism problem, the White House and NSC staff would organize an effort to bring all tools and instruments of national power into an integrated effort to address that problem. These diverse tools, to be orchestrated and sequenced, included the use of military power when absolutely necessary, but also diplomatic influence, intelligence operations and collection and analysis, law enforcement operations, capacity building, financial tools, international development and foreign assistance programs, and our strategic communications capacity.

Embedded within the whole-of-government approach to terrorism was a presumption that the federal government was not only the primary actor when it comes to terrorism and counterterrorism work but in most cases the only actor of consequence in terms of being able to deliver positive outcomes and mitigate threats to Americans. We of course were also heavily reliant on the capacity of state and local governments and partners responsible for their share of the homeland security enterprise. But for the most part, development and execution of counterterrorism strategy was a Washington-centric project for both Republican and Democratic administrations since 9/11. Today’s evolving threat landscape, and in particular the emergence of a dramatically heightened threat from domestic violent extremists, renders that whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism wholly insufficient.

Toward a Whole-of-Society Approach to Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

While we should not absolve government of its obligation to lead and organize societal response to the problem of terrorism and violent extremism, the set of actors and sectors with at least some degree of responsibility for contributing to solutions extends well beyond government. We stand a much better chance of achieving results with our CT strategies if those strategies reflect input and active participation from that diverse set of stakeholders beyond government and seek to harness the knowledge, expertise, and comparative advantage that exist outside the classified circle of CT experts centered in Washington. This wider set of contributors, or stakeholders, includes:

The private sector, including technology companies.  In the past, content associated with known Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS was widely available on larger, more mainstream social media platforms. It is also true that many of those platforms have invested significant effort and resources in building content moderation capabilities to remove that content when it violates their terms of service frameworks. Today, terrorists and violent extremists continue to take advantage of the online environment to further their agenda, but the problem has expanded to include exploitation of many different online service providers and different components of the technology stack by a broader range of actors and organizations across the ideological spectrum. That evolving reality imposes on the private sector special responsibility to be more creative and agile in the effort to develop effective tools, policies, and approaches to addressing terrorist or violent extremist content or activity on their platforms and services. Clearly, more needs to be done by industry to limit the ability of terrorists to exploit the online environment.

At the same time, the many questions private companies face in this context are not easy and many potential solutions come with unintended consequences. Countering terrorism and violent extremism are important societal objectives, but those objectives cannot be pursued at the expense of other equally important principles and priorities, to include respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression. When companies look to governments for guidance in the form of law or policy with respect to many of these complicated questions, what they often see is an incomplete and sometimes conflicting patchwork of measures and legal frameworks.

When we take stock of the last several years of back-and-forth between the U.S. government and the technology sector on this set of problems, it’s possible for two things to be simultaneously true. Several of the largest and most prominent tech companies have shown a willingness to tackle these problems more aggressively, to devote significant resources to that work, and to deepen their conversation with government about those efforts. At the same time, clearly, much more work needs to be done by those leading companies and by governments to eliminate terrorist activity on the internet as the problem of online terrorism and extremism continues to evolve.

Put simply, government and the private sector, certainly for the foreseeable future, will each have a critical role to play in addressing the societal challenge of terrorism and violent extremism. Governments look to companies to be more effective and forward leaning in promptly enforcing their terms of service. Companies increasingly look to governments for greater clarity on the policy and legal landscape, reducing the need for companies to go it alone in making decisions about designation frameworks or banned content. Creating open channels for that dialogue is essential. The organization of which I am the Executive Director, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, or GIFCT, serves as one of those vehicles for collaboration and dialogue between and among the various actors.

Civil society, to include the full array of relevant NGOs and independent voices.  The ways in which civil society voices and organizations can contribute to CT strategies, particularly in the context of DVEs, is worthy of a much longer discussion than this essay allows. Suffice to say that much of the most important and effective work being done to prevent the spread of hatred, violent extremism, and targeted violence takes place at the local or community level. It is encouraging that the Biden administration has moved quickly to capitalize on that source of strength by both emphasizing this work as part of its new national strategy, while also planning to expand the pool of federal funds available to support it.

Civil society voices also play a critical role in engaging with government and the technology sector on terrorism questions, particularly with respect to content moderation, to ensure that the work undertaken in pursuit of CT objectives has the impact of advancing fundamental human rights, especially freedom of expression. Inclusion of civil society voices in the effort to develop effective CT strategies increases significantly the chances that those strategies will be reflective of society as a whole and broadly consistent with our set of collective values.

Academics and other subject matter experts.  One of my most embarrassing personal blind spots during my period of government service working on terrorism issues centered on my failure to appreciate just how much knowledge and expertise existed outside of government on the problem that I was focused on inside government. Those of us “inside” tended to believe, or at least to act like, we had access to the best information and that our strategic insights were therefore informed by that knowledge advantage. Sitting outside government as I now do, that mindset seems myopic at best and absurdly self-defeating at worst. The deep reservoir of expertise and information on all forms of terrorism and violent extremism that exists outside of government remains untapped in my view. That is partly a result of the focus and investment of resources in the academic world that has taken place over the last twenty years. It is also a reflection of the fact that so much terrorism information and activity resides or is accessible in the open source environment, where a government analyst is no more privileged with access than any other smart terrorism expert.

The glimmer of good news is that the Biden administration’s new Domestic Terrorism strategy plainly acknowledges that government does not have a monopoly on wisdom or information with respect to this problem. The strategy calls upon DHS to “create a structured mechanism for receiving and sharing within government credible non-governmental analysis.”  That’s an important admission that successful government strategies will hinge on input, analysis, and information from outside government, where relevant expertise is available.

Other governments. Collaboration between the federal government with both state and local governments here in the United States and with partner governments abroad has long been a feature of U.S. CT strategies. That collaboration needs to deepen even further as CT resources are redirected to address other high priority national security challenges. Terrorists, even domestic terrorists, will continue to show a complete disregard for international borders. Terrorist and extremist narratives circulate freely across the world, as does relevant expertise, advice, and encouragement. That content is also translated and localized for particular audiences all over the world. Any successful approach to our CT problems will contain an important degree of both burden sharing and tangible cooperation with governments at every level.

Having argued that successful CT strategies must be more inclusive and reflective of the genuinely multi-stakeholder nature of the problem, I would not make the case that involving the full array of stakeholders is easy or always comfortable. More voices representing more constituencies can often bring more discord, disparate and competing priorities, and multiple paths to solutions that are often at odds with each other. A whole-of-society approach to our CT problems is certain to be messy, complicated, and at times very unrewarding. It may not be possible to devise policies or strategies that are acceptable to all of the various participants. The effort to arrive at a common set of solutions to a complex problem like terrorism, especially given the diverse nature of the stakeholder community, may seem literally impossible. And yet, working outside that multi-stakeholder framework ultimately limits the efficacy and impact of CT strategies before they are even conceived or developed.

Innovation of Institutions

If it is true that whole-of-society, multi-stakeholder engagement is essential to the effort to develop and implement sound CT strategy and policy, then where and how should that engagement take place? What institutions and fora can we potentially look to for inspiration and example as we try to create and mature this sort of innovative framework for policy development? Unfortunately, there is not a great deal of history on which to draw in this space and I would argue that this work is still very much in an early proof-of-concept phase. That said, there are in fact nascent efforts to create just these sorts of engagement frameworks.

One of those, the Christchurch Call , emerged out of the horrific attack on members of the New Zealand Muslim community in March 2019. Organized and driven by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and French President Emmanuel Macron, the Christchurch Call has brought together in common cause more than 50 countries and governments with almost a dozen of the major online service providers. That assembly of Call supporters is bolstered further by an Advisory Network that includes dozens of civil society organizations from around the world. In only its second year of existence, the Christchurch Call forum has quickly become an essential convening ground for government, technology companies, academics, and civil society as they work together to eliminate terrorist activity and content online.

The organization of which I am the Executive Director, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, or GIFCT , is similarly postured to carry forward this multi-stakeholder work to counter terrorism, and specifically its online dimensions. GIFCT was initially formed in 2017 by YouTube/Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter for the purpose of bringing together key technology companies to collaborate across traditionally competitive company lines to pursue the shared objective of preventing terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting the internet. GIFCT also maintains a robust connection to civil society and government through its own International Advisory Committee (IAC), its multi-sector thematic Working Groups that convene to address hard problems at the nexus of technology and terrorism, and to the academic world through its research and scholarship arm, the Global Network on Extremism and Technology .

Both of these organizations are still early in their development and are testing the limits of what is ultimately possible. Over the last year, I have experienced firsthand how worthwhile this trial effort to utilize multi-stakeholder approaches to public policy challenges can be. What these fora have already proven is that they can be essential convening bodies for discussions about the nature of the evolving terrorist threat, the set of common objectives that should be pursued to mitigate that threat environment, and about measures of success in the overall effort to counter terrorism online.

Reaching consensus around big questions such as these is no small feat and represents an important step forward in efforts to craft whole-of-society approaches to one of our most pressing national security challenges. Participation in these multi-sector processes and fora also helps create accountability as each participant is expected to speak clearly to the work they are doing and the results that their work is producing. Driving real progress and delivering concrete CT results that mitigate and reduce the threat from terrorism, while striving to be inclusive of critical diverse voices and committing to be more transparent in our processes, is the next challenge on the horizon.

About the Author(s)

Nicholas rasmussen.

Executive Director of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. Served as director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from December 2014 until December 2017. He is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. Follow him on Twitter ( @NicholasRasmu15 ).

Send A Letter To The Editor

Read these related stories next:

Can families of mass shooting victims hold social media companies responsible for violence.

by Paul M. Barrett

Jun 21st, 2024

New UN Special Rapporteur’s Report Underscores Risks of Abusive Counterterrorism

by Cyprien Fluzin

Jun 12th, 2024

​​Combatant Privilege vs. Criminal Responsibility for Organized Armed Groups

by Rogier Bartels

May 31st, 2024

Non-Coercive Interrogation Outlined in New UN Manual Advances Méndez Principles

by Gisle Kvanvig , Steven J. Barela and Yvonne Daly

May 15th, 2024

Armed Groups and International Law: Introduction to the Symposium

by Katharine Fortin and Ezequiel Heffes

May 8th, 2024

In Shifting US Ties with Niger and Africa, Focus on Human Rights and Democracy to Strengthen Partnerships

by Ikechukwu Uzoma

Apr 8th, 2024

Rethinking Risk: Reducing Harm to Nonprofits in the Push to Counter Terrorism Financing

by Lia van Broekhoven , Sangeeta Goswami , Floor Knoote and Thalia Malmberg

Feb 28th, 2024

How Israel Took the Terrorists’ Bait

by Matthew Levinger

Feb 13th, 2024

Recent NDAA Reforms Not Likely to Fix Key DHS Intelligence Abuses

by Spencer Reynolds

Jan 17th, 2024

How the KKK Produced the Department of Justice

by Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware

Jan 8th, 2024

Counterterrorism in Disguise? Does A Shift Toward `Peace Enforcement’ Spell a Death Knell for UN Peacekeeping?

by Jordan Street

Dec 15th, 2023

Unhuman Killings: AI and Civilian Harm in Gaza

by Brianna Rosen

• Skip to main content
• Keyboard shortcuts for audio player

The 20th Anniversary Of The 9/11 Attacks

The world has changed since 9/11, and so has america's fight against terrorism.

An American flag at ground zero on the evening of Sept. 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. Mark Lennihan/AP hide caption

An American flag at ground zero on the evening of Sept. 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City.

In the fall of 2001, Aaron Zebley was a 31-year-old FBI agent in New York. He had just transferred to a criminal squad after working counterterrorism cases for years.

His first day in the new job was Sept. 11.

"I was literally cleaning the desk, I was like wiping the desk when Flight 11 hit the north tower, and it shook our building," he said. "And I was like, what the heck was that? And later that day, I was transferred back to counterterrorism."

It was a natural move for Zebley. He'd spent the previous three years investigating al-Qaida's bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. And he became a core member of the FBI team leading the investigation into the 9/11 attacks.

It quickly became clear that al-Qaida was responsible.

The hijackers had trained at the group's camps in Afghanistan. They received money and instructions from its leadership. And ultimately, they were sent to the U.S. to carry out al-Qaida's "planes operation."

President George W Bush gives an address in front of the damaged Pentagon following the Sept. 11 terrorist attack there as Counselor to the President Karen Hughes and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stand by. Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images hide caption

President George W Bush gives an address in front of the damaged Pentagon following the Sept. 11 terrorist attack there as Counselor to the President Karen Hughes and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stand by.

As the nation mourned the nearly 3,000 people who were killed on 9/11, the George W. Bush administration frantically tried to find its footing and prevent what many feared would be a second wave of attacks.

President Bush ordered members of his administration, including top counterterrorism official Richard Clarke, to imagine what the next attack could look like and take steps to prevent it.

"We had so many vulnerabilities in this country," Clarke said.

At the time, officials were worried that al-Qaida could use chemical weapons or radioactive materials, Clarke said, or that the group would target intercity trains or subway systems.

"We had a very long list of things, systems, that were vulnerable because no one in the United States had seriously considered security from terrorist attacks," he said.

That, of course, quickly changed.

Security became paramount.

And over the next two decades, the federal government poured money and resources — some of it, critics say, to no good use — into protecting the U.S. from another terrorist attack, even as the nature of that threat continuously evolved.

The response to keeping the U.S. secure takes shape

The government built out a massive infrastructure, including creating the Department of Homeland Security, all in the name of protecting against terrorist attacks.

The Bush administration also empowered the FBI and its partners at the CIA, National Security Agency and the Pentagon to take the fight to al-Qaida.

The military invaded Afghanistan, which had been a haven for the group. The CIA hunted down al-Qaida operatives around the world and tortured many of them in secret prisons.

The NPR Politics Podcast

Part of flight 93 crashed on my land. i went back to the sacred ground 20 years later.

The Bush administration also launched its ill-fated war in Iraq, which unleashed two decades of bloodletting, shook the Middle East and spawned another generation of terrorists.

On the homefront, FBI Director Robert Mueller shifted some 2,000 agents to counterterrorism work as he tried to transform the FBI from a crime-fighting first organization into a more intelligence-driven one that prioritized combating terrorism and preventing the next attack.

Part of that involved centralizing the bureau's international terrorism investigations at headquarters and making counterterrorism the FBI's top priority.

Chuck Rosenberg, who served as a top aide to Mueller in those early years, said the changes Mueller imposed amounted to a paradigm shift for the bureau.

Robert S. Mueller, then-director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, talks to reporters on Aug. 17, 2006, in Seattle. Ted S. Warren/AP hide caption

Robert S. Mueller, then-director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, talks to reporters on Aug. 17, 2006, in Seattle.

"Mueller, God bless him, couldn't be all that patient about it," Rosenberg said. "It couldn't happen at a normal pace of a traditional cultural change. It had to happen yesterday."

It had to happen "yesterday" because al-Qaida was still plotting. Overseas, its operatives carried out horrific bombings in Bali, Madrid, London and elsewhere.

In the U.S., al-Qaida operative Richard Reid was arrested in December 2001 after trying to blow up a trans-Atlantic flight with a bomb hidden in his shoe. More plots were foiled in the ensuing years, including one targeting the Brooklyn Bridge.

Over time, the FBI and its partners better understood al-Qaida, its hierarchical structure, and how to unravel the various threads of a plot.

That stemmed to large degree, Zebley says, from the U.S. getting better at pulling together various threads of intelligence and by upping the operational tempo.

"If you have a little thread that could potentially tell you about a terrorist plot, not only were we much better at integrating the intelligence, but we did it at a pace that was tenfold what we were doing before," he said.

But critics warned that the government's new anti-terrorism tools were eroding civil liberties, while the American Muslim community felt it was all too often the target of an overzealous FBI.

The digital world helps transform terrorism

By the early days of the Obama administration, the U.S. had to a large extent hardened the homeland against 9/11-style plots. But the terrorism landscape was evolving.

At that time, Zebley was serving as a senior aide to Mueller. Each morning, he would sit in on the FBI director's daily threat briefing.

"I was thinking about al-Qaida for years leading up until that moment," he said. "And now I'm sitting in these morning threat briefings and I'm seeing al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, al-Shabab. ... One of my first thoughts was 'the map looks very different to me now.' "

Robert Mueller (left) and Aaron Zebley testify on Capitol Hill in Washington on July 24, 2019, before the House Intelligence Committee hearing on his report on Russian election interference. Susan Walsh/AP hide caption

Robert Mueller (left) and Aaron Zebley testify on Capitol Hill in Washington on July 24, 2019, before the House Intelligence Committee hearing on his report on Russian election interference.

Ultimately, AQAP — al-Qaida's branch based in Yemen — emerged as a significant threat to the U.S. homeland.

That became clear in November 2009 when U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hasan shot and killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas. A month later, on Christmas Day, a young Nigerian man tried to blow up a passenger jet over Detroit with a bomb hidden in his underwear.

It quickly emerged that both men had been in contact with a senior AQAP figure, an American-born Yemeni cleric named Anwar al-Awlaki.

"My sense when I first heard about him was 'well, he's some charismatic guy, born in the U.S., fluent English speaker and all that. But how big a threat could he be?" said John Pistole, who served as the No. 2 official at the FBI from 2004 until 2010 when he left to lead the Transportation Security Administration.

"I think I failed to recognize and appreciate his ability to influence others to action."

Awlaki used the internet to spread his calls for violence against America, and his lectures and ideas influenced attacks in several countries. Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011, a move that proved controversial because he was an American citizen.

A few years later, a different terrorist group emerged from the cauldron of Syria and Iraq — the Islamic State, or ISIS, a group that would build on Awlaki's savvy use of the digital world.

"When ISIS came onto the scene, particularly that summer of 2014, with the beheadings and the prolific use of social media, it was off the charts," said Mary McCord, who was a senior national security official at the Justice Department at the time.

Her Brother Died On Flight 93. She Still Sees Him Surfacing In Small Ways

Like al-Qaida more than a decade before, ISIS used its stronghold to plan operations abroad, such as the coordinated attacks in 2015 that killed 130 people in Paris. But it also used social media platforms such as Twitter and Telegram to pump out slickly produced propaganda videos.

"They deployed technology in a much more sophisticated way than we had seen with most other foreign terrorist organizations," McCord said.

ISIS produced materials featuring idyllic scenes of life in the caliphate to entice people to move there. At the same time, the group pushed out a torrent of videos showing horrendous violence that sought to instill fear in ISIS' enemies and to inspire the militants' sympathizers in Europe and the U.S. to conduct attacks where they were.

"The threat was much more horizontal. It was harder to corral," said Chuck Rosenberg, who served as FBI Director James Comey's chief of staff.

People inspired by ISIS could go from watching the group's videos to action relatively quickly without setting off alarms.

"It was clear too that there were going to be attacks we just couldn't stop. Things that went from left of boom to right of boom very quickly. People were more discreet, the thing we used to refer to as lone wolves," Rosenberg said. "A lot of bad things could happen, maybe on a smaller scale, but a lot of bad things could happen more quickly."

Bad things did happen

Europe was hit by a series of deadly one-off attacks. In the U.S., a gunman killed 49 people at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Fla., in 2016. A year later, a man used a truck to plow through a group of cyclists and pedestrians in Manhattan, killing eight people. Both men had been watching ISIS propaganda.

A makeshift memorial stands outside the Tree of Life Synagogue in the aftermath of a deadly shooting in Pittsburgh in 2018. Matt Rourke/AP hide caption

A makeshift memorial stands outside the Tree of Life Synagogue in the aftermath of a deadly shooting in Pittsburgh in 2018.

The group's allure waned after a global coalition led by the U.S. managed to retake all the territory that ISIS once claimed.

By then, America's most lethal terror threat already stemmed not from foreign terror groups, but from the country's own domestic extremists.

For nearly two decades, the FBI had prioritized the fight against international terrorists. But in early 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that had changed.

"We elevated to the top-level priority racially motivated violent extremism so it's on the same footing in terms of our national threat banding as ISISI and homegrown violent extremism," he testified before Congress.

The move came in the wake of a series of high-profile attacks by people espousing white supremacist views in Charlottesville, Va., Pittsburgh, Pa., Poway, Calif., and El Paso, Texas.

At the same time, anti-government extremist groups and conspiracy theories like QAnon were attracting more adherents.

Those various movements converged in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6, 2021, in the storming of the U.S. Capitol as Congress was certifying Joe Biden's presidential win.

Rioters climb the west wall of the the U.S. Capitol in Washington on Jan. 6. Jose Luis Magana/AP hide caption

Rioters climb the west wall of the the U.S. Capitol in Washington on Jan. 6.

The FBI has since launched a massive investigation into the assault, and Wray has bluntly described the Capitol riot as "domestic terrorism."

McCord, who is now the executive director at the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at the Georgetown University Law Center, says domestic extremist groups are using many of the same tools that foreign groups have for years.

"You see that in the use of social media for the same kind of things: to recruit, to propagandize, to plot, and to fundraise," she said.

The Capitol riot has put a spotlight on far-right extremism in a way the issue has never received in the past two decades, including in the media and the highest levels of the U.S. government.

President Biden, for one, has called political extremism and domestic terrorism a looming threat to the country that must be defeated, and he has made combating the threat a priority for his administration.

• Sept. 11 attacks
• President George W. Bush
• FBI Director Robert Mueller
• terrorist attacks

A global effort to counter extremism through education

Subscribe to the center for middle east policy newsletter, madiha afzal madiha afzal fellow - foreign policy , center for middle east policy , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , center for asia policy studies @madihaafzal.

Monday, January 25, 2021

• 25 min read

This brief is part of the Brookings Blueprints for American Renewal & Prosperity project.

A review of Obama and Trump administration policies

Policy recommendations.

This brief argues that we should productively use the current moment of reckoning with the post-9/11 era to redefine our paradigm for countering extremism and terrorism around the world in a manner that is both comprehensive and cost-effective.

Taking stock 20 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is clear that the global position of al-Qaida and the Islamic State group (IS) has weakened, owing to successful (and enormously costly) counterterrorism efforts led by the United States. Yet other groups that are more locally and regionally focused, in many cases splinters of al-Qaida and IS, are resurging or ascendant. Terrorism remains a problem around the world, and the extremism that fuels it remains largely unaddressed.

Efforts undertaken to counter extremism over the last 20 years were belated when they began, and were never as concerted as the effort to counter terrorism.

Efforts undertaken to counter extremism over the last 20 years were belated when they began, and were never as concerted as the effort to counter terrorism. They were also fragmented and focused on a bottom-up approach, when research informs us that extremism is in many ways driven from the top down, via country-level education systems, laws, and politics.

This Blueprint therefore proposes a new paradigm for countering extremism, based on a top-down, country-level approach that focuses on education and equipping citizens with critical thinking skills to counter extremist propaganda. To be specific, I propose a U.S.-led, United Nations-centered, global effort to counter extremism through education and the media. One way to operationalize this would be to have member states sign a U.N. convention on education and extremism, and have them, under that framework, reach an agreement according to which signatory countries would commit to making formal education systems and media compliant with a set of guidelines — including removing hate material from curricula and teaching tolerance, teaching critical thinking, teaching how to counter extremist propaganda, and teaching how to decipher the credibility of information seen or received through both mainstream and social media. The benefits of this approach would extend to countering all forms of extremism.

Back to top ⇑

Nineteen years after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the declaration of the subsequent U.S.-led “war on terror,” the devastation wrought by the global coronavirus pandemic has forced an American reckoning with the post-9/11 era. This reckoning had already begun in recent years, with the effort to wind down the “forever wars,” especially the war in Afghanistan, and a consideration of the enormous costs — in lives and money — that they have entailed. That the daily domestic death toll of the pandemic has been consistently exceeding that of the 9/11 attacks, puts the concern into sharp relief — as do the events of January 6, with pro-Trump extremists staging an insurrection at the U.S. Capitol — lending an urgency to the desire to turn the page . The underlying argument is that we should focus instead on long-ignored and urgent domestic problems — socioeconomic inequality, persistent racism and the threat of white supremacy, preparing for the next pandemic — and contend with other pressing foreign policy concerns, including the rise of China .

But with this urgency, there is a danger that we will move on without absorbing the lessons learned from the last two decades — and perhaps worse, shelving lessons yet unlearned — and without a concerted approach to tackling the twin problems of terrorism and extremism, which remain significant globally. In 2019, nearly 8,500 terrorist attacks took place around the world, almost the same number as in 2012. What’s more, the extremism and ideologies that fuel these attacks remain intact. This brief argues that we should productively use the current moment of reckoning with the post-9/11 era to redefine our paradigm for countering extremism and terrorism around the world in a manner that is both comprehensive and cost-effective.

Over the past two decades, American efforts have focused disproportionately on countering terror — and have seen success in protecting the U.S. homeland. But the effort at countering violent extremism (CVE), when it finally began during the second Obama administration, was belated, and based on a bottom-up approach that was piecemeal, fragmented, and ultimately insufficient to counter extremism in any comprehensive way. This Blueprint proposes a new paradigm for countering extremism, based on a top-down, state-level approach that focuses on education and equipping citizens with critical thinking skills to counter extremist propaganda. This is based on research across contexts which shows that the most important policies that affect attitudes and can lead to extremism are driven from the top down — via education systems, laws, and politics — and not the bottom up.

I recommend reform of national education policies to counter extremism, but recognize that targeting specific countries, or using bilateral approaches, is a non-starter. Therefore, I propose a U.S.-led, United Nations-centered, global effort to counter extremism through formal education and the media. One proposal to operationalize this would be to have member states sign a U.N. convention on education and extremism, and have them, under that framework, reach an agreement according to which signatory countries would commit to making education systems and media compliant with a set of guidelines. This approach, ambitious though it is, would be analogous to that followed by the Paris agreement to counter climate change. One could use a less transformative model as well, such as subsuming these guidelines and recommendations under the education goal of the Sustainable Development Goals, but that less visible approach could prove less effective. The positive externalities of focusing on education would extend beyond their effect on extremism: This would also counter disinformation campaigns and the phenomenon of fake news, and the effect on attitudes could in turn have far-reaching effects on various forms of violence.

One note — the arguments made here are based on research on jihadist extremism, but the solutions proposed are universal, and apply to other forms of extremism, including right-wing extremism in the United States, as well.

Assessing the jihadist threat around the world

The exact total cost of the post-9/11 wars to date is disputed, but the upper-bound estimate , from the Costs of War project at Brown University, posits that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and money spent on homeland security have cost the United States $6.4 trillion through 2019. If that is an overestimate, it is difficult to argue that the amount spent isn’t at least half that number. If success can be measured in terms of preventing a large-scale terrorist attack on the United States, the huge resources expended on counterterrorism, intelligence and the homeland security architecture after the attacks of September 11 have yielded results: just over 100 people have been killed in jihadist attacks in the United States since then.

Al-Qaida as an organization is far weaker than it once was, owing to U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan — including as many as 540 targeted drone strikes during the Obama administration. While the ungoverned vacuum left in Iraq led to the rise of the Islamic State group (IS), the concerted fight against it begun by the Obama administration and continued during the Trump presidency largely dismantled its “caliphate.” U.S. and international efforts in response to IS’s recruitment of foreign fighters have severely hindered the ability of foreign fighters to travel and thus of terrorist organizations to recruit them. Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have been killed. A key al-Qaida leader, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, was killed in Iran in an Israeli spy operation in August 2020.

The fiscal costs of all of this to the United States have been extraordinary, and the loss of life significant, but the American homeland is, for now, undeniably safer. With the fall of the IS “caliphate” and the decimation of al-Qaida’s leadership, the major terrorist threat the United States faces domestically is no longer jihadist, but white supremacist . Indeed, those who contend that the war on terror must no longer occupy a central position in our national priorities point to the fact that the direct jihadist threat to the U.S. has abated. (In December, though, the Trump administration dismantled a Pentagon office focused on IS, a worrying action that may have led to gaps in the provision of counterterrorism information to the incoming administration).

Yet jihadist terrorism remains a significant problem globally, including from regional al-Qaida and IS affiliates that have proven lethal to their local populations. Two devastating terrorist attacks on the same day in November 2020 in Vienna and Kabul attest to this. On the morning of November 2, 2020, three gunmen stormed Kabul University, one of the oldest universities in Afghanistan, killing 35 students and professors. Sixteen of the students killed were studying policy and public administration , hoping to help build their country’s future. A local IS affiliate, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K), claimed responsibility for the attack. In Vienna, Austria that evening, a 20-year old man shot and killed four people in a crowded district; he had been convicted of attempting to join IS in the past. IS claimed responsibility for his attack.

Al-Qaida still survives in Afghanistan, and recent reports have noted its resilience ; a spate of al-Qaida leaders was killed in special operations in Afghanistan and Syria during the last week of October 2020. Regional affiliates, including al-Shabab in Somalia, operate from the Maghreb to East Asia. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed an attack on the Pensacola naval air base in Florida in December 2019.

The Taliban, which gave haven to al-Qaida in Afghanistan in the run up to 2001, is now a legitimate political actor domestically in that country and internationally, having militarily held off the United States and signed a peace deal with it in February 2020. It is at its most powerful since 2001. Despite the main condition of the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in Doha for the Taliban being counterterrorism commitments in exchange for a complete American withdrawal, the U.N. reports that the Taliban has not cut ties with al-Qaida. It is also worth noting that the Doha deal, seen in the region as a victory for the Taliban and as “ America’s surrender ,” is perceived as a boon to the jihadist movement at large. Al-Qaida said the deal signified the “enemy acknowledging its defeat” and congratulated the Taliban on its “great victory” over America and its allies.

In Nigeria, the terrorist group Boko Haram has waged a deadly insurgency in the country’s northeast since 2009, and in recent years in the Lake Chad region at the meeting point of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. A splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), declared allegiance to IS in 2015. It is Boko Haram’s more brutal faction. Boko Haram and ISWAP have inflicted more violence on state actors in Nigeria since 2018 than at any other point in the insurgency.

The Pakistani Taliban (also known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis between 2007 and 2015, using Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. in its war in Afghanistan as justification for its insurgency. The TTP was in retreat after an extensive Pakistani military operation that began against it in 2014, but has reconsolidated and reemerged in 2020 in its former strongholds in the country’s northwest. TTP militants killed at least 40 Pakistani soldiers between March and September 2020.

Related Books

Madiha Afzal

January 2, 2018

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas, Shadi Hamid

November 28, 2017

Daniel L. Byman

May 2, 2019

Finally, attacks by individual actors who draw inspiration from global jihadist groups — lone wolves — have continued in the U.S. and Europe. In October, an attacker at the Notre Dame church in Nice, France, killed 3, in the aftermath of the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad by the magazine Charlie Hebdo. (The investigation is ongoing, but no credible group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, leading to speculation that the attack was inspired and not directed.)

Taking stock, the position of core al-Qaida and IS, terrorist groups that focus on a global jihad — and thus pose a direct threat to the United States — has weakened. Other groups that are more locally and regionally focused, in many cases splinters of al-Qaida and IS, are resurging or ascendant. There are factions and differences within the jihadist movement; there is no one leader it looks to, as it did to bin Laden, and later Baghdadi to an extent.

Yet the ideological overlap across various jihadist groups remains, and fighters often cross from one group to the other. In Pakistan, they switched from the Afghan jihad to the Kashmir-focused jihad in the 1990s. Those Talibs who are unhappy with the U.S.-Taliban deal are now being recruited by its rival, IS-K. In assessing threats to the United States, we cannot rule out local and regional terrorist actors that can cross lines to boost groups that may directly target America.

The question of extremism

Extremism and terrorism are twin problems: extremism can lead directly to violence and it also gives terrorist groups oxygen by providing them an environment for survival, in terms of logistical and financial support, potential recruits, and most broadly, ideological space. Yet while significant resources have been spent on countering terrorism, the project of understanding and tackling the root causes of jihadist extremism around the world largely remains incomplete.

There are several questions relevant to understanding extremism: who becomes a terrorist, and what leads people to support terrorist groups? Considerable attention was paid to this topic in the aftermath of 9/11. The initial conventional wisdom — that the poor and uneducated become terrorists and support terrorist groups — was debunked, and replaced with an amalgam of correlates of extremism, often not lending themselves to quick resolution or simple explanation: grievance, alienation, deficiencies in human rights, lack of political representation. Not enough attention was paid to the ideological appeal of jihadism. Neither was there a focus on understanding attitudes on a spectrum of extremism to violent extremism. The Obama administration’s approach to CVE, as the name suggests, only looked at the latter. It thus missed the structure and determinants of non-violent support —logistical, ideological, and financial — for extremist groups.

In interdisciplinary research on views on the Pakistan Taliban and Boko Haram, I have studied what drove support for these groups among the population in Pakistan and Nigeria respectively, and how it relates to education. In my work on Pakistan, I found that extremism in the population is driven by the decisions taken by the Pakistani state. The state’s curricula, its laws, and its politics have fostered in its citizens a worldview that aligns with terrorist group propaganda and thus makes them vulnerable to it. The Pakistani government education system, in particular, is a vehicle used to impart a biased, one-sided view of the world, one that victimizes Pakistan and places the blame for its problems on the rest of the world and fosters an “us-versus-them” mindset. This, I found, is a particular problem in high school history textbooks — in which information is presented without sources, and a one-sided historical narrative with half-truths and errors is presented as fact. Schooling in Pakistan focuses on rote memorization and does not teach critical thinking, which would allow students to recognize and counter propaganda when they see it. As a result, when Pakistanis encounter extremist propaganda, in many ways consistent with the exclusionary view of the world they find in their history textbooks, they buy into it. In interviews I conducted in Pakistani high schools, I met two students with views sympathetic to an extremist group who had been influenced directly by fundamentalist propaganda from that group, and found themselves unable to counter it. Other students had bought wholesale into videos or photos they had seen online which purported to show people being trained in America to attack Pakistan, a conspiracy theory.

Bangladesh, a country similar to Pakistan (and once its eastern half), offers a striking counter to Pakistan in terms of the prevalence of extremism and terrorism in the country. I’d argue it is the decisions taken by the Bangladeshi state that have ensured extremism remains checked in the country, from the structure of the constitution to its politics and education system. In a non-democratic context, Morocco also provides an example of how much the state matters: its monarchy ensures — often heavy-handedly — the espousal of a “tolerant” Islam in the population.

In the Nigerian case, I found that citizens’ support for Boko Haram rests on grievances in Nigeria’s north against the state-imposed Western system of education — one seen as insufficiently representative and responsible for the north’s backwardness (because it was imposed on an unfamiliar population after independence as part of Nigeria’s “federal character”) — and associated with the elite’s corruption.

In each of these contexts, formal education systems and curricula — in particular, those in secondary or high school – play a large role in defining attitudes in the population. (University education, I found, was less of a problem, and also countered the problematic curricula taught in high school.) Education policy, of course, is entirely endogenous, and is determined by any country’s notions of nationalism and identity. The education system can also be a clear venue and indeed the tool to address the roots of extremism and violent extremism, by promoting tolerance and teaching critical thinking.

Both Pakistan and Nigeria have focused on defeating terrorist groups militarily, and have left the roots of extremism in their countries unaddressed . This helps explain the stubborn resilience and resurgence of the TTP and Boko Haram despite military attempts to defeat them — and why those attempts succeeded only temporarily.

Closely connected to identifying the root causes of extremism is the question of the ideological appeal of jihadism: an ideology which typically centers around establishing a stringent Islamic system of governing — whether across countries or more locally — and emphasizes an existential opposition to Western values and policies (though with Donald Trump’s presidency and the rise of China, the focus on targeting America as a superpower to be attacked may have lost some of its ideological appeal). As I mentioned above, in many ways such ideological propaganda was consistent with the worldview presented in Pakistani textbooks. The Obama administration’s CVE approach focused on counter-messaging against extremist propaganda and on making it harder to access it, including by targeting group messaging apps such as Telegram. Yet there is still a preponderance of fake news and conspiracy theories — of all forms, but especially on social media and on messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, etc. — that serve the purposes of extremist propaganda. One way that extremism can be countered is if individuals are able to identify such misinformation when they receive it. This can be accomplished by teaching students the ability to evaluate information based on its sources, and critical thinking skills in schools. The applicability of this approach to countering right-wing extremism in the United States should also be clear.

In a 2016 piece calling for more attention to be paid to efforts to counter extremism, Michael Morell, Sandy Winnefeld, and Samantha Vinograd, senior intelligence, defense, and national security officials in the Obama administration, wrote that countering violent extremism “efforts have paled in comparison to our ‘hard’ counter-terrorism operation”:

“For every 1,000 hours we spent in the Situation Room talking about how to stop existing extremists from attacking us, we spent perhaps one hour talking about how to prevent the creation of terrorists in the first place. And, for every million dollars the U.S. government spent on stopping those trying to attack us, we spent perhaps one dollar on countering radical extremism.”

During the second Obama administration, there was a flurry of activity on CVE on the part of both the State Department and the White House. A White House Summit was held in February 2015, and a Leaders’ Summit was held in New York City in September 2015 with representatives from multilateral institutions and governments and civil society organizations around the world. The key themes around the CVE approach were that it should be centered at the local, community level, identifying communities vulnerable to extremism; that local leaders — and governments and civil society organizations — should be involved in tailored interventions; and that there needed to be a focus on building resilience. Youth engagement was a key component, and there was a call for women to be involved in CVE efforts.

But what did all of this really mean? Behind a well-intentioned effort and sensible-sounding concepts, this approach did not clearly identify the drivers of extremism beyond recognizing that grievance was important. And ultimately, by concentrating on the ground up, it missed the fact that the most important policies that affect attitudes in the broad population are driven from the top down — via education systems, laws, and politics.

Anything else — focusing on local or grassroots or community-level interventions — is missing the forest for the trees, or taking action that is too piecemeal and narrowly targeted, akin to putting out small individual fires.

President Barack Obama recognized the importance of country-level factors during his speech at the White House summit, where he said : “When governments oppress their people, deny human rights, stifle dissent or marginalize ethnic and religious groups, or favor certain religious groups over others, it sows the seeds of extremism and violence.” Despite that recognition, the focus of CVE efforts remained a grassroots one — perhaps partly out of pragmatism and a recognition that this approach would be more palatable than to have governments sign up for a wholesale reconfiguration. The administration’s CVE efforts also lumped thinking about homegrown threats with thinking about international and regional threats.

This approach focused on putting on the brakes on at the cusp of violence (by definition), and not earlier on the extremism spectrum; it also included deradicalization by incorporating reintegration and rehabilitation programs for former extremists. All of this is necessarily costly and fragmented. The focus in many ways was on treatment, rather than prevention. Domestically, the approach also faced criticism that it singled out Muslim communities for surveillance and looked upon them with suspicion.

The Trump administration didn’t fully dismantle the Obama administration’s CVE approach, but it did not follow through on it either. It did away with the term CVE — which it considered too “politically correct” — and replaced it in terms of rhetoric with “radical Islamic terrorism,” and on paper with counterterrorism. The Trump administration’s counterterrorism strategy in 2018, though, did acknowledge the importance of prevention “to thwart terrorist radicalization and recruitment,” adding that “prevention works.” The Trump approach ultimately was characterized more by “a lack of consistent leadership, strategy, coordination, coherence, and prioritization” than a systematic dismantling of the Obama strategy. The Obama CVE policy thus essentially stalled during the Trump presidency.

All in all, the U.S. approach to CVE resulted in an effort in which the whole did not add up to the sum of its parts, which focused on the wrong level, and which ultimately never really took off.

The main recommendation of this paper is a proposal to comprehensively address the root causes of extremism, especially as they relate to the early stages of the extremism spectrum, such that we can effectively block the later stages from developing. Crucially, it is an approach in which the main costs need not be directly borne by America.

Firstly, I propose reform of national education policies — focusing on formal schooling systems, specifically history curricula in elementary and secondary schools — to counter extremism. Country legal systems could be another potential target — say blasphemy laws — but those are all but impossible to change, as the Pakistani case makes clear. Education may be the most practical place to begin reform, but it is still likely to receive pushback. Curriculum reform flies in the face of countries wanting to use their education systems to inculcate their own sense of nationalism, sometimes narrowly defined and exclusionary, which in turn can sow the seeds for extremism. There is a reason those countries choose the curricula they do — it is in service to their own nationalism. This recommendation thus needs to be operationalized not bilaterally, nor by focusing on specific countries — which would receive clear backlash for being a “Western agenda” — but by working through the United Nations with its unique platform to bring countries around the world on board.

The biggest hurdle would be for the states to recognize with urgency that formal education is key to addressing extremism — it can foster it, and conversely, is the key tool to counter it — and that the benefits of ratifying this agreement would accrue to the states themselves.

The best model to follow might be the Paris agreement to counter climate change, which was signed in 2016 within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change . The goal would be near universal membership of a parallel U.N. convention on education, and an agreement reached according to which signatory countries would commit to making educational systems compliant with a set of guidelines. The biggest hurdle would be for the states to recognize with urgency that formal education is key to addressing extremism — it can foster it, and conversely, is the key tool to counter it — and that the benefits of ratifying this agreement would accrue to the states themselves (with positive externalities for others).

The way could be led by the developed world, including by the United States, but any bloc of countries could join the U.S. in being initial signatories. Within the U.S. government, the State Department could lead the charge on this work.

This agreement would include countries committing to a full audit of national and subnational curricula (given that curriculum formation may be a subnational responsibility) in elementary and secondary education, to removing hate material and teaching tolerance, to teaching critical thinking, to teaching how to counter extremist propaganda, and to teaching how to determine the credibility of information seen or received through both mainstream and social media. History, social studies, and civics curricula should be a central focus, but intolerance and propaganda can seep in across subjects, including in language curricula. The education component of this should extend beyond formal education to adult education, potentially through the media, with education campaigns on television and in print. A television ad campaign could, for instance, teach citizens what “fake news” looks like and how to recognize it. The externalities would extend beyond countering extremism to being able to recognize and counter all manner of disinformation campaigns.

The U.N. Security Council has put forward a number of resolutions over the past decade to deal with extremism and terrorism, including on CVE (incorporating some of the same bottom-up community-led initiatives the Obama administration had proposed in its CVE strategy), but resolutions limit themselves to “encouraging” or “urging” member states to take action. My proposed approach of an agreement within a U.N. framework would, by definition, go further and would require signatories to commit to taking action.

There would be another element to this agreement, which would require investment in country-level research to understand how each country’s particular education system might foster extremism and might be improved, so that tailored solutions can be employed. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) could also potentially develop a proposed curriculum framework to be adopted by countries. Much as in the Paris agreement, one component would ensure transparency, implementation, and compliance from the signatories.

A less ambitious, less visible version, but perhaps more easily doable, would be to subsume this under the Sustainable Development Goal on education. SDG 4 on quality education has a specific component, 4.7, which already begins to address this:

“By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.”

However, the disadvantage of a less visible approach is that it may be less likely to be implemented.

In addition, to counter regional and local terrorist groups — and to do so in a cost-effective, non-military manner as much as possible, in keeping with reducing the budget allocated to international counterterrorism efforts — I propose a second policy tool. U.S.-led action at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — a multilateral body which can place a country on a “grey list” for enhanced monitoring for terrorist financing, that in turn hinders foreign investment into the country — has been effective in recent years in encouraging Pakistan to act against militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (the FATF listing has worked better to induce Pakistan to take action than using U.S. aid as a carrot). Beyond America being directly involved in counterterrorism (at great cost), this is an effective tool that places the onus and the cost on the countries themselves to take action against militant groups. It can be used far more widely to target local and regional terrorist groups that do not pose a clear threat to America.

Wide, systematic FATF targeting across countries would also counter worries from states like Pakistan who argue that their FATF status changes are politically motivated and perceive them to be unfair. America can take the lead on this front, but would have the cover of a multilateral body as the implementer.

In our current moment of reckoning with the post-9/11 era in the wake of a global pandemic and the threat of domestic right-wing extremism, it would be a mistake to turn away from the lessons of the last two decades on fighting extremism and terrorism around the world. Instead, we have an opportunity to redefine our paradigm for countering extremism and terrorism, and to do so at once comprehensively and cost-effectively: through leading the way on an international shift in education systems and curricula, and doing so as we reengage with the world in the Biden administration. We should take up the challenge.

Related Content

May 7, 2020

Eric Rosand, Khalid Koser, Lilla Schumicky-Logan

April 28, 2020

September 22, 2020

Many thanks to Michael O’Hanlon and Natan Sachs for thoughtful feedback and suggestions, to Jeff Feltman for a helpful discussion, and to Ted Reinert for excellent editing.

Foreign Policy

Center for Middle East Policy

Adedeji Adeniran, Marco Castradori

April 19, 2021

April 16, 2020

Christina Golubski

August 6, 2019

Programs submenu

Regions submenu, topics submenu, approaches to digital public infrastructure in the global south, statistical review of world energy 2024, postponed: a complete impasse—gaza: the human toll.

• Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy
• Aerospace Security Project
• Africa Program
• Americas Program
• Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
• Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
• Asia Program
• Australia Chair
• Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy
• Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy
• Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
• China Power Project
• Chinese Business and Economics
• Defending Democratic Institutions
• Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
• Defense 360
• Defense Budget Analysis
• Diversity and Leadership in International Affairs Project
• Economics Program
• Emeritus Chair in Strategy
• Energy Security and Climate Change Program
• Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
• Freeman Chair in China Studies
• Futures Lab
• Geoeconomic Council of Advisers
• Global Food and Water Security Program
• Global Health Policy Center
• Hess Center for New Frontiers
• Human Rights Initiative
• Humanitarian Agenda
• Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program
• International Security Program
• Japan Chair
• Kissinger Chair
• Korea Chair
• Langone Chair in American Leadership
• Middle East Program
• Missile Defense Project
• Project on Critical Minerals Security
• Project on Fragility and Mobility
• Project on Nuclear Issues
• Project on Prosperity and Development
• Project on Trade and Technology
• Renewing American Innovation Project
• Scholl Chair in International Business
• Smart Women, Smart Power
• Southeast Asia Program
• Stephenson Ocean Security Project
• Strategic Technologies Program
• Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies
• Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program
• All Regions
• Australia, New Zealand & Pacific
• Middle East
• Russia and Eurasia
• American Innovation
• Civic Education
• Climate Change
• Cybersecurity
• Defense Budget and Acquisition
• Defense and Security
• Energy and Sustainability
• Food Security
• Gender and International Security
• Geopolitics
• Global Health
• Human Rights
• Humanitarian Assistance
• Intelligence
• International Development
• Maritime Issues and Oceans
• Missile Defense
• Nuclear Issues
• Transnational Threats
• Water Security

Do we need a new strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States?

Photo: PAULA BRONSTEIN/GETTY IMAGES

Table of Contents

Report by Shannon N. Green

Published December 15, 2016

Available Downloads

• Download PDF file of "Do we need a new strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States?" 2383kb

Fifteen years after September 11, terrorism has spread, gained favor among a new generation, and now casts an ever-larger shadow over the globe. The policies of the past two administrations—one Republican and one Democratic—have been successful in hunting down terrorists, destroying their safe havens, and preventing them from planning and executing attacks on the homeland. Despite this good work, the problem has only grown more urgent and severe. New and powerful movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and familial and fraternal networks to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians.

The executive branch has received almost $2.5 trillion for counterterrorism activities and operations since the 9/11 attacks.

There are no easy solutions to this problem. The United States has taken extraordinary steps to try to address it. These measures include: hardening and expanding physical barriers around sensitive locations and critical infrastructure; improving security procedures and screening at airports and other entry points; tightening controls on people entering the country; and strengthening investigation and prosecution capabilities for terrorism-related cases. More than 263 government entities were either created or reorganized to implement these reforms. Chief among them were the Department of Homeland Security, which integrated all or part of 22 different federal departments and agencies to unify domestic counterterrorism efforts, and the Transportation Security Administration, which centralized and standardized airport security.

The United States simultaneously invested vast sums on countering terrorism abroad and building the capacity of partner security and intelligence services. According to estimates, Congress has appropriated $1.6 trillion to the Department of Defense (DoD) for war-related operational costs since September 11. Intelligence budgets have also significantly increased. In 2007, Congress appropriated $43.5 billion to the National Intelligence Program (NIP). Ten years later, the budget requested for the NIP rose to $53.5 billion. When combined with an estimated $123.2 billion for relevant State Department and Foreign Operations, the executive branch has received almost $2.5 trillion for counterterrorism activities and operations since the 9/11 attacks.

In many respects, the massive human and financial resources devoted to security since September 11 have made us safer. It is more difficult for terrorists to get into the United States and, if they do, harder for them to pull off a complex attack. However, in an era of social media, domestic radicalization, and lone wolf attacks, it is clear that military, intelligence, and law enforcement strategies alone are insufficient to eradicate the threat. Combating terrorism is both a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology,” as the 2006 National Security Strategy put it.

We have undoubtedly failed when it comes to the battle of ideas. Both the Bush and Obama administrations made some attempts to confront extremist ideologies and narratives, but prevention has never received sustained attention and focus, nor has it had the desired effect. One only has to look at the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and its unprecedented use of digital platforms to recruit fighters and inspire terrorist attacks all over the world. Instead of continuing to pursue complex 9/11-style attacks, these terrorists have adapted, transitioning to plots that can be executed by small groups or individuals, against soft targets, using less sophisticated and easy-to-acquire weapons. Such attacks do not require extensive training, planning, or coordination, making them harder to spot, but no less lethal. These groups have been better at adapting to our efforts than we have been at adapting to theirs.

Take the way terrorist groups have become more proficient at using social media and modern communications tools to target recruits, build their brand and market share, and expand their reach globally. Personal connections and one-to-one interactions remain central to terrorists’ recruitment tactics. But, digital platforms serve as a powerful amplifier and accelerant, allowing terrorist groups to target a much broader audience. Wannabee terrorists can consume propaganda, get inspired, and learn how to execute an attack—without ever leaving their homes. The widespread use of social media has also made violent extremists’ plans more difficult to identify and disrupt. Security agencies now have the added challenge of isolating genuine threats from a sea of noise.

Terrorism today is therefore more atomized, pervasive, and challenging to counter than it was at the turn of the century. Going forward, terrorists will likely seek to evade improved law enforcement and intelligence capabilities and border controls by calling on national citizens or green card holders—without a criminal record or known terrorist ties—to conduct attacks. As such, “homegrown extremism” presents a growing challenge in the United States and elsewhere. Violent extremist groups are also diversifying their recruitment pool, reaching out to women and older and younger generations who are not yet as closely watched by security agencies. Terrorists have already started recruiting children in their pre-teens—a trend that is likely to accelerate—and women are increasingly found in high-profile roles as supporters, mobilizers, and members of terrorist groups.

If the past 15 years have taught us anything, it is that we will never reduce the violence caused by terrorist groups until we blunt their appeal.

This evolution will require a fundamental shift in the way we counter terrorism. We can no longer rely on purely kinetic and law enforcement approaches and expect the same degree of success. Of course, these tools will remain essential for taking terrorists off the battlefield, disrupting plots, and safeguarding our borders. However, if the past 15 years have taught us anything, it is that we will never reduce the violence caused by terrorist groups until we blunt their appeal.

What is needed now is a comprehensive strategy to discredit violent extremists’ murderous and twisted ideology and a well-resourced operational plan to confront this threat over the next 15 years. Such a strategy must view terrorism as a global, generational, and ideological struggle. It requires mobilizing and empowering parents, teachers, peers, religious leaders, and other grassroots actors—those closest to would-be terrorists—to detect risks to public safety and intervene quickly to deflect someone from the path of radicalization. Civil society and community leaders are also in the best position to compete with and overtake violent extremists’ narratives in virtual and real spaces. However, they need greater political and financial support and training to play this crucial role.

Progress will also require addressing the underlying grievances and aspirations that make individuals open to the siren call of violent extremism. While we know that there is no single variable explaining why people join violent extremist groups, we have learned that terrorism thrives where marginalization, injustice, and oppression reign and where people are struggling to find an authentic identity and sense of purpose. Joining a violent extremist movement is, for many, an aspirational act—an opportunity to gain power, prestige, and status; to address perceived injustice; or to participate in a utopian effort to remake the world.

To prevent catastrophic attacks in the future and protect a new generation from being exploited by terrorist groups, we must find partners willing to help create meaningful opportunities for people to contribute to the political, social, and economic fabric of their societies in positive and sustainable ways. This will require a major reorientation of our approach and surge of investment in bottom-up, civilian-led, and long-term efforts in making communities inhospitable to extremist ideologies and narratives.

Shannon N. Green

Programs & projects.

• Overcoming Intolerance and Extremism

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

16.4 Preventing War and Stopping Terrorism

Learning objectives.

• Outline approaches that show promise for preventing war.
• Understand the differences between the law enforcement and structural-reform approaches to preventing terrorism.

War has existed since prehistoric times, and terrorism goes back at least to the days of the Old Testament (e.g., when Samson brought down the temple of the Philistines in an act of suicide that also killed scores of Philistines). Given their long histories, war and terrorism are not easy to prevent. However, theory and research by sociologists and other social scientists point to several avenues that may ultimately help make the world more peaceful.

Preventing War

The usual strategies suggested by political scientists and international relations experts to prevent war include arms control and diplomacy. Approaches to arms control and diplomacy vary in their actual and potential effectiveness. The historical and research literatures on these approaches are vast (Daase & Meier, 2012; Garcia, 2012) and beyond the scope of this chapter. Regardless of the specific approaches taken, suffice it here to say that arms control and diplomacy will always remain essential strategies to prevent war, especially in the nuclear age when humanity is only minutes away from possible destruction.

Beyond these two essential strategies, the roots of war must also be addressed. As discussed earlier, war is a social, not biological, phenomenon and arises from decisions by political and military leaders to go to war. There is ample evidence that deceit accompanies many of these decisions, as leaders go to many wars for less than noble purposes. To the extent this is true, citizens must always be ready to question any rationales given for war, and a free press in a democracy must exercise eternal vigilance in reporting on these rationales. According to critics, the press and the public were far too acquiescent in the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, just as they had been acquiescent a generation earlier when the Vietnam War began being waged (Solomon, 2006). To prevent war, then, the press and the public must always be ready to question assumptions about the necessity of war. The same readiness should occur in regard to militarism and the size of the military budget.

In this regard, history shows that social movements can help prevent or end armament and war and limit the unchecked use of military power once war has begun (Breyman, 2001; Staggenborg, 2010). While activism is no guarantee of success, responsible nonviolent protest against war and militarism provides an important vehicle for preventing war or for more quickly ending a war once it has begun.

People Making a Difference

Speaking Truth to Power

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a Quaker organization that has long worked for peace and social justice. Its national office is in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and it has local offices in more than thirty other US cities and also in more than a dozen other nations.

AFSC was established in 1917 to help conscientious objectors serve their country in nonmilitary ways during World War I. After that war ended with the defeat of Germany and Austria, AFSC provided food to thousands of German and Austrian children. It helped Jewish refugees after Hitler came to power, and sent various forms of aid to Japan after World War II ended. During the 1960s, it provided nonviolence training for civil rights activists and took a leading role in the movement to end the Vietnam War. Since the 1960s, AFSC has provided various types of help to immigrants, migrant workers, prisoners, and other “have-not” groups in need of social justice. It also works to achieve nonviolent conflict resolution in urban communities and spoke out against plans to begin war in Iraq in 2003.

In 1947, AFSC and its British counterpart won the Nobel Peace Prize for their aid to hungry children and other Europeans during and after World Wars I and II. The Nobel committee proclaimed in part, “The Quakers have shown us that it is possible to carry into action something which is deeply rooted in the minds of many: sympathy with others; the desire to help others…without regard to nationality or race; feelings which, when carried into deeds, must provide the foundations of a lasting peace.”

For almost a century, the American Friends Service Committee has been active in many ways to achieve a more just, peaceable world. It deserves the world’s thanks for helping to make a difference. For further information, visit http://www.afsc.org .

As we think about how to prevent war, we must not forget two important types of changes that create pressures for war: population change and environmental change. Effective efforts to reduce population growth in the areas of the world where it is far too rapid will yield many benefits, but one of these is a lower likelihood that certain societies will go to war. Effective efforts to address climate change will also yield many benefits, and one of these is also a lower likelihood of war and ethnic conflict in certain parts of the world.

Finally, efforts to prevent war must keep in mind the fact that ideological differences and prejudice sometimes motivate decisions to go to war. It might sound rather idealistic to say that governments and their citizenries should respect ideological differences and not be prejudiced toward people who hold different religious or other ideologies or have different ethnic backgrounds. However, any efforts by international bodies, such as the United Nations, to achieve greater understanding along these lines will limit the potential for war and other armed conflict. The same potential holds true for efforts to increase educational attainment within the United States and other industrial nations but especially within poor nations. Because prejudice generally declines as education increases, measures that raise educational attainment promise to reduce the potential for armed conflict in addition to the other benefits of increased education.

In addition to these various strategies to prevent war, it is also vital to reduce the size of the US military budget. Defense analysts who think this budget is too high have proposed specific cuts in weapons systems that are not needed and in military personnel at home and abroad who are not needed (Arquilla & Fogelson-Lubliner, 2011; Knight, 2011; Sustainable Defense Task Force, 2010). Making these cuts would save the nation from $100 billion to $150 billion annually without at all endangering national security. This large sum could then be spent to help meet the nation’s many unmet domestic needs.

Stopping Terrorism

Because of 9/11 and other transnational terrorism, most analyses of “stopping terrorism” focus on this specific type. Traditional efforts to stop transnational terrorism take two forms (White, 2012). The first strategy involves attempts to capture known terrorists and to destroy their camps and facilities and is commonly called a law enforcement or military approach. The second strategy stems from the recognition of the structural roots of terrorism just described and is often called a structural-reform approach. Each approach has many advocates among terrorism experts, and each approach has many critics.

Law enforcement and military efforts have been known to weaken terrorist forces, but terrorist groups have persisted despite these measures. Worse yet, these measures may ironically inspire terrorists to commit further terrorism and increase public support for their cause. Critics also worry that the military approach endangers civil liberties, as the debate over the US response to terrorism since 9/11 so vividly illustrates (Cole & Lobel, 2007). This debate took an interesting turn in late 2010 amid the increasing use of airport scanners that generate body images. Many people criticized the scanning as an invasion of privacy, and they also criticized the invasiveness of the “pat-down” searches that were used for people who chose not to be scanned (Reinberg, 2010).

In view of all these problems, many terrorism experts instead favor the structural-reform approach, which they say can reduce terrorism by improving or eliminating the conditions that give rise to the discontent that leads individuals to commit terrorism. Here again the assessment of the heads of the 9/11 Commission illustrates this view: “We must use all the tools of U.S. power—including foreign aid, educational assistance and vigorous public diplomacy that emphasizes scholarship, libraries and exchange programs—to shape a Middle East and a Muslim world that are less hostile to our interests and values. America’s long-term security relies on being viewed not as a threat but as a source of opportunity and hope” (Kean & Hamilton, 2007, p. B1).

Although there are no easy solutions to transnational terrorism, then, efforts to stop this form of terrorism must not neglect its structural roots. As long as these roots persist, new terrorists will come along to replace any terrorists who are captured or killed. Such recognition of the ultimate causes of transnational terrorism is thus essential for the creation of a more peaceable world.

Key Takeaways

• Arms control and diplomacy remain essential strategies for stopping war, but the roots of war must also be addressed.
• The law enforcement/military approach to countering terrorism may weaken terrorist groups, but it also may increase their will to fight and popular support for their cause and endanger civil liberties.

For Your Review

• Do you think deceit was involved in the decision of the United States to go to war against Iraq in 2003? Why or why not?
• Which means of countering terrorism do you prefer more, the law enforcement/military approach or the structural-reform approach? Explain your answer.

Arquilla, J., & Fogelson-Lubliner. (2011, March 13). The Pentagon’s biggest boondoggles. New York Times , p. WK12.

Breyman, S. (2001). Why movements matter: The west German peace movement and US arms control policy . Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Cole, D., & Lobel, J. (2007). Less safe, less free: Why America is losing the war on terror . New York, NY: New Press.

Daase, C., & Meier, O. (Eds.). (2012). Arms control in the 21st century: Between coercion and cooperation . New York, NY: Routledge.

Garcia, D. (2012). Disarmament diplomacy and human security: Regimes, norms, and moral progress in international relations . New York, NY: Routledge.

Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. H. (2007, September 9). Are we safer today? The Washington Post , p. B1.

Knight, C. (2011). Strategic adjustment to sustain the force: A survey of current proposals . Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives.

Reinberg, S. (2010, November 23). Airport body scanners safe, experts say. Bloomberg Businessweek . Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com .

Solomon, N. (2006). War made easy: How presidents and pundits keep spinning us to death Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Staggenborg, S. (2010). Social movements . New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Sustainable Defense Task Force. (2010). Debt, deficits, & defense: A way forward . Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives.

White, J. R. (2012). Terrorism and homeland security: An introduction (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Social Problems Copyright © 2015 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

An official website of the United States government

Here’s how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock A locked padlock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

• Publications Library
• Do Business with DHS

Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its many partners across the federal government, public and private sectors, and communities across the country and around the world have worked since 9/11 to build a new homeland security enterprise to better mitigate and defend against dynamic threats, minimize risks, and maximize the ability to respond and recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds. 

Together, these efforts have provided a strong foundation to protect communities from terrorism and other threats, while safeguarding the fundamental rights of all Americans. 

While threats persist, our nation is stronger than it was on 9/11, more prepared to confront evolving threats, and more resilient in the face of our continued challenges.

Read the Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations , Progress Report 2011.

Progress Made Since 9/11

Protecting the United States from terrorism is the founding mission of the Department of Homeland Security. While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of a strengthened homeland security enterprise, threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve. Today's threats do not come from any one individual or group. They may originate in distant lands or local neighborhoods. They may be as simple as a home-made bomb or as sophisticated as a biological threat or coordinated cyber attack. More and more, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers, as well as citizens, businesses, and communities are on the front lines of detection and prevention. Protecting the nation is a shared responsibility and everyone can contribute by staying informed and aware of the threats the country faces. Homeland security starts with hometown security—and we all have a role to play.

Building the Homeland Security Enterprise

• Fusion Centers : DHS supports state and major urban area fusion centers through personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, technology, and grant funding.
• Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative : An administration effort to train state and local law enforcement to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism, crime and other threats; standardize how those observations are documented and analyzed; and enhance the sharing of those reports with law enforcement across the country.
• Grant Funding : Since fiscal year 2003, DHS has awarded more than $31 billion in preparedness grant funding based on risk to build and sustain targeted capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism.

Preventing Terrorist Travel and Improving Passenger Screening

• Advance Passenger Information and  Passenger Name Record Data : To identify high-risk travelers and facilitate legitimate travel, DHS requires airlines flying to the United States to provide Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data prior to departure. During 2008 and 2009, PNR helped the United States identify individuals with potential ties to terrorism in more than 3,000 cases, and in fiscal year 2010, approximately one quarter of those individuals denied entry to the United States for having ties to terrorism were initially identified through the analysis of PNR.
• Visa Security Program : Through the Visa Security Program (VSP), with concurrence from the Department of State, ICE deploys trained special agents overseas to high-risk visa activity posts in order to identify potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the United States. The VSP is currently deployed to 19 posts in 15 countries.
• Pre-Departure Vetting: DHS has strengthened its in-bound targeting operations to identify high-risk travelers who are likely to be inadmissible to the United States and to recommend to commercial carriers that those individuals not be permitted to board a commercial aircraft through its Pre-Departure program. Since 2010, CBP has identified over 2,800 passengers who would likely have been found inadmissible upon arrival to the United States.
• Secure Flight : Fulfilling a key 9/11 Commission recommendation, DHS fully implemented Secure Flight in 2010, in which TSA prescreens 100 percent of passengers on flights flying to, from, or within the United States against government watchlists before travelers receive their boarding passes. Prior to Secure Flight, airlines were responsible for checking passengers against watchlists. Through Secure Flight, TSA now vets over 14 million passengers weekly.
• Enhanced Explosives Screening: Prior to 9/11, limited federal security requirements existed for cargo or baggage screening. Today, TSA screens 100 percent of all checked and carry-on baggage for explosives. Through the Recovery Act and annual appropriations, TSA has accelerated the deployment of new technologies to detect the next generation of threats, including Advanced Imaging Technology units, Explosive Detection Systems, Explosives Trace Detection units, Advanced Technology X-Ray systems, and Bottled Liquid Scanners.

Strengthening Surface Transportation Security

• Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: TSA has 25 multi-modal Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams working in transportation sectors across the country to prevent or disrupt potential terrorist planning activities. Since the VIPR program was created in 2008, there have been over 17,700 operations performed.
• Baseline Surface Transportation Security Assessments: Since 2006, TSA has completed more than 190 Baseline Assessments for Security Enhancement for transit, which provides a comprehensive assessment of security programs in critical transit systems.

Strengthening Global Supply Chain Security

• Air Cargo Screening: Fulfilling a requirement of the 9/11 Act, 100 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft that depart U.S. airports is now screened commensurate with screening of passenger checked baggage and 100 percent of high risk cargo on international flights bound for the United States is screened.
• Container Security Initiative : The Container Security Initiative (CSI), currently operational in 58 foreign seaports in 32 countries, identifies and screens U.S.-bound maritime containers that pose a potential risk.

Detecting and Preventing Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats

• Detection at Ports of Entry: DHS has deployed radiation detection technologies to seaports, land border ports, and mail facilities around the world. These systems scan 100 percent of all containerized cargo and personal vehicles arriving in the U.S. through land ports of entry, as well as over 99 percent of arriving sea containers.
• State and Local Radiological Emergency Preparedness: DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has made radiological and nuclear detection training available to over 15,000 state and local officers and first responders.
• BioWatch: The Department's BioWatch system is a federally-managed, locally-operated, nationwide bio-surveillance system designed to detect the intentional release of aerosolized biological agents.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

• Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards : DHS has implemented Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards to regulate security at high-risk chemical facilities. To date, approximately 4,500 facilities have been preliminarily identified as high-risk, resulting in the development and submission of Security Vulnerability Assessments.  
• Critical Infrastructure Security Assessments : DHS has conducted more than 1,900 security surveys and 2,500 vulnerability assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and provide recommendations on protective measures.
• Training and Education: DHS has developed a variety of infrastructure protection training and educational tools for its partners at the state and local level. In total, more than 35,000 partners have taken risk mitigation training on a range of topics.

Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations

Read the  Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations , Progress Report 2011

• Preventing Terrorism and Targeted Violence

You are viewing:

Archived Content

Information released online from January 20, 2009 to January 20, 2017. Note: Content in this archive site is not updated , and links may not function. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

Go to the current State.gov website for up-to-date information.

U.s. department of state, diplomacy in action.

• Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights
• Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
• Remarks Pertaining to Counterterrorism
• 2010 Remarks Pertaining to Counterterrorism

Preventing Terrorism: Strategies and Policies To Prevent and Combat Transnational Threats

As Prepared for Delivery

Introduction

I’d like to thank the Government of Kazakhstan for hosting this important OSCE Conference on “Successful Strategies, Effective Policies, and Best Practices to Prevent Terrorism.” The United States recognizes the leadership Kazakhstan has shown in the OSCE and is very pleased to have this opportunity to collaborate with our partners here in Astana on the vital issue of terrorism prevention.

Kazakhstan’s OSCE Chairmanship this year is significant. The OSCE is known for its comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach to security and for being the largest regional security organization in the world. Now, for the very first time, the OSCE is headed by a Central Asian country – an affirmation that the OSCE draws strength from the diversity of OSCE participating States from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

I would also like to express our gratitude to the hard work of the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit, which has done so much to spearhead our shared efforts.

As a significant contributor to peace and security in across its region, the OSCE is well-suited, across its three dimensions, to address the particular challenges of counterterrorism.

In view of the upcoming OSCE summit here in Astana, this discussion is a well-timed opportunity to consider ways in which the OSCE can continue to innovate and deepen its contributions in this area.

To begin our discussion, along with my fellow panelists, I’d like to discuss briefly some key terrorist-linked transnational threats and trends; highlight current U.S. approaches to prevent and combat terrorism, and to counter violent extremism; and offer possible areas for future action that OSCE could take to further efforts on terrorism prevention. Global and Regional Transnational Terrorist Threats and Trends: With respect to threats and trends, let me begin by saying that terrorism remains one of the most enduring challenges to international peace and security that we face. The United States is committed to the urgent need to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida’s core and its adherents – a terrorist network that has killed thousands of people of multiple faiths and nationalities, many from OSCE members states. While al-Qa'ida has had some successes over the past years, we believe its overall success has been significantly tempered by numerous setbacks. Al-Qa’ida’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians, including Muslims, has increased popular disaffection with its extremist ideology. The number of imams, clerics and former militants speaking out against the organization’s indiscriminate use of violence is increasing and that is good news. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the group is under serious military pressure. Al-Qa'ida’s leadership is shrinking, and it is facing growing challenges as it seeks to raise money, train recruits, and plan attacks outside of the region. Despite these setbacks to the core leadership, however, the broader AQ threat is becoming more widely distributed, and more geographically and ethnically diversified among affiliates such as in Yemen and the Sahel. We have also witnessed a continued evolution of the threat which is no longer limited to coordinated, sophisticated, 9/11-style attacks, but expanding to single individuals attempting to carry out relatively unsophisticated attacks. We remain concerned about the terrorist threat to Central Asia posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and a splinter group known as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Supporters of both terrorist groups are believed to maintain a presence in the region. Afghanistan’s security also looms large. We are working with our allies to ensure that Afghanistan will not remain a safe haven for militants who aspire to cause regional instability. However, the extension of trafficking and organized crime networks in Central Asia with links to Afghanistan could help finance terrorists. With the youth population expanding rapidly throughout South Asia and the Middle East, the prospect of increasing numbers of “at risk” young people also rises. Europe may also continue to be fertile ground for recruitment for extremists if sizable numbers of recent immigrants and, in particular, second and third generation Muslims continue to experience socioeconomic and integration problems and feel alienated by governments’ domestic and foreign policies. Nor is the United States immune from AQ’s ideology. Several high profile cases the past few years, such as native Californian Adam Gadahn who has become an AQ spokesman or the December 25 th attempted bombing of a U.S. bound airliner by Nigerian Farouk Abdulmutallab, demonstrate that we must all remain vigilant. We also see the expanded reach of its virulent ideology through the Internet. Al-Qa’ida has continued its efforts to encourage key regional affiliates and so-called “jihadist” networks to pursue a global agenda using both the Internet as a means to distribute propaganda and telecommunications infrastructure to plan attacks and coordinate movements. Terrorists are not only using the Internet for communication, recruiting, training and planning – but also to transfer funds, although international action has made significant progress towards addressing this illicit activity. Most major terrorist groups have exploited the mass communication capabilities of the Internet through numerous propaganda websites and forums, although radicalization that leads to violent extremism still typically occurs through first-hand human interaction, rather than virtual interaction.

U.S. Strategies and Policies To Prevent and Combat Terrorism

Let me underscore: No single country can address the threat of terrorism alone. Nor can this threat be resolved through military power alone; rather it requires a comprehensive approach including continual exchange of ideas and engagement with the international community.

Addressing the challenge of terrorism over the long term demands multilateral cooperation; capacity building; and considered efforts to counter violent extremism by all levels of society and government.

The United States has been working hard to reinvigorate alliances and strengthen existing partnerships; this is especially true in the arena of counterterrorism. Through consistent diplomatic engagement, we are seeking to boost the political will and strengthen the resolve of leaders around the world to confront terrorist threats. Ultimately, our success will hinge upon strengthening the ability of others around the world to deal with terrorism in their countries and regions.

The more decentralized and diffuse threat heightens the important role of local communities, which can identify and bring the attention of lone actors to law enforcement officials who may have limited penetration in these communities. In a number of cases we have seen this happen in the United States, thus helping prevent terrorist attacks.

We are committed to addressing the limitations in some states that allow terrorists to operate freely, by promoting effective civilian law enforcement, good governance, and the rule of law, and the delivery of public services to the general population. A major focus of this work involves effectively building capacity and making counterterrorism training of police, prosecutors, border officials, and members of the judiciary more systematic, more innovative, and more effective. We are committed to working with our OSCE partners to promote these efforts.

The United States has enhanced our approach to preventing acts of terror by pursuing an integrated set of security policies that seeks to build political will and concerted cooperation among partner countries in order to deprive terrorists of the conditions conducive to the perpetration of violent actions and the spread of their perverse ideology.

We need to look to the grievances and local factors that terrorist organizations exploit and the propaganda that is their key instrument in pushing vulnerable individuals down the path toward violence. More efforts are needed through words and deeds to undermine the insidious message of terrorist groups and to prevent vulnerable individuals from turning to violence.

To make progress on this front, we must resolve legitimate grievances peacefully and strive to foster good governance, reduce poverty and corruption, and improve education, health and basic services. In particular, we need to focus our efforts on locations where the risk for radicalization is exceptionally high. Once we understand the unique combination of grievances and needs that are driving recruitment in these “hotspots,” we can set about creating tailor-made programs and strategies in response.

As we focus on these factors and pursue our counterterrorism work more broadly, we must constantly bear in mind that there is no tradeoff between security and human rights and the rule of law. To the contrary, it is increasingly evident that the recruitment of terrorists is most successful where local dynamics increase popular disaffection and create conditions of desperation.

To achieve this objective, we must empower national and local leaders to challenge extremist views through well-designed programs, training, and funding. We should recognize the added value of partnering with non-traditional actors such as NGOs, foundations, public-private partnerships, and private businesses because these actors are often the most capable and credible partners in local communities. Regional/Multilateral Efforts and the Role of OSCE in Preventing Terrorism What should be the way forward for the OSCE and its participating states? This is an important question that we should try to address as we look at the role of OSCE and regional organizations in preventing terrorism. Let me offer some thoughts. For the United States, we seek to build a network of alliances and partnerships, regional organizations, and global institutions that is durable enough to meet today’s challenges and adapt to threats of which we cannot yet conceive. In this respect, the OSCE also has an important role to play in helping to build a common strategy with regional cooperation. Moreover, like other regional organizations, the OSCE plays a useful role in building both regional ownership of the UN CT framework and indigenous counterterrorism capacity at the national level. This is done through the sharing of best practices and the implementation of training programs designed to improve the ability of national and local leaders to mitigate the vulnerabilities on which terrorism thrives. In addition, we should seek to strengthen the role and programs of OSCE’s field missions, carefully evaluate the effectiveness of OSCE activities and programs in the run-up to the summit, and determine priorities for the way ahead. An important theme for the summit will be further development of OSCE’s capabilities to combat transnational threats and continued work on counterterrorism will be a fundamental building block of that effort. The United States has focused its counterterrorism efforts over the past few years in the OSCE on issues including building public private partnerships; protecting critical energy infrastructure and cyber security, securing travel documents, and enhancing the capacities of prosecutors and judges, and the wider criminal justice system. The OSCE should continue to deepen and strengthen its capacity-building activities. However, we also believe that confronting violent extremism that leads to terrorism is and will remain one of the greatest challenges facing the OSCE region. As an organization, the OSCE needs to embrace this challenge, identify where its comparative advantages lie in working with countries in the region to address this challenge. OSCE activities should be strengthened to address the conditions that are conducive to terrorist recruitment and the spread of transnational threats. Policies and programs designed to counter violent extremism will complement capacity-building projects by mitigating the very threats that otherwise necessitate a law enforcement response. The key to success is focusing our attention on locations where the risk of radicalization may be of particular concern. These areas can be as large as a province and as small as a city block. We believe that the OSCE should work to counter violent extremism by using innovative approaches to mitigate the social and economic factors that amplify the appeal of al-Qa’ida’s radical ideology. For instance, the OSCE should work closely with victims and survivors of terrorism to encourage their efforts to condemn violent and extremist ideologies. Other areas of potential are in prison reform and inmate education to prevent radicalization and rehabilitate those who have been radicalized already, as well as programs to strengthen co-operation between government institutions and civil society. We also support the expansion of the OSCE’s efforts for and with Afghanistan to more effectively address transnational threats in the region, and we believe that the OSCE’s engagement on issues such as border management will help increase security for the entire region. Transnational criminal networks can move not only illicit goods such as narcotics, but violent extremists as well. The OSCE should also endeavor to elevate our understanding of the special role played by women and youth, both as victims and possible perpetrators of terrorist acts. Due to their positions in their families, women can exert a stabilizing influence and empower individuals to be able to resist violent extremist propaganda and radicalization that can lead to terrorism. Providing opportunities for women to apply their skills and share their knowledge can drive social and economic progress that not only brings material benefits to their families and societies, but has a derivative effect that increases ideological moderation. In this regard, the United States welcomes the chance to help raise awareness of a relatively new and innovative initiative called Sisters Against Violent Extremism (or SAVE), within Central Asia and the wider region, including Afghanistan. SAVE promotes the roles that women and children can play in countering and preventing violent extremism. In places like Northern Ireland, Spain, Pakistan, and Indonesia we have seen and are impressed by the courageous efforts of women who have used films, press events, reconciliation workshops, newspaper editorials, leadership training retreats and schools to energize and mobilize civil society's contributions toward a safer world. We look forward to discussing in more detail a potential OSCE-organized SAVE workshop next year with our hosts for this important meeting and welcome questions or feedback on this initiative from conference participants. This is but one example of the ways in which non-governmental organizations can effectively partner with the OSCE and other multilateral institutions to advance our work in this area. We have also been pleased with the opportunity OSCE’s work and activities have given us to pursue and develop specific bilateral initiatives, notably with the Russian Federation on public private partnerships and tourism security; and with Turkey on countering violent extremism. We look forward to developing these and other partnerships further. Conclusion

Through continued dialogue, the implementation of sound policies, and a comprehensive approach, we believe the OSCE has an important role to play in securing long-term stability in this region.

My remarks were intended to lay out U.S. views of our common threats and our thoughts on ways in which OSCE’s mandate can constructively expand to build capacity of its participating states, at a national and regional and sub-regional level, and begin to take on preventive measures to counter violent extremism.

The OSCE must respond to the needs of its participating states and maintain flexibility to meet these requirements. One-size-fits-all programs may work in some instances, while in others, regional and trans-regional strategies have a better chance of succeeding. This is why this conference is so important to hear from other members and maintain a dialogue.

We anticipate that this conference will serve as a critical step in the ongoing process of sharing best practices for strengthening domestic counterterrorism infrastructures and addressing the issue of recruitment to terrorism. The United States looks forward to participating in this important work with all of you and working to ensure our mutual goals of defeating terrorism and ensuring our common security.

You are entering the 2009-2017 Archive for the U.S. Department of State.

If you are looking for current information, visit www.state.gov ..

Tip: Use @ to search articles by an author

The role of education in preventing violent extremism

Interview with Tawakkol Karman, human rights activist, journalist, politician, and winner of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize. Interview by Akriti Mehra, Communications Specialist, UNESCO MGIEP

In commemoration of the International Day of Non-Violence on October 2, 2017,  Ms. Tawakkol Karman delivered the second Ahinsa Lecture at the UNESCO Headquarters, Paris on the theme ‘Working Towards Peace Building and Sustainable Development’. Ahinsa is derived from Sanskrit word ‘hims’, meaning injury and its opposite (a-himsā meaning without any injury) refers to non-violence. This ethical philosophy was popularised by Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest champion of nonviolence in the world. The Ahinsa Lecture brings forth public speakers of the highest calibre active in the field of peace and non-violence to the forum for the benefit of peace builders, policymakers, youth, UNESCO Member states and international community. The Ahinsa Lecture is organised to mark the International Day of Non-Violence celebrated on 2 October to mark the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi.

Post the lecture, we spoke with Ms. Karman and gathered her views on the role of education in preventing violent extremism.

What role does the education system play in preventing violent extremism?

Unquestionably, the educational system plays a large role in both preventing and spreading extremism. In fact, this basically depends on the philosophy of education, and on the school curriculums and the methods used in introducing them to students. I believe that having a coherent, progressive and contemporary education system is a crucial factor in preventing the infiltration of extremist ideas. In the end, the educational system plays a key role in whether the outcomes of the learning process are good or bad, and therefore the quality of education must be constantly monitored.

If this question is about the Arab world, I believe that the current education systems are unable to provide the needed skills for students, as there are obvious deficiencies regarding the curriculum and teacher qualification in addition to the shortage of equipment and laboratories that help increase students’ capacities to absorb the educational content and develop their mental and physical skills. There are good examples of successful schools, but they are few. As for the current education systems, they still suffer from several weaknesses and they are not keeping up with the latest developments related to techniques and laws.

In a peaceful and sustainable society, what does the education system look like?

In my view, the education system will be more developed, and will be a catalyst for the acquisition of different skills, creativity and innovation, as well as critical thinking. Such skills would never be accepted by any tyrannical regime that is based on indoctrination instead of debate and free thinking.

If the goal is to prevent violent extremism, what skills do students need in order to not fall susceptible to extreme ideologies?

As mentioned earlier, in order for students to not be vulnerable to radical ideologies, they must be equipped with the skill of critical thinking. Cognitive skills such as thinking, learning and the ability  to discuss and criticise constructively away from taboos are imperative for students  to be more committed to logical reasoning  and not to be susceptible to any attempts  of polarisation.

What are the major current factors that are inhibiting education systems from shaping compassionate and empathetic students?

There are several factors that make it difficult to shape compassionate students, most notably the absence of the political and moral project at the state level, the inability to deal with emotions and questions of students, in addition to extremist platforms, including media outlets and social media, which could reach them, deal with them the way they like, and provide answers to their questions, even if these questions were not correct (unclear). Therefore, attention should be paid on methodologies to increase the level of rational thinking among students and encourage their questions instead of oppressing them.

What is the connection between education systems and women’s rights?

Family and education contribute significantly to women’s access to their rights and helps prevent their margina-lisation and persecution. Societies with a high education rate are better able to understand women’s demands and are less likely to oppress them. Education is essential in correcting wrong behaviors  and misconceptions towards women.

“The Youth is a positive force that must be maintained and not allowed to turn into a negative force or a burden on society.”

What do you think are the main tools for fighting violent extremism?

There is no doubt that education is one of the tools that can help eliminate the ignorance that leads to violent extremism. Besides education, however, other fundamental factors are required to overcome extremism and terrorism. Freedom, democracy and justice help  create cohesive and non-extremist societies. Tyranny dilutes education  and creates extremism and terrorism.

What social actors should be involved in shaping education systems?

They include states, researchers and institutions concerned with education development, NGOs and students themselves. Students should be consulted and allowed to assess what they are studying.

Follow us at:

UNESCO MGIEP, ICSSR Building, First Floor 35 Ferozshah Road, New Delhi-110001 Phone: +91 11 23072356-60

We use cookies on this site to enhance your user experience. For more information on how we use cookies, read our privacy policy .

Fill in your details to receive updates from us:

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

Here's how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock A locked padlock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Domestic Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Countering and preventing terrorism is a primary concern for state and local law enforcement agencies as well as the federal government. Terrorists are those who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social or religious goals. The goal of NIJ’s work on domestic radicalization and violent extremism is to provide community leaders with evidence-based practices for bolstering resilience and developing communitywide responses that can prevent  radicalization and mitigate threats posed by those individuals mobilized to violent extremism.

Important questions remain about the nature of terrorism, but few are as vexing as why and how individuals become terrorists. This process, often referred to as “radicalization to terrorism” or "radicalization to violent extremism," is the central focus of NIJ’s research and evaluation efforts in this area of study.

To improve our understanding of radicalization to violent extremism as it occurs in the United States, NIJ supports research aimed at answering several questions:

• What common threads exist among cases of domestic radicalization to violent extremism?
• Which models of radicalization to violent extremism explain how the process occurs in the United States, and what can these models tell us about preventing and countering violent extremism?
• Why do people adopt radical beliefs, and why do some people choose to engage in violence to further those beliefs while others do not?
• How are U.S. communities responding to radicalization, and what works to prevent radicalization to violent extremism and terrorism?

NIJ has funded research on terrorism since 2002. Since 2012, NIJ has focused its research investments in this area on developing a better understanding of domestic radicalization and advancing evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention of radicalization to violent extremism in the United States.

Following are short overviews of our primary focus in each year of the program and links to a list of awards funding in that year.

Fiscal Year 2023

In the twelfth year of the program (FY23), NIJ continued its focus in understanding and identifying threats of radicalization and violent extremism, as well as examining intervention and prevention strategies. In addition, with the increase of online engagement facilitating radicalization and violent extremism, this year’s funding also supported research that explored the role of social media, online forums and other internet platforms on violent extremism and radicalization. Overall, NIJ identified these areas of focus in the solicitation:

• Research to inform terrorism intervention and prevention efforts.
• Research on the role of communications in promoting and countering extremist content and information.
• Research on disengagement, deradicalization and the reintegration into society of individuals incarcerated for terrorism related offenses.
• Evaluations of programs and practices to prevent acts of terrorism.

NIJ selected five projects for funding that each address these areas of focus to inform policy on strategies to counter the increase in radicalization and violent extremism.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2023 projects.

Fiscal Year 2022

In the eleventh year of the program (FY22), NIJ shared many of the same objectives as the fiscal year 2021 solicitation of assembling knowledge for the prevention and intervention of radicalization to violent extremism. Additionally, in order to address a major research need and in direct response to the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism , NIJ solicited research on mis-, dis-, and mal- information. In all, NIJ expressed interest in the following areas:

• Research to inform terrorism prevention efforts.
• Research on the disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration of individuals convicted of terrorism related charges.
• Evaluations of programs and practices to prevent terrorism.
• Research on countering mis-, dis-, or mal-information.

Moreover, in response to NIJ’s congressional mandate for FY22, the solicitation emphasized a focus on the radicalization of White nationalists, and evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies were encouraged.

After a competitive review process, NIJ awarded grants for two projects.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2022 projects.

Fiscal Year 2021

In the tenth year of the program (FY21), NIJ desired insight into the domestic radicalization process to inform evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies. As highlighted in three focus areas, NIJ sought applicants conducting rigorous studies to

• Improve upon existing research on terrorism prevention,
• Increase knowledge on how to support the reintegration of individuals convicted of terrorism-related charges back into the community effectively, or
• Evaluate programs and practices aimed at preventing terrorism.

An overarching goal of this solicitation was to bridge the gap between research and practice by having applicants partner with agencies to develop novel and translational approaches for efficiently meeting the needs of current and former extremists. Ultimately, NIJ selected eight projects for funding.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2021 projects.

Fiscal Year 2020

In the ninth year of the program (FY20), NIJ aimed to support research that specified approaches to prevent terrorism effectively. 

An emphasis was placed on the following priority areas:

• Evaluations of terrorism prevention programs and practices.
• Research on the reintegration of individuals convicted of terrorism-related charges back into the community.

Funded projects demonstrated an effort to establish partnerships between researchers and practitioners in developing terrorism prevention strategies and underscored clear benefits and implications for criminal justice agencies.

 In total, NIJ chose three projects for funding. These projects examined the risk and protective factors increasing or decreasing an individual’s involvement in politically motivated violence, the differences among five far-right groups to create an analytic framework for policies that address far-right extremism, and how a community-based program can engage individuals at risk of radicalizing to violence.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2020 projects .

Fiscal Year 2019

In the eighth year of the program (FY19), NIJ emphasized an interest in evaluations of new and existing demonstration programs to prevent terrorism. NIJ encouraged applicants to submit projects which conduct phased, comparative and multi-site programmatic evaluations, help the field better understand risk factors, and develop risk assessment tools. NIJ also encouraged applicants to submit projects to increase knowledge surrounding deradicalization and disengagement, in addition to programming and services provided to those incarcerated for or released from terrorism related offenses.

NIJ’s priorities for the FY19 solicitation were to fund studies in three focus areas:

• Both formative and outcome evaluations of programs and practices to prevent terrorism
• Research to inform terrorism prevention efforts (same as previous years)
• Research on the reintegration of individuals to the community (new)

The first area of focus emphasized a phased evaluation approach. If applicants selected for awards under this area are successful in completing a formative and evaluability assessment, additional funding may be provided to those applicants for the subsequent phases of the evaluation (i.e. the process evaluation or the outcome/impact evaluation).  Applicants were also allowed to submit proposals for standalone outcome evaluations of existing strong and well-developed programs. Rigor and strong experimental designs were emphasized.

The second area of focus solicited research on prevention and intervention programs, as well as comparative analyses of these types of programs from various communities across the country. This area of focus attempted to develop knowledge and bridge gaps in research about pathways, risk and protective factors, and the assessment of those risk factors. This area also focused on the development of instruments, procedures, and practices to improve the identification of individuals at high-risk of becoming committed to terrorist ideologies and carrying out acts of terrorism. NIJ sought applications that build and improve on existing research in this area, including research that improves on data sources and methods.

The last area of focus emphasized needs-assessments and general knowledge building around the reintegration of persons released on terrorism-related charges. As this research area is highly understudied and still in its infancy, NIJ sought to build knowledge of pre-release and post-confinement characteristics of those convicted of committing acts of terrorism that may inform reintegration policies, programs, and practices.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2019 projects that were selected for funding .

Fiscal Year 2018

In the seventh year of the program, we re-emphasized many of the same themes from the fiscal year 2017 solicitation. Special attention was directed towards supporting replication and rigorous scientific evaluation of existing programs, as well as the development and evaluation of programs where none currently exist. We funded studies that apply an approach that engages researchers and practitioners in an active partnership to develop more effective solutions to specific problems, and to produce transportable lessons and strategies that may help other localities with similar problems.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2018 projects that were selected for funding .

Fiscal Year 2017

In the sixth year of the program, NIJ sought to support both programmatic evaluations and foundational research to better understand causes and contributing factors to radicalization. Areas of focus highlighted in the solicitation included (but were not limited to):

• Risk factors and risk assessment tools.
• Development of instruments, procedures, and practices.
• Comparative/multi-site programmatic evaluations and analyses.

Our overall with this solicitation was to bridge gaps in knowledge by understanding why and how radicalization occurs, and what research-informed steps can be taken to prevent it, or intervene before it leads to violence.

Read abstracts and see award details for the 2017 projects that were selected for funding .

Fiscal Year 2016

The fifth year of the program continued the theme of focusing on the application of research. Along with the release of many of the individual studies funded in the first two years of the program, NIJ is launching a series of papers that will synthesize the results of the studies and integrate findings from non-NIJ studies and reports to state plainly what the research tells us about radicalization pathways, behavioral indicators and so forth. Second, NIJ hosted a Program Status Meeting in December of 2016 which brought together NIJ grantees, practitioners, local/state/federal partners and stakeholders to discuss research findings and ideas for future research direction. The fiscal year 2016 solicitation called for papers that intended to support replication and evaluation of existing programs as well as the development and evaluation of programs where none currently exist. NIJ sought applications that applied an “action research” approach that engages researchers and practitioners in an active partnership to develop more effective solutions to specific problems and to produce transportable lessons and strategies that may help other localities with similar problems. The fiscal 2016 solicitation resulted in the funding of three new studies. Read abstracts and see award details for the 2016 projects .

Fiscal year 2015

Year 4 of the program shifted away from the construction of the evidence base to focus more on prevention and intervention. Two major activities demarcated this shift. The first was a major, three-day conference called “Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons from Canada, the UK and the US,” which brought together the most influential research teams from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. It gathered the best researchers from five robust and comprehensive programs targeting terrorism and delivered practical, timely and plain spoken results to the practitioners who can use them.   

The second major activity was the launch of an effort to work with stakeholders in the field to determine the requirements for identifying individuals who would benefit from early intervention to dissuade radicalization or for determining whether an individual is eligible for diversion and rehabilitation programs. To accomplish this, NIJ supported a Department of Homeland Security Directorate of Science and Technology (DHS S&T) contract action that will scan and assess existing tools and programs against the requirements of stakeholders.

Lastly, NIJ launched a fourth call for proposals addressing radicalization to terrorism. The objectives of this call for proposals were to address radicalization to Indigenous forms of terrorism, to explore contemporary forms of radicalization, and to evaluate community-based prevention and intervention programs. Four projects were selected for funding. Read abstracts and see award details for the 2015 projects.

Fiscal year 2014

Year 3 of the program has focused on the dissemination of early results. NIJ hosted practitioners, including representatives from U.S. Attorneys' Offices, other federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and international partners, at a program update meeting in June 2014. The meeting provided a chance for the first-year grantees to present their initial findings and for the second-year grantees to introduce their new projects.

After a competitive review process, NIJ awarded grants for six research projects in 2014. Read abstracts and see award details for the 2014 projects .

Fiscal Year 2013

In the second year of the program, NIJ undertook a coordinated effort to bring together stakeholders and demonstrate the importance of the research. The effort culminated in a meeting of grantees and key stakeholders from federal, state and local criminal justice agencies.

The research and evaluation goals were expanded to include six research grants targeting new questions that were brought to the table. NIJ identified the following areas of interest for year 2 proposals:

• Comparative analysis of individual terrorists, individuals who perpetrate mass casualty events, gang members, hate group members and/or organized criminals
• Online radicalization to terrorism
• Evaluations of promising practices
• The relationship between and convergence of organized crime and either terrorist groups or transnational gangs

After a competitive review process, NIJ awarded six grants. 

Five of the six were awarded under the "Research and Evaluation on Radicalization to Violent Extremism in the United States" solicitation.  Read abstracts and see award details for those five projects .

One grant was awarded under the "Research and Evaluation on Transnational Issues Trafficking in Persons, Transnational Organized Crime and Violent Extremism" solicitation. Read an abstract and see award details for that award . 

Fiscal Year 2012 (Initial Year of the Program)

In the first year of the program, NIJ focused its call for research proposals on four areas of interest:

• Empirical evaluation of social science theories of domestic radicalization.
• Examination of the radicalization process for individuals, including “lone wolf” terrorists.
• Comparative analysis of terrorists, organized criminals, gangs, hate groups and/or cults.
• Influence of community-level and policing strategies on domestic radicalization.

After a competitive review process, NIJ awarded six grants and one evaluation contract.  Read abstracts and see award details for the 2012 projects .

Cite this Article

Read more about:.

NIJ periodically updates this page as new awards are made. 

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

Here's how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock A locked padlock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

NCJRS Virtual Library

Policing terrorism, additional details.

Washington , DC 20528 , United States

1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW , Washington , DC 20036 , United States

Availability

Related topics.

Terrorism Essay for Students and Teacher

500+ words essay on terrorism essay.

Terrorism is an act, which aims to create fear among ordinary people by illegal means. It is a threat to humanity. It includes person or group spreading violence, riots, burglaries, rapes, kidnappings, fighting, bombings, etc. Terrorism is an act of cowardice. Also, terrorism has nothing to do with religion. A terrorist is only a terrorist, not a Hindu or a Muslim.

Types of Terrorism

Terrorism is of two kinds, one is political terrorism which creates panic on a large scale and another one is criminal terrorism which deals in kidnapping to take ransom money. Political terrorism is much more crucial than criminal terrorism because it is done by well-trained persons. It thus becomes difficult for law enforcing agencies to arrest them in time.

Terrorism spread at the national level as well as at international level.  Regional terrorism is the most violent among all. Because the terrorists think that dying as a terrorist is sacred and holy, and thus they are willing to do anything. All these terrorist groups are made with different purposes.

Causes of Terrorism

There are some main causes of terrorism development  or production of large quantities of machine guns, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, missiles, etc. rapid population growth,  Politics, Social, Economic  problems, dissatisfaction of people with the country’s system, lack of education, corruption, racism, economic inequality, linguistic differences, all these are the major  elements of terrorism, and terrorism flourishes after them. People use terrorism as a weapon to prove and justify their point of view.  The riots among Hindus and Muslims are the most famous but there is a difference between caste and terrorism.

The Effects Of Terrorism

Terrorism spreads fear in people, people living in the country feel insecure because of terrorism. Due to terrorist attacks, millions of goods are destroyed, the lives of thousands of innocent people are lost, animals are also killed. Disbelief in humanity raises after seeing a terrorist activity, this gives birth to another terrorist. There exist different types of terrorism in different parts of the country and abroad.

Today, terrorism is not only the problem of India, but in our neighboring country also, and governments across the world are making a lot of effort to deal with it. Attack on world trade center on September 11, 2001, is considered the largest terrorist attack in the world. Osama bin Laden attacked the tallest building in the world’s most powerful country, causing millions of casualties and death of thousands of people.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Terrorist Attacks in India

India has suffered several terrorist attacks which created fear among the public and caused huge destruction. Here are some of the major terrorist attacks that hit India in the last few years: 1991 – Punjab Killings, 1993 – Bombay Bomb Blasts, RSS Bombing in Chennai, 2000 – Church Bombing, Red Fort Terrorist Attack,2001- Indian Parliament Attack, 2002 – Mumbai Bus Bombing, Attack on Akshardham Temple, 2003 – Mumbai Bombing, 2004 – Dhemaji School Bombing in Assam,2005 – Delhi Bombings, Indian Institute of Science Shooting, 2006 – Varanasi Bombings, Mumbai Train Bombings, Malegaon Bombings, 2007 – Samjhauta Express Bombings, Mecca Masjid Bombing, Hyderabad Bombing, Ajmer Dargah Bombing, 2008 – Jaipur Bombings, Bangalore Serial Blasts, Ahmedabad Bombings, Delhi Bombings, Mumbai Attacks, 2010 – Pune Bombing, Varanasi Bombing.

The recent ones include 2011 – Mumbai Bombing, Delhi Bombing, 2012 – Pune Bombing, 2013 – Hyderabad Blasts, Srinagar Attack, Bodh Gaya Bombings, Patna Bombings, 2014 – Chhattisgarh Attack, Jharkhand Blast, Chennai Train Bombing, Assam Violence, Church Street Bomb Blast, Bangalore, 2015 –  Jammu Attack, Gurdaspur Attack, Pathankot Attack, 2016 – Uri Attack, Baramulla Attack, 2017 – Bhopal Ujjain Passenger Train Bombing, Amarnath Yatra Attack, 2018 Sukma Attack, 2019- Pulwama attack.

Agencies fighting Terrorism in India

Many police, intelligence and military organizations in India have formed special agencies to fight terrorism in the country. Major agencies which fight against terrorism in India are Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Terrorism has become a global threat which needs to be controlled from the initial level. Terrorism cannot be controlled by the law enforcing agencies alone. The people in the world will also have to unite in order to face this growing threat of terrorism.

Customize your course in 30 seconds

Which class are you in.

• Travelling Essay
• Picnic Essay
• Our Country Essay
• My Parents Essay
• Essay on Favourite Personality
• Essay on Memorable Day of My Life
• Essay on Knowledge is Power
• Essay on Gurpurab
• Essay on My Favourite Season
• Essay on Types of Sports

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Download the App

Terrorism Prevention Essay Examples and Topics

Aviation security behavioral profiling.

• Words: 3445

Role of Media in Terrorism and Its Force Multipliers

Aspects of operation geronimo.

• Words: 1393

Public Safety Exception: Miranda’s Warnings

The effectiveness of counterterrorism activities, researching of counterterrorism, terrorist groups: creation and prevention, hard and soft policies against terrorism and their effectiveness, legal authority for operation geronimo.

• Words: 1183

The Legality of Operation Geronimo

Failed and failing states.

• Words: 1320

Operation «Anaconda» in Afghanistan

Problems the us faced in the prosecution of the international terrorists, prevention of ansar al-din’s attack on hoover dam.

• Words: 2434

Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018

Operation anaconda case study: unity of command, addressing challenges of religious terrorism, the ways terrorists raise and move money.

• Words: 1412

Global Impact of 9-11 Events on Terrorism Prevention

September 11, 2001 attacks: what we have learned about terrorism since 9,11, oversight of local counterterrorism and security intelligence, debate on whether to defend civil liberties or counterterrorism measures, the case of saudi arabia’s soft counter-terrorism strategy, transnational organized crime in the united states, terrorism prevention: operation geronimo, tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism in the us.

• Words: 1416

Countering Terrorism Through Innovative Approaches

Countering terrorism and preventive measures, the diplock courts and the democratic society, response to a hypothetical terrorist event.

• Words: 1127

Terrorism: Cargo and Passenger Screening

March for our lives: campaign to defund police in schools, public policy issue: domestic terrorism, terrorism and data mining algorithms, description of the “patriot act”: what it may, can, and should do, the ocean shipping security concerns, airfreight security breaches and terrorism, introduction to homeland security.

• Words: 3328

Emergency Operations in Case of Radiological Terrorism

• Words: 1378

The Role of the National Response Framework (NRF)

• Words: 1418

Command Structure of Sharing the Information About Possible Acts of Terror

• Words: 1388

The Concept of Counter-Insurgency Practices

Terrorism in the united states of america.

• Words: 1132

Identifying Terrorism-Related Situations

• Words: 1145

The Use of Intelligence Collection Systems

• Words: 1119

Counterterrorism and Intelligence

• Words: 1421

Task Force and the Fusion Center: Terrorism Prevention

• Words: 1392

Fusion Centers: The Role in Terrorism Prevention

Australian anti-terrorism laws.

• Words: 1792

The Speech of Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani

War on terrorism: budget and policy discussion.

• Words: 1648

National Strategy for Counterterrorism

• Words: 1107

Local Response to Terrorism

• Words: 1684

Boilover: Fire Aspects of the World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks Analysis

• Words: 3585

Secure Transportation System Against Global Terror

• Words: 1188

Terrorism Response Strategy

• Words: 2269

Four Priorities of Action for Combating Terrorism on Our Shores

Us and terrorism relations overview.

• Words: 1639

Incident Response: Staples Center (Los Angeles, CA)

• Words: 1170

About the Priorities of the Emergency Response Mission

• Words: 1213

Terrorist Event Countering: First Responders Risk

• Words: 1144

Financing Terrorism: Challenges and Solutions

• Words: 1109

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Terrorism

• Words: 1520

Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Preparedness and Response

• Words: 1019

Legislation Related to Bioterrorism

Terrorism and liberal democracy: what we should know.

• Words: 1932

Is Terrorism Still the Most Important Security Issue for Australia?

• Words: 2220

Most Effective Anti-Terrorist Tactics, Organizations in the World

• Words: 2756

The Use of Counter-Terrorism Attacks During the Algerian War of Independence From F.L.N.

• Words: 2565

Physical Security: Islamabad Hotel Bombing

• Words: 2807

Anti-Terrorists Tactics and Organizations

• Words: 2946

Community Policing and War on Terror

• Words: 1077

Media and the War on Global Terrorism

• Words: 3513

How the US is Dealing with Terrorism?

Early response to weapons of mass destruction terrorism.

• Words: 1424

Counter Terrorism Measures in the UK

• Words: 1632

United States & EU Efforts to Fight Terrorism

• Words: 1186

American Governmnet Against the Threat of Terrorism

“terrorism and economic security” by robert l. hutchings, terrorism: countering and responding to the treat, the european union’s counterterrorism strategy.

• Words: 1998

The Functioning of Terrorist Groups

• Words: 1811

Counter Terrorism and Public Awareness Plan

War on terror and its victory meaning, can terrorism only be defeated by military means, hazard vulnerability analysis and terrorism, antiterrorism: united nations security council resolution 1540.

• Words: 1110

Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Extremism in the US Criminal Justice System

• Words: 1151

Countering Threats Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices

Islamic state in iraq and syria and global response, american war on terror and operational strategies, local operational planning for potential terrorist threats.

• Words: 2599

Preventing Terrorism: Strategies and Challenges

Terrorism preventive measures in the united states, terrorism prevention on the international level, national security & central intelligence agencies.

• Words: 2174

Islamic State Global Terror Threat Countermeasures

• Words: 1384

Counter Islamic State Intelligence Campaign

• Words: 1447

War on Terror in Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf States

• Words: 1950

War on Terror in Central Asia and the Caucasus

• Words: 1951

US Intelligence to Prevent Terrorist Attacks

Uk national security council: position on syria and iraq.

• Words: 1663

Cyber Security’s and Counter Terrorism’ Intersection

• Words: 4220

Visionary Leadership: Crafting Counter-Terrorism Strategies

• Words: 1211

Antiterrorism Response Unit in Criminal Justice

Homeland security changes: adjusting to terrorism, islamic state of iraq and syria: countermeasures, coping with terrorism in the usa, contemporary terrorism: the american army special forces, conventions on terrorism in the 21st century, countering terrorism: the us intelligence community.

• Words: 1546

Canadian Foreign Security Policy

• Words: 3050

Insurgents Movement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Fighting terrorism: “iraqi freedom” and “enduring freedom”.

• Words: 1728

Current Hurdles in Combating Terrorism

Ethnic, racial and religious profiling in terrorism, terrorism: post-9/11 maritime security initiatives in the usa.

• Words: 3323

What is the Best Way for Fighting Terrorism According to Mortenson?

• Words: 1450

Under-age Criminals in the New York Times Archives

The advanced community planning in response to the potential threat of terrorism.

• Words: 2329

• Our Program Divisions
• Our Three Academies
• Government Affairs
• Statement on Diversity and Inclusion
• Our Study Process
• Conflict of Interest Policies and Procedures
• Project Comments and Information
• Read Our Expert Reports and Published Proceedings
• Explore PNAS, the Flagship Scientific Journal of NAS
• Access Transportation Research Board Publications
• Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
• Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
• Economic Recovery
• Fellowships and Grants
• Publications by Division
• Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education
• Division on Earth and Life Studies
• Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
• Gulf Research Program
• Health and Medicine Division
• Policy and Global Affairs Division
• Transportation Research Board
• National Academy of Sciences
• National Academy of Engineering
• National Academy of Medicine
• Publications by Topic
• Agriculture
• Behavioral and Social Sciences
• Biography and Autobiography
• Biology and Life Sciences
• Computers and Information Technology
• Conflict and Security Issues
• Earth Sciences
• Energy and Energy Conservation
• Engineering and Technology
• Environment and Environmental Studies
• Food and Nutrition
• Health and Medicine
• Industry and Labor
• Math, Chemistry, and Physics
• Policy for Science and Technology
• Space and Aeronautics
• Surveys and Statistics
• Transportation and Infrastructure
• Searchable Collections
• New Releases

VIEW LARGER COVER

Nuclear Terrorism

Assessment of u.s. strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to weapons of mass destruction.

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health.

RESOURCES AT A GLANCE

• Press Release
• Conflict and Security Issues — Prevention, Security and Response
• Conflict and Security Issues — Military and Defense Studies
• Conflict and Security Issues — Policy, Reviews and Evaluations

Suggested Citation

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction . Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27215. Import this citation to: Bibtex EndNote Reference Manager

Publication Info

What is skim?

The Chapter Skim search tool presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter. You may select key terms to highlight them within pages of each chapter.

Copyright Information

The National Academies Press (NAP) has partnered with Copyright Clearance Center's Marketplace service to offer you a variety of options for reusing NAP content. Through Marketplace, you may request permission to reprint NAP content in another publication, course pack, secure website, or other media. Marketplace allows you to instantly obtain permission, pay related fees, and print a license directly from the NAP website. The complete terms and conditions of your reuse license can be found in the license agreement that will be made available to you during the online order process. To request permission through Marketplace you are required to create an account by filling out a simple online form. The following list describes license reuses offered by the NAP through Marketplace:

• Republish text, tables, figures, or images in print
• Post on a secure Intranet/Extranet website
• Use in a PowerPoint Presentation
• Distribute via CD-ROM

Click here to obtain permission for the above reuses. If you have questions or comments concerning the Marketplace service, please contact:

Marketplace Support International +1.978.646.2600 US Toll Free +1.855.239.3415 E-mail: [email protected] marketplace.copyright.com

To request permission to distribute a PDF, please contact our Customer Service Department at [email protected] .

What is a prepublication?

An uncorrected copy, or prepublication, is an uncorrected proof of the book. We publish prepublications to facilitate timely access to the committee's findings.

What happens when I pre-order?

The final version of this book has not been published yet. You can pre-order a copy of the book and we will send it to you when it becomes available. We will not charge you for the book until it ships. Pricing for a pre-ordered book is estimated and subject to change. All backorders will be released at the final established price. As a courtesy, if the price increases by more than $3.00 we will notify you. If the price decreases, we will simply charge the lower price. Applicable discounts will be extended.

Downloading and Using eBooks from NAP

What is an ebook.

An ebook is one of two file formats that are intended to be used with e-reader devices and apps such as Amazon Kindle or Apple iBooks.

Why is an eBook better than a PDF?

A PDF is a digital representation of the print book, so while it can be loaded into most e-reader programs, it doesn't allow for resizable text or advanced, interactive functionality. The eBook is optimized for e-reader devices and apps, which means that it offers a much better digital reading experience than a PDF, including resizable text and interactive features (when available).

Where do I get eBook files?

eBook files are now available for a large number of reports on the NAP.edu website. If an eBook is available, you'll see the option to purchase it on the book page.

View more FAQ's about Ebooks

Types of Publications

Consensus Study Report: Consensus Study Reports published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine document the evidence-based consensus on the study’s statement of task by an authoring committee of experts. Reports typically include findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on information gathered by the committee and the committee’s deliberations. Each report has been subjected to a rigorous and independent peer-review process and it represents the position of the National Academies on the statement of task.